BY 

ALBERT  STICKNEY 

1 1 


NEW    YORK 
HARPER    &    BROTHERS,    PUBLISHERS 

FRANKLIN     SQUARE 

1879 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1879.  by 

HARPER    &    BROTHERS, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


"  GOD  said,  I  am  tired  of  kings, 

I  suffer  them  no  more ; 
Up  to  my  ear  the  morning  brings 
The  outrage  of  the  poor. 
»          *          *          * 
"  I  will  have  never  a  noble  ; 

No  lineage  counted  great ; 
Fishers  and  choppers  and  ploughmen 
Shall  constitute  a  State." — EMERSON. 

"But  a  democratic  nation  may  be  imagined,  organized  differently 
from  the  American  people.  Is  it,  then,  impossible  to  conceive  a 
government  really  established  upon  the  will  of  the  majority,  but 
in  which  the  majority,  repressing  its  natural  instinct  of  equality, 
should  consent,  with  a  view  to  the  order  and  stability  of  the  State, 
to  invest  a  family  or  an  individual  with  all  the  attributes  of  execu- 
tive power?  Might  not  a  democratic  society  be  imagined  in  which 
the  forces  of  the  nation  would  be  more  centralized  than  they  are  in 
the  United  States ;  where  the  people  would  exercise  a  less  direct 
and  less  irresistible  influence  upon  public  affairs,  and  yet  every 
citizen,  invested  with  certain  rights,  would  participate,  within  his 
sphere,  in  the  conduct  of  the  government  ?"— DE  TOCQUEVILLB. 


NOTE. 


THIS  book  is  not  the  work  of  a  scholar.  It  concerns  mat- 
ters which  lie  outside  of  my  profession,  and  which  I  have 
never  studied  with  thoroughness.  To  its  writing  I  have 
been  able  to  give  only  such  time  from  day  to  day  as  could  be 
taken  from  professional  practice.  It  is  not  what  I  wish  I 
might  make  it ;  no  doubt  it  has  many  faults  of  which  I  have 
no  knowledge  or  suspicion. 

But  it  is  written  for  a  purpose.  Its  purpose  must  be  the 
excuse  for  its  existence. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  have  a  new  and  great 
problem  to  solve.  That  they  will  solve  it  I  make  no  doubt. 

The  immense  growth  of  party  which  we  have  had  in  this 
country  is  something  new  in  history.  I  do  not  think  its 
evils  have  been  duly  weighed ;  nor  do  I  think  its  causes  have 
been  carefully  studied.  It  has  been  too  readily  assumed  that 
political  parties  are  desirable  things  in  the  State.  We  speak 
of  the  abuses  of  party  government.  Is  it  certain  that  party 
government  now  has  its  uses  ? 

Party  and  party  rule,  as  they  now  exist  with  us,  are,  as  I 
believe,  great  evils — evils  which  naturally  and  certainly  re- 
sult from  certain  features  in  our  political  system. 

In  private  life  we  find  in  every  profession  and  employ- 
ment many  men  who  do  their  work  as  well  as  they  know 
how.  We  have  at  times  such  men  in  public  life ;  but,  as  a 
rule,  our  public  men  do  their  work,  not  as  well  as  they  know 
how,  but  only  as  well  as  the  interests  of  party  will  allow  them. 
Many  of  those  men  have  good  intentions,  but  they  are  bound 


8  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

PAGE 
EXECUTIVE   ADMINISTRATION 206 

CHAPTER  X. 

THE   LEGISLATURE 212 

CHAPTER  XI. 

A   TRUE    REPUBLIC 242 

CHAPTER  XII. 

CONCLUSION 258 

APPENDIX...  ,.  267 


A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

WE  have  been  living  under  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  now  nearly  one  hundred  years,  and  in  that 
time  we  have  done  a  great  work.  We  have  cleared  a  wil- 
derness, filled  it  with  thriving  cities  and  villages,  and  cover- 
ed it  with  railroads  and  mills.  We  have,  in  the  main,  a 
free  and  law-abiding  people.  We  have  become  one  of  the 
great  nations  of  the  earth. 

Many  men,  too,  think  that  we  have  a  nearly  perfect 
form  of  government,  that  here  at  last  a  true  Republic  has 
reached  a  ripe  growth. 

Yet  we  nearly  all  agree  that  the  daily  working  of  this 
government  is  not  what  we  wish.  Men  in  all  parts  of  the 
country  say  much  of  Civil  Service  Reform.  It  means  one 
thing — that  whatever  they  may  think  as  to  the  theory  of 
our  government,  it  does  not  in  practice  give  satisfactory 
results. 

We  ought  to  have  in  our  public  affairs,  as  we  should  all 
agree,  our  very  best  men,  and  the  very  best  work  that  they 
know  how  to  give  us.  Nothing  less  than  that  will  serve 
our  needs.  It  is  not  enough  for  us  to  have  merely  or- 
dinary men  and  ordinary  work.  And  these  best  men  and 

1* 


10  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

their  best  work  we  must  have  at  all  times,  in  time  of 
peace  as  well  as  war,  in  times  of  seeming  safety  as  well  as 
of  danger. 

Laying  entirely  out  of  consideration  the  needs  of  war, 
and  looking  only  to  our  ordinary  business  relations  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  in  times  of  peace,  we  need  always 
the  wisest  and  most  economical  management  of  our  pub- 
lic affairs.  The  people  that  now  wishes  to  win  in  the  race 
of  life  must  be  able  to  sell  cotton  and  woollen  cloths  and 
railroad  iron  at  the  lowest  price.  The  price  at  which  we 
can  sell  cloth  and  iron  depends  very  greatly  on  the  way 
in  which  our  government  affairs  are  managed.  Every  dol- 
lar spent  by  our  public  officials  is  in  some  way  paid  by 
the  people,  and  is  charged  in  the  price  of  what  we  make 
and  sell.  To  be  able  to  sell  cheaply,  we  must  have  our 
public  affairs,  as  well  as  our  mills  and  railroads,  operated  at 
the  lowest  possible  cost  and  in  the  wisest  way.  We  have 
to  compete  with  all  other  nations ;  and  the  difference  of 
only  one  or  two  millions  a  year  in  our  government  ex- 
penses may  easily  at  some  day  win  or  lose  for  us  the 
markets  of  the  world. 

But  war  is  a  thing  that  must  still  be  counted  as  one  of 
the  possibilities  of  our  daily  life.  It  comes  without  warn- 
ing. It  is  ruin  without  preparation.  At  this  day  cam- 
paigns are  short  and  deadly.  They  are  won  by  that  peo- 
ple which  can  in  the  shortest  time  mass  at  one  point  the 
heaviest  armies  of  the  best  men,  with  the  best  generals 
and  the  finest  material.  Armies  cannot  be  made  in  one 
year  or  two.  We  have  in  our  mere  position  a  great  pro- 
tection. But  we  cannot  depend  on  our  position  only  for 
safety.  In  the  war  of  the  Rebellion  we  had  an  enemy  as 
unprepared  as  we  were  ourselves ;  and  we  could  then  take 
two  or  three  years  to  create' and  organize  an  army.  We 


INTRODUCTORY.  11 

had,  too,  such  an  immense  advantage  over  our  enemy  in 
strength  and  numbers  that  we  could  throw  away  men, 
money,  and  material  without  stint,  and  still  carry  our  cause. 
But  suppose  we  were  to  have  a  war  against  a  nation  with 
an  army  like  the  Prussian  army  and  a  navy  like  the  Eng- 
lish navy.  We  could  not  then  take  two  or  three  years  to 
raise  an  army.  Nor  could  we  then  waste  thousands  of 
men  and  millions  of  money.  We  must  make  our  prepara- 
tions in  time  of  peace,  before  war  comes,  or  we  shall  be 
beaten  before  we  begin  them.  The  winning  of  campaigns 
may  at  any  time  depend  on  mere  economy  of  men  and 
material ;  and  the  fullest  preparation  with  vast  resources 
may  all  go  for  nothing,  unless  we  have  great  generals  and 
great  war  ministers. 

To  manage  well  mills  and  railroads,  as  we  all  under- 
stand, requires  men  of  great  ability  and  thorough  training. 
But  how  is  it  with  the  vast  affairs  of  a  nation  ?  Our  safety 
at  any  time  depends  on  our  having  in  our  service  at  all 
times  the  Bismarcks  and  Napoleons,  if  they  can  be  found. 
Individuals  and  private  corporations  in  this  country  have 
little  difficulty  in  finding  good  men  to  do  their  work,  and 
in  having  that  work  well  done.  Go  into  any  one  of  our 
best  mills.  Every  man,  woman,  and  child  in  the  place  has 
wonderful  skill  in  doing  some  one  thing.  Nothing  is 
wasted.  The  whole  immense  combination  of  men  and 
iron  and  water  and  steam  works  like  the  delicate  mechan- 
ism of  a  watch,  and  brings  great  results  at  the  least  cost. 

But  is  it  so  in  our  government  affairs  I 

We  found  here  a  new  country.  We  had  in  the  begin- 
ning to  use  rude  methods  and  machinery.  Our  roads  were 
rough.  We  built  our  dwellings  of  timber  from  the  nearest 
forest,  instead  of  brick  or  stone.  Our  bridges  we  made  of 
open  trestle-work,  instead  of  solid  masonry  ;  but  our  build- 


12  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

ings,  our  bridges,  our  railroads,  all  kinds  of  work  done  by 
private  individuals,  have  been  all  the  time  growing  better. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  our  government  affairs  we  began 
well,  and  have  ever  since  been  steadily  losing  ground.  "We 
had  at  first  in  our  public  service  the  best  men  in  the  country, 
and  we  had  from  them  their  best  work.  The  men  we  now 
have  in  the  public  service  are  not  our  best  men ;  nor  do  we 
have  from  them  the  best  work  that  even  they  can  give  us. 

There  must  be  a  reason  for  this.  My  belief  is  that  the 
reason  is  to  be  found  in  our  system  of  government.  As 
I  believe,  our  system  of  government  is  such  that  it  must 
certainly  drive  and  keep  our  best  men  out  of  public  life, 
and  is  such  as  to  make  it  certain  that  the  men  whom  we 
have  in  public  life  will  not  give  us  the  best  work  they 
know  how  to  give. 

Some  of  us  have  been  in  the  habit  of  thinking  that  the 
Constitution  of  1787  was  a  work  finished  for  all  time.  It 
may  be  not  so.  Every  new  Constitution,  or  form  of  gov- 
ernment, or  statute  is  nothing  but  an  experiment  in  polit- 
ical science.  The  Constitution  of  1787  was  simply  anoth- 
er experiment ;  and  the  men  who  framed  it  never  thought 
it  anything  else.  The  idea  that  some  men  now  hold,  that 
this  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  the  one  perfect 
piece  of  political  machinery  that  the  world  has  ever  seen, 
is  a  weak  growth  of  later  years.  The  men  of  1787  knew 
better.  No  one  of  them  thought  it  the  best  form  of  gov- 
ernment that  could  be  devised.  It  was  the  only  form  on 
which  they  could  then  agree.  It  was  a  form,  as  they  well 
knew,  to  be  tried,  and  to  be  changed  if  upon  trial  it  should 
be  found,  in  some  points,  to  fail. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  is  richer  than  any  pri- 
vate individual,  and  it  ought  to  be  able  to  draw  to  its  ser- 
vice the  ablest  men  in  the  country. 


INTRODUCTOKY.  13 

It  is  my  belief  that  we  can  in  our  public  affairs  have  a 
better  service  than  any  private  individuals  can  command 
in  their  private  affairs,  if  we  only  have  the  right  govern- 
ment machinery ;  and  it  is  my  belief  that  we  can  have  the 
right  government  machinery.  We  have  at  this  day  wider 
information  than  the  men  who  designed  our  Constitution  a 
hundred  years  ago.  Where  they  had  only  conjecture  we 
have  knowledge.  They  began  an  experiment — we  have  its 
results.  Is  it  possible  that  from  those  results  we  can  learn 
nothing  ?  And  are  we  forever  to  use  the  machinery  of  a 
past  age,  throwing  away  all  the  teachings  of  later  years  ? 

It  is  intended  by  this  inquiry  to  find,  if  may  be,  what 
are  the  faults  in  our  political  system.  For,  in  my  belief, 
there  are  faults  that  can  be  clearly  pointed  out.  The  in- 
tention, then,  is  to  find,  if  may  be,  the  remedies  for  those 
faults.  And,  in  my  belief,  the  precise  remedies  can  be 
pointed  out. 

It  is  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  dilate  on  the  good  points 
in  our  Constitution.  They  are,  as  I  think,  very  many  and 
very  great.  But  this  is  a  search  for  only  diseases  and 
remedies.  Nor  is  it  intended  here  to  give  a  scientific  trea- 
tise on  government.  Some  general  principles  will  be  con- 
sidered, but  only  so  far  as  is  needed  for  the  purpose  of 
this  special  examination. 

It  will  be  well  to  state,  at  the  outset,  the  point  to  be 
considered. 

We  are  in  the  habit  of  saying  much  about  "popular 
government."  What  do  we  mean  by  it?  Not  that  the 
people  of  the  whole  country  are  themselves  to  raise,  equip, 
and  command  their  armies,  pass  their  laws,  or  themselves 
sit  on  the  benches  of  their  courts ;  but  only  that  the  peo- 
ple are,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  select  the  men  who  are  to 
do  this  government  work  for  them. 


14  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

This  government  work  which  is  to  be  done  by  the  peo- 
ple's servants  is  of  different  kinds.  And  a  very  natural 
division  of  that  work,  which  in  this  country  we  have  as- 
sumed to  be  a  wise  one,  is  this.  There  are — 

1.  The  administration  of  justice. 

2.  Executive  administration — the  management  of  the 
affairs  of  the  army,  the  navy,  the  post-office,  the  treasury, 
and  other  similar  departments  of  the  Government. 

3.  Legislation,  as  it  is  commonly  called  —  which  is,  in 
effect,  the  exercising  the  supreme  control  in  the  State  over 
the  citizens,  and  over  all  the  work  of  all  kinds  done  by 
public  servants. 

It  will  be  assumed  that  in  its  general  features  the  frame- 
work of  our  Government  is  what  it  should  be.  Justice  is 
to  be  administered  by  courts  and  judges,  constituted  in  the 
main  as  they  now  are.  The  Executive  administration  is 
to  be  earned  on  by  different  departments,  with  one  man 
at  the  head  of  each  department,  and  with  one  man  over  all 
departments,  whom  we  call  the  Chief  Executive.  Legisla- 
tion is  to  be  carried  on  by  one  or  two  assemblies  of  men 
(whether  one  or  two  will  not  be  here  discussed)  who  are 
elected,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  people,  and  the  Leg- 
islature is  to  have  the  power  of  passing  the  laws  and  con- 
trolling the  supplies. 

Some  modifications  in  our  system  of  government  will 
be  proposed  which  are  not  deemed  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance. 

But  it  has  been  already  said  that  our  system  of  govern- 
ment is  such  as  necessarily  and  certainly  to  keep  out  of 
the  public  service  our  best  men,  and  is  such  as  to  make 
it  certain  that  the  men  in  our  public  service  will  not  give 
us  their  best  work.  The  main  inquiry  here  made,  then, 
will  be  what  changes,  if  any,  we  need  in  our  political  sys- 


INTRODUCTORY.  15 

tern,  in  order  to  secure  in  each  department  of  our  public 
service — 

1.  Our  best  men. 

2.  Their  best  work. 

If  we  can  secure  these  two  points,  we  shall  have  nearly 
all  we  can  ask.  We  can  hardly  have  more  than  that  un- 
der any  system  of  government. 

And  there  is  no  need  of  theorizing.  The  student  in 
political  science  cannot,  indeed,  like  the  chemist,  make  his 
own  experiments.  He  can  only  study  experiments  made 
by  other  men  in  times  gone  by.  But  those  experiments 
made  by  other  men  have  been  very  many,  and  of  many 
kinds. 

Some  men  think  that  hereditary  monarchy  may,  with 
all  its  evils,  be  the  only  effective  means  of  dealing  with 
lawless  men,  who  are  certain  to  be  found  in  every  society. 
Other  men  think  that  we  need  to  adopt  some  features 
from  what  is  called  parliamentary  government.  It  will 
best  serve  the  purposes  of  this  inquiry  if  we  first  give 
some  consideration  to  these  two  systems,  and  see  what 
lessons  we  can  learn  from  either. 


16  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  II. 

HEREDITARY    MONARCHY THE    TYRANNY    OF    KINGS. 

AMONG  civilized  nations  hereditary  monarchy,  of  the 
absolute  type,  is  coming  to  be  a  thing  of  the  past.  Yet 
it  has,  even  for  republicans,  some  useful  lessons.  It  has 
its  bad  features.  But  it  may  be  that  it  has  some  features 
which  it  would  be  well  for  us  to  copy. 

A  pure  despotism,  with  no  limits  whatever  to  the  pow- 
er of  the  monarch,  can  seldom,  if  ever,  exist.  Some  limits 
there  always  are  to  the  use  of  his  power,  fixed  either  by 
custom  or  by  the  temper  of  the  people,  beyond  which  the 
monarch  does  not  venture  to  go. 

But  hereditary  monarchy,  as  far  as  it  can  have  one  typ- 
ical form,  and  as  far  as  it  here  claims  our  notice,  has  these 
distinguishing  features — 

1.  One  man  is  the  head  of  the  executive  administration. 

2.  This  same  one  man  is  the  supreme  authority  in  the 
State.     He  holds  the  purse  and  makes  the  laws. 

3.  He  is  chosen,  not  for  his  fitness,  but  by  the  chance  of 
birth. 

4.  He  is  "  irresponsible ;"  that  is,  his  power  cannot,  if  he 
misuse  it,  be  taken  from  him  by  any  peaceful  procedure 
under  the  law. 

This  system  of  hereditary  monarchy,  with  these  main 
features,  has  been  often  tried,  by  one  people  after  another, 
in  the  world's  history.  And  their  experience  has  very 
clearly  established  certain  results.  And,  whatever  may 


HEREDITARY  MONARCHY.  17 

have  been  the  theory  of  the  English  laws,  this  system  of 
hereditary  monarchy  has  been  in  times  past  very  thor- 
oughly tried  in  England.  The  experience  of  the  English 
people  under  it  will  be  found  sufficient  to  show  the  good 
and  bad  points  of  the  system  everywhere. 

The  first  feature  which  has  been  mentioned,  that  of  hav- 
ing one  man  at  the  head  of  the  whole  executive  adminis- 
tration, has  undoubtedly,  at  times,  given  good  results.  In 
fact,  under  all  systems  of  government,  all  the  efficient  ad- 
ministration we  have  ever  seen  has  been  had  when,  from 
one  reason  or  another,  affairs  have  been  under  the  control 
of  one  man.  But  these  good  results  come  only  when  this 
head  of  the  executive  administration  is  both  an  able  man 
and  an  honest  one.  When  he  is  either  weak  or  dishonest, 
then  the  results  are  bad. 

But  this  is  an  advantage  that  we  can  have  under  a  sys- 
tem of  government  which  is  elective,  which  has  in  it  no 
hereditary  element.  We  can  give  to  an  elected  chief  mag- 
istrate any  degree  of  power.  We  may,  if  we  will,  make 
him  a  despot.  To  gain  any  advantage,  as  far  as  this  point 
is  concerned,  we  need  not  have  an  hereditary  system  of 
government.  And  in  fact  the  most  brilliant  administra- 
tions in  the  history  of  hereditary  monarchies  have  usually 
been  in  the  reigns  of  the  usurpers  who  have  founded  dy- 
nasties, and  not  of  the  descendants  who  have  inherited 
their  power.  Hereditary  monarchy,  then,  can  have  no  ad- 
vantage, even  as  to  vigor  of  administration,  unless  it  can 
also  give  us  some  security  for  getting  at  the  head  of  af- 
fairs men  who  are  both  able  and  honest. 

How,  then,  has  the  system  operated,  in  so  far  as  it  gives 
to  one  man  the  supreme  authority  in  the  State  ? 

It  has  been  well  proved  that  the  control  of  the  people's 
money,  and  the  control  of  the  methods  of  government, 


18  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

that  is,  the  power  of  making  the  laws,  should  never  be  put 
in  the  hands  of  one  man,  for  two  reasons.  No  one  man 
can  have  the  needed  wisdom.  We  must  have  the  wisdom 
of  many  minds.  No  one  man  should  have  so  vast  power ; 
it  must  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  assembly,  of  many 
men.  English  history  has  been  one  long  struggle  to  con- 
quer from  the  crown  the  right  to  control  the  revenues  and 
make  the  laws.  The  English  people  have  found  that  they 
could  not  trust  this  power  to  their  kings.  They  have 
found  that  it  can  be  safely  given  only  to  some  body  of 
men  chosen  by  themselves.  And  that  has  been  the  expe- 
rience of  all  races  and  of  all  ages. 

How,  then,  is  it  as  to  the  next  feature,  the  choosing  the 
men  who  are  to  hold  power  in  the  State  by  the  chance  of 
birth  ?  What  kind  of  security  have  we  that  we  shall  get 
able  and  honest  rulers  ? 

Here,  too,  the  system  has  been  thoroughly  tried.  We 
need  only  take  the  teachings  of  experience.  And,  from 
experience,  we  find  that  this  method  of  selecting  rulers  by 
the  chance  of  birth  cannot  be  depended  on  as  a  means  for 
giving  us  the  best  men  for  high  service  in  the  State. 

The  founders  of  royal  houses  have  often  been  able  men, 
men  who  have  won  their  crowns  in  a  struggle  which  called 
for  power  of  some  kind  in  the  winner.  But  how  often 
does  it  happen  that  their  descendants  are  able  men  ?  What 
kind  of  a  permanent  machinery  for  getting  wise  rulers  is 
this  hereditary  system  ?  In  selecting  the  men  who  are 
to  hold  in  their  hands  the  destinies  of  a  people,  shall  we 
choose  a  man  who  has  himself  done  great  deeds,  or  a  man 
who  is  merely  the  son  of  his  father?  There  can  be  no 
doubt  as  to  the  answer  to  this  question.  The  hereditary 
system  may  have  other  good  points.  But  as  a  means  of 
selecting  great  men  for  a  people's  rulers,  it  has  failed.  We 


HEREDITARY  MONARCHY.  19 

need  only  look  at  the  experience  of  the  English  people  to 
decide  that  point. 

A  very  able  writer  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  says  :* 

"  In  the  one  hundred  and  fifty  years,  or  nearly  so,  between  the  re- 
settlement of  the  Crown  and  the  accession  of  her  Majesty  there  have 
been  seven  reigns.  Excepting  William  III.,  can  it  be  said  that  any 
of  the  other  six  sovereigns  were  capable  of  being  permanent  prime 
ministers,  and  of  directing  the  foreign  policy  of  the  nation  ?  Anne 
was  governed  by  bedchamber  women.  George  I.  was  a  stranger  to 
the  language  and  laws  of  the  country  to  which  he  was  called  in  the 
decline  of  life.  George  II.,  incompetent  himself,  had  the  good  fort- 
une during  a  part  of  his  reign  to  be  guided  by  a  sensible  wife.  We 
were  spared  the  reign  of  a  King  Frederick.  The  long  life  of  George 
in.  was  obscured  by  mental  disease.  Of  George  IV.  and  William 
IV.  we  need  say  nothing.  All  these  princes  were  well-meaning,  and 
loyal  to  their  trust.  They  were  simply,  one  and  all,  incapable  of 
forming  a  reasoned  opinion  upon  any  important  question,  civil  or 
military.  The  earlier  sovereigns  of  the  House  of  Hanover,  taking  lit- 
tle or  no  interest  in  the  domestic  politics  of  this  country,  were  chiefly 
concerned  with  foreign  policy,  and  their  foreign  policy  consisted  en- 
tirely in  using  the  resources  of  England  for  the  protection  of  their 
petty  electorate.  George  III.  not  only  involved  this  country  in  a  war 
which  dismembered  the  empire,  but  he  meddled  with  every  detail  of 
administration,  and,  by  keeping  the  patronage  of  the  Government  in 
his  own  hands,  was  enabled  to  do  a  great  deal  of  mischief.  George 
IV.,  as  Regent  and  King,  found  congenial  ministers  in  the  Percivals 
and  Castlereaghs  and  Liverpools.  The  attempt  of  William  IV.  to 
assert  his  royal  will,  and  its  signal  failure,  are  matters  of  recent  his- 
tory. Even  William  III.  valued  the  Crown  of  England  only  as  it 
aided  him  in  accomplishing  the  sole  object  of  his  life — the  humilia- 
tion of  France  and  the  readjustment  of  the  balance  of  power." 

But  passing  this  point,  whether  the  accident  of  birth  is 
a  wise  method  for  the  selection  of  the  rulers  of  a  nation, 

*  "The  Constitution  and  the  Crown,"  Edinburgh  Review,  July, 
1878  (Amer.  ed.),  p.  149. 


20  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

what  kind  of  training,  for  a  man  who  is  to  wield  power  in 
the  State,  is  the  life  of  a  royal  prince  ?  Can  there  be,  as 
a  rule,  anything  worse  ?  Suppose  him  to  have  by  nature 
great  talents,  can  he,  in  any  other  position  of  life,  be  sur- 
rounded by  influences  more  likely  to  make  him  a  useless 
man  ?  He  has  his  career  made  for  him.  He  already  has 
the  first  place  in  the  State.  He  has  nothing  to  gain.  He 
is  pressed  by  no  need.  He  is  tempted  by  every  pleasure. 
It  is  almost  certain  that  he  is  not  an  able  man.  It  is  a 
miracle  if  he  ever  becomes  a  useful  one.  And  how  often 
has  it  happened  in  the  history  of  royal  houses  that  kings 
have  been  only  harmless  ?  The  hereditary  monarch,  from 
his  cradle,  is  taught  that  the  people  are  his.  The  power 
which  he  holds  in  the  State,  as  he  is  taught,  is  his — is  his 
property.  He  inherited  it  from  his  father.  He  is  to  hand 
it  down  to  his  son.  He  makes  it  the  aim  of  his  life  to  in- 
crease it,  with  his  other  possessions,  at  his  people's  cost. 
If  he  is  not  an  exceptionally  upright  man,  he  will  use  his 
power,  as  he  does  his  other  property,  for  his  own  gain  and 
pleasure,  and  not  for  his  people's  good.  How  often  has 
an  English  king  been  either  a  wise  or  a  well-meaning  ruler  ? 
The  great  English  novelist  puts  in  the  mouth  of  an  Eng- 
lish gentleman  these  words:  "Ours  is  the  most  loyal  peo- 
ple in  the  world,  surely :  we  admire  our  kings,  and  are  faith- 
ful to  them  long  after  they  have  ceased  to  be  true  to  us. 
'Tis  a  wonder,  to  any  one  who  looks  back  at  the  history  of 
the  Stuart  family,  to  think  how  they  kicked  their  crowns 
away  from  them ;  how  they  flung  away  chances  after 
chances ;  what  treasures  of  loyalty  they  dissipated,  and 
how  fatally  they  were  bent  on  consummating  their  own 
ruin.  If  ever  men  had  fidelity,  it  was  they ;  if  ever  men 
squandered  opportunity,  'twas  they ;  and  of  all  the  ene- 
mies they  had,  they  themselves  were  the  most  fatal."  The 


HEREDITARY  MONARCHY.  21 

mere  incident  in  the  story  of  Esmond  culminates  at  the 
scene  where  England's  hereditary  king  throws  away  a 
crown  for  a  mistress.  The  picture  is  taken  from  the  life. 
English  kings  for  years  warred  against  the  English  people, 
and  while  sitting  on  England's  throne  were  in  the  pay  of 
England's  enemies.  They  knew  no  duty,  and  they  kept 
no  oath.  Kings,  emperors,  and  sultans,  in  all  times  and 
all  countries,  have  used  their  power  in  one  way.  Their 
tyranny  has  been  limited  only  by  their  people's  endurance. 
When  Englishmen  praise  English  royalty,  they  forget  their 
own  history.  They  have  floating  in  their  minds  some  dim 
vision  of  monarchy  without  a  monarch.  There  is  no  wrong- 
that  a  people  could  suffer  that  the  English  people  have  not 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  their  kings.  All  the  liberties  the 
English  people  have  ever  had,  they  have  had  to  conquer 
from  those  kings. 

Whenever,  too,  a  king  is  not  himself  an  able  man,  he  is 
always  a  puppet  in  the  hands  of  other  men  and  of  women. 
A  royal  court  is  almost  certainly  a  hot-bed  of  intrigue. 
Mr.  Hallam  says  of  the  downfall  of  one  of  Queen  Anne's 
ministries  :* 

"  Every  one  knows  that  this  ministry  was  precipitated  from  power 
through  the  favorite's  abuse  of  her  ascendency,  become  at  length  in- 
tolerable to  the  most  forbearing  of  queens  and  mistresses,  conspiring 
with  another  intrigue  of  the  bedchamber  and  the  popular  clamor 
against  Sacheverell's  impeachment.  It  seems  rather  a  humiliating 
proof  of  the  sway  which  the  feeblest  prince  enjoys  even  in  a  limited 
monarchy,  that  the  fortunes  of  Europe  should  have  been  changed  by 
nothing  more  noble  than  the  insolence  of  one  waiting  woman  and 
the  cunning  of  another.  *  *  *  The  House  of  Bourbon  would  proba- 
bly not  have  reigned  beyond  the  Pyrenees,  but  for  Sarah  and  Abigail 
at  Queen  Anne's  toilet." 

*  Hallam,  "  Const.  Hist."  vol.  iii.  p.  210. 


22  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

And  Mr.  Bagehot,  one  of  the  latest  eulogists  of  English 
royalty,  writes  :* 

"  Where  there  is  no  court,  there  cau  be  no  evil  influences  from  a 
court.  What  these  influences  are,  every  one  knows ;  though  no  one, 
hardly  the  best  and  closest  observer,  can  say  with  confidence  and 
precision  how  great  their  effect  is.  Sir  Robert  Walpole,  in  language 
too  coarse  for  our  modern  manners,  declared,  after  the  death  of 
Queen  Caroline,  that  he  would  pay  no  attention  to  the  King's  daugh- 
ters ('  those  girls,'  as  he  calls  them),  but  would  rely  exclusively  on 
Madame  de  Walmoden,  the  King's  mistress.  '  The  King,'  says  a 
writer  in  George  IV.'s  time, '  is  in  our  favor,  and  what  is  more  to  the 
purpose,  the  Marchioness  of  Conyngham  is  so  too.'  Everybody  knows 
to  what  sort  of  influences  several  Italian  changes  of  government  since 
the  unity  of  Italy  have  been  attributed.  These  sinister  influences  are 
likely  to  be  most  effective  just  when  everything  else  is  troubled,  and 
when,  therefore,  they  are  particularly  dangerous." 

Until  the  reign  of  the  present  sovereign,  how  often  has 
it  happened  that  English  monarchy  has  been  anything  but 
the  rule  of  royal  favorites  and  royal  mistresses  ? 

But  the  most  vicious  point  in  a  system  of  hereditary 
monarchy  is  the  fact  that  the  monarch  is  "  irresponsible," 
that  his  power,  if  he  misuse  it,  cannot  be  taken  from  him 
by  any  peaceable  means,  under  the  law. 

The  hereditary  monarch  holds  his  power  for  his  life. 
He  may  only  lead  a  life  of  idle  luxury,  or  he  may  waste 
the  people's  money  in  wild  debauchery.  He  may  use  his 
power  wisely.  He  may,  from  any  motive,  even  from  the 
best  motives,  use  his  power  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  ruin 
to  his  people.  Yet,  under  the  law,  there  is  no  way  to  be  rid 
of  him.  It  may  well  be  that  the  power  of  removing  the 
head  of  the  executive  administration  is  one  open  to  abuse. 
But  it  must  somewhere  exist.  Is  it  safe  to  give  to  any 

*  "  The  English  Constitution,"  p.  140. 


HEREDITARY   MONARCHY.  23 

one  man  the  command  of  the  people's  armies  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  all  their  officers,  and  yet  have,  under  the  law, 
no  means  of  taking  from  that  man  his  vast  power,  if  the 
people's  interests  require  it  ?  This  fact,  that,  under  a  sys- 
tem of  hereditary  monarchy,  the  sovereign  cannot  be  peace- 
ably removed,  has  been  the  cause  of  every  armed  revolution 
in  every  hereditary  government  the  world  has  ever  seen. 
When  kingly  tyranny  goes  beyond  the  bounds  of  endur- 
ance, then  a  remedy  will  be  made,  if  none  exists.  If  a 
royal  tyrant  cannot  be  removed  peaceably,  under  the  law, 
he  will  be  removed  forcibly,  by  war.  Macaulay  says : 
"  During  the  hundred  and  sixty  years  which  preceded  the 
union  of  the  Roses,  nine  kings  reigned  in  England.  Six 
of  these  nine  kings  were  deposed ;  five  lost  their  lives  as 
well  as  their  crowns."  What  did  this  mean  ?  Simply, 
that  the  English  people  were  compelled  to  make  armed 
revolution  part  of  the  ordinary  procedure  under  their  sys- 
tem of  government — for  lack  of  any  other  remedy  against 
the  abuses  of  royal  power. 

The  English  people  have  at  last  become  weary  of  war, 
as  a  means  of  removing  royal  tyrants.  They  have  found 
it  too  costly  a  method  of  changing  the  head  of  the  execu- 
tive administration.  They  have  found  by  the  bitter  expe- 
rience of  centuries,  after  loyal  devotion  to  their  sovereigns, 
that  they  cannot  trust  power  in  the  hands  of  hereditary 
kings.  They  have  been  driven,  in  self -protection,  to  take 
power  from  their  "  irresponsible  "  kings  and  put  it  in  the 
hands  of  "responsible"  ministers.  They  have  found  that 
a  king  cannot  be  trusted  with  even  the  choice  of  these  min- 
isters. They  allow  him  that  choice  only  in  form. 

The  English  people  have  had  a  thorough  experience  of 
hereditary  monarchy,  and  they  have  at  last  learned — 

1.  That  the  heads  of  their  executive  administration,  the 


24  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

men  who  are  to  command  their  armies  and  navies  and 
decide  their  foreign  policy,  must  be  selected,  not  by  the 
chance  of  birth,  but  for  fitness  of  some  kind. 

Their  ministers  are,  therefore,  in  an  indirect  way,  chosen 
by  the  House  of  Commons. 

2.  That  these  heads  of  the  executive  administration  must 
be  removable,  under  the  law,  for  unfitness  of  some  kind. 

The  ministers  are,  therefore,  in  an  indirect  way,  removed 
by  the  House  of  Commons. 

3.  That  no  one  man  can  be  trusted  with  the  supreme 
authority  in  the  State,  can  be  allowed  to  hold  the  purse 
and  make  the  laws. 

That  is  a  power  which  must  be  in  the  hands  of  an 
assembly,  chosen  by  the  people,  or  by  some  part  of  the 
people. 

English  history  is  one  series  of  revolutions  against  kings. 
It  is,  too,  one  long  revolution  against  hereditary  monarchy. 
This  whole  device  of  constitutional  royalty,  as  it  is  called, 
is  simply  an  attempt  to  keep  the  form  of  hereditary  mon- 
archy without  its  substance.  The  English  people  keep 
their  king,  and  strip  him  of  his  power.  The  king  inherits 
the  throne.  The  House  of  Commons  choose  and  remove 
the  ministers. 

That  is  the  theory  of  the  English  Constitution  at  this 
day.  That  is  the  result  which  the  English  people  have 
worked  out  in  their  political  life.  It  is  a  result  which 
they  have  reached  against  their  wishes.  The  English  peo- 
ple, more  loyal  than  any  other  in  the  world's  history  to 
their  hereditary  kings,  have,  despite  all  the  beliefs  and  feel- 
ings inherited  from  their  fathers,  been  driven  to  destroy 
hereditary  power. 

These,  then,  are  the  points  which  we  gather  from  the 
history  of  hereditary  monarchy,  in  England  and  elsewhere : 


HEREDITARY   MONARCHY.  25 

1.  No  one  man  should  be  trusted  with  the  supreme 
power  in  the  State  —  the  power  of  mating  the  laws  and 
controlling  the  revenues.     That  should  be  only  trusted  to 
an  assembly  of  men. 

2.  To  have  one  man  at  the  head  of  the  executive  ad- 
ministration, if  he  be  both  able  and  honest,  gives  vigor  to 
that  administration. 

3.  The  men  who  are  to  hold  power  in  the  State  must 
be  selected,  not  by  birth,  but  for  their  fitness. 

4.  The  men  who  are  to  hold  power  in  the  State  should 
be  "  responsible,"  as  the  phrase  is — that  is,  there  should  be 
some  means,  under  the  law,  of  removing  them  for  unfitness. 

2 


?6  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  III. 

CONSTITUTIONAL    ROYALTY UNFINISHED    REVOLUTION. 

THERE  has  grown  up  in  England  a  form  of  government 
which  is  called  "  constitutional  monarchy  "  or  "  constitu- 
tional royalty."  And  very  many  men,  even  in  the  United 
States,  think  that  this  "  constitutional  royalty,"  or  some- 
thing in  some  points  like  it,  is,  on  the  whole,  the  best  form 
of  government  the  world  has  yet  seen. 

This  constitutional  royalty,  as  far  as  here  concerns  this 
inquiry,  has  these  main  points — 

1.  Parliament,  or  the  House   of  Commons,  is  the   su- 
preme supervisory  power  in  the  State.     It  votes  the  sup- 
plies and  makes  the  laws. 

2.  Whatever   may  be  the  law,  in   practice   the  king's 
ministers,  and  not  the  king,  are  the  chief  executive. 

3.  These  ministers,  though  in  law  they  are  the  king's 
servants,  are  "  responsible,"  not  to   the  king,  but  to  the 
Legislature.     They  are,  in  an  indirect  way,  appointed  and 
removed  by  a  vote  of  the  House  of  Commons. 

One  further  point  is  to  be  noted. 

These  ministers  have  two  distinct  sets  of  duties — 

1.  They  are  the  heads  of  the  executive  administration. 

2.  They  are  too,  in  effect,  the  heads  of  the  Legislature. 
They  sit  in  the  Legislature,  and  propose   all  important 
measures  of  legislation. 

And  this  point,  that  the  executive  minister  has  also 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  27 

legislative  duties,  will  be  found  to  be  the  most  important 
feature  in  the  whole  system. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  examination,  it  will  be  assumed 
that  the  legislative  work  cannot  be  better  done  than  it  is 
done  under  the  English  Government. 

But  how  is  it  as  to  the  executive  administration  ?  How 
perfect  a  piece  of  machinery  is  that  ? 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  English  Government  may 
not  be  perfect  in  point  of  form  ;  it  may  not  be  such  a 
machinery  as  a  theorizer  would  devise  on  paper;  but  it 
"  works  well ;"  it  is  practical ;  it  is  something  which  has 
"grown,"  and  is  thoroughly  fitted  to  the  needs  of  the 
English  people. 

How  true  is  this?  How  does  this  machinery  "work?" 
Let  us  take  at  the  outset  this  "  practical "  point. 

Let  us  especially  examine  the  "working"  of  the  Eng- 
lish War-office.  It  is  a  part  of  the  system,  no  better  and 
no  worse  than  the  other  parts.  The  last  time  it  was  real- 
ly tried  was  in  the  Crimean  Avar.  Let  us  see  how  it  stood 
the  test. 

Sir  Garnet  Wolseley  says  :* 

"  The  history  of  the  Crimean  war  is  still  fresh  in  the  memory  of 
those  who  took  part  in  it.  Never  was  any  expedition  planned  by  a 
home  government  with  more  reckless  ignorance  of  war  and  its  re- 
quirements than  that  which  landed  at  Eupatoria.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign  our  Treasury  was  as  parsimonious  as  it  was  subse- 
quently lavish  in  expenditure.  About  twenty-four  thousand  British 
soldiers — no  finer  body  of  men  have  ever  worn  her  Majesty's  uniform 
— were  hurled  ashore  without  the  means  of  carrying  their  wounded, 
and  even  without  sufficient  tools  to  bury  their  dead.  British  disci- 
pline in  two  or  three  hard-fought  battles  won  for  England  a  brilliant 
but  a  short-lived  success ;  and  when,  through  the  military  ignorance 
of  those  in  Downing  Street  who  planned  the  campaign,  that  devoted 

*  Nineteenth  Century,  March,  1878,  p.  436  et  seq. 


28  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

little  army  dwindled  down  almost  to  a  handful  of  half-starved  scare- 
crows, those  who  had  starved  us  through  their  ignorant  parsimony 
sent  out  commissioners,  whose  avowed  business  it  was  to  select  a 
victim  from  among  our  generals  on  whom  to  cast  the  blame.  They 
selected  the  ablest  of  them  as  their  scape-goat,  and  held  him  up  to 
public  opprobrium  because  he  had  not  made  a  road  from  Balaklava 
to  the  camp,  although  they  knew  full  well  he  had  neither  the  tools 
nor  the  labor  at  his  disposal  for  such  an  undertaking." 

******* 

"  I  have  alluded  to  the  military  ignorance  of  our  ministers  in  the 
Crimean  war:  here  is  an  example  of  it.  A  letter  was  read  in  the 
House  of  Parliament  one  evening  from  an  officer  in  the  field,  in 
which  he  referred  to  the  want  of  all  means  for  conveying  our  sick 
and  wounded  to  the  ships  for  embarkation,  adding  that  our  army 
.had  to  depend  upon  the  French  cacolets  lent  to  us  for  that  purpose. 
The  English  minister  who  was  responsible  for  army  affairs  at  once 
got  up  and  indignantly  denied  the  statement,  adding  that  he  knew  it 
to  be  untrue,  because  he  had  the  best  authority  for  asserting  posi- 
tively that  there  were  a  hundred  hospital  panniers  at  that  moment 
in  the  Crimea.  lie  might  just  as  well  have  said  there  were  so  many 
toothpicks  there ;  as  a  hospital  pannier,  which  he  evidently  thought 
was  a  conveyance  of  some  sort,  is  nothing  more  than  a  wicker-work 
basket,  made  in  a  peculiar  manner,  for  the  reception  of  medicines, 
operating  instruments,  and  other  medical  appliances.  The  page  of 
Hansard  which  records  that  reply  is  the  gravest  of  all  possible  sat- 
ires upon  our  war  administration  of  that  time." 

******* 

"  Curious  stories  without  end  might  be  told  to  illustrate  my  state- 
ment as  to  the  inefficiency  of  many  of  those  who  composed  the  staff 
which  originally  embarked  in  1854.  Here  is  one  as  it  was  told  me  by 
an  eye-witness  :  while  the  army  was  in  Turkey,  before  it  left  for  the 
Crimea,  an  important  military  operation  had  to  be  undertaken.  A 
few  days  before  that  named  for  the  operation,  my  friend  went  to  a 
staff-officer  in  high  position,  who  was  his  immediate  superior,  and 
whose  duty  it  was  to  make  all  the  necessary  arrangements,  and  to 
draw  up  instructions  for  all  the  departments  and  general  officers  con- 
cerned, and  asked  if  he  had  any  orders  to  give.  The  reply  was : 
'  No ;  I  have  not  yet  thought  over  the  matter,  but  I  will  see  to  it  by- 
and-by.'  The  next  day  the  question  was  repeated  with  a  similar  re- 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  29 

suit,  and  upon  the  third  day — the  day  before  this  very  complicated 
and  difficult  operation  was  to  have  taken  place — as  my  friend  re- 
peated his  question  he  saw  that  his  superior  was  whittling  a  piece 
of  stick.  That  superior  was  an  amiable  old  gentleman  and  an  ex- 
cellent carpenter.  He  listened  calmly  to  my  friend,  who  was  rather 
excited,  seeing  that  nothing  was  ready  for  the  move,  and  that  no  at- 
tempt had  as  yet  been  made  to  prepare  for  it.  After  a  pause,  the 
man  on  whom  for  the  moment  a  great  national  responsibility  rested 

looked  up  and  said :  '  Perhaps,  Captain ,  you  do  not  know  what 

I  am  doing.'  '  No,  sir,'  replied  my  friend.  '  Well,'  said  the  old  gen- 
eral, '  upon  strolling  about  here  this  morning,  I  perceived  that  there 
was  no  latch  or  bolt  to  Lord  Raglan's  cupboard,  and  I  am  making 
one,  as  an  agreeable  surprise  for  him.'  Here  was  an  army  about  to 
begin  a  most  serious  undertaking,  the  preparations  and  arrangements 
for  which  could  only  be  made  by  this  high  official ;  but  so  utterly 
was  he  incapable  of  taking  in  the  serious  responsibility  that  rested 
on  him,  so  ignorant  was  he  of  the  duties  attached  to  his  position, 
that  he  employed  his  time  in  carpentering,  when  all  his  intellect,  all 
his  energies,  should  have  been  devoted  to  the  great  duty  which  de- 
volved upon  him." 

He  says  further  :* 

"During  the  epoch  I  have  referred  to  [the  period  before  the  Cri- 
mean war],  the  army  of  England  was  unworthy  of  being  classed  as  a 
fighting  implement  fit  to  be  employed  against  an  enemy  more  formi- 
dable than  a  Kaffir  or  an  Asiatic,  and,  even  when  so  engaged,  gained 
its  ends  always  with  difficulty,  and  not  always  without  discredit  and 
disaster.  It  was  a  police  force  dressed  in  the  guise  of  soldiers.  It 
was  a  body — a  fine  muscular  body  certainly — without  a  soul.  All 
ranks  were  full  of  courage — without  doubt  the  first  and  greatest  fac- 
tor in  military  excellence — but  all  other  warlike  instincts  were  want- 
ing. Its  generals,  men  of  Peninsular  experience,  were  old  in  body 
and  old-fashioned  in  mind,  while  its  regimental  officers  were  entirely 
ignorant  of  their  profession.  They  would  have  made  the  finest  pri- 
vate soldiers  in  the  world,  but  they  were  as  little  acquainted  with  the 
art  and  science  of  war  as  the  rank  and  file  they  were  commissioned 
to  lead." 

*  Nineteenth  Century,  January,  1878,  p.  2. 


30  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

Let  us  look  somewhat  farther.  An  English  army  was 
sent  to  the  Crimea  to  invest  and  capture  a  great  strong- 
hold. The  general  in  command  knew  nothing  of  the  num- 
bers of  the  enemy  he  was  to  attack,  nor  of  the  country 
where  he  was  to  make  his  campaign.  After  he  had  been 
in  the  Crimea  for  four  or  five  months,  it  was  found  that 
this  fortress,  which  he  was  to  have  invested  and  captured, 
had  regular  communications  with  the  main-land  by  a  bridge. 
This  bridge  had  been  built  four  or  five  years.  But  no  one 
in  the  English  army  or  War  Office  had  so  much  as  heard 
of  it,  until  it  Avas  found  on  a  map  "  sent  home  by  the  cap- 
tain of  a  vessel  who  learned  of  it  from  some  of  the  Tar- 
tars !"  Men  were  dying  in  the  English  army  by  thousands 
for  want  of  the  food  and  clothing  which  lay  less  than  ten 
miles  away  from  them.  The  road  on  which  the  army  de- 
pended for  all  its  supplies  had  broken  up.  It  had  from 
the  beginning  been  certain  that  it  would  do  so.  There 
was  one  man  in  the  whole  world  who  should  have  seen  all 
these  things  beforehand,  and  who  should  have  done  some- 
thing to  hinder  them — the  head  of  the  English  War  Office. 
He  was  the  one  man  in  the  world  who  knew  nothing  of 
them,  and  who  did  nothing  to  set  them  right,  even  after 
he  knew  the  condition  in  which  the  army  was.  He  him- 
self testified,  before  a  House  of  Commons  committee,  that 
he  had  "  no  official  information  "  that  his  troops  were  ill- 
fed,  bnt  that  he  did  at  last,  "  in  common  with  the  rest  of 
the  world,"  "  become  painfully  aware  of  it."  He  could  not 
tell  when  it  was  that  he  knew  of  the  breaking  up  of  the 
road  on  which  depended  the  safety  of  his  army ;  "  it  was 
one  of  those  facts  that  unfortunately  grow  upon  one  as 
events  follow  one  another !"  He  seemed  in  some  doubt 
as  to  whether  the  road  really  had  broken  up,  but  finally 
toiled  to  the  conclusion  that  it  had,  inasmuch  as  "  it  was 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  31 

seen  by  its  consequences  that  things  were  not  carried  to 
the  front."  He  was  asked  if  he  took  any  steps  to  have  a 
road  made  as  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  failure  of  the  old 
one,  and  his  answer  was,  "  No,  I  cannot  say  that  I  did." 
That  was  a  thing,  he  said,  that  it  was  "  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  leave  to  officers  on  the  spot." 

The  "  officers  on  the  spot,"  it  would  seem,  thought  it 
a  thing  which  it  was  "absolutely  necessary  to  leave"  to 
the  War  Office  at  home ;  for  they  did  nothing.  And  there 
was  an  English  army,  with  food  at  their  elbows,  actually 
starving,  because  no  one  knew  whose  duty  it  was  to  feed 
them.  If  they  had  left  their  digestive  organs  where  their 
supplies  were,  at  the  other  end  of  the  road,  affairs  might 
have  gone  on  well  enough.  But  that  point,  too,  had  been 
overlooked.* 

*  The  Duke  of  Newcastle  testified  before  the  Roebuck  Committee : 
"Qu.  14,426.  And  I  am  bound  to  say  that  some  four  or  five 

months  afterward  we  ascertained,  what  was  not  before  known  in 
this  country,  or  elsewhere  before  that  time,  that  the  Russians  had  an- 
other means  of  access  into  the  Crimea,  some  miles  to  the  eastward 
of  Perekop,  by  a  bridge  *  *  *  a  bridge  which  was  commenced  by  the 
Russians  some  four  or  Jive  years  ayo,  by  which  they  had  obtained  a 
good  road.  *  *  *  I  have  seen  a  plan  which  was  sent  home  by  the 
captain  of  a  vessel,  who  obtained  the  information  from  some  of  the 
Tartars.  *  *  * 

*  *  *  "  Is  there  no  other  information  ? — No." 

******* 

"  Qu.  14,588.  Were  you  ever  informed  that  the  troops  were  ill-fed, 
and  that  the  horses  had  little  or  insufficient  forage  ? — A.  Of  course 
I  received  that  information.  As  I  said  before,  in  common  with  the 
rest  of  the  world,  I  was  painfully  aware  of  it. 

"Qu.  14,589.  I mean  officially  ? — A.  No;  I  think  not. 

"Qu.  14,590.  You  obtained  all  that  information  from  the  news- 
papers, did  you  ? — A.  No ;  from  complaints  principally  from  persons 
that  had  suffered. 


32  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

That  is,  as  I  believe,  a  fair  picture  of  the  way  in  which 
the  affairs  of  the  English  War  Office  and  army  were  man- 
aged during  the  Crimean  war. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  Were  there  not  then  exceptional 
circumstances  which  created  the  condition  of  things  which 
then  existed?  Was  not  the  ignorance  of  English  army 
officers  to  be  assigned  to  some  cause  not  connected  with 
the  system  of  Parliamentary  Government  ? 

No  doubt  much  of  the  ignorance  of  English  army  offi- 
cers was  the  result  of  the  purchase  system,  under  which 
young  gentlemen  of  rank,  who  knew  everything  about  fox- 
hunting and  nothing  about  war,  were  allowed  to  buy  with 
good  English  sovereigns  the  privilege  of  wearing  her  Maj- 
esty's uniform,  receiving  her  Majesty's  pay,  and  throwing 
away  the  lives  of  her  Majesty's  loyal  subjects.  No  doubt 

"Qu.  14,591.  You  were  not  informed  that  the  failure  on  the  part 
of  the  commissariat  to  feed  the  troops  was  occasioned  by  the  failure 
of  oilier  departments  in  their  duties  ? — A.  Not  officially. 

"  Qu.  14,592.  When  did  you  first  receive  information  of  the  break- 
up of  the  road  from  Balaklava  to  the  camp  ? — A.  I  do  not  remember 
the  exact  date ;  it  was  one  of  those  facts  that  unfortunately  grow  upon 
one  as  events  follow  one  another ;  and  it  was  seen  by  its  consequences 
that  things  were  not  carried  to  the  front. 

"  Qu.  14,593.  Can  you  tell  whether  any  information  was  given  you 
of  the  probable  failure  of  the  road,  before  the  failure  took  place? — 
A.  Certainly  not. 

"  Qu.  14,594.  So  that  you  remained  altogether  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
chance  of  the  non-supply  of  the  troops  arising  from  the  failure  of  the 
road? — A.  Yea. 

"  Qu.  14,595.  So  soon  as  you  heard  of  the  failure  of  the  road,  you 
took  steps,  did  you  not,  to  have  a  road  made  of  some  sort  or  another  ? 
— A.  No,  I  cannot  say  that  I  did  ;  because  it  was  impossible  for  me 
to  be  able  to  judge4  whether  the  thing  was  practicable  then.  There 
are  things  which  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  leave  to  officers  on  the 
spot."  ' 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  33 

they  risked  their  own  lives  bravely  enough.  But,  as  I 
maintain,  the  condition  of  the  English  War  Office,  as  it 
was  then  developed  and  disclosed,  was  the  certain  and  nat- 
nral  result  of  what  men  call  the  English  system  of  "  Par- 
liamentary Government." 

Let  us  examine  it,  and  see  what  kind  of  a  machinery  it 
is,  how  it  is  fitted  for  accomplishing  the  two  purposes  of — 

1.  Getting  in  the  executive  service  the  best  men  for 
that  service. 

2.  Getting  from  them  their  best  work  in  that  service. 
The  head  of  the  War  Office  in  England  is  selected,  in  the 

vast  majority  of  instances,  not  because  he  knows  anything 
about  the  army,  nor  because  he  has  ever  shown  any  ad- 
ministrative talent,  nor  because  he  has  ever  had  any  ad- 
ministrative training,  nor  because  he  has  proved  himself, 
even  in  Parliament,  to  be  a  ripe  statesman,  but  for  the 
one  reason  that,  at  that  particular  time,  he,  with  some  other 
men,  can  bring  together  a  certain  number  of  votes  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  some  matters  of  general  legisla- 
tion. And  these  matters  of  legislation,  nine  times  out  of 
ten,  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  affairs  of  the 
army.  In  short,  the  heads  of  the  executive  offices  are 
chosen  not  because  they  are  fit  for  their  executive  work, 
but  always  for  fitness  they  have  shown  for  something  else. 

But  after  the  ministers  are  chosen,  how  does  the  ma- 
chinery work  as  to  the  second  point,  the  getting  from 
these  men  at  the  head  of  the  executive  departments  their 
best  work  in  those  departments  ? 

At  the  outset,  we  have  the  point,  that  these  heads  of 
departments  have  two  distinct  kinds  of  work  to  do,  leg- 
islative and  executive.  These  two  kinds  of  work  are  ut- 
terly unlike,  and  call  for  different  men  to  do  them.  Not 
once  in  a  hundred  years  is  there  any  one  man  who  has  the 

o* 


34  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

powers  that  fit  him.  to  do  them  both.  One  alone  is  all 
that  a  man  can  find  time  or  strength  for.  And  if  one 
man  tries  to  do  both  sets  of  duties,  it  is  certain  that  he 
will  not  do  both  well,  and  the  chance  is  that  he  will  do 
both  ill. 

This  is  not  a  matter  that  rests  on  theoretical  considera- 
tions or  conjecture.  But  on  this  point  we  have  the  ex- 
perience of  one  of  England's  greatest  ministers.  Mr.  Mar- 
tin tells  us,  in  his  life  of  the  Prince  Consort  :* 

"  It  has  long  been  accepted  or  understood  that  it  was  Sir  Robert 
Peel's  opinion,  in  common  with  that  of  Mr.  Canning,  that  the  Prime- 
minister  should  be  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Such  was  his  opin- 
ion for  a  great  part  of  his  career;  but  his  experience  of  the  last 
four  years  had  led  him  to  a  different  conclusion.  *  *  *  The  amount 
of  work  imposed  upon  the  first  minister  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
in  addition  to  what  he  had  to  go  through  elsewhere,  was  too  great 
for  any  human  strength." 

That  ground  of  itself  would  seem  to  be  enough  to  de- 
cide the  question,  whether  executive  ministers  should  sit 
in  a  legislature. 

But  assume,  for  the  moment,  that  the  heads  of  the  differ- 
ent executive  offices,  although  selected  for  none  but  Par- 
liamentary reasons,  were  the  best  men  that  could  be  found 
for  their  executive  offices.  Assume  that  they  had,  each 
of  them,  wonderful  abilities  for  both  kinds  of  work.  As- 
sume, too,  that  they  could  have  the  time  and  strength  to 
do  both  well.  There  is  another  point.  The  system  is  so 
framed  as  to  make  it  certain  that  these  men  at  the  heads 
of  the  executive  offices  will  give  their  time  and  thought, 
in  the  main,  to  work  in  Parliament,  and  not  to  the  work 
of  their  executive  offices. 

*  Martin's  "  Life  of  Prince  Consort,"  vol.  i.  p.  266. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  85 

The  one  point  which,  is  commonly  made  by  men  who 
admire  English  Parliamentary  Government  is,  that  under  it 
ministers  are  made  "  responsible  "  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. So,  indeed,  they  are. 

But  for  what  ? 

The  War  Minister  of  England  is  held  "  responsible,"  not 
for  what  lie  himself  has  or  has  not  done,  but  for  some- 
thing done  or  not  done  by  the  ministry  as  a  body.  Indi- 
vidual responsibility  for  individual  acts  is  destroyed. 

And,  as  one  member  of  the  ministry,  he  is  held  respon- 
sible, in  the  vast  majority  of  instances,  not  for  work  done 
by  him  or  them  in  the  affairs  of  the  War  Office,  but  for 
something  done  in  the  House  of  Commons.  It  may,  in- 
deed, happen  that  a  ministry  would  be  driven  to  resign 
for  mismanagement  of  the  War  Office  or  the  Foreign  Of- 
fice. Nearly  always,  however,  the  head  of  the  War  Office, 
as  one  of  the  ministry,  goes  out  of  office,  not  for  anything 
that  concerns  the  management  of  the  army,  but  because 
the  ministry  have  lost  votes  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  some  matter  of  Roman  Catholic  Emancipation,  or  the 
Irish  Church,  or  a  House  Tax. 

In  other  words,  England's  War  Minister  leaves  the  War 
Office,  not  for  what  he  has  done  ill  in  the  War  Office  as 
to  army  affairs,  but  for  what  other  men  have  done  ill,  in 
another  place,  as  to  other  things. 

Will  such  a  system  as  that  get  good  work  in  the  execu- 
tive offices? 

Suppose  a  mill-owner  were  hiring  a  superintendent,  and 
were  to  say  to  him,  "  I  employ  you  because  you  know  how 
to  manage  my  mill ;  I  shall  keep  you  in  charge  of  it  just 
so  long  as  you  manage  it  well,  and  no  longer :  meantime 
you  will  be  well  paid  in  money  and  in  reputation  " — there 
would  be  some  possibility  that  he  might  have  the  work  of 


36  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

his  mill  well  done.  Suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  he  were 
to  say,  "  I  do  not  employ  you  because  you  know  how  to 
manage  my  mill.  I  am  well  aware  that  you  have  never 
seen  the  inside  of  a  mill  in  your  life.  I  expect  you  to 
spend  your  whole  time  in  the  town -meeting.  Do  your 
work  in  the  mill  well  or  ill,  that  is  not  the  point  which 
will  decide  me  to  keep  you  in  my  service.  But  the  mo- 
ment you  cannot  bring  me  seventy-five  votes  in  that  town- 
meeting,  I  shall  find  a  new  superintendent."  That  course, 
one  would  think,  would  not  work  well  with  mills;  nor  does 
it  with  governments. 

It  needs  no  very  keen  brain  to  see  that  if,  in  order  to 
keep  office,  men  must  keep  votes  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, it  is  to  this  keeping  votes  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons that  they  will  give  their  time  and  thought. 

To  sum  up  this  branch  of  the  matter,  then,  the  War 
Minister  of  England,  or  the  head  of  the  Foreign  Office,  or 
of  any  other  executive  office,  is  always  a  man  taken  from 
Parliament,  by  Parliament,  for  work  done  in  Parliament. 
For  keeping  his  executive  office,  he  depends  on  work  to  be 
done  in  Parliament ;  and  there  it  is  certain  he  will  do  his 
best  work. 

Not  only  is  that  the  natural  result  of  the  system,  but  it 
is  the  way  in  which  the  system  actually  works.  Their 
War  Minister  has  always  spent  his  time  in  managing  the 
House  of  Commons.  He  has  always  been  made  War  Min- 
ister for  the  reason  that  he  could  manage  the  House  of 
Commons. 

If  there  has  ever  been  in  England,  as  Englishmen  be- 
lieve, a  great  war  minister,  it  was  Pitt.  If  ever  there  was 
a  man  who  believed  in  the  present  English  "  system  "  of 
Parliamentary  Government,  it  was  Macaulay.  Let  us  see 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  37 

what  kind  of  a  war  minister  Pitt  was,  on  the  testimony  of 
Macaulay.     He  says  :* 

"  Great  as  Pitt's  abilities  were,  his  military  administration  was  that 
of  a  driveller.  He  was  at  the  head  of  a  nation  engaged  in  a  struggle 
for  life  and  death,  of  a  nation  eminently  distinguished  by  all  the 
physical  and  all  the  moral  qualities  which  make  excellent  soldiers. 
The  resources  at  his  command  were  unlimited.  The  Parliament  was 
even  more  ready  to  grant  him  men  and  money  than  he  was  to  ask 
for  them.  In  such  an  emergency,  and  with  such  means,  such  a 
statesman  as  Richelieu,  as  Louvois,  as  Chatham,  as  Wellesley,  would 
have  created  in  a  few  months  one  of  the  finest  armies  in  the  world, 
and  would  have  soon  discerned  and  brought  forward  generals  worthy 
to  have  commanded  such  an  army.  *  *  *  But  the  fact  is  that,  after 
eight  years  of  war,  after  a  vast  destruction  of  life,  after  an  expendi- 
ture of  wealth  far  exceeding  the  expenditure  of  the  American  war, 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  of  the  war  of  the  Austrian  succession,  and 
of  the  war  of  the  Spanish  succession  united,  the  English  army,  under 
Pitt,  was  the  laughing-stock  of  all  Europe.  It  could  not  boast  of  one 
brilliant  exploit.  It  had  never  shown  itself  on  the  Continent  but  to 
be  beaten,  chased,  forced  to  re-embark,  or  forced  to  capitulate.  To 
take  some  sugar  island  in  the  West  Indies,  to  scatter  some  mob  of 
half-naked  Irish  peasants,  such  were  the  most  splendid  victories  won 
by  the  British  troops  under  Pitt's  auspices." 

Such  was,  according  to  Macaulay,  the  fitness  of  the  man 
for  the  duties  of  his  place.  But  how  did  he  get  and  keep 
his  place  ?  Let  us  learn  from  the  same  authority  : 

"  While  his  schemes  were  confounded,  while  his  predictions  were 
falsified,  while  the  coalitions  which  he  had  labored  to  form  were  fall- 
ing to  pieces,  while  the  expeditions  which  he  had  sent  forth  at  an 
enormous  expense  were  ending  in  rout  and  disgrace,  *  *  *  his  author- 
ity over  the  House  of  Commons  was  constantly  becoming  more  and 
more  absolute.  There  was  his  empire.  There  were  his  victories,  his 
Lodi  and  his  Arcola,  his  Rivoli  and  his  Marengo.  If  some  great  mis- 
fortune, a  pitched  battle  lost  by  the  allies,  the  annexation  of  a  new 

*  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  Article  "  Pitt." 


38  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

department  to  the  French  Republic,  a  sanguinary  insurrection  in  Ire- 
land, a  mutiny  in  the  fleet,  a  panic  in  the  city,  a  run  on  the  bank, 
had  spread  dismay  through  the  ranks  of  his  majority,  that  dismay" 
lasted  only  till  he  rose  from  the  treasury  bench,  drew  up  his  haughty 
head,  stretched  his  arm  with  commanding  gesture,  and  poured  forth, 
in  deep  and  sonorous  tones,  the  lofty  language  of  inextinguishable 
hope  and  inflexible  resolution.  Thus,  through  a  long  and  calamitous 
period,  every  disaster  that  happened  without  the  walls  of  Parliament  was 
regularly  followed  by  a  triumph  within  them.  At  length  he  had  no 
longer  an  opposition  to  encounter.  *  *  *  It  is  true  that  Addiugton 
might  easily  have  been  a  better  war  minister  than  Pitt,  and  could 
not  possibly  have  been  a  worse.  But  Pitt  had  cast  a  spell  on  the 
public  mind.  The  eloquence,  the  judgment,  the  calm  and  disdainful 
firmness  which  he  had,  during  many  years,  displayed  in  Parliament, 
deluded  the  world  into  the  belief  that  he  must  be  eminently  quali- 
fied to  superintend  every  department  of  politics  ;  and  they  imagined, 
even  after  the  miserable  failures  of  Dunkirk,  of  Quiberon,  and  of 
the  Helder,  that  he  was  the  only  statesman  who  could  cope  with 
Napoleon." 

That  is  not  an  exceptional  case.  That  is  the  way  in 
which  the  system  has  been  working  ever  since  the  English 
people  have  had  what  they  call  "Parliamentary  Govern- 
ment." That  is  what  the  English  people  have,  "  Parlia- 
mentary Government,"  and  not  executive  administration. 
They  have  never  a  war  minister — nothing  but  a  leader  of 
the  House. 

That  is  not  all.  Could  these  ministers  know  that  they 
would  certainly  hold  their  places  for  even  four  years,  there 
might  be  a  possibility  that  they  would  learn  something  of 
their  executive  work.  They  never  have  a  certainty  that 
they  will  hold  office  for  a  month.  How  soon  it  may  at 
any  time  happen  that  the  English  ministry  in  office  will  be 
defeated  in  Parliament  on  a  vote  as  to  Church  discipline, 
and  will  be  therefore  compelled  to  resign,  no  man  can  tell. 
It  may  be  in  less  than  six  months  after  they  take  office,  or 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  89 

it  may  be  after  the  experience  of  a  few  years  has  given 
them  something  really  like  an  acquaintance  with  their 
official  duties.  It  makes  no  difference  which  it  is,  whether 
the  time  has  been  long  or  short,  whether  the  ministers 
have  become  through  experience  useful  public  servants,  or 
whether  they  still  blaze  in  the  full  glory  of  their  pristine 
ignorance. 

From  1762  to  1868  there  were  thirty-four  administra- 
tions. Of  these  thirty-four  administrations  eleven  lasted 
less  than  one  year,  five  others  less  than  two  years,  and  five 
others  less  than  three  years.  Only  three  of  the  thirty-four 
lasted  longer  than  six  years. 

Under  such  a  system  experience  and  training  cannot  be 
had.  One  thing  is  absolutely  certain :  however  much  the 
War  Minister  may  know  about  the  Irish  Church  and  the 
House  Tax,  he  will  know  nothing  about  army  affairs. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  although  the  heads  in  the  Brit- 
ish administrative  offices  may  be  ignorant  of  department 
matters,  yet  the  subordinates  (especially  since  the  adoption 
of  the  Civil  Service  rules)  are  well  trained,  and  the  chief 
can  always  have  the  advice  and  knowledge  of  experienced 
men  under  him. 

But  is  this  enough  ?  The  men  who  believe  in  Civil 
Service  Reform  urge  it  because  they  have  found  that  men 
in  government  service,  as  well  as  elsewhere,  must  have 
training  and  experience.  But  it  is  not  enough  to  have 
only  the  subordinates  able.  The  man  at  the  head,  who 
has  the  real  power,  must,  of  all  men,  be  the  man  of  capac- 
ity and  training,  or  there  can  be  no  efficient  administra- 
tion. These  subordinates  may  do  mere  routine  work  very 
well.  They  will  do  nothing  but  routine  work.  If,  in  or- 
der to  get  good  work,  it  is  found  that  even  the  under- 
lings must  have  capacity  for  their  especial  duties,  and 


40  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

must,  above  all,  have  training,  all  the  more  important  is 
it  for  the  chiefs.  Can  they  alone  be  ignorant  and  un- 
skilled? 

It  may  be  said  that  these  ministers  at  the  head  of  the 
war  and  naval  offices  can,  in  all  matters  of  importance,  get 
advice  from  army  and  navy  officers.  But  suppose  army 
and  navy  officers  do  not  agree  in  their  advice.  Who  is 
to  decide  ?  No  one  can  decide  but  the  man  who  has  in  law 
the  power.  Of  all  the  devices  in  government  machinery, 
none  is  so  dangerous  as  that  of  giving  power  to  a  man  on 
the  expectation  that  he  is  never  to  use  it,  but  is  in  all 
things  to  be  guided  by  other  men  wiser  than  himself. 
Men  who  have  power  do  use  it,  and  always  will.  It  was 
by  a  direct  order  from  the  ministry  that  the  British  troops 
made  the  expedition  to  the  Crimea,  to  attempt  the  reduc- 
tion of  a  great  stronghold,  without  organization  and  with- 
out supplies.  Sir  Charles  Napier  said  at  a  public  banquet 
in  London,  "  I  state  it  to  the  public,  and  I  wish  them  to 
know,  that  had  I  followed  the  advice  of  Sir  James  Graham 
[First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty],  I  should  most  inevitably 
have  left  the  British  fleet  behind  me  in  the  Baltic."*  Sir 
Charles  meant,  of  course,  that  he  would  have  been  left 
there  with  the  fleet. 

So  far,  then,  as  we  have  now  seen,  the  natural  result  of 
the  English  system  of  government,  as  it  concerns  the  ex- 
ecutive administration,  is  this :  It  selects  the  heads  of  ad- 
ministration entirely  with  a  view  to  their  fitness  for  other 
work.  It  makes  it  certain  that  they  will  do  that  other 
work.  It  makes  it  certain  that  they  will  not  have  the 
knowledge  or  training  needed  for  their  department  duties 
when  they  come  into  office.  It  makes  it  as  nearly  certain 

*  Martin's  "  Life  of  Prince  Consort,"  vol.  Hi.  p.  131. 


CONSTITUTION AL  ROYALTY.  41 

as  it  can  that  they  will  never  get  that  knowledge  and  train- 
ing after  they  are  in  office. 

But  another  point  is  to  be  considered.  There  has  never 
been  any  way  of  getting  any  vigorous  or  efficient  admin- 
istration anywhere,  in  governments,  or  mills,  or  railroads, 
other  than  by  having  one  man  at  the  head,  giving  him 
power,  and  holding  him  responsible  for  accomplishing  re- 
sults. No  doubt  that  one  man  must  be  under  proper  su- 
pervision and  control.  So,  too,  must  an  executive  com- 
mittee of  many  men.  But,  to  have  good  administration 
in  a  government,  there  must  be  at  the  head  of  each  ex- 
ecutive department  one  man,  with  power,  who  is  held  re- 
sponsible for  the  working  of  the  whole  of  that  depart- 
ment, and  for  nothing  else.  And  there  must  be  over  all 
the  departments  one  man,  with  power,  who  is  held  respon- 
sible for  the  working  of  all  the  executive  departments, 
and  for  nothing  else.  It  is  a  fact  well  learned  by  all  men 
who  have  ever  had  to  do  with  affairs  of  any  kind,  that 
to  have  vigor  you  must  have  power  in  the  hands  of 
one  man,  and  to  have  responsibility  you  must  have  the 
responsibility  of  one  man.  When  we  come  to  supervision, 
to  the  general  ordering  of  the  general  course  of  affairs, 
we  need  something  else.  Then  we  must  have  counsel,  of 
many  minds;  but  for  execution  we  must  have  force,  of 
one  will. 

Now,  English  executive  administration  has  no  head. 
The  result  is,  they  have  only  confusion. 

I  do  not  rest  for  this  point  on  my  own  opinion.  I  am 
well  aware  that  a  man  who  undertakes  to  discuss  the 
working  of  a  government  of  which  he  has  seen  nothing 
must  be  ignorant,  and  is  probably  mistaken.  But  on  this 
point  we  have  the  highest  authority,  that  of  Sir  James 
Fitzjatnes  Stephen,  the  clearest  thinker  (to  my  mind) 


42  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

among  Englishmen  of  this  day  on  matters  of  English  gov- 
ernment. He  has  written  :* 

"Long  before  the  Crimean  war,  Sir  James  Stephen,  who,  in  1847, 
left  the  Colonial  Office,  of  the  permanent  establishment  of  which  he 
had  been  the  head  for  many  years,  used  to  say  continually  that  the 
war  departments  were  so  organized  that  if  a  European  war  occurred 
they  would  utterly  break  down.  The  Colonial  Office  of  those  days 
was  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State  for  War  and  the  Colonies.  At 
the  time  in  question  I  believe  there  was  not,  and  had  not  been  for 
many  years,  a  single  soldier  in  it.  Its  functions,  and  those  of  the 
Secretary  at  War  and  the  Commander-in-chief,  were  so  strangely  in- 
termixed that  I  believe  no  one  knew  distinctly  how  they  were  related 
to  each  other."  *  *  * 

"  If  it  be  asked  what  Parliamentary  Government  has  to  do  with 
this  result,  I  answer,  it  has  practically  destroyed  all  unity  in  adminis- 
tration, by  reducing  the  office  of  king  to  a  cipher,  and  by  replacing 
him  by  a  set  of  ministers  who  shift  backwards  and  forwards,  who 
are  equal  among  themselves,  and  are  little  kings  in  their  own  de- 
partments, and  who  are,  therefore,  neither  competent  nor  inclined  to 
attempt  to  give  distinctness  and  unity  to  the  whole  system."1' 'f 

He  says  further  :J 

"  This  arrangement  docs  not  appear  favorable  to  a  vigorous  central 
control  of  the  different  departments.  It  puts  the  Prime  Minister  in 
a  position  greatly  less  powerful  than  that  of  a  king,  and  I  believe  a 
king  of  some  sort,  a  king  who  really  governs,  and  it  may  be  for  a  lim- 
ited time,  to  be  essential  to  good  administration.  *  *  * 

"  Facts  known  to  all  the  world  strongly  suggest  that  the  effect  of 
the  Parliamentary  system  upon  the  executive  government  of  the 
country  has  been  to  deprive  the  king  of  all  real  power,  and,  by  the 
introduction  of  fictions  and  the  creation  of  unconnected  offices,  to 
convert  the  executive  government  into  an  aggregate  of  isolated  insti- 
tutions, having  no  common  centre,  no  clear  and  well-defined  constitu- 
tion or  connection  with  each  other,  and  no  permanent  heads." 

But  how,  it  may  be  said,  has  the  English  nation  won  all 
its  great  successes  ? 

*  Contemporary  Review,  Dec.,  1873,  p.  15.      ^  Ibid.  p.  1C.     \lbid.  p.  14. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  43 

English  victories  have  been  won  by  the  dogged  courage 
of  English  soldiers  and  sailors,  by  the  genius  of  single  Eng- 
lish men,  the  Marlboroughs  and  the  Olives,  in  spite  of  the 
most  wonderful  mismanagement  of  the  home  administra- 
tion. The  English  people  pour  out  their  lives  and  treasure 
for  years  in  a  war  to  crush  a  foreign  people  or  overthrow 
a  foreign  tyrant,  and  at  last  find  a  Wellington  or  a  Nelson 
to  lead  their  armies  and  their  fleets.  But  the  Wellingtons 
and  Nelsons  have,  in  the  incompetence  of  the  home  offices, 
foes  more  terrible  than  the  Napoleons  and  foreign  armies. 
Campaigns  now  are  decided  in  a  great  measure  by  the 
length  of  the  purse.  But  no  treasury  can  long  stand  such 
enormous  drains  as  are  in  these  years  brought  on  a  people 
by  feeble  management  with  good  intentions.  There  must 
be  not  only  generals  in  the  field,  but  there  must  be  great 
ministers  behind  them  at  home.  Either  alone  will  not  be 
enough.  England  was  able  for  years  to  keep  all  Europe 
in  her  pay,  and  at  last  to  wear  out  Napoleon.  But  how 
would  it  be  now,  in  this  age  of  railroads,  if  the  English 
people  were  to  have  a  war  with  the  Prussian  armies  under 
Von  Moltke?  A  campaign  and  a  war  may  in  these  days 
be  easily  decided  by  the  genius  of  the  war  minister  at 
home,  as  well  as  of  the  captain  in  the  field,  and  be  decided 
with  amazing  swiftness.  Can  the  English  people  longer 
take  risks  like  these  ? 

Moreover,  how  can  such  a  thing  be  possible,  as  any  vig- 
orous stable  policy  in  the  War  Office,  the  Foreign  Office,  or 
anywhere  else,  when  ministers  are  going  in  and  out  of  of- 
fice every  six  months  or  every  two  years  ?  No  one  can 
tell  when  there  will  be  a  change  in  the  ministry — when 
there  will  be  a  new  "  government,"  as  the  phrase  is — nor 
can  human  wit  tell  who  will  be  the  men  at  the  head  of  it. 
The  English  nation  may  be  in  the  middle  of  a  great  war; 


44  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

the  ministry  blunder  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  some 
revenue  question.  There  must  be  a  new  war  minister  and 
a  new  head  of  the  Foreign  Office.  No  doubt  any  system 
is  absurd  which  makes  the  chief  executive  go  out  of  office 
at  the  end  of  four  years,  when  the  nation  may  be  in  ex- 
treme peril,  when  a  change  in  the  head  of  the  government 
may  mean  ruin.  But  under  such  a  system  men  do  at 
least  know  when  the  change  is  to  be  made,  and  can  per- 
haps make  some  preparations  for  it  beforehand.  Indeed, 
in  a  time  of  great  national  danger  there  would  be  at  least 
a  possibility  that  the  executive,  if  he  were  a  great  man, 
might  be  re-elected.  But  changes  of  executive  adminis- 
tration in  England  arc  decided  by  nothing  but  a  parlia- 
mentary dice-box. 

The  hap-hazard  way  in  which  the  chief  executive  office 
in  the  English  Government  is  made  a  shuttlecock  for  Par- 
liamentary politicians,  is  put  very  pleasantly  in  a  letter 
written  to  his  brother  by  Lord  Palmerston,  just  after  he 

became  prime  minister  in  1855  :* 

"February  15th,  1855. 
"  MY  DEAR  WILLIAM, — 

4 Quod  nemo  promittcre  Divum 

Auderct  volveuda  dies  en  attulit  ultro.' 

"A  month  ago,  if  any  one  had  asked  me  to  say  what  was  one  of 
the  most  improbable  events,  I  should  have  said  my  being  Prime  Min- 
ister. Aberdeen  was  there,  Derby  was  head  of  one  great  party,  John 
Russell  of  the  other,  and  yet,  in  about  ten  days'  time,  they  all  gave 
way  like  straws  before  the  wind,  and  so  here  am  I,  writing  to  you 
from  Downing  Street,  as  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury." 

But  there  are  certain  arguments  which  are  often  urged 
in  favor  of  the  English  system  of  government  which 
should  perhaps  be  more  fully  considered. 

*  Ashley's  "  Life  of  Lord  Palmerston,"  vol.  ii.  p.  76. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  45 

It  is  said  that  ministers  should  sit  in  the  Legislature,  in 
order  that  they  may  there  be  held  responsible  for  their  ad- 
ministrative action,  and  that  they  may  there  be  called  on 
to  explain  and  defend  that  action. 

So  far  as  a  legislature  needs  information  as  to  the  work 
of  the  executive  offices,  it  can  be  much  better  given  by 
written  reports  than  by  oral  answers  to  hasty  questions. 
In  fact,  information  which  is  sufficiently  full  to  be  of  any 
real  service  to  a  legislature  cannot  be  given  in  a  mere  de- 
bate or  a  mere  oral  colloquy.  It  must  be  given  in  the 
form  of  written  reports.  If  anything  more  than  the  re- 
ports be  needed,  legislative  committees  can  easily  send  for 
witnesses  with  books  and  papers.  Members  of  the  Legis- 
lature on  its  floor  can  no  doubt  put  sharp  questions  and 
get  sharp  answers.  But  for  giving  exhaustive  informa- 
tion, that  is  a  process  which  is  very  insufficient.  More- 
over, if  a  minister  must  spend  his  time  on  the  floor  of  the 
Legislature,  it  is  an  impossible  thing  that  he  should  have 
the  thorough  knowledge  of  the  affairs  of  his  department 
which  will  enable  him  to  give  any  accurate  information 
of  its  doings.  And  which  is  the  better,  that  a  minister 
should  have  a  policy  which  will  defend  itself,  or  that  he 
should  spend  his  time  in  the  Legislature  defending  a  poor 
one?  And  his  policy  certainly  will  be  a  poor  one  if  he 
uses  his  hours  outside  of  his  office.  His  time  should  be 
spent  in  making  a  policy.  If  he  makes  a  good  one  he  can 
leave  its  defence  to  other  men.  This  system  of  double 
duties  never  has  worked  well,  and  it  never  will. 

But  it  is  said,  if  ministers  sit  in  the  Legislature,  and 
go  out  of  office  on  a  vote  of  the  Legislature,  we  secure 
harmony  between  the  legislative  and  executive  depart- 
ments. It  is  said  that  the  men  who  shape  the  legis- 
lation of  the  country  should  properly  and  wisely  have  in- 


46  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

trusted  to  them  the  w6rk  of  carrying  that  legislation  into 
effect. 

But  if  it  be  really  an  important  point,  that  the  men  who 
propose  and  pass  legislative  measures  should  be  the  men 
intrusted  with  the  execution  of  those  measures,  we  have 
a  new  difficulty.  Suppose  a  ministry  remains  in  office  for 
a  long  time.  It  has  during  that  long  time  passed  many 
measures.  According  to  this  argument,  it  is  this  very  min- 
istry which  has  framed  and  passed  all  these  measures  which 
should  have  their  execution.  Arid  the  longer  they  have 
been  in  office,  the  more  necessary  it  is,  as  far  as  this  point 
is  concerned,  that  they  should  stay  in  office.  As  a  fact, 
however,  no  matter  how  many  measures  the  ministry  may 
have  passed,  no  matter  how  wise  those  measures  may  have 
been,  or  how  necessary  it  may  be  for  the  successful  work- 
ing of  those  many  and  wise  measures  that  the  ministry 
should  stay  in  office,  so  soon  as  they  are  defeated  in  one 
important  measure  of  legislation,  out  they  must  go.  If 
they  have  been  long  in  office,  presumptively  both  their 
legislation  and  their  administration  during  that  long  period 
have  been  in  harmony  with  the  views  of  the  Legislature 
and  of  the  country ;  and  they  have  gained  experience  in 
both  departments. 

Moreover,  the  question  on  which  the  ministers  resign  is 
usually  not  a  matter  of  legislation  passed  by  their  oppo- 
nents, but  one  which  they  fail  to  pass  themselves — which 
neither  party  has  passed.  So  that,  instead  of  the  adminis- 
tration of  legislative  measures  being  put  in  the  hands  of 
the  authors  of  those  measures,  it  is  as  matter  of  practice 
put  in  the  hands  of  their  enemies.  And  in  the  case  sup- 
posed, when  a  ministry  has  been  long  in  office,  although 
the  whole  point  of  the  system,  as  it  is  generally  stated,  is 
to  have  as  executive  officers  men  who  are  in  harmony  with 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  47 

a  majority  of  Parliament  on  matters  of  legislation,  tho 
ministry  have  to  resign  because  they  disagree  with  a  ma- 
jority of  the  House  on  one  question,  to  make  way  for  men 
who  disagree  with  a  majority  of  the  House  on  five  hundred. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  question  on  which  the  ministry 
disagrees  with  the  House  is  the  latest  one,  and  therefore 
presumably  the  most  important.  But  is  the  latest  ques- 
tion always  or  often  the  most  important,  either  presumably 
or  as  a  matter  of  fact  1  It  may  be,  and  often  is,  a  question 
of  the  very  least  importance,  that  is,  in  comparison  with 
the  long  series  of  measures  that  have  gone  before  it. 

But  what  is  the  real  weight  of  this  argument  that  the 
executive  officers,  the  ministers,  should  be  "  in  harmony  " 
with  the  majority  of  the  Legislature  ?  "  In  harmony  "  as 
to  what?  Is  it  very  material  to  have  your  war  minister 
"  in  harmony  "  with  the  Legislature  as  to  matters  of  Church 
discipline,  or  as  to  anything  other  than  his  administration 
of  the  affairs  of  the  War  Office?  Can  any  man  be  so  in- 
sane as  to  argue  that  a  war  minister  like  Bismarck  or 
Von  Moltke  would  wisely  be  removed  from  his  office  for 
his  opinions  on  a  revenue  bill  ? 

That,  however,  is  the  English  "  system." 

Undoubtedly  there  should  be  provisions  for  removing 
the  head  of  the  War  Office  for  inefficient  management  of 
the  affairs  of  the  War  Office.  But  that  is  precisely  what 
the  English  "  system "  does  not  give.  Neither  the  ap- 
pointment nor  the  removal  of  the  officer,  in  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  instances,  is  made  to  depend  on,  or  have  any  con- 
nection whatever  with,  the  efficient  administration  of  the 
duties  of  the  office.  Can  this  be  wise  ? 

So  far,  we  have  seen  how  the  executive  administration 
goes  on  under  the  English  system  of  government,  when 
the  English  people  are  so  fortunate  as  to  have  a  govern- 


48  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

ment.  But  they  do  not  always  have  one.  England  may 
be  in  the  midst  of  a  great  war,  fighting  for  her  life.  The 
ministry  is  beaten  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  resigns. 
There  must  be  a  new  head  of  the  War  Office.  Some  one 
has  to  "form  a  government."  Some  one  man  must  be 
found  who  can,  at  that  particular  time,  with  other  men, 
combine  a  majority  of  votes  in  the  House  of  Commons. 

Now  it  is  not  always  the  case  that  any  one  man  can 
be  found  who  will  take  this  task  upon  him,  or  who  can 
accomplish  it,  if  he  does;  for  every  man  in  Parliament 
knows  that,  if  he  takes  office,  he  cannot  hold  it  for  a  day, 
unless  he  can  have  his  Parliamentary  majority  at  his  back. 
It  may  be  that  the  men  who  are  needed  will  not  combine. 
Meantime  there  may  be  great  questions  of  foreign  policy, 
or  of  civil  or  military  administration,  pressing  for  a  wise 
decision  without  delay.  The  safety  of  the  nation  may  de- 
pend on  the  action  or  inaction  of  an  hour,  and  there  is  no 
official  in  existence  who  can  act.  And  when  the  next  of- 
ficial comes  into  existence,  it  is  certain  that  his  action  can- 
not, unless  by  a  miracle,  be  wise. 

This  is  not  matter  of  imagination  nor  of  antiquity — it 
is  the  statement  of  the  actual  working  of  English  govern- 
ment machinery  at  this  day.  And  it  seems  such  a  sur- 
prising condition  in  which  to  find  the  executive  adminis- 
tration of  a  great  nation,  that  a  certain  amount  of  detail 
will  be  used. 

In  February,  1851,  the  ministry  of  Lord  John  Russell 
resigned,  and  the  resignation  came  in  this  way :  On  the 
14th  February  the  ministry  had  a  severe  contest  on  the 
bill  to  prevent  the  assumption  of  territorial  titles  by  Ro- 
man Catholic  bishops,  and  earned  the  bill  under  a  strong 
opposition.  They  lost  strength  afterward  on  a  question 
as  to  the  repeal  of  the  Window  Tax.  They  were  then  de- 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  49 

feated  on  a  motion  carried  by  the  opposition,  for  leave  to 
bring  in  a  bill  to  assimilate  the  county  franchise  to  that 
of  the  boroughs ;  and  this  notwithstanding  Lord  John 
Russell  had  given  his  assurance  that  he  would  himself 
submit,  at  the  opening  of  the  next  session,  a  measure  for 
the  extension  of  the  suffrage.  The  ministry  thereupon 
resigned. 

It  was  on  the  22d  February  that  the  resignation  took 
place. 

The  Queen  sent  for  Lord  Stanley,  and  requested  him  to 
"form  a  government."  And  he  declined,  saying  that  he 
thought  it  difficult,  in  the  existing  state  of  parties,  to  form 
a  stable  government,  though  he  would  try,  if  again  called 
upon  by  her  Majesty.  And  he  recommended  that  an  at- 
tempt should  be  made  to  strengthen  the  present  govern- 
ment or  to  reconstruct  it. 

Lord  Aberdeen  was  sent  for,  and  was  requested  to  form 
a  government.  And  he  declined,  giving,  among  other  rea- 
sons, his  conviction  that  no  ministry  could  stand  which  re- 
fused, as  he  must  do,  to  deal  with  the  question  of  Papal 
Aggression. 

The  Queen  a  second  time  sent  for  Lord  Stanley,  who 
made  an  attempt  for  the  co-operation  of  the  men  upon 
whom  he  must  depend  for  his  working  majority.  And  he 
failed. 

Her  Majesty  then,  being  able  to  find  no  one  else  who 
would  undertake  to  form  a  ministry,  wrote  to  Lord  John 
Russell,  who  had  just  gone  out  of  office,  as  follows  :* 

"  All  possible  combinations  have  failed  in  their  turn.  First,  you 
declared  your  inability  to  carry  on  the  Government  on  account  of  the 
hostility  displayed  toward  it  in  Parliament.  Secondly,  Lord  Stanley 
declined  forming  a  government  of  his  party  until  every  other  possi- 

*  Martin's  "  Life  of  Prince  Consort,"  vol.  ii.jx  347. 
3 


50  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

bility  had  been  exhausted.  Thirdly,  you  have  failed  to  reconstruct 
the  Government  by  a  combination  with  Sir  Robert  Peel's  friends. 
Fourthly,  Lord  Aberdeen  did  not  think  it  possible  for  him  to  form  a 
government  with  his  friends  alone.  Fifthly,  Lord  Stanley  has  failed 
in  the  attempt  to  construct  a  government  by  a  junction  with  some  of 
Sir  R.  Peel's  friends,  or  of  his  party  alone." 

A  memorandum  from  Prince  Albert,  written  at  the  time 
to  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  throws  further  light  on  the 
situation.  He  wrote : 

"  The  important  questions  agitating  the  public  mind  are — 

"  a.  Protection  or  Free-trade. 

"  b.  Parliamentary  Reform. 

"  c.  Papal  Aggression. 

******* 

"  It  would  appear  from  this  that  the  Peelites,  with  the  support  of 
the  Whigs  and  adhesion  of  the  Radicals,  Irish  and  Roman  Catholics, 
would  be  able  to  carry  on  an  efficient  government ;  but  Sir  James 
Graham  and  Lord  Aberdeen  distinctly  declared  that  the  country  ex- 
pected a  measure  to  be  carried  against  the  papal  aggressions,  to 
which  the  Peelites  neither  will  nor  can  be  a  party  ;  while  the  House 
of  Commons  is  actually  pledged  to  some  measure  by  deciding  for 
the  introduction  of  Lord  John  Russell's  bill  by  three  hundred  and 
ninety-five  to  sixty-three  votes.  Lord  John  will  accordingly  have  to 
pass  some  such  measure,  but  this  very  measure  will  detach  perma- 
nently from  him  a  great  portion  of  his  ordinary  supporters. 

"  From  this  it  would  appear  that  Lord  John  and  the  Whigs  must 
bring  in,  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  an  antipapal  measure,  but 
that  they  require  a  junction  with  the  Peelites  for  the  carrying  on  of 
an  efficient  government,  preventing  a  revolution  in  Ireland,  and  keep- 
ing the  confidence  of  the  Radicals,  which  is  necessary  for  a  peaceful 
carrying  out  of  parliamentary  and  financial  reforms. 

"So  matters  stand  in  theory.  In  practice  innumerable  personal 
difficulties  will  have  to  be  overcome ;  as,  for  instance,  who  is  to  form 
that  government  ?" 

And  the  memorandum  of  the  Prince  ends : 

"  The  Queen  requests  the  Duke  of  Wellington's  opinion  upon  the 
problem  here  proposed." 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  51 

And  indeed  it  must  be  admitted  it  was  a  "  problem " 
which  stood  in  need  of  a  solution.  That  was  indeed  a 
question,  of  more  or  less  importance,  who  was  to  "  form  a 
government."  Lord  John  Russell  wrote  at  the  time  to  the 
Prince  Consort  :* 

"  I  am  very  glad  to  hear  that  the  Queen  has  sent  for  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  and  not  sorry  that  he  is  at  Strathfieldsaye.  It  will  be  an 
excellent  reason  for  the  Queen's  not  sending  for  any  one  to-day.  I 
own  that,  without  some  such  reason,  I  was  afraid  that  t/te  prerogative 
of  the  Crown  might  pass  to  the  House  of  Commons." 

Meantime  England  was  on  the  brink  of  a  great  war,  and 
was  without  an  executive. 

Take  a  later  case. 

In  February,  1852,  the  one  thing  of  all  most  pressing, 
for  the  English  Government,  was  to  arm  the  nation  for  de- 
fence. Lord  John  Russell's  ministry  was  left  in  a  minor- 
ity in  the  House  of  Commons,  resigned,  and  Lord  Derby 
had  the  task  of  forming  a  new  government.  He  offered 
Lord  Palmerston  the  Chancellorship  of  the  Exchequer; 
and  Lord  Palmerston  declined  to  serve  under  Lord  Derby, 
"  on  the  ground  that  he  could  under  no  circumstances  as- 
sent to  the  expediency  of  imposing  a  duty  on  foreign  corn.'1'1 
And  Lord  Palmerston  was  the  one  man  in  any  of  the 
ministries  of  the  time  who  showed  any  real  administrative 
talent. 

Take  the  next  case. 

When  Lord  Aberdeen's  government  took  office  in  1852, 
Mr.  Martin  says  :f 

"Her  Majesty  had  no  hesitation  in  charging  Lord  Aberdeen  with 
the  formation  of  a  new  government.  This  was  on  the  19th,  and  it 
was  not  until  the  2Sth  that  the  new  ministry  were  able  to  kiss  hands 

*  Martin's  "  Life  of  Prince  Consort,"  vol.  ii.  p.  349. 
f  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.  p.  482. 


52  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

upon  their  appointment,  so  many  were  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome, 
when  there  were  fewer  offices  to  fill  than  able  men  with  just  preten- 
sions to  fill  them." 

This  was  the  19th  of  December,  1852.  The  needs  of  the 
country  at  the  time  can  be  gathered  from  a  letter  written 
on  the  31st  of  January,  1853,  by  Lord  Palmerston  to  his 
brother  :* 

"  We  are  laboring  to  place  tJie  country  in  a  state  of  defence,  and  our  , 
only  limit  is  the  purse  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer ;  but  what- 
ever may  be  at  the  bottom  of  the  secret  thoughts  of  the  French  Em- 
peror, into  whose  bosom  no  man  can  dive,  yet  I  see  no  reason  to  ap- 
prehend an  immediate  or  even  an  early  rupture  with  France ;  and  if 
u-e  have  two  years  more  of  preparation  allowed  us,  we  shall  be  in  a 
yood  defensive  position.  In  the  mean  time  we  do  not  allow  that  we 
are  even  now  defenseless." 

To  an  enemy  of  England,  how  charming  must  have  been 
the  spectacle  of  a  country  with  its  war  minister  engaged 
,  in  the  manipulation  of  parliamentary  majorities,  and  turn- 
ing over  the  affairs  of  his  office,  whenever  he  chanced  to 
vote  wrongly  on  a  question  of  papal  aggression,  to  a  new 
man  (if  one  could  be  found)  who  knew  less  than  himself ! 
All  this  was  when  the  English  people  expected  a  war  with 
France,  and  within  about  a  year  of  the  war  with  Russia. 
Is  it  hard  to  understand  how  that  war  found  the  English 
army  a  mass  of  magnificent  raw  material,  without  any  effi- 
cient working  organization. 

Events  went  on.  On  the  eve  of  the  Crimean  war,  after 
the  British  fleet  had  moved  up  to  Constantinople,  Lord 
Palmerston  offered  his  resignation  from  the  ministry.  He 
was  not,  indeed,  at  the  head  of  the  Foreign  Office  or  the 
War  Office.  But  it  was  thought  by  nearly  all  men  that 
his  mere  presence  in  the  ministry,  in  any  position,  was  of 

*  Ashley's  "  Life  of  Lord  Palmerston,"  vol.  ii.  p.  6. 


CONSTITUTIONAL   ROYALTY.  53 

the  utmost  importance  to  the  country.  His  reason  for  re- 
signing, given  by  himself  in  a  letter  to  his  brother-in-law,* 
is  as  follows : 

"  I  told  Aberdeen  and  Lansdowne  last  year,  when  I  joined  the  Gov- 
ernment, that  I  felt  great  doubts  as  to  my  being  able  to  concur  in  the 
plan  of  parliamentary  reform  which  John  Russell  might  propose  this 
year.  *  *  *  I  had  then  nothing  left  for  it  but  to  resign.  *  *  *  I 
could  not  take  up  a  bill  which  contained  material  things  of  which  I 
disapproved,  and  assist  to  fight  it  through  the  House  of  Commons." 

In  the  first  failures  of  the  Crimean  war,  Mr.  Roebuck 
made  his  motion  for  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to 
inquire  into  the  condition  of  the  army  before  Sebastopol, 
and  the  conduct  of  certain  departments  of  the  Government. 
Lord  John  Russell  immediately  resigned.  The  position  in 
which  the  ministry  was  then  placed  is  thus  given  by  Lord 
Palmerston  in  a  letter  to  Lord  John  Russell  :f 

"As  regards  the  country,  the  action  of  the  executive  will  be  para- 
lyzed for  a  time,  in  a  critical  moment  of  a  great  war,  with  an  impend- 
ing negotiation,  and  we  shall  exhibit  to  the  world  a  melancholy  spec- 
tacle of  disorganization  among  our  political  men  at  home  similar  to 
that  which  has  prevailed  among  our  military  men  abroad." 

Mr.  Martin  saysj  of  the  same  matter : 

"  The  Queen  protested  against  this  decision  [to  resign],  as  exposing 
herself  and  the  country  to  extreme  peril,  it  being  manifestly  impossible 
to  change  the  Government  at  such  a  moment  without  deranging  the 
whole  external  policy  of  diplomacy  and  war.  A  break-up  of  the  Gov- 
ernment at  this  time  would  also  exhibit  to  the  world  the  humiliating 
spectacle  of  a  disorganization  among  our  statesmen  at  home,  akin  to 
that  which  had  become  too  palpable  among  our  military  men  at  the 
seat  of  war,  and  had  already  tended  greatly  to  lower  our  prestige  in 
the  eyes  of  Europe." 

*  Ashley's  "  Life  of  Lord  Palmerston,"  vol.  ii.  p.  19. 

f  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.  p.  71. 

|  Martin's  "  Life  of  Prince  Consort,"  vol.  iii.  p.  200. 


54  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

Another  repetition  was  then  had  of  the  attempts  to  cre- 
ate an  executive.  The  Queen  wrote  to  Lord  John  Eussell, 
who  was  chronically  in  office  one  day  and  the  next  day 
out  :* 

"  The  Queen  has  just  seen  Lord  Lansdowne  after  his  return  from 
his  conference  with  Lord  John  Russell  and  Lord  Palmerston.  As 
moments  are  precious,  and  the  time  is  rolling  on  without  the  various 
consultations  which  Lord  Lansdowne  has  had  the  kindness  and  pa- 
tience to  hold  with  the  various  persons  composing  the  Queen's  late 
government  having  led  to  any  positive  result,  she  feels  that  she  ought 
to  intrust  some  one  of  them  with  the  distinct  commission  to  attempt 
the  formation  of  a  government." 

And,  indeed,  most  men  would  admit  that  it  was  a  wise 
thing  for  "  some  one  "  to  "  attempt "  the  formation  of  a 
government.  And  the  note  continues : 

"  The  Queen  addresses  herself  in  this  instance  to  Lord  John  Rus- 
sell, as  the  person  who  may  be  considered  to  have  contributed  to  the 
vote  of  the  House  of  Commons  which  displaced  her  last  government, 
and  hopes  that  he  will  be  able  to  present  to  her  such  a  government 
as  will  give  a  fair  promise  to  overcome  the  great  difficulties  in  which 
the  country  is  placed." 

And  when  Pitt  made  his  coalition  with  the  Duke  of 
Newcastle,  the  country  had  been  without  an  administration 
for  eleven  weeks,  in  the  middle  of  a  war. 

Is  not  this  somewhat  alarming?  I  concede,  and  urge, 
that  a  properly  constituted  legislature  should  have  the 
power  of  removing  the  head  of  the  War  Office.  But  for 
what  ?  For  voting  wrongly  on  Roman  Catholic  emancipa- 
tion, or  for  mismanagement  of  army  affairs?  If  only  one 
minister  were  removed  for  his  own  failure  to  do  well  the 
work  of  his  own  office,  there  would  be  reason  in  that.  But 
in  England  the  whole  ministry  go  out.  When  and  how  a 

*  Martin's  "  Life  of  Prince  Consort,"  vol.  iii.  p.  206. 


CONSTITUTIONAL   ROYALTY.  55 

new  one  can  be  had,  no  man  can  tell.  The  "  system  "  is  a 
series  of  revolutions.  Every  change  of  ministry  is  a  revolu- 
tion— a  peaceful  revolution,  it  is  true,  a  revolution  under 
the  law ;  but  still  a  revolution,  full  of  danger  in  times  of 
danger. 

In  times  past  the  English  people  used,  as  part  of  the  or- 
dinary machinery  of  their  government,  the  method  of  arm- 
ed revolution,  in  violation  of  law,  against  the  tyranny  of  a 
king.  At  the  present  time  they  use  the  method  of  peace- 
ful revolution,  under  the  law,  when  they  wish  to  change  a 
ministry.  It  is  not  a  wise  or  safe  method. 

Thus  far  it  has  been  assumed,  as  men  generally  do  as- 
sume in  discussing  what  is  called  Constitutional  Royalty, 
that  the  king  is  king  only  in  name — that  the  sovereign 

1.  Uses  the  will  and  judgment  of  the  Commons  in  his 
appointment  of  ministers. 

2.  Uses  the  will  and  judgment  of  the  ministers  in  all 
executive  action. 

3.  Uses  his  own  will  and  judgment  in  nothing. 

I  say  this  is  generally  assumed  in  discussions  on  these 
matters. 

It  may  be  that  few  men, 'or  no  men,  would  lay  down 
these  three  propositions  broadly  as  they  are  laid  down  here. 

But  the  manner  of  making  the  assumption  is  commonly 
this :  In  discussing  these  matters,  Englishmen,  and  many 
Americans,  say  that  the  king  can  do  no  harm  in  the  State. 
They  say,  he  has,  indeed,  in  law,  the  appointment  of  his 
ministers  ;  but,  in  fact,  he  must  appoint  ministers  who  are 
satisfactory  to  the  Commons.  They  say,  he  is,  in  law,  the 
chief  executive ;  but,  in  fact,  he  must  follow  the  advice  of 
his  ministers. 

Now,  if  the  king  has  any  real  power  in  the  State,  he  can 
use  it  for  both  good  and  evil.  If  he  can  do  good  by  the 


56  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

wise  use  of  bis  power,  lie  can  do  harm  by  tbe  unwise  use 
of  it. 

It  is  no  doubt  true,  as  Englishmen  always  claim,  tbat  a 
wise  and  upright  king  in  the  English  State,  as  it  is  now 
ordered,  can  do  an  endless  amount  of  good.  It  is  as  true 
that  a  king  in  England  who  is  not  both  wise  and  upright 
can  do  an  endless  amount  of  harm.  If  he  is  a  man  of  the 
purest  intentions  in  the  world,  unless  he  be  also  wise  and 
able,  he  is  most  dangerous.  He  may  mean  to  use  his  pow- 
er wisely ;  other  men  will  try  to  use  him  and  his  power 
unwisely.  To  make  the  use  of  it  safe,  the  wisdom  must 
be  where  the  power  is — with  him. 

This  point  deserves  careful  examination. 

Undoubtedly  there  is  no  danger  in  this  nineteenth  cen- 
tury that  any  English  king  will  be  a  Charles,  or  any  Eng- 
lish queen  will  be  an  Elizabeth.  No  doubt  royal  power  m 
England  at  this  day  is  as  thoroughly  under  the  control  of 
public  opinion  as  the  power  of  ministers — or  of  the  House 
of  Commons.  Public  opinion  controls  everything,  as  soon 
as  it  once  gets  an  existence  and  a  voice.  Nor  will  there 
be,  for  many  years  to  come,  if  ever  there  is,  in  England,  an 
armed  revolution  against  royal  or  other  tyranny.  When 
the  people  once  gets  the  free  use  of  its  voice,  it  no  longer 
needs  to  use  its  hands.  This  is  becoming  an  age  where 
brains  and  thought  are  stronger  than  mere  muscle. 

But  in  England,  down  to  this  present  reign,  with  hardly 
an  exception,  there  has  been  no  English  king  or  queen  who 
has  not  used  the  power  that  the  law  gave  them,  on  their 
own  judgment,  on  their  own  will,  for  their  own  purposes. 
Each  one  of  them  has  always  made  the  hardest  struggle  they 
could,  with  such  weapons  as  they  dared  to  use,  against  the 
will  and  well-being  of  the  Commons  and  the  English  people. 

But  how  has  it  been  in  the  present  reign  ? 


CONSTITUTIONAL   ROYALTY.  57 

So  late  as  the  year  1852,  her  Majesty,  the  present  queen, 
dismissed  Lord  Palmerston  from  the  ministry,  for  no  rea- 
son whatever  except  that  he  did  not  conduct  the  business 
of  the  Foreign  Office  in  a  manner  that  conformed  to  her 
ideas  e>f  the  personal  dignity  of  the  sovereign.  There  was 
no  question  made  as  to  his  administrative  ability,  or  as  to 
his  being  in  complete  accord  with  Parliament  on  all  points 
of  home  and  foreign  policy.  He  might  have  been,  and  in 
the  minds  of  the  majority  of  Englishmen  he  was,  the  one 
man  in  England  to  fill  his  place.  But  he  was  dismissed,  on 
the  mere  will  of  the  sovereign,  for  these  purely  personal 
reasons.  Lord  John  Russell,  on  the  occasion  of  this  dis- 
missal, read  in  the  House  of  Commons  a  royal  memoran- 
dum on  the  duties  and  failings  of  Lord  Palmerston.  It 
was  the  language  of  the  monarch,  approved  by  the  minis- 
ter, and  it  was  as  follows : 

"  The  Queen  requires,  first,  that  Lord  Palmerston  will  distinctly 
state  what  he  proposes  in  a  given  case,  in  order  that  the  Queen  may 
know  as  distinctly  to  what  she  has  given  her  royal  sanction.  Sec- 
ondly, having  once  given  her  sanction  to  such  a  measure,  that  it  be 
not  arbitrarily  altered  or  modified  by  the  minister.  Such  an  act  she 
must  consider  as  failure  in  sincerity  toward  the  Crown,  and  justly  to 
be  visited  by  the  exercise  of  Tier  constitutional  right  of  dismissing  that 
minister.  She  expects  to  be  informed  of  what  passes  between  him 
and  foreign  ministers  before  important  decisions  are  taken  based 
upon  that  intercourse ;  to  receive  the  foreign  despatches  in  good 
time,  and  to  have  the  drafts  for  her  approval  sent  to  her  in  sufficient 
time  to  make  herself  acquainted  with  the  contents  before  they  must 
be  sent  off." 

Lord  Palmerston  Avas  dismissed  because  he  transacted 
the  public  business  on  his  own  motion,  on  his  own  re- 
sponsibility, without  consulting  the  Queen.  Yet  English 
writers  say  that  it  is  the  minister  who  is  "  responsible  "  for 
the  executive  action ;  that  he,  and  not  the  monarch,  must 

3* 


58  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

meet  an  impeachment  for  the  action  of  the  Crown.  If  the 
law  has  any  consistency,  it  is  the  minister  who  should  have 
the  deciding  will.  This  royal  memorandum,  so  late  as  the 
year  1852,  says  that  the  minister  has  not  that  deciding 
will,  that  he  shall  not  act  without  the  sovereign's  approval, 
and  that  if  he  does  so  act,  the  sovereign  will  dismiss  him, 
no  matter  whether  he  belong  to  the  majority  in  Parlia- 
ment or  not. 

This  doctrine  was  not  simply  asserted  by  the  Queen. 
Lord  John  Russell  said,  at  the  time  of  reading  the  memo- 
randum :* 

"I  thus  become  responsible  for  the  sanction  of  the  doctrine  I  am 
about  to  read.  *  *  * 

"  I  think  that  when,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Crown,  in  consequence  of 
a  vote  of  the  House  of  Commons,  places  its  constitutional  confidence 
in  a  minister,  that  minister  is  bound,  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  Crown, 
to  the  most  frank  and  full  detail  of  every  measure  that  is  to  be  taken, 
and  is  bound  either  to  obey  the  sanction  of  the  Crown,  or  to  leave  to 
the  Crown  that  full  liberty  which  the  Crown  must  possess  of  no  longer 
continuing  that  minister  in  office." 

And  he  spoke  of  the  Queen's  "  constitutional  right  of  dis- 
missing that  minister." 

Lord  Palmerston  on  the  same  occasion  said : 
"No  important  political  instruction  is  ever  sent  to  any  British 
minister  abroad,  and  no  note  addressed  to  any  foreign  diplomatic 
agent,  without  the  draft  being  first  submitted  to  the  head  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, in  order  that  the  pleasure  of  the  Crown  might  be  taken  upon 
it ;  and  if  either  the  higher  authority  or  the  Prime  Minister  suggested 
alterations,  those  alterations  were  made,  or  the  despatch  was  withheld." 

This  means  something.  There  is  the  fact  of  a  dismissal 
of  a  minister,  not  on  any  vote  of  the  Commons — not  on  the 
will  of  the  Commons — of  the  ablest  administrator  England 
then  had  in  her  service,  on  nothing  but  the  royal  will. 

*  Hansard,  Third  Series,  vol.  cxix.  p.  90. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  69 

The  admirers  of  English  constitutional  royalty  have 
been  mistaking  a  person  for  an  institution.  They  have 
been  mistaking  the  reign  of  one  pure  and  upright  queen 
for  the  monarchy.  The  expectation  is  that  always  the 
sovereign  will  have  no  will  of  his  own,  but  will  merely 
register  the  will  of  Parliament.  That  has,  in  the  main, 
been  so,  in  this  present  reign  —  when  the  sovereign  is  a 
woman,  who  is,  of  course,  compelled  to  lean  on  the  advice 
of  some  one,  and  who,  under  such  exceptional  circum- 
stances as  have  never  before  existed  in  the  history  of  Eng- 
lish royalty,  has  followed  good  advice  from  good  advisers. 
But  has  it  never  happened  that  an  English  king  has  had 
bad  advisers,  or  that  he  has  not  taken  advice  ? 

Mr.  Bageh  ot  says : 

"  If  we  look  at  history,  we  shall  find  that  it  is  only  during  the 
period  of  the  present  reign  that  in  England  the  duties  of  a  constitu- 
tional sovereign  have  ever  been  well  performed.  The  first  two 
Georges  were  ignorant  of  English  affairs,  and  wholly  unable  to  guide 
them,  whether  well  or  ill.  For  many  years  in  their  time  the  Prime 
Minister  had,  over  and  above  the  labor  of  managing  Parliament,  to 
manage  the  woman — sometimes  the  queen,  sometimes  the  mistress — 
who  managed  the  sovereign.  George  III.  interfered  unceasingly,  but 
he  did  harm  unceasingly ;  George  IV.  and  William  IV.  gave  no 
steady  continuing  guidance,  and  were  unfit  to  give  it.  On  the  Conti- 
nent, in  first-class  countries,  constitutional  royalty  has  never  lasted 
out  of  one  generation.  Louis  Phillippe,  Victor  Emanuel,  and  Leo- 
pold are  the  founders  of  their  dynasties.  We  must  not  reckon  in 
constitutional  monarchy  any  more  than  in  despotic  monarchy  on  the 
permanence  in  descendants  of  the  peculiar  genius  which  founded  the 
race.  As  far  as  experience  goes,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  a 
hereditary  series  of  useful  limited  monarchs." 

Why  is  it  that  "  it  is  only  during  the  period  of  the 
present  reign  that  in  England  the  duties  of  a  constitu- 
tional sovereign  have  ever  been  well  performed  ?"  Be- 
cause this  is  the  very  first  reign  in  the  history  of  the  Eng- 


CO  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

lish  monarchy  when  the  will  of  the  sovereign  has  sub- 
mitted to  the  will  of  the  Commons. 

But  concede  that  an  English  king  will  never  again  try 
to  use,  for  his  own  selfish  purposes,  the  power  that,  under 
the  law,  he  has.  Concede  that  English  monarchs  have  at 
last  entered  on  a  career  of  self-abnegation  that  will  never 
end.  Assume  that  English  ministers  will  do  all  executive 
acts — in  other  words,  that  the  hereditary  king  is  king  only 
in  name,  and  that  the  real  king  is  the  minister. 

How  many  Englishmen,  even  advanced  Liberals,  will  ad- 
mit or  claim  that  this  power  of  appointing  the  ministers, 
which,  under  the  law,  belongs  to  the  king,  is  a  power  which 
he  is  to  use  at  all  times  in  complete  subservience  to  the 
will  and  judgment  of  any  other  man  or  body  of  men,  even 
of  a  majority  in  Parliament,  and  not  in  the  least  according 
to  his  own  judgment  ?  Suppose  England  to  be  engaged 
in  a  great  war  for  her  life,  and  that  a  Bismarck  had  been 
found  in  the  English  nation  who  was  the  one  man,  of  all 
men,  to  be  at  the  head  of  the  War  Office.  Suppose,  too, 
that  this  war  had  already  been  going  on  for  several  years, 
that  this  one  man  had  been  during  those  years  at  the  head 
of  the  War  Office,  and  had  there  shown  his  singular  genius 
and  fitness  for  that  one  place.  Suppose,  then,  that  on  an 
important  question  of  legislative  policy  the  ministry  found 
themselves  in  a  hopeless  minority,  and  resigned.  Here  is 
the  one  man  who  can  save  the  English  nation.  Whom  shall 
the  king,  in  such  a  case,  place  and  keep  at  the  head  of  the 
War  Office?  Shall  he  take  the  man  who  will  ruin  the  na- 
tion, and  throw  away  the  man  who  will  save  the  nation, 
simply  for  the  reason  that  the  one  is  and  the  other  is  not 
one  of  a  combination  of  men  who  have  a  majority  in  the 
House  of  Commons?  I  doubt  if  many  Englishmen  would 
go  as  far  as  this. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  61 

But  it  may  be  said  this  is  an  extreme  case  ;  and  we  must 
not  judge  of  a  system  by  extreme  cases.  On  the  contrary, 
a  system  is  to  be  judged  precisely  by  its  capacity  for  meet- 
ing extreme  cases.  Almost  any  system  will  do  as  a  fair- 
weather  system.  The  whole  matter  comes  down  to  this — 
is  the  King  of  England,  in  the  selection  of  cabinet  minis- 
ters at  any  time,  under  any  conceivable  circumstances,  to 
use  his  own  will  ?  If  he  is,  upon  what  principle  is  he  to 
be  allowed  to  do  so  ?  Upon  no  conceivable  principle,  for 
no  possible  reason,  except  that  the  public  good  demands 
it.  And  how  is  he  to  ascertain  whether  the  public  good 
does  demand  it  ?  Men,  the  wisest  and  best,  may  differ  on 
the  point.  Who  is  to  decide?  In  the  nature  of  things 
only  one  man  can  decide — the  man  who  has  in  law  the 
power.  And  how  is  he  to  decide  ?  He  must  decide  on 
his  own  judgment,  for  he  can  decide  on  no  other.  He 
might  as  well  try  to  walk  on  other  men's  legs. 

There  never  has  yet  been  a  government  on  the  face  of 
the  earth  where  men  have  not  used  the  power  that  the 
law  gave  them.  There  never  will  be  one.  In  years  past 
the  English  kings  have  always  used  their  power  at  their 
own  will.  In  years  to  come  English  kings  will  still  use 
their  power  at  their  own  will.  They  may  use  it  with  the 
most  upright  purposes,  for  what  they  think  the  people's 
good.  But  if  the  English  people  Avish  to  keep  the  possi- 
bility of  this  royal  power  being  well  used,  they  must  take 
the  possibility  of  its  being  ill  used.  They  will  sooner  or 
later  find  that,  for  their  own  safety,  it  must  be  in  wise 
hands. 

The  English  people — there  is  no  doubt  of  it — need  to 
have  some  one  man  use,  in  fact,  precisely  the  power  that 
the  king  has,  in  law.  They  need  to  have  one  man  at  the 
head  of  the  whole  executive  administration  who  shall  con- 


62  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

trol  the  whole  executive  administration,  who  shall  have 
nothing  to  do  with  legislation,  who  shall  give  vigor  and 
stability  to  the  whole  government  policy. 

But  the  man  who  is  to  do  work  like  that  must  be  a  man 
with  strength  of  his  own,  something  more  than  another 
man's  son.  He  must  be  a  man  who  has  proved  himself, 
who  is  able  to  do  great  deeds,  who  is  chosen  for  what  he 
himself  has  done  and  can  do,  and  not  on  the  hope  that  he 
will  let  other  men  do  something  for  him.  He  must  have 
a  will  and  judgment  of  his  own.  The  people  must  be  able 
to  put  their  trust  in  what  he  will  do  on  his  own  judgment, 
and  not  be  driven  to  pray  that  he  will  take  good  advice 
from  good  advisers. 

And  the  man  who  is  to  have  power  like  that  must,  of 
course,  be  himself  held  "  responsible  "  for  the  use  of  it.  It 
will  not  do  to  hold  some  other  men  "  responsible  "  for  his 
misdeeds.  Who  was  the  wonderful  being  that  hit  on  this 
weird  fancy  of  vicarious  atonement  in  affairs  of  state  ? 

The  experience  of  the  English  people  had  shown  them 
that  when  they  did  chance  to  have  a  king  who  was  able 
and  upright,  they  had  wise  and  strong  executive  adminis- 
tration. But  they  found  that  this  chief  executive  power 
must  be  put  in  the  hands  of  a  man  who  was — 

1.  Chosen,  in  some  way,  for  fitness  of  some  kind. 

2.  Removed,  in  some  way,  for  unfitness  of  some  kind. 
This  had  been  the  lesson  of  all  English  history. 

They  should  have  made  their  machinery  such  as  to 
choose  and  remove  their  king,  and  not  his  ministers,  for 
some  fitness  or  unfitness  of  his  own.  The  fitness  or  unfit- 
ness  for  which  ministers  arc  removed  should  be  fitness  or 
unfitness,  not  for  catching  votes,  but  for  executive  admin- 
istration. If  the  House  of  Commons  can  be  trusted  to 
appoint  and  remove  a  dozen  ministers,  they  can  be  trusted 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  63 

to  appoint  and  remove  one  king.  If  the  House  of  Com- 
mons can  be  trusted  to  remove  a  war  minister  because  he 
has  wrong  ideas  on  the  Irish  Church,  they  can  be  trusted 
to  remove  him  because  he  knows  nothing  about  army  af- 
fairs. The  difficulty  in  the  English  Government  is,  that 
they  remove  the  wrong  man  for  the  wrong  thing.  The 
English  people  must  use  with  the  king  himself  the  same 
rule  that  they  use  with  his  servants.  He  must  be  chosen 
for  fitness.  He  must  be  held  responsible.  And  then  give 
him  the  use,  in  fact,  of  the  power  he  lias,  in  law. 

And  at  last,  what  is  this  "system"  of  "English  Consti- 
tutional Royalty  "  as  it  stands  at  this  day  ? 

It  begins  with  giving  the  chief  executive  power  in  the 
State  to  a  man,  not  because  he  is  himself  fit,  but  because 
he  is  another  man's  son.  It  gives  him  that  power,  not  to 
use  himself,  but  for  other  men  to  use  for  him.  It  does 
not  hold  him  responsible  for  the  use  of  the  power  that 
he  has,  but  holds  his  ministers  responsible  for  the  use  of 
power  they  have  not.  His  ministers,  who  are  to  use  the 
power  that  the  law  gives  to  him,  he  is  to  appoint,  not  on 
his  own  judgment,  but  at  the  will  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. These  ministers,  who  are  the  heads  of  the  execu- 
tive offices,  are  appointed  because  they  are  fit,  not  for  the 
work  of  their  offices,  but  for  something  else.  After  they 
are  appointed,  they  give  their  best  efforts,  not  to  the  work 
of  their  offices,  but  to  something  else.  The  minister  does 
not  know  how  to  do  the  work  of  his  office,  but  must  use 
the  judgment  of  other  men.  He  is  removed  from  his  of- 
fice, not  because  he  has  done  its  work  ill,  but  because  the 
ministry  as  a  body  have  blundered  in  Parliament.  Be- 
cause they  have  blundered  in  Parliament,  the  ministry  are 
removed  from  their  executive  offices ;  and  they  keep  their 
places  in  Parliament,  where  they  have  made  their  blunders. 


64  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

The  king,  who  is,  in  law,  the  chief  executive,  does  nothing. 
The  ministry,  which  is,  in  fact,  the  chief  executive,  does 
work  in  the  Legislature.  The  House  of  Commons,  which 
should  do  nothing  but  give  supervision  to  the  whole  ad- 
ministration, is  ever  meddling  with  details.  The  king, 
who  should  use  his  executive  power,  has  his  hands  tied  by 
the  ministers.  The  ministers  have  their  hands  tied  by 
the  House  of  Commons.  The  House  of  Commons  has  its 
hands  tied  by  the  fear  of  the  next  general  e^ction. 

Men  say  this  is  a  wonderful  system  of  "  checks."  It  is 
precisely  a  system  of  "  checks,"  and  nothing  else.  We 
might  as  well  try  to  run  a  railway  train  by  the  brakes,  as 
manage  the  army,  and  navy,  and  great  public  works  of  a 
nation  by  any  such  machinery  as  that.  Such  a  wonder- 
ful thing  in  the  shape  of  a  government  was  never  before 
seen  on  the  face  of  the  earth,  or  any  other  heavenly  body. 
The  brain  of  no  human  being  could  ever  have  devised  so 
ingenious  a  scheme  for  having  every  man's  work  done  by 
some  one  else,  and  everything  done  ill. 

"  Why  is  it,"  Mr.  Bagehot  asks,*  with  charming  naivete, 
"  that  our  English  Government,  which  is  beyond  compari- 
son the  best  of  parliamentary  governments,  is  not  cele- 
brated through  the  world  for  administrative  efficiency? 
It  is  noted  for  many  things ;  why  is  it  not  noted  for  that  ? 
Why,  according  to  popular  belief,  is  it  characterized  by 
the  very  contrary  ?"  Why  ?  For  the  very  simple  reason 
that  the  "  popular  belief  "  is  true. 

It  was  left  for  the  English  people  to  give  to  the  world 
its  most  unique  exhibition  of  the  glories  of  "  Constitu- 
tional Royalty  "  when  Sir  Robert  Peel,  in  1839,  declined  to 
take  office  because  her  Majesty  the  Queen  refused  to  re- 

*  "  The  English  Constitution,"  p.  273. 


CONSTITUTIONAL   ROYALTY.  65 

move  the  ladies  of  the  royal  bedchamber.  What  a  sight 
for  England's  enemies !  That  the  point  of  who  should  be 
the  war  minister  of  a  great  nation  should  depend  on  the 
question  which  of  two  noble  ladies  should  flutter  with  the 
sublime  ecstasy  of  drawing  on  and  off  the  royal  hose ! 
And  men  write  gravely  of  such  an  affair. 

We  hear  much  said  of  the  "English  system"  of  admin- 
istration. Does  any  living  Englishman  know  what  it  is? 
Sir  James  Fitzjames  Stephen  tried  to  find  out,  and  failed. 
He  gives  us  the  result  of  his  search,  as  follows  :* 

"I  will  content  myself  with  a  single  additional  remark  on  the 
chaotic  condition  to  which  our  Parliamentary  system  has  reduced 
the  executive  government.  No  one  living  man  knows  what  the  sys- 
tem is,  or  where  to  get  an  account  of  it.  Many  years  ago — more  than 
twenty — I  studied  the  subject  with  some  care,  with  a  view  to  writing 
a  book  about  it.  Engagements  of  other  kinds  caused  me  to  lay  the 
scheme  aside ;  but  my  inquiries  satisfied  me  that  there  was  no  toler- 
able account  of  the  subject  to  be  found  anywhere,  and  that  the  only 
way  tff  forming  one  would  be  by  giving  thorough  studies  and  mak- 
ing personal  inquiries  which  hardly  any  one  is  in  a  position  to  un- 
dertake." 

But  how  did  such  a  machinery  ever  come  into  exist- 
ence? 

The  English  people  had  their  hereditary  king.  He  was 
not  chosen  for  any  fitness  of  his.  He  had  vast  power  un- 
der the  law.  And  no  matter  what  abuse  of  that  power  he 
might  make,  there  was,  under  the  law,  no  means  of  remov- 
ing him.  They  found  that  here  was  an  evil  they  could 
not  longer  endure.  They  sought  a  remedy. 

They  might  have  said,  We  will  have  no  king.  Or  they 
might  have  provided  some  means  of  choosing  a  fit  man 
to  be  king.  Or  they  might  have  taken  from  the  king  his 

*  Contemporary  Review,  Dec.,  1873,  p.  16. 


66  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

power.  Or  they  might  have  provided  some  means,  under 
the  law,  of  removing  him  for  an  abuse  of  that  power.  If 
they  had  done  either  of  these  things,  they  would  have 
aimed  straight  at  the  evil  from  which  they  had  suffered. 

They  did  neither.1 

They  kept  their  king,  and  surrounded  him  with  "  ad- 
visers." Even  then,  if  they  had  punished  or  removed  the 
king  for  not  taking  the  advice  of  his  "  advisers,"  there 
would  have  been  reason  in  that.  They  did  nothing  of  the 
kind.  They  punish  or  remove  the  "  adviser,"  because  the 
king  will  not  take  the  advice. 

These  "  advisers,"  the  ministers  whom  the  king,  in  law, 
appointed  and  removed,  he  appointed  and  removed  at  the 
will  of  Parliament.  Naturally  it  came  to  be  the  rule  that 
the  ministers  were  taken  from  Parliament.  The  whole 
machinery  came  to  be  a  roundabout  method  of  an  election 
by  Parliament  of  ministers  from  its  own  members.  There 
was  the  origin  of  this  confusion  of  legislative  and  admin- 
istrative functions,  of  this  custom  of  appointing  and  re- 
moving a  war  minister  for  things  that  have  no  connection 
whatever  with  the  work  he  is  to  do. 

Very  clearly,  too,  if  the  people  kept  their  hereditary 
king,  who  was  king  in  form,  they  could  not  have  an  elec- 
tive king,  who  should  be  king  in  fact.  That  is  the  reason 
why  they  must  have  a  ministry,  which  is  nothing  but  a 
collection  of  heads  of  departments,  with  no  one  man  who 
is  at  the  head  of  the  executive  administration,  and  who 
is  responsible  for  it  all.  For  that  man  would  be  the  real 
King  of  England. 

The  English  revolution  against  hereditary  monarchy  is 
not  yet  finished.  It  may  never  be  finished.  But  until  it 
is  finished,  and  until  royal  power  is  placed  in  fit  and  re- 
sponsible hands,  the  English  people  will  have,  not  a  gov- 


CONSTITUTIONAL  ROYALTY.  6*7 

eminent,  but  a  medley.  This  attempt  to  use  the  machin- 
ery of  hereditary  feudalism  for  doing  the  work  of  a  free 
people  is  a  method  behind  the  age.* 

And  from  the  workings  of  English  Constitutional  Roy- 
alty, we  can,  unless  these  views  are  greatly  mistaken,  gather 
these  points : 

1.  There  should  be  one  man  at  the  head  of  all  execu- 
tive administration,  with  power,  responsible  for  the  whole 
of  that  executive  administration. 

2.  An  executive  officer  should  be  chosen  for  his  fitness 
for  the  work  of  his  office,  and  not  for  work  in  the  Legis- 
lature. 

3.  He  should  give  his  time  and  thought  to  the  work  of 
his  office,  and  not  to  work  in  the  Legislature. 

4.  He  should  be  held  "  responsible  "  for  the  work  of  his 
office,  and  not  for  work  in  the  Legislature. 

5.  It  is  not  enough  to  hold  only  ministers  "  responsi- 
ble "  for  the  use  of  power  which  is  vested  in  a  chief  exec- 
utive.    The  chief  executive  himself  must  be  held  respon- 
sible for  the  use  of  his  own  power. 

And  these  points,  on  being  simply  stated,  would  seem 
to  approve  themselves  to  the  common  sense  of  men. 

*  See  Appendix  A. 


68  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FALSE    REPUBLICANISM THE    TYRANNY    OF    PARTY. 

IN  the  minds  of  the  men  of  1787  who  framed  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States,  one  idea  stood  out  more 
strongly  than  any  other.  They  had  seen,  as  they  thought, 
the  evils  of  a  tyranny  of  king  and  lords.  They  said, 
therefore,  we  will  have  no  king  and  no  lords.  There 
shall  be  nothing  hereditary  in  our  system  of  government. 
They  said,  we  will  have — 

1.  No  man  inheriting  power  for  his  birth., 

2.  No  man  holding  power  which  cannot  be  taken  from 
him. 

But  they  said — 

1.  Power  shall  be  given  to  men  for  their  fitness. 

2.  Power  shall  be  taken  from  men  for  their  unfitness. 
The  end  of  this  Government  was  to  be  the  good  of  the 

people. 

The  intention  was  that  this  Government  should  be,  as 
the  phrase  is,  a  government  by  the  people,  that — 

1.  The  people  should  choose  their  own  rulers. 

2.  The  people's  offices  should  be  used  only  in  the  peo- 
ple's service. 

The  result  has  been  a  government  by  party. 

1.  Party  has  chosen  the  people's  rulers. 

2.  The  people's  offices  have  been  used  in  the  service  of 
party. 

As  it  seems  to  me,  few  men  arc  in  the  habit  of  thinking 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  69 

how  far  these  two  statements  are  true,  how  thoroughly  the 
interests  of  the  people  have  been  sacrificed  by  our  public 
servants  to  the  needs  of  party.  It  is  a  point  worthy  our 
careful  consideration. 

Let  us  take  the  two  points  in  their  reverse  order.  Let 
us  first  see  how  far  the  people's  offices  have  been  used  in 
the  service  of  party. 

Party  did  not  at  once  get  its  full  growth.  Nor  did  the 
system  of  party  rule  at  once  bring  its  full  fruits.  Able 
men  wished  to  serve  the  people  under  the  Government; 
and  the  people  wished  and  had  their  services.  It  took 
many  years  for  party  politics  to  drive  our  best  men  from 
public  life,  where  they  wished  to  be,  and  where  the  people 
wished  they  should  be. 

But  the  system  began  its  work  early.  The  abuses  be- 
gan as  soon  as  parties  got  their  existence.  In  the  earliest 
days  of  party  history,  party  men  acted  on  true  party  prin- 
ciples. They  used  the  people's  offices  to  pay  for  party 
services.  They  used  official  power  for  party  ends. 

Thomas  Jefferson  was  the  first  leader  of  the  first  oppo- 
sition party.  Let  us  see  what  party  action  was  in  his  day, 
as  he  describes  it. 

Mr.  Jefferson  writes,  just  before  his  own  election  as 
President,*  under  date  12th  February,  1801  : 

"Edmund  Livingston  tells  me  tbat  Bayard  applied  to-day  or  last 
night  to  General  Smith,  and  represented  to  him  the  expediency  of 
his  coming  over  to  the  States  who  vote  for  Burr ;  that  there  was 
nothing  in  the  way  of  appointment  which  he  might  not  command, 
and  particularly  mentioned  the  Secretaryship  of  the  Navy.  Smith 
asked  him  if  he  was  authorized  to  make  the  offer.  He  said  he  was 
authorized.  Smith  told  this  to  Livingston,  and  to  W.  C.  Nicholas, 
who  confirms  it  to  me.  Bayard,  in  like  manner,  tempted  Livingston, 

*  Jefferson's  "  Writings,"  ed.  Boston,  1830,  vol.  iv.  p.  515. 


70  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

not  by  offering  any  particular  office,  but  by  representing  to  him  his 
(Livingston's)  intimacy  and  connection  with  Burr,  and  that  from  him 
he  had  everything  to  expect,  if  he  would  come  over  to  him.  To 
Dr.  Linn,  of  New  Jersey,  they  have  offered  the  government  of  New 
Jersey." 

And  as  to  this  bargain  and  sale  of  the  people's  offices, 
from  Mr.  Jefferson  there  came  not  so  much  as  one  word  of 
surprise. 

Very  naturally,  Thomas  Jefferson,  the  apostle  of  liberty, 
the  foe  of  monarchy  and  corruption,  the  first  leader  of  the 
first  opposition  party  in  our  history,  may  claim  and  keep 
the  glory  of  being  the  first  President  of  the  United  States 
who  confessedly  used  the  power  of  his  office  for  mere 
party  purposes.  He  gives  us  the  statement  of  his  own 
deeds  and  principles  in  a  letter  dated  the  23d  March, 
1801 — immediately  after  his  inauguration  to  the  office  of 
President  of  the  United  States.* 

"  That  some  ought  to  be  removed  from  office  and  that  all  ought 
not,  all  mankind  will  agree.  *  *  *  Some  principles  have  been  the 
subject  of  conversation,  but  not  of  determination:  e.g. — 1.  All  ap- 
pointments to  civil  offices  during  pleasure,  made  after  the  event  of 
the  election  was  certainly  known  to  Mr.  Adams,  are  considered  as 
nullities.  I  do  not  view  the  persons  appointed  as  even  candidates 
for  the  office,  but  make  others  without  noticing  or  even  notifying 
them.  *  *  *  3.  Good  men,  to  whom  there  is  no  objection  but  a  differ- 
ence of  political  principle,  practised  on  only  as  far  as  the  right  of  a 
private  citizen  will  justify,  are  not  proper  subjects  of  removal,  except 
in  the  case  of  attorneys  and  marshals.  The  courts  being  so  decided- 
ly federal  and  irremovable,  it  is  believed  that  republican  attorneys 
and  marshals,  being  the  doors  of  entrance  into  the  courts,  are  indis- 
pensably necessary  as  a  shield  to  the  republican  part  of  our  fellow- 
citizens,  which,  I  believe,  is  the  main  body  of  the  people." 

These  words  were  written   when   John   Marshall   was 
*  Jefferson's  "  Writings,"  vol.  iii.  p.  464. 


FALSE  REPUBLICANISM.  71 

Chief -Justice  of  the  United  States.  Did  Mr.  Jefferson 
really  believe  that  John  Marshall  dealt  out  decrees  accord- 
ing to  the  political  opinions  of  the  suitors  before  the 
courts  ?  Did  Mr.  Jefferson  mean  that  the  "  attorneys  and 
marshals"  whom  he  appointed  were  to  know  parties  in 
the  administration  of  justice,  or  that  they  were  in  any  case 
to  interfere  with  the  due  and  decorous  administration  of 
the  law  ? 

These  questions  can  best  be  answered  by  considering 
what  Mr.  Jefferson  has  written  in  reference  to  the  some- 
what noted  case  of  Callender. 

Callender  had  been  indicted,  tried,  and  convicted  under 
the  Sedition  Act.  lie  had  been  sentenced  to  pay  a  fine 
for  his  breaking  the  law.  There  was  no  doubt  of  the 
man's  guilt,  nor  had  there  been  any  error  in  his  trial.  He 
was  pardoned  by  the  President,  who  ordered  his  fine  to  be 
repaid  him  by  the  Government.  Of  this  executive  action 
Mr.  Jefferson  wrote  :* 

"  In  the  cases  of  Callender  and  others  the  judges  determined  the 
Sedition  Act  was  valid  under  the  Constitution,  and  exercised  t/ieir  regu- 
lar power  of  sentencing  them  to  fine  and  imprisonment.  But  the 
executive  determined  that  the  Sedition  Act  was  a  nullity  under  the 
Constitution,  and  exercised  his  regular  power  of  prohibiting  the  exe- 
cution of  the  sentence,  or  rather  of  executing  the  read  laic." 

It  could  not  admit  of  a  doubt  that  Congress  had  the 
power  to  enact  laws  to  punish  rebellion,  or  that  such  laws 
should  be  enforced.  It  was  clear,  too,  that  a  sure  way  to 
bring  the  government  to  ruin  was  to  hinder  those  laws 
from  being  executed.  It  will  be  seen  that  Mr.  Jefferson 
had  some  difficulty  in  finding  a  fitting  phrase  to  describe 

*  Jefferson's  "  Writings,"  vol.  iv.  p.  75. 


72  A  TKUE  REPUBLIC. 

tliis  executive  action.  To  "  execute  the  real  law  "  by  par- 
doning a  criminal  convicted  for  breaking  it  is  something 
new  in  legal  definitions  and  in  legal  ethics.  The  execu- 
tive whose  action  is  thus  happily  described  was  Thomas 
Jefferson,  the  first  President  who  deliberately  encouraged 
violation  of  the  laws,  and  who  had,  it  is  presumed,  with 
due  solemnity,  taken  his  oath  to  "  defend  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States." 

Let  us  consider  another  instance : 

The  right  of  an  accused  person  in  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion to  have  "the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defence" 
has  always,  in  this  country,  been  allowed  to  b'e  essentially 
necessary  for  securing  the  liberty  of  the  citizen.  And  so 
important  was  it  deemed  by  the  founders  of  our  Govern- 
ment, that  even  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
it  is  secured  by  a  special  clause,  though  it  was  not,  in  or- 
dinary times,  or  at  the  hands  of  ordinary  men,  thought  to 
be  in  danger.  On  the  trial  of  Burr  for  high  treason,  Mr. 
Luther  Martin,  one  of  the  lights  of  the  American  bar,  was 
one  of  the  counsel  for  the  prisoner.  And  during  that 
trial  Mr.  Jefferson,  then  President  of  the  United  States, 
wrote  to  his  friend  Mr.  Hay,  who  was  concerned  in  the 
prosecution  :* 

"Shall  we  moce  to  commit  Luther  Martin  as  particeps  criminis  with 
Burr?  Graybcll  will  fix  upon  him  misprision  of  treason  at  least; 
and,  at  any  rate,  his  evidence  will  put  down  this  unprincipled  and  im- 
pudent federal  bull-dog,  and  add  another  proof  that  the  most  clam- 
orous defenders  of  Burr  are  all  his  accomplices." 

In  later  years  we  have  seen  the  President  of  the  United 
States  ostentatiously  welcome  a  prisoner  in  the  dock  at  a 

*  Jefferson1^  "  Writings,"  vol.  iv.  p.  87. 


FALSE  REPUBLICANISM.  73 

state  dinner  in  the  executive  mansion.  It  has,  however, 
seldom  been  the  case  that  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  this 
country  has  used  the  influence  and  power  of  his  high  po- 
sition to  hinder  the  conviction  and  punishment  of  crimi- 
nals, or  to  interfere  with  the  administration  of  justice. 
For  executive  action  of  this  class  Mr.  Jefferson  gives  us 
the  earliest  precedent.  And  it  needs  high  authority. 

Now  Mr.  Jefferson  was  a  conscientious  man.  Nor  was 
he  a  man  who  seriously  intended  to  violate  his  oath  of  of- 
fice. But  he  was  the  first  high  official  in  the  Government 
who  set  the  example  to  the  people  of  the  United  States 
of  deliberately  defying  the  law.  From  his  teachings  of 
resistance  to  what  he  called  illegal  laws  came  the  whole 
theory  of  nullification,  and  the  whole  fact  of  the  rebellion. 
Would  he  have  ever  done  the  things  here  mentioned  ex- 
cept for  the  pressure  of  party  and  party  needs  ? 

The  practice  instituted  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  of  making  ap- 
pointments to  and  removals  from  office  for  mere  party 
reasons,  grew  until  Mr.  Van  Buren  established  it  in  all  its 
fulness.  From  his  time  it  was  the  regular  system,  acted 
on  by  both  parties,  that  public  offices  were  the  spoils  be- 
longing to  the  victors  in  the  party  contests.  And  from 
that  time  down  to  the  present  the  ordinary  practice  has 
been,  on  the  coming  in  of  a  new  party,  to  remove  every 
official  belonging  to  the  old  party,  and  use  his  place  as  a 
reward  for  party  service,  except  that  some  experienced 
men  who  were  needed  to  carry  on  the  ordinary  depart- 
ment business  have  generally  been  continued  from  one 
administration  to  another. 

The  abuses  of  party  action  did  not  become  so  gross  or 
so  apparent  until  later  in  our  history ;  and  it  is  especially 
the  period  of  the  rebellion  and  its  beginning  that  here 
concerns  this  argument. 

4 


74  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  in  many  ways  a  very  great  man  —  a 
man  of  remarkable  eloquence,  and  of  a  peculiar  wisdom 
that  seemed  at  times  to  be  a  kind  of  inspiration.  Most 
men  will  concede  that  he  was  a  man  of  thoroughly  pure 
intentions,  having  in  all  his  acts  only  a  wish  to  serve  the 
people's  highest  interests.  In  him  the  people  had  un- 
bounded faith.  They  were  more  ready  to  follow  him  than 
he  was  to  lead  them.  His  power  over  them  he  never 
knew.  If,  then,  we  find  that  such  a  man,  in  his  attempts 
to  serve  the  nation,  was  overborne  by  party  and  party  in- 
fluences, party  in  this  country  must  have  a  power  too  great 
for  the  people's  good. 

As  soon  as  Mr.  Lincoln  was  elected  President,  it  was 
seen  that  a  war  for  national  existence  was  to  be  carried  on. 
It  was  clear  that  the  war  would  be  a  great  war.  Great 
amounts  of  money  and  material  were  to  be  handled.  The 
success  of  our  armies  and  fleets  depended  on  the  way  in 
which  this  money  and  material  should  be  used.  It  was, 
to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  matter  of  life  and  death 
that  there  should  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  War  and 
Navy  departments  men  who  were  able  and  honest,  as  Mr. 
Lincoln  well  understood. 

At  the  time  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  nomination  for  the  Presi- 
dency at  the  Chicago  Convention,  according  to  one  of  his 
biographers,  an  agreement  had  been  made  between  the 
friends  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  friends  of  one  Simon  Cam- 
eron, of  Pennsylvania,  that  if  the  Pennsylvania  delegates 
to  the  Convention  would  vote  for  Mr.  Lincoln,  a  seat  in  Mr. 
Lincoln's  cabinet,  if  he  should  be  elected,  would  be  given 
to  Mr.  Cameron.  This  agreement  had  been  made  without 
Mr.  Lincoln's  knowledge.  But  after  Mr.  Lincoln  was  elect- 
ed, he  was  asked  to  carry  out  the  bargain  which  his  friends 
on  his  behalf  had  made.  As  to  what  followed,  the  narra- 


FALSE  REPUBLICANISM.  75 

tive  will  be  taken  from  Mr.  Lincoln's  biographer.      The 
biographer  says  :* 

"  Cameron  had  many  and  formidable  enemies,  who  alleged  that  he 
was-  a  man  notorious  for  his  evil  deeds,  shameless  in  his  rapacity  and 
corruption,  and  even  more  shameless  in  his  mean  ambition  to  occu- 
py exalted  stations,  for  which  he  was  utterly  and  hopelessly  incompe- 
tent ;  that  he  had  never  dared  to  offer  himself  as  a  candidate  before 
the  people  of  Pennsylvania,  but  had  more  than  once  gotten  high  office 
from  the  Legislature  by  the  worst  means  ever  used  by  a  politician ; 
and  that  it  would  be  a  disgrace,  a  shame,  a  standing  offence  to  the 
country,  if  Mr.  Lincoln  should  consent  to  put  him  in  his  cabinet." 

As  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  action,  the  biographer  continues  the 
story  from  the  statement  of  one  of  the  actors — Colonel 
M'Clure: 

"  I  do  not  know  that  any  one  went  there  to  oppose  the  appoint- 
ment but  myself.  *  *  *  Lincoln's  character  for  honesty  was  considered 
a  complete  guaranty  against  such  a  suicidal  act.  No  efforts  had  there- 
fore been  made  to  guard  against  it.  *  *  *  I  hastily  got  letters  from 
Governor  Curtin,  Secretary  Slifen,  Mr.  Wilmot,  Mr.  Dayton,  Mr.  Ste- 
vens, and  started.  I  took  no  affidavits  with  me,  nor  were  any  specific 
charges  made  against  him  by  me,  or  by  any  of  the  letters  I  bore ;  but 
they  all  sustained  me  in  the  allegation  that  the  appointment  would 
disgrace  the  administration  and  the  country,  because  of  the  notorious 
incompctency  and  public  and  private  villany  of  the  candidate.  I  spent 
four  hours  with  Mr.  Lincoln  alone ;  and  the  matter  was  discussed 
fully  and  frankly.  Although  he  had  previously  decided  to  appoint 
Cameron,  he  closed  our  interview  by  a  reconsideration  of  his  purpose, 
and  the  assurance  that  within  twenty-four  hours  he  would  write  me 
definitely  on  the  subject." 

Mr.  Lincoln's  own  opinion  of  Mr.  Cameron  was  so  bad 
as  to  make  him  think  that  the  mere  appointment  of  Mr. 
Cameron  by  him  to  a  cabinet  position  would  of  itself  de- 
stroy his  own  great  reputation  for  honesty.  According 
to  his  biographer,  he  said : 

*  Lamon's  "  Life  of  Lincoln,"  p.  459. 


76  A  TKUE   REPUBLIC. 

"  All  that  I  am  in  the  world — the  Presidency  and  all  else — I  owe 
to  that  opinion  of  me  which  the  people  express  when  they  call  me 
Honest  Old  Abe.  Now  what  will  they  think  of  their  honest  Abe  when 
he  appoints  Simon  Cameron  to  be  his  familiar  adviser  ?" 

The  appointment  was  made.  At  the  head  of  the  Navy 
Department,  where,  too,  as  in  the  War  Department,  it  was 
absolutely  essential  to  the  people's  safety  that  we  should 
have  vigor,  honesty,  and  knowledge,  a  man  was  placed  who 
knew  nothing  whatever  about  ships  or  naval  affairs,  and 
who  had  never  shown  any  qualifications  for  the  office.  He 
was  a  party  man,  appointed  for  party  reasons. 

The  result  was  what  was  to  be  expected. 

The  Government  was  compelled  to  purchase  large  quan- 
tities of  material  of  all  kinds — arms  and  supplies  for  the 
army,  and  vessels  for  the  transport  service  and  the  navy. 
To  the  ordinary  lay  mind  it  would  seem  natural  and  rea- 
sonable that  vessels  to  be  purchased  should  be  fitted  for 
the  use  they  were  to  be  put  to.  The  arms  to  be  bought 
should  have  been  such  as  could  be  of  service.  And  it  was 
very  clear  that  the  men,  of  all  others,  who  would  be  the 
best  judges  of  what  was  needed  by  the  two  branches  of 
the  service  in  the  way  of  ships  and  arms  would  be  the  of- 
ficers of  the  navy  and  army.  And  the  officers  of  the  navy, 
in  the  beginning,  had  nothing  else  on  which  they  could 
well  be  employed  except  these  very  purchases.  For  we 
had  no  vessels  for  them  to  command.  For  some  reason, 
however,  best  known  to  the  men  who  conducted  the  affairs 
of  the  country  at  the  time,  the  political  friends  of  Congress- 
(  men  and  cabinet  members  were  found,  of  all  men  in  the 
United  States,  to  be  the  only  ones  having  the  needed  skill 
and  knowledge  which  fitted  them  to  make  purchases  for 
the  Government. 

The  purchasing  of  vessels  for  the  Navy  Department  at 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  77 

the  port  of  New  York  was  taken  from  the  commandant 
of  the  Navy-yard  there,  and  transferred  to  a  man  of  whom 
a  House  of  Representatives  Committee*  says  that  he  had 

"never  had  the  slightest  experience  in  the  new  and  responsible 
duties  which  he  was  called  upon  to  discharge,  either  in  the  naval 
service,  the  building  or  buying  and  selling  of  ships,  or  in  any  pursuit 
calling  for  a  knowledge  of  their  construction,  capacity,  or  value,  never 
having  spent  an  hour  in  either." 

The  committee  further  say  that 

"  The  evidence  was  abundant  before  the  committee,  that  if  it  had 
been  necessary  to  obtain  the  services  of  any  gentlemen  outside  of  the 
navy  itself,  those  gentlemen,  combining  from  experience  and  educa- 
tion the  knowledge  most  calculated  to  fit  them  for  this  duty,  inde- 
pendent of  outside  aid,  could  have  been  secured  without  the  slightest 
difficulty  for  a  salary  not  exceeding  $5000  for  the  year." 

The  other  points  of  the  affair  can  be  best  given  in  a  lit- 
eral extract  from  the  committee's  report.  They  say  of 
this  purchasing  agent  that  he 

"  received  as  compensation  during  the  period  of  seven  weeks  pre- 
vious to  the  6th  day  of  September,  when  this  testimony  was  taken, 
the  enormous  sum  of  $51,584,  as  admitted  by  himself  before  the 
committee.  When  this  testimony  was  taken,  information  of  its  ex- 
traordinary character  and  import  was  communicated  to  the  depart- 
ment, in  the  hope  that  an  abuse  so  glaring,  when  pointed  out,  might 
be  corrected.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the  department  became  thus  pos- 
sessed of  the  information  that  its  own  agent  was,  by  this  system  of 
commissions,  amassing  a  private  fortune,  the  committee  have  been 
surprised  to  learn,  from  a  recent  communication  from  the  Navy  De- 
partment furnishing  them  with  the  numbers  and  prices  of  vessels 
purchased  by  Mr.  Morgan  for  the  Government  since  said  6th  day  of 
September,  that  the  cost  of  those  thus  purchased  by  him  amounts  in 
the  aggregate  to  the  sum  of  $1,736,992.  If  he  has  received  the  same 

*  House  of  Representatives,  Thirty-seventh  Congress,  Second  Ses- 
sion, Report  No.  2. 


78  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

rate  of  compensation  since  as  before  that  date,  there  must  be  added 
to  the  sum  of  $51,584  paid  him  before  that  date  the  further  com- 
pensation of  $43,424  for  services  rendered  since,  making  in  all  the 
sum  of  $95,008  paid  to  a  single  individual  for  his  services  as  agent 
of  the  Government  since  the  15th  day  of  July,  a  period  of  four  and 
one-half  months." 

And  the  committee  add : 

"  The  committee  do  not  find  in  the  transaction  the  less  to  censure 
in  the  fact  that  this  arrangement  between  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
and  Mr.  Morgan  was  one  between  brothers-in-law." 

Five  thousand  carbines  belonging  to  the  Government 
were  sold  to  a  private  individual  for  $3.50  apiece,  and 
were  immediately  repurchased  for  the  Government  for  $22 
apiece,  making  a  difference  on  this  one  transaction  of 
nearly  $90,000.  One  lot  of  these  carbines  suffered  this 
process  of  sale  and  repurchase  twice.  They  were  first  sold 
by  the  Government  at  a  price  merely  nominal,  and  were 
repurchased  at  $15  apiece.  They  were  again  sold  by  the 
Government  at  the  price  above  stated,  of  $3.50,  and  again 
repurchased  at  $22.  How  many  other  times  these  arms 
did  service  under  the  purchase  and  sale  treatment,  or 
whether  they  ever  did  service  in  the  field,  did  not  appear. 

A  certain  contractor  testified  that  he  furnished  supplies 
to  the  Government  to  the  amount  of  $800,000,  on  which 
he  made  a  profit  of  over  forty  per  cent.  The  purchases 
from  him  were  made  in  direct  violation  of  law.  Two  pol- 
iticians in  New  York,  one  of  them  an  old  personal  and 
political  friend  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  had  $2,000,000 
of  Government  money  placed  in  a  private  banking-house, 
subject  to  their  order  for  the  purchase  of  supplies,  in  vio- 
lation of  law :  $250,000  of  this  money  they  spent  with- 
out ever  accounting  for  any  of  it.  It  was  in  evidence  that 
of  this  amount  $10,000  was  paid  for  a  large  quantity  of 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  79 

groceries  supplied  by  a  dealer  in  hardware.  And  another 
sum  of  over  $20,000  was  paid  for  "  straw  hats  and  linen 
trousers."  But  no  one  in  the  array  saw  any  of  our  troops 
decked  in  this  fantastic  costume.  Within  the  period  of 
one  month  $151,000  was  paid  for  fortifications  which 
were  to  be  constructed  at  St.  Louis,  before  even  the  con- 
tract for  doing  the  work  ^as  executed.  Two  steamers 
were  purchased  by  a  friend  of  high  Government  officials 
for  about  $100,000,  and  were  immediately  sold  to  the 
Government  for  $200,000.  One  steamer  was  chartered  to 
the  Government  for  $2500  a  day,  and  the  Government  paid 
$135,000  for  a  period  in.  which  she  lay  at  a  wharf  before 
she  was  ever  once  used.  One  railroad  company  received 
for  transportation  in  one  year  from  the  Government  over 
$3,500,000,  being  an  excess  over  the  company's  entire 
earnings  for  the  previous  year  of  $1,350,000,  or  about 
forty  per  cent.  And  the  rates  charged  for  this  transpor- 
tation were  about  thirty-three  and  one-third  per  cent,  in 
excess  of  the  rates  paid  by  private  individuals.  The  broth- 
er-in-law of  the  president  of  this  railroad  company  was 
Mr.  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  War. 

These  are  merely  single  instances  of  the  way  in  which 
the  people's  money  was  wasted  by  the  party  leaders  and 
their  political  supporters. 

That  was  not  all.  In  every  war,  under  any  form  of 
government,  there  has  generally  been  more  or  less  waste 
of  the  public  money.  It  remained  for  the  great  republic 
of  modern  times  to  give  to  the  world  the  most  unique 
exhibition  of  campaigning  recorded  in  history.  Not  only 
did  we  waste  our  own  men  and  money,  but  we  fed  and 
clothed  the  army  of  the  enemy  we  were  fighting.  The 
Confederate  forces  got  the  very  supplies  which  kept  them 
in  the  field  by  trade  carried  on  through  the  lines  under 


80  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

written  permits  given  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States. 

The  report  of  a  Congressional  committee  states  :* 

"  The  testimony  before  the  committee  discloses  the  shameless  and 
treasonable  character  of  the  trade  which  has  been  carried  on  within 
the  rebel  lines  with  rebel  agents,  and  for  the  use  of  rebel  armies. 
The  amount  of  supplies  necessary  for  the  support  of  rebel  armies, 
which,  under  the  cover  of  this  trade,  has  been  sent  through  the  rebel 
lines  at  New  Orleans,  Memphis,  Norfolk,  and  other  places,  almost  sur- 
passes belief.  Negotiations  have  been  entered  into  and  correspond- 
ence carried  on  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  with  rebel  agents  to 
deliver  for  the  rebel  government  provisions  and  other  necessary  ar- 
ticles to  sustain  the  rebel  armies  in  return  for  cotton." 

And  the  report  adds : 

"General  Canby  states  that  the  rebel  armies  east  and  west  of 
the  Mississippi  River  have  been  mainly  supplied  for  the  last  twelve 
months  by  the  unlawful  trade  carried  on  on  that  river."f 

*  Report  on  "  Trade  with  Rebellious  States,"  Thirty-eighth  Con- 
gress, Second  Session,  House  of  Representatives  Report,  No.  24. 

f  Here  is  a  specimen  of  the  permits  under  which  this  trade  was 
carried  on : 

"  An  authorized  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department  having,  with 
the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  contracted  for  the  cot- 
ton above  mentioned,  and  the  parties  having  agreed  to  sell  and  de- 
liver the  same  to  said  agent, 

"It  is  ordered  that  the  cotton,  moving  in  compliance  with  and  for 
fulfilment  of  said  contract,  and  being  transported  to  said  agent,  or 
under  his  direction,  shall  be  free  from  seizure  or  detention  by  any 
officer  of  the  Government ;  and  commandants  of  military  departments, 
districts,  posts,  and  detachments,  naval  stations,  gunboats,  flotillas, 
and  fleets,  will  observe  this  order,  and  give  the  said  *  *  *  their 
agents,  transports,  and  means  of  transportation,  free  and  unobstruct- 
ed passage,  for  the  purpose  of  getting  said  cotton,  or  any  part  there- 
of, through  the  lines,  and  safe  conduct  within  our  lines,  while  the 
same  is  moving,  in  compliance  with  regulations  of  the  Secretary  of 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  81 

But  party  influence  went  further  than  controlling  the 
Treasury  and  the  War  and  Navy  departments.  It  con- 
trolled the  appointment  of  our  generals.  Politicians  as- 
pired to  the  glory  of  the  soldier.  They  were  men  without 
either  education  or  experience.  One  of  them  at  least  had 
never  in  his  life  so  much  as  handled  a  battalion  or  a  com- 
pany on  a  parade  ground.  Men  of  this  kind  were  given 
general's  commissions  and  the  command  of  armies;  and 
through  their  ignorance  and  incapacity  thousands  of  better 
men  than  themselves  lost  their  lives. 

But  party  influence  interfered  with  the  management  of 
our  armies  in  the  field.  General  M'Clellan  may  or  may 
not  have  been  a  great  general.  It  is  certain  that  he  never 
was  allowed  to  fight  his  campaigns  in  his  own  way.  He 
should  have  been  allowed  to  fight  them  in  his  own  way  or 
not  at  all.  Intriguing  party  leaders,  for  party  reasons,  did 
everything  that  could  be  done  to  hinder  his  success. 

The  affairs  of  the  Government  in  all  departments, 
throughout  the  war,  were  managed  by  party  men  on  true 
party  principles — that  is,  the  people's  offices  were  used,  not 
for  the  service  of  the  people,  but  for  the  service  of  party, 
to  reward  party  men  for  party  work.  One  party  is  no 
better  and  no  worse  than  another.  It  is  the  natural  result 
of  our  system  of  party  rule. 

Let  us  see,  if  we  can,  what  was  the  cost  to  the  people  of 
the  United  States  of  these  party  methods. 

In  the  nine  years — 1862  to  1870,  both  inclusive — during 
which  came  the  war  of  the  rebellion,  our  general  govern- 
ment alone  spent  more  than  $5,500,000,000.  From  the 


the  Treasury,  and  for  fulfilment  of  said  contract  with  the  agent  of 
the  Government.  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

Committee  Report  No.  24,  Second  Session  Thirty-eighth  Congress. 
4* 


82  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

organization  of  the  national  government  down  to  the  year 
1862,  there  had  been  only  two  years  when  its  expenditures 
reached  the  figure  of  $74,000,000.  At  that  rate  of  former 
years,  we  may  assume  that  the  ordinary  expenditures  of 
those  nine  years,  without  any  war  expenses,  would  have 
been  in  all  not  more  than  $600,000,000.  The  difference 
between  these  two  amounts,  about  $4,900,000,000,  stands 
for  a  part  of  the  cost  of  the  war  of  the  rebellion  in  mere 
money.  But,  aside  from  these  expenditures  of  the  national 
government,  there  were  immense  sums  of  money  paid  out 
by  the  States  and  cities  and  towns  all  over  the  country  for 
war  purposes.  And  the  disbursements  for  the  war  have 
not,  even  in  1879,  all  yet  been  made.  Five  thousand  mill- 
ions of  dollars  is  doubtless  far  within  the  figures  of  the 
money  expenditure  for  the  war  made  by  the  general  gov- 
ernment alone. 

At  least  one-half  that  amount  of  money,  $2, 500,000,000, 
was  simply  thrown  away,  or  stolen,  through  the  incompe- 
tency  or  dishonesty  of  our  public  officials. '  From  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end  of  the  war  the  waste  of  the  people's 
money  was  utterly  unchecked.  General  Schofield,  as  high 
authority  as  could  be  cited,  has  written  :* 

"  It  is  capable  of  demonstration,  to  the  satisfaction  of  any  average 
military  mind,  that  our  late  war  might  have  been  brought  to  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion  in  two  years  instead  of  four,  and  at  half  the  cost 
in  men  and  money,  if  any  one  soldier  of  fair  ability  had  been  given 
the  absolute  control  of  military  operations,  and  of  the  necessary  mil- 
itary resources  of  the  country." 

Every  intelligent  man  who  saw  anything  of  the  way  in 
which  the  war  was  carried  on  knows  that  to  be  a  moderate 
statement. 

*  Cited  in  "  The  Army  of  the  United  States,"  by  General  J.  A. 
Garfield,  North  American  Review,  May-June,  1878. 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  83 

Every  one  will  admit  that  we  began  the  war  under  great 
difficulties  —  that  an  immense  army  was  to  be  organized 
and  supplied,  and  that  the  machinery  for  that  purpose  was 
not  then  in  working  order  to  organize  and  supply  it.  But 
who  was  the  proper  man  to  be  placed  in  charge  of  this 
enormous  work  of  organizing  and  supplying  this  great 
army  which  was  to  fight  for  national  existence — a  party 
politician,  or  an  honest  and  capable  soldier  ? 

Mr.  Lincoln's  opinion  of  his  Secretary,  of  his  "familiar 
adviser,"  was  strictly  accurate,  as  Mr.  Lincoln  well  knew, 
when  he  placed  him  at  the  head  of  the  War  Department. 
Take  the  most  charitable  view  that  we  can  of  that  appoint- 
ment, and  is  it  anything  more  or  less  than  the  fulfilment 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  an  agreement  to 
sell  an  office  ? 

But  wherein  consisted  really  the  greatest  injury  to  the 
people's  interests  and  the  people's  conscience  ?  Perhaps 
not  in  the  mere  making  or  performing  of  an  agreement  to 
appoint,  but  in  the  character  of  the  appointment.  Lord 
Bacon  admitted  that  he  took  bribes,  but  claimed,  by  way 
of  defence,  that  he  always  gave  just  decrees.  If  Mr.  Lin- 
coln could  have  said  to  the  people,  "  It  is  true  that  my 
friends  bought  votes  for  me  at  the  nominating  convention 
by  promising  that  I  should  appoint  Mr.  Cameron  to  the 
War  Department,  and  I,  knowing  the  terms  of  the  pur- 
chase, have  taken  the  votes  and  paid  the  price.  Buying 
votes  is  indeed  a  bad  thing.  But  then  Mr.  Cameron  is,  of 
all  men,  the  one  most  fit  to  fill  that  high  office  now  in  my 
gift.  And  by  my  oath  of  office,  which  weighs  heavily  on 
my  conscience,  I  am  bound  to  appoint  him  for  his  great 
fitness,  and  so  I  must  do  " — the  position  would  be  different. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  at  last  compelled  to  summarily  dismiss 
his  Secretary.  And,  of  course,  the  dismissal  was  made  in 


84  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

terms  fitting  the  conduct  which  had  been  its  cause.     Here 
are  its  words: 

"Hon.  SIMON  CAMERON,  Secretary  of  War: 

"  DEAR  SIR, — I  have  this  day  appointed  Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton  to 
be  Secretary  of  War,  and  you  to  be  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  Rus- 
sia. Very  truly,  A.  LINCOLN."* 

That  was  not  the  end.  The  'dismissed  Secretary  wished 
to  have  it  appear  on  the  record  that  he  had  not  been  dis- 
missed at  all,  that  he  had  voluntarily  resigned  his  office, 
that  his  resignation  had  been  honorably  accepted,  and  that 
he  had  been  honorably  appointed  to  another  position, 
where  he,  a  man  of  high  personal  worth,  was  fitly  to  repre- 
sent a  great  nation  at  an  imperial  court.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  he  had  not  resigned.  To  make  it  appear  so,  it  would 
be  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  falsification  of  the 
correspondence  between  himself  and  the  President,  of  the 
records  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  And  more 
than  that,  it  was  necessary  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  should  be  a  party  to  this  falsification  of  public 
records. 

I  take  from  the  same  biographer  the  account  of  the  next 
scene,  as  given  from  the  witness  to  the  earlier  incidents. 

Colonel  M'Clure  says  :f 

"  In  my  presence  the  proposition  was  made  and  determined  upon 
to  ask  Lincoln  to  allow  a  letter  of  resignation  to  be  antedated,  and  to 
write  a  kind  acceptance  of  the  same  in  reply.  The  effort  was  made, 
in  which  Mr.  Chase  joined,  although  perhaps  ignorant  of  all  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case,  and  it  succeeded.  The  record  shows  that  Mr. 
Cameron  voluntarily  resigned,  while  in  point  of  fact  he  was  sum- 
marily removed  without  notice." 

*  Lamon's  "Life  of  Lincoln,"  p.  461. 
f  Ibid.,  p.  462. 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  85 

How  did  it  happen  that  Mr.  Lincoln,  a  man  of  the  most 
honest  intentions,  and  moved  at  all  times  by  the  purest 
wishes  for  the  people's  good,  appointed  to  office  corrupt 
men,  knowing  them  to  be  corrupt ;  that  the  stealing  of 
money  and  the  waste  of  life,  which  he  could  have  made 
impossible  by  the  mere  giving  or  withholding  his  name  on 
paper,  went  on  without  intermission  from  the  beginning 
of  the  war  to  the  end,  with  his  knowledge,  and  with  no 
substantial  interference  on  his  part  ? 

With  all  his  high  purposes,  with  all  his  great  eloquence, 
and  with  all  the  wisdom  and  shrewdness  which  Mr.  Lin- 
coln undoubtedly  had,  and  whatever  may  have  been  his 
theories  as  to  the  duties  of  a  President  of  the  United 
States,  in  practice  he  always  regarded  party  interests  in  his 
official  action.  His  appointments  were  party  appoint- 
ments. In  law,  he,  the  President  of  the  United  States,  had 
in  his  hands  power  which  he  was  bound  to  use  with  a 
view  only  to  the  people's  good.  In  fact,  he  gave  the  use 
of  this  power  to  the  party  men  who  surrounded  him,  to 
be  used  for  party  interests.  That  he  intended  to  use  his 
power  wrongly  for  his  own  interest,  no  fair  man  can  be- 
lieve. That  he  allowed  his  power  to  be  used  for  the  in- 
terests of  his  party,  and  to  the  great  injury  of  the  inter- 
ests of  the  people,  no  fair  man  can  doubt. 

The  war  was  ended.  The  most  remarkable  state  of  af- 
fairs that  has  ever  been  seen  in  history  called  for  wise  ac- 
tion. One  race — men  of  free  blood,  of  free  lives — had  been 
conquered.  They  had  been  conquered,  not  by  a  foreign 
tyrant,  but  by  a  free  Government,  against  which  they  had 
rebelled ;  and  they  were  to  keep  their  freedom.  Another 
race,  of  slaves,  were  to  be  made  free.  They  had  got  their 
freedom  at  the  gift  of  the  conquerors  of  their  old  masters. 
And  these  slaves  and  their  old  masters  were  to  live  on  the 


86  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

same  soil,  and  have  the  same  rights  under  the  law.  These 
two  races  had  been  deadly  foes,  and  they  were  to  be 
made  into  one  people  under  the  same  laws,  if  that  could  be 
done.  The  task  no  doubt  was  a  hard  one;  it  needed  wise 
rulers  and  the  help  of  all  men.  It  was  the  great  work  to 
be  done  by  the  administration  of  President  Grant.  Let  us 
see  how  that  administration  gives  its  teachings. 

Here  was  another  President,  a  man  of  thoroughly  hon- 
est intentions,  a  man  of  great  strength  of  will,  who  had 
done  the  people  great  service,  who  began  his  administra- 
tion with  at  least  an  attempt  to  perform  the  duties  of  his 
office  to  the  best  of  his  ability.  Especially  it  was  clear 
that  President  Grant  at  the  outset  of  his  term  had  strong 
prejudices  against  the  professional  party  men,  and  intend- 
ed not  to  be  guided  by  them  in  his  official  action. 

No  man  can  fail  to  be  influenced  by  his  surroundings. 
President  Grant  was  no  exception  to  the  general  rule. 
There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  he  at  any  time  changed 
his  principles,  or  that  he  had  in  any  part  of  his  service  as 
President  any  intention  to  do  anything  other  than  what 
he  thought  his  duty.  But  he,  too,  submitted,  as  have  all 
Presidents  in  late  years,  to  the  control  of  the  party  leaders, 
as  nearly  as  can  be  gathered  from  his  actions.  Some  of 
the  events  during  his  term  of  office  are  pertinent  to  this 
part  of  the  discussion,  and  will  be  here  given ;  and  the  at- 
tempt will  be  made  to  examine  only  such  matters  as  admit 
of  no  real  difference  of  opinion. 

In  the  State  of  Louisiana  there  was,  in  the  year  18*72,  a 
bitter  contest  for  the  control  of  the  State  government  be- 
tween the  two  prominent  political  parties.  There  was  a 
dispute  as  to  the  office  of  governor,  whether  the  Repub- 
lican or  Democratic  candidate  was  elected.  A  suit  was 
brought  in  the  United  States  Court  by  the  Republican 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  87 

candidate  for  that  office  of  governor.  A  committee  of 
the  United  States  Senate,  of  whom  a  majority  were  Re- 
publicans, and  who  cannot  be  presumed  to  have  been  un- 
duly opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  Republican  executive 
and  cabinet,  reported,  as  to  this  suit  in  the  United  States 
Court,  as  follows : 

"  It  is  at  least  questionable  whether  this  bill  on  its  face  presented 
a  case  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal  court.  *  *  *  Conceding, 
however,  that  the  bill  did  present  a  case  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court,  that  jurisdiction  was  limited  by  the  scope  of  the  bill,  and 
gave  no  warrant  to  the  extraordinary  proceedings  which  were  subse- 
quently had  in  the  case.  The  subsequent  attempt  of  the  court,  on  a 
bill  in  equity,  to  determine  the  title  of  Warmouth,  Wharton,  and  oth- 
ers to  act  as  State  canvassers,  was  a  matter  wholly  beyond  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Federal  courts." 

The  fact  that  the  Federal  court  had  no  jurisdiction  did 
not,  however,  hinder  a  United  States  judge  from  making 
an  order  which  gave  final  judgment,  before  the  defendant 
was  ever  brought  into  court,  declaring  one  board  of  can- 
vassers to  be  illegally  constituted,  and  forbidding  them 
to  take  any  official  action  on  the  returns.  The  order,  al- 
though made  by  a  judge,  was,  in  point  of  law,  worth  pre- 
cisely the  paper  on  which  it  was  written. 

This  order  was  followed  by  another,  made  equally  in 
defiance  of  law,  of  which  the  same  Senate  committee  say : 

"  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  a  more  irregular,  illegal,  and  in 
every  way  inexcusable  act  on  the  part  of  the  judge.  Conceding  the 
power  of  the  court  to  make  such  an  order,  the  judge  out  of  court 
had  no  more  authority  to  make  it  than  the  marshal.  It  had  not 
even  the  form  of  judicial  process.  It  was  not  sealed,  nor  was  it 
signed  by  the  clerk,  and  had  no  more  legal  effect  than  an  order  sign- 
ed by  any  private  citizen." 

The  Senate  committee  say  further : 


88  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

"  Viewed  in  any  light  in  which  your  committee  can  consider  them, 
the  order  and  injunction  made  and  granted  by  Judge  Durell  in  this 
cause  are  most  reprehensible,  erroneous  in  point  of  law,  and  are 
wholly  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction." 

The  order,  of  which  the  committee  used  these  words,  di- 
rected the  United  States  Marshal  to 

"  forthwith  take  possession  of  the  building  known  as  the  Mechanics' 
Institute,  and  occupied  as  the  State- House,  for  the  assembling  therein 
of  the  Legislature  in  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  and  hold  the  same  sub- 
ject to  tfa  further  order  of  this  court,  and  meantime  to  prevent  all  un- 
lawful assemblages  therein." 

This  order  was  signed,  or  claimed  to  have  been  signed,  at 
midnight  of  the  5th  December,  1872.  On  the  3d  Decem- 
ber, 1872,  the  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  in 
Washington  telegraphed  the  following  message : 

"  Department  of  Justice,  December  3d,  1872. 
"  S.  B.  PACKARD,  V.  S.  Marshal, 

New  Orleans,  La. : 

"You  are  to  enforce  the  decrees  and  mandates  of  the  United 
States  Courts,  no  matter  by  whom  resisted  ;  and  General  Emory  will 
furnish  you  with  all  necessary  troops  for  that  purpose. 

"  GEO.  H.  WaLiAMS,  Attorney-General.'1'' 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  conclude  that  this  telegraphic 
despatch  was  sent  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  used. 
The  purpose  for  which  it  was  used  was  the  execution 
of  the  "  void  "  order  just  given.  And  that  was  the  only 
"mandate"  there  was  to  be  "enforced."  The  use  that 
was  made  of  this  "  void  order  "  was  forthwith  telegraphed 
to  the  President  of  the  United  States  by  his  brother-in- 
law,  one  of  the  men  who  used  it,  in  these  words : 

"  New  Orleans,  December  6th,  1872. 

"  PRESIDENT  GRANT, — Marshal  Packard  took  possession  of  the  State 
House  this  morning  with  a  military  posse,  in  obedience  to  a  mandate 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  89 

of  the  Circuit  Court.  *  *  *  Decree  of  the  court  just  rendered  declares 
Warmouth's  returniug-board  illegal.  *  *  *  The  decree  was  sweep- 
ing in  its  provisions,  and  if  enforced,  will  save  the  Republican  ma- 
jority, and  give  Louisiana  a  Republican  Legislature  and  State  Govern- 
ment. *  *  *  JAS/F.  CASEY." 

The  legally  elected  Governor  of  the  State  of  Louisiana, 
who  was  hindered  by  the  United  States  troops,  acting  un- 
der this  void  "  mandate  "  of  a  United  States  judge,  from 
exercising  the  duties  of  his  office,  telegraphed  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  in  these  words : 

"  His  Excellency  U.  S.  GRANT, 

President  of  the  United  States  : 

"Claiming  to  be  Governor  elect  of  this  State,  I  beg  you,  in  the 
name  of  all  justice,  to  suspend  recognition  of"  either  of  the  dual  gov- 
ernments now  in  operation  here,  until  there  can  be  laid  before  you 
all  facts  and  both  sides  touching  the  legitimacy  of  either  govern- 
ment. The  people  denying  the  legitimacy  of  Pinchback's  govern- 
ment and  its  legislature  simply  ask  to  be  heard,  through  committees 
of  many  of  our  best  citizens  on  eve  of  departure  for  Washington, 
before  you  recognize  the  one  or  the  other  of  said  governments.  I  do 
not  believe  we  will  be  condemned  before  we  are  fully  heard." 

The  President  of  the  United  States  made  no  answer 
whatever  to  the  respectful  written  communication  of  the 
Governor  elect  of  the  State  of  Louisiana.  His  Attorney- 
General,  however,  presumably  by  the  President's  directions, 
sent  the  following  reply  : 

"  Hon.  JOHN  M'ENERY, — Your  visit  with  a  hundred  citizens  will  be 
unavailing,  so  far  as  the  President  is  concerned.  His  decision  is  made, 
and  cannot  be  changed ;  and  the  sooner  it  is  acquiesced  in,  the  soon- 
er good  order  and  peace  will  be  restored. 

"GEO.  H.  WILLIAMS,  Attorney- General." 

Who  can  say  that  in  these  one  hundred  years  no  discov- 
eries have  been  made  in  constitutional  procedure  ?  In  an- 


90  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

cient  times  it  took  years  and  a  war  to  crush  a  government. 
It  was  here  done  in  less  than  twenty  days,  without  a  drop 
of  blood,  by  a  piece  of  paper  called  a  "  mandate "  of  a 
court.  And  with  what  ease !  Courts  in  former  years 
were  in  the  habit  of  hearing  argument  with  parties  before 
them.  They  took  time  to  deliberate  and  render  judgment. 
Here  everything  was  done  without  any  of  the  tedious  de- 
lays, any  of  the  weary  wrangles  attending  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  in  ancient  times  and  under  ancient  forms. 
Judgment  was  given  in  the  presence  of  only  one  party — 
the  sworn  testimony  before  the  Congressional  committee 
went  so  far  as  to  say,  in  the  presence  of  neither  party. 

In  the  same  State,  at  a  later  period,  the  members  of  one 
'House  of  the  State  Legislature  were  expelled  from  their 
place  of  meeting  by  the  troops  of  the  United  States,  act- 
ing under  orders  from  the  department  at  Washington. 

In  1867  the  Governor  of  the  same  State  was  "removed 
from  office,"  and  another  governor  appointed,  by  a  com- 
mon army  order  of  a  general  of  United  States  forces. 

And  so  late  as  the  year  1875,  General  Sheridan,  of  the 
United  States  army,  sent  to  the  Secretary  of  War  a  de- 
spatch containing  the  following  words : 

"  I  think  that  the  terrorism  now  existing  in  Louisiana,  Mississippi, 
and  Arkansas  could  be  entirely  removed,  and  confidence  and  fair 
dealing  established,  by  the  arrest  and  trial  of  the  ringleaders  of  the 
armed  white  leagues.  If  Congress  woidd  pass  a  bill  declaring  them 
banditti,  tlicy  could  be  tried  by  a  military  commission.'1'1 

This  despatch  meant  that  United  States  citizens  should 
be  hung  or  shot  without  a  trial  by  a  court  and  jury.  Gen- 
eral Sheridan  is  a  great  cavalryman,  but  a  poor  lawyer,  and 
no  statesman  at  all.  He  is  a  wonderful  man  in  his  place 
— on  the  field  of  battle.  His  action  was  what  might  have 
been  expected  from  an  impulsive  soldier.  From  the  Pros- 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  91 

ident  of  the  United  States  and  his  cabinet,  however,  the 
country,  of  course,  looked  for  wise  and  temperate  counsels, 
and  of  course  the  country  had  them.     The  answer  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  this  despatch  was  as  follows : 
"  Gen.  P.  H.  SHERIDAN,  New  Orleans,  La.  : 

"  Your  telegram  is  received.  The  President  and  all  of  us  have 
full  confidence,  and  thoroughly  approve  your  course." 

And  the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  a  message  to 
Congress,  said  of  this  proposed  course  of  General  Sheridan : 

"  He  never  proposed  to  do  an  illegal  act,  nor  expressed  a  determina- 
tion to  proceed  beyond  what  the  law  might  authorize  for  the  punishment 
of  the  crimes  which  had  been  committed,  and  the  commission  of 
which  cannot  be  successfully  denied." 

Lawyers  in  this  country  had  been  in  the  habit  of  be- 
lieving that  it  was  not  within  the  power  of  a  general  of 
the  army  to  shoot  citizens  of  the  United  States  without  a 
fair  trial  in  a  court.  It  is  well  that  they  should  be  advised 
of  their  errors  by  a  great  publicist. 

These  are  single  cases.  The  political  history  of  the 
United  States  in  the  years  since  the  war  has  been  a  long 
story  of  corruption  and  misconduct  on  the  part  of  public 
officers. 

Since  the  year  1870,  we  have  spent  on  our  navy  alone 
over  $180,000,000,  for  which  we  ought  to  have  an  effi- 
cient fleet  of  war  vessels.  We  have  nothing  whatever  to 
show  for  it.  The  money  has  been  simply  thrown  away. 
The  account  given  in  1874  by  Admiral  Porter  of  the  con- 
dition of  our  navy  is  now  as  true  as  it  was  then.  He 
then  wrote  :* 

"  I  may  therefore  say  that  our  navy,  as  compared  with  others,  is 

*  Report  Admiral  D.  D.  Porter,  printed  with  the  Report  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy,  Dec.  1st,  1874,  pp.  199-201. 


92  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

like  a  foot-soldier  armed  with  a  pistol,  encountering  a  mounted  man 
clad  in  armor  and  carrying  a  breech-loading  rifle.  It  would  be  easy 
to  imagine  how  little  chance  the  man  on  foot  would  have  should  a 
conflict  occur.  *  *  * 

"  There  is  not  a  navy  in  the  world  that  is  not  in  advance  of  us  as 
regards  ships  and  guns,  and  I,  in  common  with  the  older  officers  of 
the  service,  feel  an  anxiety  on  the  subject  which  can  only  be  appre- 
ciated by  those  who  have  to  command  fleets  and  take  them  into 
battle. 

"  If  called  upon  at  this  time  to  command  the  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States,  in  case  of  hostilities,  a  position  which  it  is  my  ambition 
and  my  right  to  fill,  I  should  be  put  to  my  wit's  end  to  succeed  with 
such  an  incongruous  set  of  vessels  as  we  now  possess.  Prudence 
would  probably  recommend  that  they  be  shut  up  in  port,  and  no  fleet 
operations  be  attempted  with  them;  sending  the  wooden  vessels 
abroad  singly,  to  do  all  the  damage  possible  until  captured  by  the 
enemy ;  our  fifty-gun  frigates  perhaps  succumbing  to  a  two-gun  clip- 
per armed  with  ten-inch  rifles,  and  our  small  cruisers  driven  off  by 
merchant  vessels  carrying  rifle-guns  of  lesser  calibre. 

"  This  is  no  exaggeration.  It  is  simply  what  will  occur  when  we 
go  to  war,  and  it  would  be  much  better  to  have  no  navy  at  all  than 
one  like  the  present — half-armed  and  with  only  half  speed — unless 
we  inform  the  world  that  our  establishment  is  only  intended  for 
times  of  peace,  and  to  protect  the  missionaries  against  South  Sea 
savages  and  Eastern  fanatics." 

The  revenue  legislation  of  the  country  and  the  action 
of  executive  departments  have,  in  repeated  instances,  been 
framed  and  guided  in  the  interest  of  informers  and  spies, 
to  enable  them  to  plunder  honorable  merchants.  Officers 
of  the  law,  whose  duty  it  was  to  protect  the  citizen,  have 
used  their  power  to  extort  money  from  honest  men.  It 
is  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  members  of  Con- 
gress have  been  paid  for  their  votes.  It  is  matter  of  re- 
corded testimony  that  judges  of  our  highest  courts  have 
corruptly  received  money,  in  bank-notes,  the  currency  of 
thieves.  In  one  form  or  another  the  party  politicians,  in 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  93 

late  years,  have  been  accumulating  fortunes  by  plundering 
the  people.  In  the  feudal  times  the  kings  of  England, 
ruling  by  divine  right,  raised  their  revenues  by  force,  in 
open  violation  of  the  law.  In  our  own  day  and  country, 
the  rulers  chosen  by  a  free  people  levy  taxes,  under  the 
law,  and  steal  the  money  that  is  paid  into  the  public  treas- 
ury. The  methods  only  have  changed. 

Finally,  in  the  great  commercial  metropolis  of  the  Unit- 
ed States,  the  science  of  party  politics  reached  its  highest 
development  and  its  perfect  fruit. 

There  had  been  in  New  York,  as  elsewhere,  nominally 
two  political  parties.  But  centralization  was  the  oi'der  of 
the  day.  It  surely  was  a  discovery  of  genius  that  one  man 
should  manage  both  parties.  On  the  surface,  in  the  city 
of  New  York,  there  were  apparently  bitter  contests  be- 
tween Republicans  and  Democrats.  Intelligent  citizens 
were  deluded  with  the  idea  that  there  really  were  two  sets 
of  party  men,  who  were  battling  earnestly  and  honestly 
for  great  political  principles.  The  statesmen  of  the  city 
of  New  York,  calling  themselves  by  two  sets  of  names, 
would  appear  before  the  public,  make  their  party  platforms 
and  resolutions,  denounce  one  another's  political  sins,  and 
then  quietly  and  copiously  dine  and  wine  together,  make 
up  together  their  lists  of  candidates  for  public  office,  and 
arrange  together  with  accuracy  how  the  repeaters  should 
roll  up  the  majorities.  And  after  honest  citizens  had  cast 
their  ballots  for  the  candidates  placed  before  them,  with 
an  innocent  idea  that  they  were  in  some  vague  way  or 
other  enjoying  the  franchises  of  free  government,  the  men 
who  arranged  the  scenery  and  characters  of  the  play  pro- 
ceeded to  plunder  the  public  treasury,  and  rob  private  in- 
dividuals. 

These  men,  who  controlled  political  affairs  in  the  city  of 


94  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

New  York,  established  as  thorough  a  tyranny  as  has  been 
seen  in  any  civilized  country  in  many  years.  Neither  life, 
liberty,  nor  property  was  safe.  One  prominent  member  of 
the  New  York  bar  was  struck  down  in  the  street  and  left 
for  dead,  because,  as  was  believed,  he  had  made  himself 
too  prominent  in  his  opposition  to  the  schemes  of  certain 
powerful  men  in  the  city  of  New  York.  Another  was 
put  iu  prison,  without  bail,  for  honestly  protecting  the 
property  of  other  men  that  had  been  trusted  to  his  care. 
Corporation  elections  were  carried  by  corrupt  orders  of 
the  courts.  Bankers'  offices  were  entered  in  broad  day- 
light, and  securities  taken  from  them  under  the  process  of 
a  Court  of  Chancery.  The  high  prerogative  writ  of  habeas 
corpus,  the  great  bulwark  provided  by  the  English  com- 
mon law  for  the  liberty  of  the  subject,  was  used  for  the 
discharge  from  prison  of  convicted  criminals.  The  reme- 
dial process  of  a  Court  of  Equity,  originally  designed  for 
the  preservation  of  property  for  its  rightful  owners,  was 
used  for  the  purpose  of  taking  it  from  them  and  giving 
it  to  thieves.  As  we  now  look  back  on  it,  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  in  the  city  of  New  York  a  few  years 
since  has  an  aspect  almost  ludicrous.  It  was  not  then  lu- 
dicrous. In  England  the  courts  had  at  times  been  made 
the  means  of  political  oppression,  but  they  had  been  cre- 
ated, and  had  in  the  main  been  used,  for  the  purpose  of 
doing  justice  between  man  and  man,  and  of  protecting 
property.  To  use  them  for  the  purpose  of  simple  steal- 
ing— that  was  an  achievement  reserved  for  the  statesmen 
of  a  free  democracy  in  the  nineteenth  century. 

The  results  of  the  last  Presidential  election  give  us  the 
latest  instance  of  the  legitimate  workings  of  party  and 
party  rule. 

We  have  in  the  Presidential  office  a  man  as  to  whose 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  95 

strict  personal  honesty  no  one  has  a  doubt.  He  began  his 
administration  by  calling  to  his  cabinet  men  of  honor  and 
ability.  He,  too,  made  it  clear  that  his  intention  was,  in 
his  official  action,  not  to  be  guided  by  the  wishes  of  party 
schemers.  He  was  elected  to  his  office  for  the  reason  that 
the  people  believed  he  was  going  to  give  them  civil  ser- 
vice reform.  He  begins  his  administration  with  a  declara- 
tion that  there  are  to  be  no  removals  from  office  for  mere 
party  reasons.  Every  honest  man  throughout  the  country 
applauds  him.  Sound  principle  and  consistency  both  re- 
quire, too,  that  there  should  be  no  appointments  to  office 
for  mere  party  reasons.  He  follows  this  declaration  with 
an  order  (in  effect)  that  executive  officers  shall  not  take 
any  part  in  influencing  elections.  Again,  every  honest 
man  applauds  him.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  wisdom 
of  his  action.  At  least  he  has  none.  In  England,  so  long 
ago  as  1779,  the  British  House  of  Commons  resolved  that 
"  it  is  highly  criminal  in  any  minister  or  ministers,  or  oth- 
er servants  under  the  Crown  of  Great  Britain,  directly  or 
indirectly,  to  use  the  powers  of  office  in  the  election  of 
representatives  to  serve  in  Parliament,  and  an  attempt  at 
such  influence  will  at  all  times  be  resented  by  this  House 
as  aimed  at  its  own  honor,  dignity,  and  independence,  and 
as  an  infringement  of  the  dearest  rights  of  every  subject 
throughout  the  empire,  and  tending  to  sap  the  basis  of 
this  free  and  happy  constitution."  The  present  President, 
before  his  election,  announced  his  determination  to  serve 
in  any  event  for  only  one  term.  If  he  had  the  capacity 
and  honesty  to  serve  the  people  well,  his  services  would, 
indeed,  at  the  end  of  one  term  merely  begin  to  have  their 
value.  And  then,  if  ever,  should  they  be  at  the  people's 
command.  But  having  made  and  announced  that  deci- 
sion, he  has  no  personal  ends  to  serve,  no  fears  of  party 


96  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

men  to  influence  him.  And  he  has  all  the  power.  He 
has  not  changed  his  mind  as  to  his  duty.  No  new  expe- 
rience has  shown  him  the  folly  of  his  own  opinion  or  of 
British  legislation.  He  was  elected  to  office,  not  because 
the  people  at  large  knew  him  to  be  a  great  man,  for  they 
knew  nothing  of  him  at  all,  but  because  they  believed  him 
to  be  an  honest  man,  and  that  he  would  honestly  carry  out 
his  promises  of  giving  them  a  pure  civil  service.  They 
still  believe  him  to  be  honest. 

But  the  one  thing  that  he  promised  to  do  he  has  not 
done. 

Civil  service  reform  meant  only  that  public  servants 
were  to  be  appointed  for  nothing  whatever  but  their  fit- 
ness. A  very  large  number  of  the  men  who  had  to  do 
with  carrying  the  election  in  certain  doubtful  States  in  fa- 
vor of  the  present  President  have  been  appointed  by  that 
President  to  offices  under  the  general  Government.  Who 
is  there  that  believes  that  these  appointments  have  been 
made  for  the  fitness  of  the  men  ?  Most  men  believe  that 
these  appointments  have  been  made  because  of  some  agree- 
ment or  understanding  that,  if  certain  votes  were  counted 
in  a  certain  way,  the  men  who  did  the  counting  should  be 
paid  for  it — with  the  people's  offices.  No  one  thinks  the 
President  made  the  bargain.  He  only  took  its  fruits,  and 
paid  the  price. 

And  the  main  feature  of  the  last  Presidential  election  is 
this,  that  the  unelccted  candidate  is  charged  with  having 
made  an  attempt,  which  failed,  to  buy  electoral  votes  with 
his  own  money,  and  the  elected  President  is  believed  to 
have  paid  for  electoral  votes  with  the  people's  offices. 

For  a  President  of  the  United  States  to  buy  votes  with 
his  own  money  is  a  thing  bad  enough.  For  him  to  buy 
them  with  either  promises  or  gifts  of  the  people's  offices 


FALSE  REPUBLICANISM.  97 

is  somewhat  worse.  His  money  is  his  own,  to  do  with  as 
he  wills.  The  offices  are  the  people's,  which  he,  their  Chief 
Magistrate,  is  bound  to  bestow  on  the  fittest  men,  and  not 
to  use  in  any  way  for  his  own  profit;  and,  both  in  law 
and  in  morals,  it  makes  slight  difference  whether  a  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  himself  makes  the  bargain  to 
buy  votes,  or  simply  carries  out  the  bargain  made  by  other 
men,  and  pays  for  the  votes  after  they  are  cast  in  his  own 
favor. 

But  the  most  remarkable  instance  in  our  history,  as  far 
as  I  am  aware,  of  the  power  of  party,  party  habits,  and 
party  influences  over  official  action,  we  have  from  Mr. 
Buchanan.  It  will  be  best  given  in  the  words  of  one  of 
the  actors  in  the  scene,  the  Hon.  Thomas  L.  Clingman.* 

"About  the  middle  of  December  [1860]  I  had  occasion  to  see  the 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  on  some  official  business.  On  my  entering 
the  room,  Mr.  Thompson  said  to  me, '  Clingman,  I  am  glad  you  have 
called,  for  I  intended  presently  to  go  up  to  the  Senate  to  see  you.  I 
have  been  appointed  commissioner  by  the  State  of  Mississippi  to  go 
down  to  North  Carolina  to  get  your  State  to  secede,  and  I  wished  to 
talk  with  you  about  your  Legislature  before  I  start  down  in  the  morn- 
ing to  Raleigh,  and  to  learn  what  you  think  of  my  chances  of  suc- 
cess.' I  said  to  him, '  I  did  not  know  that  you  had  resigned.'  He 
answered, '  Oh  no,  I  have  not  resigned.'  '  Then,'  I  replied,  'I  suppose 
you  resign  in  the  morning.'  '  No,'  he  answered, '  I  do  not  intend  to 
resign,  for  Mr.  Buchanan  wished  us  all  to  hold  on  and  go  out  with 
him  on  the  4th  of  March.'  '  But,'  said  I, '  does  Mr.  Buchanan  know 
for  what  purpose  you  are  going  to  North  Carolina  ?'  '  Certainly  he 
knows  my  object.'  Being  surprised  by  this  statement,  I  told  Mr. 
Thompson  that  Mr.  Buchanan  was  probably  so  much  perplexed  by 
his  situation  that  he  had  not  fully  considered  the  matter,  and  that,  as 
he  was  already  involved  in  difficulty,  we  ought  not  to  add  to  his  bur- 
dens, and  then  suggested  to  Mr.  Thompson  that  he  had  better  see 
Mr.  Buchanan  again,  and,  by  way  of  inducing  him  to  think  the  matter 

*  Clingman's  "  Speeches,"  vol.  i.  p.  526. 
5 


98  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

over,  mention  what  I  had  been  saying  to  him.     Mr.  Thompson  said, 
'  Well,  I  can  do  so,  but  I  think  he  fully  understands  it.' 

"  In  the  evening  I  met  Mr.  Thompson  at  a  small  social  party,  and 
as  soon  as  I  approached  him  he  said, '  I  knew  I  could  not  be  mis- 
taken. I  told  Mr.  Buchanan  all  you  said,  and  he  told  me  he  wished 
me  to  go,  and  hoped  I  might  succeed.1  I  could  not  help  exclaiming, 
'  Was  there  ever  before  any  potentate  who  sent  out  his  own  cabinet 
ministers  to  incite  an  insurrection  against  his  government?'  The 
fact  that  Mr.  Thompson  did  go  on  the  errand,  and  had  a  public  re- 
ception before  the  Legislature,  and  returned  to  his  position  in  the 
cabinet,  is  known ;  but  this  incident  serves  to  recall  it." 

Assuming  tins  narrative  to  be  entirely  correct,  it  may 
be  that  the  acts  of  President  Buchanan  here  told  did  not 
constitute,  in  law,  the  crime  of  high-treason.  But  where 
is  the  difference  in  common-sense?  A  President  of  the 
United  States  "  sending  his  own  cabinet  ministers  to  in- 
cite an  insurrection  against  his  government !"  How  did 
this  happen?  Party  feeling,  and  the  life -long  habit  ac- 
quired by  Mr.  Buchanan  in  party  service,  of  always  work- 
ing for  party  success,  is  the  only  and  the  sufficient  expla- 
nation for  this  most  singular  act.  Mr.  Buchanan  had  taken 
his  oath  to  "  preserve,  protect,  and  defend  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States."  It  may  well  be  doubted  if  it  once 
entered  his  mind,  at  that  time,  or  ever  afterward,  that  he 
had  committed  so  much  as  a  slight  impropriety  of  con- 
duct. Not  the  least  of  the  results  of  party  rule,  as  we 
have  had  it  developed  in  this  country,  is  the  fact  that 
men  seem,  in  the  violence  and  great  temptations  of  party 
conflict,  utterly  to  lose  their  ordinary  moral  perceptions. 
Things  that  they  would  condemn  in  other  men,  or  in  them- 
selves at  other  times,  they  do  without  thought  or  hesita- 
tion. For  we  need  not,  even  with  all  the  corruption  in 
our  modern  political  history,  conclude  that  all  or  even 
many  of  our  public  men  have  been  devoid  of  common 


FALSE   REPUBLICANISM.  99 

principle.  They  have  not  been.  The  power  of  party  has 
done  the  mischief.  The  party  men  simply  have  yielded 
to  the  immense  pressure  of  their  surroundings. 

So  far,  as  to  the  effects  of  party  on  the  use  by  public 
officers  of  their  official  powers. 

We  come  then  to  the  other  statement  that  was  made 
at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter — that  Party  has  chosen 
the  people's  rulers.  How  true  is  that  ? 

"VVe  say  that  our  public  officers  are  chosen  by  the  peo- 
ple. Is  it  a  fact  that  the  people  really  do  elect  their  own 
public  officers  1  Taking  universal  suffrage  precisely  as  we 
now  have  it,  are  the  men  now  in  public  office  the  men 
whom  the  people  at  large  really  wish  to  manage  their  gov- 
ernment affairs  ?  Are  these  men  really  the  choice  of  the 
people  ? 

The  people  at  large,  on  the  day  of  election,  have  at  most 
the  choice  between  two  men  or  sets  of  men ;  and  with  the 
point  who  these  two  men  or  sets  of  men  are  to  be,  with 
the  selection  of  the  candidates,  the  people  at  large  have 
little  or  nothing  to  do.  It  may  be  said  that  the  people 
can  and  should  have  something  to  do  with  the  selection 
of  the  candidates.  However  that  may  be,  it  is  the  fact 
that  they  do  not.  And  we  are  here  considering  the  way 
our  system  really  operates.  These  candidates  are  simply 
selected,  for  either  party,  by  the  leaders  who  control  that 
party,  or  often  by  the  one  man  who  controls  the  party. 
One  party  retains  the  control  of  the  Government  for  three 
or  four  Presidential  terms,  as  the  case  may  be.  By  that 
time  sufficiently  powerful  interests  may  combine  against  it 
to  induce  the  people  to  throw  it  aside  for  a  new  party. 
But  so  long  as  one  party  keeps  control  of  our  government 
affairs,  so  long  a  small  handful  of  men  in  that  party,  not 
always  the  same  men  for  the  whole  time,  substantially  ap- 


100  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

point  our  public  officers  for  us.  When  any  one  man  or 
set  of  men  in  public  office  commits  very  glaring  outrages, 
it  often  happens  that  that  man,  or  set  of  men,  will  fail  of 
getting  the  people's  vote  at  the  polls.  In  short,  when  the 
abuse  of  power  goes  beyond  all  endurable  limits,  we  have 
a  revolution — under  the  law  —  at  the  polls.  But  some- 
times those  limits  seem  impossible  to  be  reached.  Do  we 
often  see  a  man  of  so  bad  a  character  as  to  make  him  cer- 
tain of  defeat  when  supported  by  the  ordinary  party  ma- 
chinery ?  Do  we  often  see  a  man  of  so  bad  a  character  as 
to  fail  of  getting  that  support  ? 

In  theory  and  in  law,  the  people  elect  their  rulers.  In 
fact,  these  rulers  are  not  elected  by  the  people,  but  are  ap- 
pointed by  the  party  leaders.  The  real  working  of  the 
Government  is  controlled,  not  by  the  officials  whom  the 
people  nominally  elect,  but  by  the  party  managers  who 
really  appoint  those  officials.  These  party  managers  hold, 
as  such,  no  position  known  to  the  law ;  they  have  no 
duties  or  responsibilities  under  the  law.  Usually  they 
hold  some  official  position  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  a 
salary  from  the  people.  But  their  real  power  they  have, 
not  from  their  official  position,  but  because  they  control 
the  party  policy,  and,  above  all,  the  party  nominations. 
And  they  hold  their  real  power  in  the  State,  not  for  any 
short  term  of  years,  but  without  any  limit  whatever  as  to 
time,  simply  until  their  tyranny  becomes  unbearable,  and 
we  have  a  peaceful  revolution  at  the  polls. 

When  our  Constitution  of  1787  was  formed,  the  Amer- 
ican people  intended  to  use  wisely  the  lesson  they  had 
from  English  history,  and  from  all  history.  They  had 
learned  that  irresponsible  power  in  a  hereditary  monarch 
certainly  made  a  tyranny.  They  said,  therefore,  we  will 
have  no  hereditary  king,  and  no  tyranny  by  any  man  or 


FALSE  REPUBLICANISM.  101 

set  of  men.  They  established,  as  they  thought,  a  true  re- 
public— a  government,  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  for  the 
people.  They  established,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  powerful 
oligarchy,  a  tyranny,  of  the  people,  by  party,  for  party. 
They  kept,  as  they  thought,  the  real  control  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. They  kept,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  nothing  but  a 
right  of  peaceful  revolution.  Elsewhere  tyranny  and  rev- 
olution both  violate  the  law ;  with  us  they  both  follow 
it.  Often,  before  our  time,  revolution  has  resulted  only  in 
a  change  of  tyrants ;  with  us  it  is  still  the  same.  We  re- 
bel against  the  tyranny  of  one  party  ;  we  simply  place  our- 
selves under  the  rule  of  the  other  party ;  and  then  again 
go  through  the  same  cycle  of  tyranny  and  revolt. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  had  been  formed 
"  to  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  "  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States  in  the  year  1787,  and  their  posterity  after 
them.  Surely  in  the  Year  of  Grace  1871  the  blessings  of 
liberty  had  been  manifold  and  varied,  and  perhaps  of  a 
kind  not  altogether  contemplated  by  the  founders  of  the 
Government,  or  desired  by  their  posterity.  We  have  had 
one  President  inciting  rebellion  against  the  Government, 
another  selling  the  highest  office  of  the  people  in  his  gift, 
another  overturning  by  force  of  arms  the  government  of 
a  State,  subjecting  its  people  to  the  rule  of  plunderers, 
and  refusing  even  the  common  decency  of  a  hearing  to  its 
chief  magistrate,  who  came  simply  to  ask  protection  for 
his  people's  rights.  Citizens  of  the  United  States  have 
been  imprisoned  without  due  process,  without  any  process, 
of  law,  and  without  bail.  We  have  had  the  election  of 
our  rulers  taken  from  us  by  party  oligarchies.  We  have 
had  the  money  of  the  people  stolen  and  their  lives  wasted 
by  the  officers  who  should  have  guarded  us  from  harm. 
We  have  had  our  courts  of  justice  used,  not  to  protect 


102  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

life,  liberty,  and  property,  but  to  rob  honest  men,  and  open 
prison  doors  for  convicted  thieves. 

So  long  ago  as  the  thirteenth  century  the  barons  of 
England  took  arms  for  wrongs  lighter  than  these,  and  con- 
quered their  liberties  from  an  English  king.  One  King 
of  England  lost  his  crown  and  his  head  for  insisting  on 
illegal  revenues.  Our  own  ancestors  levied  war  against 
the  most  powerful  monarch  on  the  face  of  the  earth  for 
the  right  to  vote  their  own  taxes.  All  the  grievances  that 
all  the  colonies  together  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  Home 
Government  before  the  Revolutionary  War  were  a  mere 
trifle  compared  with  what  the  people  of  the  city  of  New 
York  alone  suffer  at  the  hands  of  their  rulers  in  a  single 
year.  But  we  bear  our  wrongs  patiently,  because  we  have 
ourselves  made  this  Government  under  which  we  live,  and 
because,  as  we  think,  we  ourselves  choose  these  men  who 
make  our  laws  and  spend  our  money. 

But,  it  is  sometimes  said,  the  real  cause  of  the  present 
condition  of  our  public  affairs  is  the  fact  that  we  no  longer 
have  the  same  class  of  men  in  public  life  as  in  the  years 
gone  by.  Where  are  the  Websters,  the  Calhouns,  the 
Clays,  in  our  national  Government  of  to-day,  it  may  be  ask- 
ed ?  It  is  said  we  suffer  from  our  own  apathy ;  we  have 
in  our  own  hands  the  remedy  against  these  wrongs — we 
must  choose  a  better  class  of  men  for  our  public  officers. 

But  why  is  it  that  we  no  longer  have  the  same  class  of 
men  as  of  old  in  public  place  ?  How  does  it  happen  that 
our  public  men  are  no  longer  as  able  or  upright  as  they 
were  in  former  years?  For,  without  imagining  all  the 
glory  to  have  passed  from  the  earth,  it  will  be  generally 
admitted  that  there  has  been  a  falling  off  in  the  character 
of  the  men  in  our  public  service. 

This  is  only  another  effect  of  party  rule. 


FALSE  REPUBLICANISM.  103 

No  man  can  now  hold  office  under  our  Government  for 
any  long  time  unless  he  will  sacrifice  the  interests  of  the 
people  to  the  interests  of  party.  The  party  leaders  wish 
pliant  men  who  will  serve  party,  and  not  honest  men  who 
will  serve  only  the  people.  They  will  not  have  in  official 
position  men  whom  they  cannot  control  and  use.  The 
men  they  cannot  control  and  use  they  drive  from  public 
life. 

The  men  who  stay  in  public  life  are  compelled  to  yield 
and  submit  to  party.  They  cannot  resist  the  immense 
party  pressure  which  surrounds  them.  We  have  had  not- 
ably three  Presidents — Mr.  Lincoln,  General  Grant,  and  Mr. 
Hayes — each  of  whom,  as  most  men  will  agree,  took  office 
with  the  purpose  of  always  serving  the  people  without  re- 
gard to  the  interests  of  party.  They  all  at  last  gave  them- 
selves more  or  less  completely  to  the  control  of  the  party 
men.  So  long  as  they  tried  to  do  their  simple  duty  to  the 
people,  they  found  themselves  in  the  midst  of  enemies, 
without  friends.  They  had  to  surrender.  To  resist  would 
take  strength  more  than  human. 

But  is  there  any  way  out  of  this  party  tyranny  ?  May 
it  not  be  that  this  party  tyranny  is  a  necessary  incident  of 
republican  institutions  in  any  form,  that  it  is  an  evil  which 
we  must  submit  to,  and  bear  as  well  as  we  can  ?  May  it 
not  be,  even,  that  party  has  its  good  points,  its  advantages  ? 

To  answer  these  questions,  we  must  consider  what  are 
the  causes  which  bring  party  into  existence,  the  nature  of 
party,  and  its  uses. 


104  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PARTY ITS    CAUSES,  ITS    NATURE,  AND    ITS    USES. 

ALL  men  will  admit  that  party  rule,  as  we  Lave  had  it 
in  this  country,  has  been  attended  with  great  evils  and 
abuses.  But  most  men  think  that  these  evils  are  merely 
accidents  of  the  time,  that  in  some  way  party  government 
can  be  kept  and  these  evils  can  be  removed,  that  these 
evils  are  far  outweighed  by  the  good  results  which  party 
brings,  and  that  party,  with  all  its  evils,  is  a  machinery 
without  which  free  government  cannot  exist. 

I  believe  this  to  be  a  mistake ;  that  these  evils  which  we 
have  had  are  not  mere  accidents,  but  that  they  are  of  the 
very  essence  of  party ;  that  we  cannot  rid  ourselves  of  these 
evils  unless  we  rid  ourselves  of  party;  that  what  men  call 
the  good  results  of  party  we  should  still  get  if  we  had  no 
parties;  that  party,  instead  of  being  a  machinery  necessary 
to  the  existence  of  free  government,  is  its  most  dangerous 
foe ;  and  that,  in  order  to  get  anything  which  really  de- 
serves the  name  of  republican  government,  we  must  de- 
stroy party  altogether. 

I  am  well  aware  that  these  views  will  be  commonly 
deemed  rank  heresies.  Yet  they  may  be  sound.  And  if 
they  are  sound,  they  are  surely  important. 

I  shall  then,  in  this  chapter,  attempt  to  show — 

1.  How  party,  as  we  have  had  it,  came  into  existence. 

2.  What  party,  as  we  have  had  it,  really  is. 

3.  What  uses  party,  for  us,  really  has. 

4.  What  we  should  do  with  it. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          105 

And  our  first  inquiry  is,  How  party,  as  we  have  it,  came 
into  existence. 

The  intention  of  the  founders  of  our  National  and  State 
constitutions  was,  that  the  people  should  both  choose  their 
public  officers  and  control  them.  Looking  to  that  end, 
they  said,  We  will  have  our  public  servants  hold  office  for 
short  terms  of  years.  Then,  if  a  public  servant  does  his 
work  well,  at  the  end  of  his  term  we  can  elect  him  again. 
If  he  does  his  work  ill,  at  the  end  of  his  term  we  can  drop 
him,  and  choose  another  man  in  his  stead. 

The  purpose  was  to  keep  all  public  servants  dependent 
on  the  people — who  were  to  be  the  source  of  all  power, 
and  were  to  control  its  use. 

And  this  system  of  a  short  term  of  years  they  made  use 
of  both  for  the  members  of  the  Legislature  and  for  the 
Chief  Executive. 

Another  point  is  to  be  noted.  As  to  their  Chief  Execu- 
tive, they  provided  no  means  for  removing  him  at  any  time 
before  the  end  of  his  term,  in  case  he  did  his  work  ill. 
They  said,  in  so  many  words,  that  he  could  be  removed 
from  office  only  on  "conviction  of  treason,  bribery,  or 
other  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors."  He  might  use  his 
power  so  unwisely  as  to  bring  ruin  on  the  people ;  but  if 
he  was  honest  in  what  he  did,  there  was  no  remedy  under 
the  law.  And,  though  nothing  was  said  on  the  point,  it 
was  no  doubt  the  intention  that  the  same  rule  should  hold 
as  to  the  Legislature  and  other  public  servants. 

The  English  people  remove  the  minister  who  commands 
their  armies,  not  because  he  does  his  work  well  or  ill,  but 
because  his  ideas  on  the  Church  Liturgy  are  not  what 
they  should  be.  We  remove  our  President,  who  com- 
mands our  armies,  not  because  he  does  his  work  well  or 
ill,  but  because  the  earth  has  made  four  journeys  through 


106  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

space  around  that  star  which  we  call  the  sun.  It  is  hard 
to  say  which  we  should  most  admire  as  a  means  of  ascer- 
taining the  tenure  of  office  of  public  officials,  the  parlia- 
mentary or  the  astronomical  system. 

It  may  be  that  this  term  system  was  the  only  one  we 
could  have.  That  is  yet  to  be  considered.  But  one  point 
seems  clear. 

If  the  Constitution  had  said,  every  public  servant  shall 
be  removed  as  soon  as  he  fails  to  do  his  work  well,  wheth- 
er he  has  been  in  office  one  month  or  one  day,  then  we 
should  have  put  the  servant  under  pressure  to  do  his  work 
well.  When,  however,  we  said,  a  public  servant  shall  hold 
his  office  for  a  term  of  four  or  two  years,  whether  he  does 
his  work  well  or  ill,  and  for  another  additional  term  of 
years  if  he  can  carry  the  next  election,  then  we  put  the 
servant  under  pressure  to  carry  the  next  election.  And 
when  we  said  (as  we  did  in  effect)  all  public  servants  shall 
depend  for  keeping  their  offices,  not  on  whether  they  do 
their  work  well  or  ill,  but  on  carrying  the  next  election, 
then,  instead  of  giving  them  each  a  separate  interest  to  do 
his  own  work  well,  we  gave  them  all  one  common  interest 
to  carry  the  next  election.  We  made  it  certain  that  they 
would  combine,  and  form  parties,  for  the  purpose  of  car- 
rying elections. 

But  there  was  another  point.  The  knowledge  which  all 
men  had,  that  at  the  end  of  a  fixed  time  there  would  be  a 
large  number  of  vacancies,  made  it  certain  that  other  men, 
who  were  not  in  office,  would  combine  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  out  the  men  who  were  in  office,  and  getting  in 
themselves.  The  term  system  was  certain,  then,  to  create 
two  great  parties  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  elections. 
The  men  who  were  in  formed  a  party  to  keep  office.  The 
men  who  were  out  formed  a  party  to  get  office.  It  may 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          107 

be  that  the  term  system  had  other  results.  It  had  at  least 
this  result. 

English  ministers,  who  depended  for  keeping  their  of- 
fices on  keeping  votes  in  Parliament,  gave  their  best  efforts 
to  keeping  those  votes.  Our  public  servants,  who  depend- 
ed for  keeping  their  offices  on  carrying  elections,  in  the 
same  way  gave  their  best  efforts  to  carrying  elections. 
Whether  they  wished  it  or  not,  our  public  servants  were 
driven  by  this  point  in  our  system  of  government  to  make 
this  work  of  carrying  elections  their  regular  profession. 
In  that  profession  they  gained  great  skill.  In  that  work 
they  were  sure  to  have  more  skill  than  the  ordinary  citi- 
zens, who  gave  their  time  and  thought  to  other  things. 
The  professional  must  always  beat  the  amateur.  These 
party  organizations  became  vast  and  powerful.  The  lead- 
ers of  these  parties  controlled  party  action.  It  came  to  be 
the  fact  (almost  without  an  exception),  that  no  man  could 
be  chosen  to  an  office  without  a  party  nomination,  and  no 
man  could  have  a  party  nomination  against  the  will  of  the 
party  leaders.  And  the  party  leaders  would  give  party 
nominations  to  no  man  who  did  not  do  party  service. 
The  natural  and  certain  result  was,  that  party  leaders,  for 
party  purposes,  controlled  the  elections  of  public  servants, 
and  the  action  of  public  servants  after  they  were  elected. 

The  expectation  had  been  that  this  system  of  short 
terms  would  secure — 

1.  The  best  men  for  the  people's  service. 

2.  Their  best  work  for  the  people. 

The  result  was  that  this  term  system  secured — 

1.  The  best  men  for  party  service. 

2.  Their  best  work  for  party. 

The  expectation  had  been  that  the  people,  through  this 
system  of  short  terms,  would  themselves  control — 


108  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

1.  The  election  of  public  officers. 

2.  The  action  of  public  officers  after  they  were  elected. 
The  result  was,  as  has  been  seen,  that  party  controlled — 

1.  The  election  of  public  officers. 

2.  The  action  of  public  officers  after  they  were  elected. 
This  result  which  we  have  had  is  not  a  strange  or  a 

new  one.  It  has  always  come,  wherever  the  cause  has 
existed. 

Whenever,  under  any  system  of  government,  it  has  been 
necessary  for  the  men  who  are  in  office  to  carry  elections 
in  order  to  keep  in,  and  it  has  been  possible  for  the  men 
who  are  out  of  office  by  carrying  elections  to  get  in,  then 
there  have  always  been  parties,  or  factions,  which  have 
been  really  only  combinations  for  the  purpose  of  getting 
place  and  power.  Then  public  officers,  instead  of  doing 
the  work  of  their  office,  have  always  done  election  work; 
instead  of  serving  the  people,  they  have  served  party; 
instead  of  being  statesmen,  they  have  been  politicians. 
Whenever  the  system  of  government  has  been  such  as  to 
create  a  profession  of  election  carriers,  that  profession  has 
always  been  filled  with  the  men  who  were  best  fitted  for 
it.  It  was  so  at  Athens ;  it  was  so  at  Rome ;  it  is  so  in 
England  and  in  the  United  States ;  and  it  is  becoming  so 
in  France.  It  is  so  alike  under  a  constitutional  monarchy 
and  under  a  false  republic.  It  is  only  the  natural  opera- 
tion of  natural  laws. 

The  mistake  which  we  made,  and  which  other  peoples 
have  made  before  us,  lies  in  perverting  the  use  of  the  ma- 
chinery of  election.  That  machinery,  as  I  shall  try  more 
fully  to  show,  is,  within  certain  limits,  the  best  machinery 
that  can  be  devised  for  the  mere  choosing  of  public  ser- 
vants. But  it  is  not  the  fit  machinery  for  securing  good 
service  from  them  after  they  are  chosen.  For  that  pur- 


PARTY— ITS   CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          109 

pose  we  must  have,  not  a  machinery  of  re-election  for  fit- 
ness and  good  conduct,  but  only  of  removal  and  punish- 
ment for  unfitness  and  misconduct. 

What,  then,  is  party,  as  we  have  had  it  ? 

It  has  been  generally  assumed  by  political  writers  that 
parties  here  and  in  England  have  been  combinations  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  measures  in  the  interest  of  the 
people. 

I  maintain,  on  the  contrary,  that  parties  have  never  been 
combinations  to  carry  measures ;  that  the  interests  of  the 
people  have  always  been  subordinated  to  the  interests  of 
the  men  who  have  been  working  for  office;  that  parties 
have  pressed  measures  only  as  far  as  party  interests  de- 
manded ;  and  that,  in  this  country,  in  the  large  number  of 
instances,  the  questions  raised  by  party  men  have  been 
questions  which,  so  far  as  the  true  interests  of  the  people 
at  the  time  were  concerned,  should  not  have  been  raised 
at  all. 

Let  us  examine  some  instances  of  party  action,  and  see 
how  fa.r  this  is  true. 

Thomas  Jefferson  was  the  head  of  our  first  opposition 
party.  And  no  doubt  he  believed  that  an  opposition  party 
was  then  a  necessary  thing  in  our  Government.  Let  us  see 
what  were  the  points  on  which  Mr.  Jefferson  and  his  friends 
made  up  our  first  party  contest,  and  consider  whether  the 
true  interests  of  the  people  demanded  unending  strife  or 
thorough  rest  on  the  points  that  this  opposition  party  then 
raised ;  whether  there  were  any  wise  measures  that  they 
then  proposed  to  carry ;  whether  this  party  combination 
was  a  combination  of  citizens  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
measures  of  any  kind. 

Let  us  take  Mr.  Jefferson's  own  statement  of  the  needs 
of  the  people  at  the  time. 


110  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

He  writes  on  the  24th  of  April,  1796  :* 

"  The  aspect  of  our  politics  has  wonderfully  changed  since  you  left 
us.  In  place  of  that  noble  love  of  liberty  and  republican  govern- 
ment which  carried  us  triumphantly  through  the  war,  an  Anglican, 
monarchical,  and  aristocratical  party  has  sprung  up  whose  avowed 
object  is  to  draw  over  us  the  substance  as  they  have  already  done 
the  forms  of  the  British  Government.  The  main  body  of  our  citizens, 
however,  remain  true  to  their  republican  principles.  The  wtoole  land- 
ed interest  is  republican,  and  so  is  a  great  mass  of  talents.  Against 
us  are  the  executive  power,  the  judiciary,  two  out  of  three  branches 
of  the  Legislature,  all  the  officers  of  the  Government,  all  who  want 
to  be  officers,  all  timid  men  who  prefer  the  calm  of  despotism  to  the 
boisterous  sea  of  liberty,  British  merchants  and  Americans  trading 
on  British  capital,  speculators  and  holders  in  the  banks  and  public 
funds,  a  contrivance  invented  for  the  purposes  of  corruption  and  for 
assimilating  us  in  all  things  to  the  rotten  as  well  as  the  sound  parts 
of  the  British  model.  It  would  give  you  a  fever  were  I  to  name  to 
you  the  apostates  who  have  gone  over  to  these  heresies — men  who 
were  Samsons  in  the  field  and  Solomons  in  the  council,  but  who  have 
had  their  heads  shorn  by  the  harlot  England." 

The  "Anglican,  monarchical,  and  aristocratical  party" 
was  made  up  of  the  men  who  had  risked  their  lives  on  the 
field  of  battle  fighting  an  English  king.  They  were  the 
men  who  had  created  this  republican  government  under 
which  we  now  live.  The  man  who  had  "  invented "  the 
"  banks  and  public  funds  "  "  for  the  purposes  of  corruption  " 
was  Alexander  Hamilton,  who  had  done  almost  more  than 
all  other  men  to  get  our  Constitution  adopted  and  organ- 
ize a  working  machinery  under  it,  while  Thomas  Jefferson 
was  taking  lessons  in  political  science  from  the  mobs  of 
Paris.  The  "executive"  who,  with  Hamilton  and  the  oth- 
ers, was  working  to  suppress  freedom  and  republican  insti- 
tutions, was  George  Washington.  In  the  "  great  mass  of 

*  Jefferson's  "Writings,"  vol.  iii.  p.  327. 


TARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          Ill 

talents,"  the  men  who  did  not  "  want  to  be  officers  "  was, 
it  is  to  be  presumed,  Thomas  Jefferson,  who,  however  he 
might  write  of  Washington  and  Hamilton  in  his  private 
letters,  was  yet  entirely  willing  to  hold  for  years,  under 
one  of  them,  and  with  the  other,  a  seat  in  the  cabinet 
by  which  all  these  nefarious  schemes  of  corruption  were 
devised. 

To  such  lengths  did  party  strife  and  party  violence  go 
in  those  early  years  of  party  existence,  that  Washington 
wrote,  in  a  letter  to  Jefferson  himself  :* 

"  To  this  I  may  add,  and  very  truly,  that  until  the  last  year  or  two 
I  had  no  conception  that  parties  would,  or  ever  could,  go  to  the 
lengths  I  have  been  witness  to.  Nor  did  I  believe  until  latterly  that 
it  was  within  the  bounds  of  probability,  hardly  within  those  of  possi- 
bility, that  while  I  was  using  my  utmost  exertions  to  establish  a  na- 
tional character  of  our  own,  independent,  as  far  as  our  obligations 
and  justice  would  permit,  of  every  nation  on  the  earth,  and  wished, 
by  steering  a  steady  course,  to  preserve  this  country  from  the  horrors 
of  desolating  war,  I  should  be  accused  of  being  the  enemy  of  one  na- 
tion and  subject  to  the  influence  of  another ;  and  to  prove  it,  that 
every  act  of  my  administration  would  be  tortured,  and  the  grossest 
and  most  insidious  misrepresentations  of  them  be  made,  by  giving 
one  side  only  of  a  subject,  and  that,  too,  in  such  exaggerated  and 
indecent  terms  as  could  scarcely  be  applied  to  a  Nero,  to  a  notorious 
defaulter,  or  even  to  a  common  pickpocket." 

Twenty  years  before  this  time,  Thomas  Jefferson  and  his 
party  friends,  with  Washington  and  Hamilton,  had  been 
struggling  for  the  freedom  of  the  colonies.  Freedom  had 
been  gained.  Ten  years  before  they  had  all  been  working 
in  harmony  to  form  a  government.f  They  had  formed  it. 


*  Washington's  "  Writings,"  vol.  xi.  p.  139. 

f  Jefferson  himself,  indeed,  was  not  in  the  country  at  the  time  of 
the  Constitutional  Convention. 


112  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

After  the  Government  had  been  formed,  they  had  to  choose 
the  men  who  were  to  carry  on  this  new  government.  They 
had  chosen  the  men. 

At  the  end  of  the  first  twelve  years  under  the  Constitu- 
tion those  men  who  had  been  carrying  on  the  government 
were  just  as  fit  for  their  places  as  they  had  been  when  they 
were  chosen.  They  were  more  so.  They  had  in  the  be- 
ginning only  been  honest  and  able.  They  had  now  gained 
experience.  They  were  charged  with  attempting  to  turn 
our  republican  government  into  an  English  monarchy. 
The  charge  was  not  true.  No  man  in  his  calm  judgment 
could  believe  it.  It  was  a  charge  which  accomplished  one 
purpose,  that  of  capturing  public  offices. 

The  Jefferson  party  soon  developed  into  the  party  of 
what  was  called  State  Rights ;  and  for  years  this  doctrine 
of  State  Rights  was  a  war-cry  on  which  one  of  the  great 
national  parties  existed.  It  was  under  Mr.  Jefferson's 
teachings  that  this  doctrine  of  State  Rights  had  its  birth. 
At  a  later  period  it  took  the  form  of  nullification,  which 
was  only  another  name  for  the  right  of  a  State  Legislature 
to  declare  void  an  act  of  the  national  Congress. 

How  sound  a  doctrine  was  this,  and  how  far  did  the 
true  interests  of  the  people  demand  a  contest  over  it  ? 

It  was  urged  by  the  supporters  of  the  doctrine  of  nulli- 
fication that  these  States  had  been  originally,  and  were  still, 
sovereign  States ;  that  all  the  powers  they  had  not  given  to 
the  general  government  by  the  Constitution  had  been  by 
them  retained ;  that  they  had  never,  by  the  Constitution, 
given  to  the  general  government  the  power  of  coercing  a 
State ;  and  that  if  a  State  should  declare  null  and  void  any 
act  of  the  national  Legislature,  the  national  executive  had 
no  right  to  enforce  any  such  nullified  law  against  the  State 
or  its  citizens. 


TARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          113 

It  is  almost  hard  to  understand  the  constitutional  argu- 
ment of  nullification.  What  these  implied  powers  reserved 
by  sovereign  States  were,  what  were  sovereign  States,  and 
whether  the  States  composing  the  Union  were  such  sover- 
eign States,  were  points  that  might,  in  the  case  of  imagi- 
nable leagues,  or  imaginable  federal  governments,  admit  of 
doubt.  But  as  to  the  right  of  these  particular  States,  un- 
der this  particular  government,  established  by  this  particu- 
lar constitution,  to  nullify  or  make  void,  by  an  act  of  a 
State  Legislature,  any  act  of  the  United  States  Congress — 
as  to  that,  there  never  could  be  any  doubt  at  all.  For 
there  it  was,  written,  in  the  very  words  of  the  instrument 
itself,  adopted  by  the  same  peoples  that  had  created  the 
State  legislatures  and  governments  (or  adopted,  if  you 
choose,  by  the  States  themselves),  that  "this  Constitution 
and  the  laws  of  the  United  States  which  shall  be  made  in 
pursuance  thereof  *  *  *  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the 
land,  *  *  *  anything  in  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  any  State 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding."  There  was  no  doubt  as 
to  the  words  or  their  meaning.  Long  argument  was  had  as 
to  whether  the  States  or  the  people  of  the  States  had  made 
the  Constitution.  That  point  was  very  immaterial.  There 
was  no  doubt  as  to  what  the  Constitution  said,  whoever 
might  have  made  it.  Long  argument  was  had  as  to  wheth- 
er the  States  had  been  or  remained  sovereign  States.  It 
made  no  difference.  There  was  the  paper ;  and  the  States 
or  the  people  composing  them  had  assented  to  that  paper. 
Long  argument  was  had  as  to  whether  there  was  an  im- 
plied right  of  nullification.  The  right  was  taken  away  by 
express  words.  Finally,  it  was  urged  that  this  Constitution 
was  only  a  compact  between  separate  and  sovereign  States. 
But  in  the  case  of  a  mere  compact,  has  either  party,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  a  right  to  break  it  ?  Even  if  this  were  only 


114  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

a  compact,  what  were  the  words  of  the  compact  ?  They 
plainly  were,  that  a  certain  body,  called  a  Congress,  should 
have  the  power  of  making  laws,  which  should  be  binding 
on  all  men,  in  all  the  States.  And  has  it  ever  been  claim- 
ed that,  even  in  the  case  of  a  mere  compact,  the  compact 
can  rightfully  or  lawfully  be  broken  or  abrogated  by  only 
one  party?  When  you  come  to  the  right  of  revolution 
against  tyranny,  that  is  another  question.  But  these  mat- 
ters were  always  discussed  as  matters  of  law,  under  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.* 

In  the  case  of  a  government  imposed  by  force  upon  a 
people  against  its  will,  most  men  do  not  question  the  right 
of  that  people  to  forcibly  resist  arbitrary  and  oppressive 
acts.  But  here  was  the  case  of  a  government  made  by 
the  people  of  these  States  themselves,  a  Constitution  assent- 
ed to  by  them,  which  provided  peaceable  and  lawful  means 
for  its  own  modification,  and  even  for  ending  its  existence. 
The  Legislatures  of  three-fourths  of  the  States  could,  by 
the  terms  of  the  Constitution  itself,  amend  it  in  any  way, 

*  Luther  Martin,  in  the  Constitutional  Convention,  proposed  to  add 
in  the  third  section  of  the  third  article,  after  the  clause  which  defines 
treason  against  the  United  States,  the  following :  "  Provided,  that  no 
act  or  acts  done  by  one  or  more  of  the  States  against  the  United 
States,  or  by  any  citizen  of  any  one  of  the  United  States  under  the 
authority  of  one  or  more  of  the  said  States,  shall  be  deemed  trea- 
son, or  punished  as  such ;  but  in  case  of  war  being  levied  by  one  or 
more  of  the  States  against  the  United  States,  the  conduct  of  each 
party  toward  the  other,  and  their  adherents  respectively,  shall  be  reg- 
ulated by  the  laws  of  war  and  of  nations."  But  this  provision  was 
not  adopted.  Luther  Martin's  letter  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Delegates  of  Maryland.  Elliot's  Debates,  vol.  i.  p.  382. 

There  would  seem  to  have  been  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution  as  to  what  constituted  the  offence  of 
treason. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          115 

and  of  course  they  could  amend  it  in  such  a  way  as  to 
provide  for  the  release  of  any  one,  or  more,  or  all  of  the 
States  from  its  obligations.  In  other  words,  the  Constitu- 
tion itself  provided  the  means  by  which  there  might  be 
such  a  thing  as  peaceable  secession.  And  can  it  be  argued 
that  there  could  be,  in  law,  under  the  Constitution,  such  a 
thing  as  forcible  secession  ? 

But,  it  was  said,  here  are,  or  may  be,  unconstitutional 
laws.  Grant  it.  What  had  a  State  Legislature  to  do  with 
the  matter  ?  Clearly,  if  a  law  passed  by  Congress  was  con- 
stitutional, the  State  Legislature  had  no  right  to  speak ; 
and  if  the  law  was  unconstitutional,  the  State  Legislature 
had  no  need  to  speak ;  and  in  either  case  it  had  no  call  to 
speak ;  for  the  courts,  both  State  and  national,  would  de- 
clare that  law  unconstitutional,  and  therefore  void,  when- 
ever an  attempt  was  made  to  enforce  it.  Even  under  any 
State  Constitution,  where  did  the  State  Legislature  ever 
get  judicial  authority,  to  pass  on  the  constitutionality  of 
any  law,  either  State  or  national  ?  State  courts  had  such 
a  right,  in  the  first  instance ;  but  what  had  a  State  Legis- 
lature to  do  with  it,  which  was  only  a  creature  of  a  consti- 
tution, and  whose  only  power  given  by  that  constitution 
was  to  make  certain  laws  ? 

This  doctrine  of  nullification  was  not  merely  a  claim 
that  unconstitutional  laws  passed  by  Congress  should  not 
be  enforced.  As  to  that,  all  men  agreed.  It  was  a  claim 
that  a  State  Legislature  could  pass  on  the  constitutionality 
of  those  laws,  and  could  lawfully  organize  armed  rebellion. 
Where  did  they  ever  get  any  such  power  as  that  ?  Under 
what  State  law  or  State  Constitution,  or  divine  dispensation  ? 

It  was  said  that  the  national  government  had  no  right 
to  coerce  a  State.  That  point  did  not  go  far  enough.  The 
true  point  was,  that  a  State  government  had  no  right  to 


116  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

be  coerced — it  had  no  right  to  put  itself  in  a  position  of 
resistance.  There  was  no  doubt  that  the  national  govern- 
ment had  a  right  to  enforce  its  laws  on  individuals ;  and 
the  State  government  had  no  right  to  speak  in  the  matter, 
on  the  one  side  or  the  other. 

This  whole  doctrine  of  nullification,  which  subsequently 
grew  into  rebellion,  would  never  have  been  heard  of,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  existence  of  parties  and  the  needs  of 
party  contests.  The  whole  question  was  one  which  never 
should  have  been  raised.  It  was  not  a  practical  question. 
If  Congress  should  at  any  time  pass  laws  beyond  its  pow- 
ers, under  which  some  individual  citizen  should  be  illegally 
deprived  of  liberty  or  property,  he  had  his  remedies  in  the 
courts,  and  those  remedies  had  always  been  equal  to  all 
needs.  The  courts  had  often  declared  statutes,  both  of 
Congress  and  of  the  State  Legislatures,  to  be  unconstitu- 
tional, and  therefore  void.  There  was  no  difficulty  in  that. 
And  if  it  should  ever  come  that  there  should  be  a  grand 
overwhelming  combination  of  Congressmen,  President,  and 
judges,  striving  to  make  and  enforce  unconstitutional  laws, 
then,  indeed,  it  might  be  time  to  think  of  armed  revolution, 
after  all  peaceful  remedies  under  the  law  should  have  been 
tried,  and  had  failed.  This  was  all  that  lawful  citizens,  who 
wished  only  their  rights,  ever  could  or  ever  did  ask.  But 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  elections  that  was  not  enough. 
There  being  at  the  time  no  other  "  issue,"  as  it  is  called, 
on  which  people  could  be  excited,  there  being  no  practical 
question  on  which  there  was  any  real  division  of  existing 
interests,  this  doctrine  of  State  Rights  was  conjured  into 
being,  made  a  war-cry,  and  on  it  was  developed  a  great 
party  combination,  which  was  in  after  years  the  nucleus 
for  resistance  to  any  and  all  unpopular  measures  of  the 
national  government. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          117 

When  Mr.  Jefferson  and  his  friends  first  raised  the  cry 
that  Washington  and  Hamilton  wished  a  monarchy,  that 
was  a  cry  which  should  not  have  been  raised.  Even  if  still 
there  were  in  the  country  some  men  who  wished  a  mon- 
archy, such  a  wish  was  nothing  but  an  idle  dream.  That 
point  was  decided — was  a  thing  of  the  past — and  there  it 
should  have  been  left.  There  was  then  a  great  work  be- 
fore all  men,  in  which  all  men  were  bound  to  join — that 
of  rebuilding  the  people's  fortunes  under  the  new  govern- 
ment which  we  had.  How  did  it  matter  what  form  of  gov- 
ernment a  few  individuals  had  wished  twenty  years  before  ? 

But  though  the  issue  as  to  whether  we  should  have  a 
monarchy  was  dead  and  gone,  the  feelings  which  the  con- 
test over  that  issue  had  roused  were  still  living,  and  could 
be  played  on  by  party  men,  for  their  own  ends,  and  against 
the  people's  interests. 

So,  too,  in  1830,  although  there  was  then  no  one  meas- 
ure of  Congress  which  the  country  would  agree  in  dislik- 
ing, and  though  it  was  impossible  to  organize  any  serious 
opposition  to  any  one  national  law,  yet  it  was  very  easy  to 
rouse  the  fears  of  many  men  that  at  some  time  national 
laws  might  be  passed  which  would  be  unconstitutional, 
and  which  some  of  them  might  wish  to  resist.  And  by 
playing  on  those  fears,  it  was  easy  to  organize  the  party 
of  what  was  called  State  Rights,  which  meant  simply  State 
rebellion.  What  reason  was  there  for  this  strife?  We 
can  now  look  back  on  it  calmly.  Did  the  true  interests 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  demand  it  ?  This  Con- 
stitution we  had.  It  might  some  time  become  necessary 
to  change  it.  If  so,  then  we  could  change  it,  by  peaceful 
means  under  the  law.  It  might  possibly  become  neces- 
sary to  do  away  with  it  altogether.  If  so,  then  we  could 
meet  in  convention,  and  do  away  with  it  altogether,  by 


118  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

peaceful  means  under  the  law,  as  we  had  made  it.  Mean- 
time we  had  to  live  under  it  and  obey  it.  And  that  was 
all  that  the  people  needed  to  think  of.  But  that  was  not 
enough  for  party  men  who  were  struggling  for  office. 

At  the  end  of  our  first  fifty  years  under  the  Constitu- 
tion we  had,  indeed,  a  government,  and  great  material  pros- 
perity under  it.  For  all  ordinary  affairs  of  peace,  the  ma- 
chinery of  the  national  Government  had  proved  itself  suffi- 
cient. As  matter  of  law  and  mere  argument,  too,  it  had 
been  very  well  settled,  in  the  minds  of  the  large  majority 
of  thinking  men,  that  the  laws  of  this  Government  were 
not  to  be  swept  aside  at  the  will  of  any  one  State  or  num- 
ber of  States ;  but  that  all  the  citizens  of  all  the  States 
were  really  bound  to  obey  these  national  laws,  whether  they 
willed  it  or  no,  so  long  as  they  were  laws,  was  not  a  fact 
that  had  been  drilled  into  the  convictions  of  the  people. 
If  rebellion  was  thought  of  at  all,  it  was  thought  of  as  a 
thing  to  be  reasoned  with  and  persuaded,  not  to  be  crushed. 
De  Tocqueville,  in  1833,  wrote:  "Experience  has  hitherto 
shown  that  whenever  a  State  has  demanded  anything  with 
perseverance  and  resolution,  it  has  invariably  succeeded ; 
and  that,  if  it  has  distinctly  refused  to  act,  it  was  left  to 
do  as  it  thought  fit."  And  he  said  further :  "  If  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  Union  were  to  engage  in  a  struggle  with 
that  of  the  States  at  the  present  day,  its  defeat  may  be 
confidently  predicted ;  and  it  is  not  probable  that  such  a 
struggle  would  be  seriously  undertaken."  And  that  doubt- 
less was  the  opinion  of  most  men  who  then  chose  to  think 
on  the  point. 

That  the  Government  was  not  then  a  strong  govern- 
ment, and  that  its  laws  did  not  then  in  all  cases  command 
instant  and  thorough  obedience,  was  due  to  parties  and 
party  contest. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          119 

Later  still,  in  1860  and  1861,  suppose  there  Lad  not 
been  two  great  parties  engaged  in  a  great  contest  for  the 
offices  of  the  Government,  striving  (honestly,  perhaps)  to 
inflame  the  people's  feelings,  instead  of  urging  them  to 
some  wise  practical  measures  of  policy,  who  can  say  that 
we  should  have  had  the  war  of  the  rebellion  ?  Concede 
that  slavery  was  a  great  wrong  to  the  slave  and  a  great 
injury  to  the  master.  What  was  the  wise  thing  for  all 
parties,  to  have  strife  and  war,  or  to  find  some  wise  meas- 
ure which  would  solve  the  difficulty  in  the  best  interests 
of  all  men  ? 

Perhaps  that  was  a  thing  which  could  not  have  been  ac- 
complished. But  it  was 'precisely  what  the  party  men,  in 
either  party,  neither  tried  nor  wished.  They  did  not  de- 
vise measures  in  the  interest  of  the  people.  They  were 
working  for  victory  at  the  polls  over  their  opponents. 

And  since  the  war  of  the  rebellion  ended,  what  has 
been  the  course  of  our  two  political  parties?  Has  either 
party  proposed  one  practical  measure  for  solving  the  polit- 
ical problems  we  had  to  solve  ? 

Let  me  quote,  as  to  the  policy  of  the  general  govern- 
ment, in  what  has  been  called  the  reconstruction  of  the 
South,  the  words  of  a  distinguished  divine,  who  is  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Republican  party.  Dr.  Leonard  Bacon,  in  a  let- 
ter to  the  New  York  Tribune,  dated  12th  December,  1876, 
writes  as  follows : 

"  More  than  eleven  years  have  passed  since  the  armies  of  the  civil 
war  were  disbanded,  and  the  work  of  reconstructing  the  States  re- 
covered from  the  enemies  of  the  United  States  was  begun.  Nothing 
in  our  political  outlook  to-day  is  more  manifest  than  that  the  recon- 
struction attempted  in  the  negro  States  has  been  a  failure.  *  *  * 
The  blunder  in  reconstruction  was  not  that  which  the  Democratic 
party  would  have  made — universal  suffrage  for  white  men,  and  no 
suffrage  at  all  for  black  men ;  it  was  the  more  excusable  blunder  of 


120  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

universal  suffrage  without  distinction  of  race  or  color — universal  suf- 
frage instead  of  intelligent  suffrage.  *  *  *  One  word — party — sums 
up  the  reasons  why  nothing  of  this  kind  was  done  in  reconstruction. 
The  Democratic  party  in  Congress  at  that  time  was  not  very  numer- 
ous ;  but  I  will  venture  to  say  that  had  there  been  among  its  leaders 
a  few  men,  ever  so  few,  with  mind  and  soul  enough  to  ask  how  those 
disorganized  populations  might  be  made  to  pass  from  under  military 
government  to  a  condition  of  peaceful  order  and  prosperity  under 
republican  forms  of  government ;  had  there  been  only  two  or  three 
Senators,  and  as  many  Representatives,  willing  to  rise,  at  such  a  junc- 
ture, out  of  politics  into  statesmanship,  out  of  party  into  patriotism, 
the  result  might  have  been  far  different  from  what  it  is  now.  Had 
they  said,  '  This  work  of  reconstruction  is  above  all  party  interests, 
and  therefore  we  are  ready  to  consult  and  co-operate  heartily  with 
all  who  will  unite  with  us  in  giving  to  those  recovered  States  the  best 
practical  government  at  the  earliest  practicable  day ;'  had  they  said, 
'  The  abolition  of  slavery  is  a  completed  fact,  the  f reedmen  of  each 
State  are  to  be  incorporated  into  the  commonwealth,  and  no  man's 
color  or  race  is  to  exclude  him  from  any  civil  or  political  right ;  but 
government  in  those  States  cannot  safely  rest  on  the  suffrages  of  ig- 
norant millions  just  coming  up  out  of  slavery  or  of  any  other  class 
as  ignorant  as  they' — such  an  appeal,  I  am  sure,  would  not  have  been 
in  vain.  It  would  have  taken  effect  in  Congress.  It  would  have 
had  an  effect  on  the  nation.  The  power  of  extreme  and  hot-headed 
men  to  lead  or  drive  the  Republican  party  would  have  been  broken, 
and  common-sense  would  have  asserted  itself.  But  at  the  decisive 
moment,  Democratic  Senators  and  Representatives  were  thinking  not 
so  much  how  to  establish  the  best  practical  system  in  the  recovered 
States  as  how  to  embarrass  the  Republican  party." 

i  That  is  all  very  admirable,  all  very  true.  But  suppose, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  leaders  of  the  Republican  par- 
ty had!  been  men  "  willing  to  rise  out  of  politics  into  states- 
manship, out  of  party  into  patriotism,"  was  there  any  stat- 
ute to  forbid  it,  and  would  there  have  been  any  evil  con- 
stitutional results  ?  More  than  that,  which  party  was  pe- 
culiarly called  on  to  take  measures  which  were  truly  for 
the  public  weal,  the  party  which  was  in  power,  or  the  par- 


PARTY— ITS   CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          121 

ty  which  was  not  ?  So  it  has  been  ever  since  party  ma- 
chinery became  fully  developed.  The  one  thought  with 
party  men,  on  either  side,  at  all  times,  however  good  may 
have  been  their  general  intentions,  has  been,  not  what  will 
best  serve  the  interests  of  the  people,  but  what  will  best 
serve  the  interests  of  party.  Such  is  the  legitimate  ten- 
dency of  the  system,  and  it  has  worked  out  its  tendencies 
with  wonderful  success. 

Take  the  proceedings  of  our  national  Legislature  during 
the  present  administration.  The  party  men  on  both  sides 
have  made  it  their  chief  work  to  search  the  past  history 
of  their  opponents  (bad  enough  it  is  for  either),  for  the 
mere  purpose  of  finding  material  to  use  for  the  next  po- 
litical campaign,  as  it  is  called.  Here  have  been  impor- 
tant questions  of  revenue  and  currency  waiting  for  action. 
And  our  legislators  do  nothing.  Many  men  think  the 
matter  of  civil  service  reform  is,  in  legislation,  the  one 
thing  most  important  to  the  country.  Upon  that  ques- 
tion the  party  men  on  both  sides  are  agreed,  to  say  all 
they  can,  and  to  do  only  what  they  must.  On  every  point 
where  the  country  needs  action,  the  party  men  avoid  ac- 
tion. If  they  should  act,  they  think  they  might  lose 
votes.  Everything  that  they  do  or  say,  everything  that 
they  leave  undone  and  unsaid,  has  one  purpose,  the  carry- 
ing the  next  election. 

These  are  only  single  illustrations  taken  from  our  politi- 
cal history.  They  might  be  multiplied  and  extended. 

No  doubt  our  political  parties  have  in  many  instances 
taken  sides  on  questions  of  real  interest  and  importance  to 
the  people.  And  party  men  have,  no  doubt,  often  been 
the  means  of  giving  us  good  legislation  and  good  admin- 
istration. I  do  not  mean  that  party  men  have  never  done 
good  service,  or  that  their  conscious  purposes  have  been 

6. 


122  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

always  or  often  corrupt.  But  the  good  work  that  has 
been  done  has  not  been  the  work  of  party,  but  has  gener- 
ally been  done  in  spite  of  party  and  of  party  influences. 

It  may  be  said,  however,  that  this  may  be  the  nature  of 
party  combinations  here,  under  a  republican  government, 
with  universal  suffrage,  but  that  it  has  not  been  so  in  Eng- 
land ;  that  there,  at  least,  party  and  party  rule  have  been 
the  only  means  of  gaining  freedom  and  good  government. 

But  let  us  examine  this ;  and  let  us  begin  the  exami- 
nation with  the  very  first  manifestation,  as  far  as  I  am 
aware,  of  true  party  machinery  in  English  history. 

Macaulay's  account  of  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  general 
election  of  1698  is  a  precise  counterpart  of  the  party  op- 
position made  by  the  Anti-Federalists,  in  the  first  years  of 
our  government,  to  the  men  and  measures  of  Washington's 
administration.  In  England  the  policy  of  the  Whig  min- 
istry had  been  most  wise,  and  had  brought  the  most  won- 
derful prosperity  to  the  nation.  And  the  Parliament  then 
in  existence,  the  Parliament  of  1695,  was  a  parliament  of 
the  best  men  in  the  country,  called  into  the  people's  ser- 
vice, as  were  our  own  rulers  immediately  after  the  Revolu- 
tionary War,  by  the  most  pressing  needs  of  the  nation. 
Macaulay  says  :* 

"  That  election  [of  1695]  had  taken  place  at  a  time  when  peril  and 
distress  had  called  forth  all  the  best  qualities  of  the  nation.  The 
hearts  of  men  were  in  the  struggle  for  independence,  for  liberty,  and 
for  the  Protestant  religion.  *  *  *  The  majority,  therefore,  readily 
arranged  itself  in  admirable  orfler  under  the  ministers,  and  during 
three  sessions  gave  them,  on  almost  every  occasion,  a  cordial  support. 
The  consequence  was  that  the  country  was  rescued  from  its  danger- 
ous position,  and  when  that  Parliament  had  lived  out  its  three  years, 
enjoyed  prosperity  after  a  terrible  commercial  crisis,  peace  after  a 

*  Macaulay's  "  History,"  chap.  24. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          123 

long  and  sanguinary  war,  and  liberty,  united  with  order,  after  civil 
troubles  which  had  lasted  during  two  generations,  and  in  which 
sometimes  order  and  sometimes  liberty  had  been  in  danger  of  per- 
ishing. *  *  *  Such  were  the  fruits  of  the  general  election  of  1695. 
The  ministers  had  flattered  themselves  that  the  general  election  of 
1698  would  be  equally  favorable  to  union,  and  that  in  the  new  Par- 
liament the  old  Parliament  would  revive.  Nor  is  it  strange  that  they 
should  have  indulged  such  a  hope.  Since  they  had  been  called  to 
the  direction  of  affairs,  everything  had  been  changed — changed  for 
the  better,  and  changed  chiefly  by  their  wise  and  resolute  policy,  and  by 
the  firmness  with  which  their  party  had  stood  by  them.  *  *  *  The 
statesmen  whose  administration  had  been  so  beneficent  might  be 
pardoned  if  they  expected  the  gratitude  and  confidence  they  had  fair- 
ly earned.  But  it  soon  became  clear  that  they  had  served  their  coun- 
try only  too  well  for  their  own  interest.  In  1698  prosperity  and  se- 
curity had  made  men  querulous,  fastidious,  and  unmanageable.  The 
Government  was  assailed  with  equal  violence  from  widely  different 
quarters.  The  opposition,  made  up  of  Tories,  many  of  whom  carried 
Toryism  to  the  length  of  Jacobitism,  and  of  discontented  Whigs,  some 
of  whom  carried  Whiggism  to  the  length  of  republicanism,  called  it- 
self the  Country  party,  a  name  which  had  been  popular  before  the 
words  Tory  and  Whig  were  known  in  England.  The  majority  of  the 
House  of  Commons — a  majority  which  had  saved  the  State — was  nick- 
named the  Court  party.  The  Tory  gentry,  who  were  powerful  in  all 
the  counties,  had  special  grievances.  The  wJwle  patronage  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, tliey  said,  was  in  Whig  Itands.  *  *  *  There  were  three  war- 
cries  in  which  all  the  enemies  of  the  Government,  from  Trenchard  to 
Seymour,  could  join — 'No  standing  army ;'  '  No  grants  of  Crown  prop- 
erty ;'  and  lNo  Dutchmen.'1 " 

The  king  who  had  saved  the  English  nation  was  a 
Dutchman ;  some  of  his  advisers,  who  had  been  most 
trusted  by  himself  and  by  the  nation,  were  Dutchmen. 
Some  of  the  troops  who  had  done  most  valiant  service  to 
the  English  people  were  Dutchmen.  And  if  one  thing  at 
the  time  was  certain,  it  was  that  England  could  not  be  safe 
without  a  standing  army. 

In  the  first  years  of  our  national  Government  Washing- 


124  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

ton  and  Hamilton,  and  the  men  wlio  had  helped  to  carry 
out  their  policy,  made  the  nation.  Such  a  thing  as  an 
English  monarchy  in  this  country,  after  the  establishment 
of  the  Constitution,  was  a  thing  that  neither  Hamilton  nor 
Washington  nor  any  of  their  political  friends  ever  dreamed 
of.  And  the  men  then  in  charge  of  our  public  affairs 
were  deposed  from  the  management  of  the  Government, 
under  a  cry  that  they  were  endeavoring  to  befriend  Eng- 
land, and  set  up  here  an  English  monarchy. 

In  England  in  1698,  and  in  America  in  1800,  party 
men,  on  mere  party  cries,  drew  into  one  combination  all 
the  enemies  of  the  men  who  were  then  in  office,  all  the 
elements  of  discontent  in  the  country,  and  drove  wise 
men  from  the  councils  of  the  nation,  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  place  for  themselves. 

"VVe  have  seen  that,  in  this  country,  party  feeling  and 
the  necessities  of  party  contests  urged  a  President  of  the 
United  States  to  the  length  of  inciting  rebellion  against 
his  own  government.  In  the  English  House  of  Commons, 
party  needs  urged  men  to  the  length  of  supporting  treason. 
Hallaui  says  of  the  case  of  Admiral  Russell  :* 

"  The  credulity  and  almost  wilful  blindness  of  faction  is  strongly 
manifested  in  the  conduct  of  the  House  of  Commons  as  to  the  quar- 
rel between  this  commander  and  the  head  of  the  Admiralty.  They 
chose  to  support  one  who  was  secretly  a  traitor,  because  he  bore  the 
name  of  Whig,  tolerating  his  infamous  neglect  of  duty  and  contemp- 
tible excuses,  in  order  to  pull  down  an  honest  though  not  very  able 
minister  who  belonged  to  the  Tories." 

It  remained  for  English  statesmen  in  1832,  at  the  last 
great  struggle  for  freedom  in  English  history,  in  the  con- 
test over  the  first  Reform  Bill,  to  give  one  of  the  most 

*  II u] la  11 1,  "Const.  Hist,"  vol.  iii.  p.  126. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          125 

remarkable  instances  of  the  true  working  of  party  ma- 
chinery. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington,  with  the  other  leaders  of  the 
Conservative  party,  were  making  the  attempt  to  "form  a 
government."  The  House  of  Commons  was  determined 
to  have  Parliamentary  Reform.  And  no  government  could 
stand  which  did  not  bring  in  a  Reform  Bill.  The  Con- 
servatives had  been  steadily  fighting,  with  all  their  strength, 
against  reform.  The  Liberals  had  been  steadily  fighting 
for  reform.  Both  parties,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  believed 
in  the  principles  they  professed.  The  Liberals  professed 
to  believe  that  the  passage  of  a  Reform  Bill  would  be 
the  saving  of  the  nation.  The  Conservatives  professed 
to  believe  that  the  passage  of  a  Reform  Bill  would  be  the 
nation's  ruin.  What  the  two  parties  did  was  this :  The 
Conservative  leaders  proposed  to  take  office  and  pass  a 
Reform  Bill.  The  Liberal  leaders  refused  to  allow  the 
Reform  Bill  to  pass  unless  they  could  take  office  them- 
selves. Both  parties  were  ready  to  throw  away  their 
principles  to  get  place. 

That  is  merely  one  instance.  So  it  has  always  been  in 
English  Parliamentary  history.  Each  party  has  been,  at 
one  time  or  another,  on  both  sides  of  every  important 
question  of  government  policy.  Principles  and  measures 
have  had  little  to  do  with  the  action  of  parties  in  Eng- 
land, except  that  there,  as  hero,  the  party  leaders  have  used 
the  great  questions  of  the  day  as  battle-cries  in  the  strug- 
gle for  place.  Many  great  men  and  honest  men  in  Eng- 
land have  been  party  men.  They  have,  too,  done  great 
service  to  the  English  people.  But  they  have  done  that 
good  service  always  in  spite  of  party  and  party  influences. 

Within  the  last  three  years  it  has  seemed  that  the  Eng- 
lish people  were  almost  at  the  turning-point  of  their  fort- 


126  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

unes.  As  it  seemed  for  a  time,  they  were  on  the  eve  of 
a  great  war  with  a  powerful  nation  for  dominion  in  the 
East,  and  we  were  about  to  witness  either  the  downfall, 
or  a  new  and  extended  growth,  of  the  Anglo-Indian  Em- 
pire. Was  England  brought  to  the  position  in  which  she 
was  a  few  months  since  by  the  temperate  counsels  of  wise 
statesmen?  How  did  it  happen  that  on  this  great  ques- 
tion of  a  great  war,  which  could  not  but  bring  misery  to 
many  individuals,  and  might  possibly  bring  disaster  for 
years  on  the  mass  of  the  English  people,  the  expressed 
opinion  of  all  public  men  followed  almost  exactly  the 
party  lines?  Is  it  a  possible  thing  that  no  one  of  the 
Liberal  party  men  was  in  favor  of  a  war  with  Eussia,  and 
that  no  one  of  the  Conservatives  was  opposed  to  it? 
That,  in  the  nature  of  things,  could  not  be.  But  such  is 
the  effect  of  party  contest  and  party  feeling,  that  with  this 
question  before  them,  of  life  and  death  to  the  nation,  the 
men  of  one  party  did  all  they  could  to  plunge  the  nation 
into  a  war,  while  the  men  of  the  other  party  did  all  they 
could  to  keep  the  nation  out  of  a  war,  and  the  English 
people  Lad  the  calm,  deliberate  thought  and  action  of 
neither  party.  "  Politics  "  may  consist  in  the  mere  con- 
test of  party  men  for  power  and  place.  That  is  not,  how- 
ever, statesmanship. 

But  is  this  the  only  point  to  be  noticed  ?  We  have  in 
this  country  developed  not  only  parties,  but  enormous 
party  machinery  for  the  mere  purpose  of  carrying  elec- 
tions— a  machinery  that  is  intricate,  costly,  powerful,  and 
tyrannical.  The  man  in  public  place  in  these  days  in  this 
country  must  be,  not  a  statesman,  but  a  man  of  skill  and 
capacity  in  manipulating  this  election  machinery.  And 
how  is  it  in  England? 

In  the  Fortnightly  Revieio  for  July,  1877,  is  an  article 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          127 

written  by  Mr.  Chamberlain,  of  the  House  of  Commons, 
entitled  "  A  New  Political  Organization."  It  gives  an  ac- 
count of  one  of  the  most  significant  and  important  move- 
ments in  English  history.  There  has  been  now  for  some 
time  a  "  Liberal  Association,"  for  the  purpose  of  regulat- 
ing candidates  and  measures  for  the  Liberal  party  in  the 
city  of  Birmingham.  That  one  organization  has,  accord- 
ing to  Mr.  Chamberlain,  brought  about  this  result.  "  It 
has  given  them  (the  Liberals)  the  control  of  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  local  government  of  the  town."  It  is  now 
proposed  to  form  a  similar  organization  extending  over 
the  whole  nation.  Mr.  Chamberlain  explains  that  the 
managing  committees  in  the  Birmingham  association  "are 
elected  by  public  meetings  generally  called  in  each  ward, 
and  open  to  every  Liberal  resident."  There  is  to  be  a 
similar  organization  in  every  parliamentary  constituency, 
and  there  is  to  be  a  national  council,  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives from  all  the  local  councils  and  associations. 
This  national  council  is  to  regulate,  directly  or  indirectly, 
and  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  the  policy  of  the  Liberal 
party  in  England.  Some  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  sentences 
are  very  pertinent  and  very  interesting.  He  says :  "  Owing 
to  various  causes,  and  notably  to  the  extension  of  the  suf- 
frage, and  to  the  increased  interest  taken  by  the  mass  of 
the  people  in  general  politics,  it  is  not  only  desirable,  but 
absolutely  necessary,  that  the  whole  of  the  party  should 
be  taken  into  its  counsels,  and  that  all  its  members  should 
share  in  its  control  and  management.  It  is  no  longer  safe 
to  attempt  to  secure  the  representation  of  a  great  constit- 
uency for  the  nominee  of  a  few  gentlemen  sitting  in  pri- 
vate committee,  and  basing  their  claims  to  dictate  the 
choice  of  the  election  on  the  fact  that  they  have  been  will- 
ing to  subscribe  something  toward  the  expenses.  The 


128  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

working  class,  who  cannot  contribute  pecuniarily,  though 
they  are  often  ready  to  sacrifice  a  more  than  proportion- 
ate amount  of  time  and  labor,  are  now  the  majority  in 
most  borough  constituencies,  and  no  candidate  and  no 
policy  has  a  chance  of  success  unless  their  good-will  and 
active  support  can  be  first  secured." 

In  other  words,  according  to  Mr.  Chamberlain,  a  national 
society  is  now  to  be  formed,  for  the  purpose,  nominally,  of 
guiding  the  policy  of  the  English  Liberal  party.  It  needs 
no  great  shrewdness  to  see  that  this  organization  will  be 
used  for  nominating  candidates  for  Parliament  and  all 
local  elective  offices,  and  that  the  men  who  control  this 
organization  will  control  the  action  of  the  Liberal  party 
throughout  the  kingdom.  This  party  organization  on  the 
part  of  the  Liberals  will  compel  the  formation  of  a  like  or- 
ganization on  the  part  of  the  Conservatives.  The  English 
people,  in  short,  unless  appearances  are  very  deceptive,  are 
soon  to  have  inaugurated,  in  its  most  approved  form,  that 
grand  political  panacea,  the  caucus  system.  Some  English- 
men believe  that  by  the  Reform  acts  they  have  at  last  se- 
cured the  thing  for  which  they  have  been  struggling  for 
centuries,  for  which  so  many  noble  lives  have  been  lost, 
and  so  much  noble  toil  has  been  given — a  free  representa- 
tive government.  They  have  as  yet  secured  nothing  of 
the  kind.  They  have  secured  a  government,  by  party  pol- 
iticians, through  the  machinery  of  frequent  popular  elec- 
tions. And  they  are  just  entering  on  that  blessed  era  in 
the  progress  toward  free  government,  the  era  of  party 
tyranny. 

Mr.  Goldwin  Smith  writes,  in  an  article  in  Macmillan's 
Magazine  for  August,  1877 : 

"  The  tendency  in  party  government  to  supersede  tlie  national  Legislat- 
ure by  the  party  caucus  has  long  been  completely  developed  in  the  United 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          129 

States,  where  it  may  be  said  that  in  ordinary  times  the  only  real  de- 
bates are  those  held  in  caucus,  Congressional  legislation  being  simply 
a  registration  of  the  caucus  decision,  for  which  all  the  members  of 
the  party,  whether  they  agreed  or  dissented  in  the  caucus,  feel  bound 
by  party  allegiance  to  record  their  votes  in  the  House — just  as  the 
only  real  election  is  the  nomination  by  the  caucus  of  the  party  which  fias 
the  majority,  and  which  then  collectively  imposes  its  will  on  the  con- 
stituency ;  so  that  measures  and  elections  may  be,  and  often  are,  car- 
ried by  a  minority  but  little  exceeding  one-fourth  of  the  House  or  the 
constituency,  as  the  case  may  be.  TJie  same  tendency  is  rapidly  de- 
veloping itself  in  England,  and  it  is  evidently  fatal  to  the  existence  of 
parliamentary  institutions." 

When  we  study  political  institutions,  our  effort  is  to 
learn,  not  only  how  affairs  are  now  from  past  causes,  but 
how  affairs  are  to  be  from  causes  now  existing.  English 
public  affairs  are  now  in  only  a  transition  state.  The  cal- 
dron is  still  seething.  The  English  people  have  not  yet 
finished  their  revolution.  The  men  who  think  they  ad- 
mire party  rule  in  England,  admire  a  state  of  things  which 
is  now  disappearing,  and  which  has  resulted  from  causes 
which  have  already  disappeared.  But  what  a  change  there 
has  been  even  now !  Here  is  a  great  people,  which  has 
had  statesmen  in  its  sendee  —  Burke  and  Pitt  and  Fox, 
Grey  and  Peel  and  Gladstone.  By  what  strange  freak  of 
fortune  does  it  chance  that  the  management  of  their  gov- 
ernment affairs  has  fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  somewhat 
clever  writer  of  tawdry  romances?  For  the  one  reason 
that  he  is  a  shrewd  manipulator  of  party  machinery.  No 
one  ever  thought  him  a  statesman.  But  that  is  the  man 
that  party  rule  naturally  and  certainly  puts  in  high  place, 
where  he  has  to  deal  with  such  a  man  as  Bismarck. 
Doubtless  it  is  highly  pleasing  to  the  German  Chancellor. 
But  is  it  greatly  for  the  best  interests  of  the  English 
people  ? 

G* 


130  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

So  far  \ve  have  an  examination  of  the  facts  of  history. 
But  how  must  those  facts  necessarily  be,  from  the  nature 
of  things  ? 

It  is  said  that  parties  are  combinations  of  citizens  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  measures.  I  maintain,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  these  combinations,  which  we  call  parties,  never 
can  be  anything  but  combinations  of  office-holders,  to  carry 
elections. 

The  citizens  who  compose  these  political  parties  do  not, 
and  cannot,  themselves  frame  and  decide  the  actual  meas- 
ures of  public  policy.  They  can  and  do  only  elect  the 
men  who  are  to  frame  and  decide  those  measures.  Tak- 
ing the  theory  at  its  best,  then,  the  first  thing,  in  point  of 
time,  to  be  done  by  these  political  parties,  is  to  elect  men 
to  public  office. 

And  with  the  men  who  manage  these  parties,  however 
upright  may  be  their  intentions,  the  end  which  is  first,  in 
point  of  time,  is  to  get  office  for  themselves ;  to  this  end 
they  must  have  the  support  of  other  party  men ;  to  this 
end  they  must  give  their  support  to  other  party  men.  The 
party  organization  naturally  and  certainly  becomes  an  or- 
ganization of  men  who  combine  and  work  together  to  se- 
cure their  own  election  to  the  different  places  under  gov- 
ernment. It  becomes,  try  to  disguise  it  as  we  may,  a  sys- 
tem of  trading  in  office. 

In  the  affairs,  too,  of  any  great  nation,  or  even  of  a  sin- 
gle city,  there  are,  not  one  or  two,  but  very  many,  weighty 
questions  of  public  policy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  men 
composing  these  large  parties  cannot  all  agree  on  more 
than  one  or  two  of  those  main  questions.  Nor  do  they 
profess  to.  And  as  to  those  one  or  two  main  questions, 
they  agree,  not  on  actual  measures  to  be  carried,  but  only 
on  what  they  are  pleased  to  term  general  principles. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          131 

There  is,  however,  one  point  on  which  the  party  leaders 
can  agree — their  candidates  for  office.  And  here  they  do 
agree.  On  all  other  points  they  must  differ,  and  they  do 
differ.  They  do  indeed,  before  each  election,  say  some- 
thing about "  principles ;"  they  make  a  "  platform,"  as  they 
term  it — a  collection  of  "  sounding  and  glittering  general- 
ities," so  vague  as  to  mean  nothing,  by  which  they  think 
they  can  catch  votes.  This  word  "  platform "  truly  de- 
scribes the  thing  for  which  it  is  the  name.  It  is  some- 
thing to  be  put  under  foot. 

Whatever  may  be  the  theory  of  political  parties  as  they 
should  be,  wherever  there  are  many  offices  and  many  elec- 
tions, the  natural  and  certain  result  is  that  these  party  or- 
ganizations, as  a  fact,  are  used  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
elections  and  not  measures.  Parties  do  not  elect  men  to 
put  into  action  certain  principles ;  they  use  principles  as 
battle-cries  to  elect  certain  men. 

That  is  not  only  the  working  of  party  rule,  it  is  the  the- 
ory of  party  rule  as  it  actually  exists.  Any  other  state- 
ment is  only  the  theory  of  party  rule  as  men  wish  it 
might  be. 

What,  then,  are  the  uses  of  party  ? 

It  is  often  said  that  in  a  free  government  we  must  have 
parties,  that  they  are  necessary,  in  order — 

1.  To  get  concerted  action. 

2.  To  keep  alive  the  interest  of  the  people  in  public  af- 
fairs, and  thus 

3.  To  preserve  free  government. 
How  far  is  this  true  ? 

And,  first,  must  we  have  these  vast  party  combinations 
for  the  purpose  of  getting  concerted  action  ? 

For  the  purpose  of  accomplishing  results,  in  govern- 
ment affairs  as  well  as  in  private  affairs,  we  must  have, 


132  A  TEUE   REPUBLIC. 

there  is  no  doubt,  combination.  But  do  we  need,  in  or- 
der to  get  combination,  permanent  party  organizations,  such 
as  we  have  had  ?  Combinations  of  men,  for  the  purpose 
only  of  carrying  measures,  always  must  and  always  will 
exist.  No  system  of  government  can  possibly  be  devised 
which  will  prevent  it.  If  men  have  interests  that  need  to 
be  protected,  they  will  combine  to  protect  those  interests. 
If  at  any  time  there  is  any  one  great  controlling  interest 
as  to  which  wise  legislation  or  executive  action  is  needed, 
is  it  a  possible  thing  that  men  will  not  combine  and  work 
together,  to  get  that  legislation  or  action,  as  they  always 
combine  in  all  private  affairs,  as  they  always  have  done  in 
public  affairs  ? 

It  is  said  we  must  have  combination.  We  cannot  hin- 
der it,  do  what  we  will. 

Let  us  go  a  step  farther.  It  may  be  that,  so  far  from 
parties  being  necessary  to  get  concerted  action,  they  are 
even  a  great  hindrance  in  getting  it. 

We  have  seen  so  much  of  parties  and  party  contests 
that  we  have  almost  come  to  look  on  them  as  an  end  in 
themselves.  But  what  is  always  the  real  end  to  be  reached 
in  public  affairs  ?  As  we  should  all  agree,  it  is  action  of 
some  kind.  In  order  to  have  that  action  wise,  we  need 
calm  thought  and  discussion  before  we  decide  what  that 
action  shall  be,  and  united  effort  after  our  action  is  de- 
cided. We  need  at  every  stage,  not  strife  between  two 
factions,  but  harmony  of  all  men.  We  must  have  the  work- 
ing together,  of  all  men's  minds,  to  get  the  wisest  thought, 
of  all  men's  wills,  to  get  the  strongest  action. 

This  working  together,  this  harmony,  of  thought  and  ac- 
tion, we  need,  too,  from  our  public  officers  even  more,  if  pos- 
sible, than  from  the  people  themselves ;  for  it  is  the  public 
officers  who  are  to  decide  on  the  actual  government  measures. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          133 

And  how  does  this  machinery  of  party  tend  to  help  or 
hinder  us  in  getting  these  results,  wise  thought  and  strong 
action,  from  both  the  people  and  their  public  servants  ? 

Parties  and  party  contests  make  it  an  impossible  thing 
to  get  from  the  people  their  calm  wise  thought  and  action. 
One  party  seizes  one  side  of  a  question,  the  other  party 
takes  the  other  side,  or,  oftener,  each  party  takes  differ- 
ent sides  in  different  sections  of  the  country.  What  the 
party  men  labor  for  is  not  to  find  out  the  best  thing  to  be 
done  by  the  men  of  all  parties,  but  to  catch  votes  for  their 
own  party.  And  their  whole  effort  is  to  make  men  follow 
party  and  work  for  party  success,  instead  of  using  their 
minds  and  their  judgments.  In  party  contests  men  do  not 
think  over  measures ;  they  fight  for  candidates.  We  have 
always  strife,  not  deliberation. 

So  it  is  as  to  the  action  and  thought  of  the  people  them- 
selves. But  how  is  it  as  to  the  action  of  our  public  ser- 
vants? It  is  our  right  to  have  our  Senators  and  Repre- 
sentatives sit  down  together  and  give  us  the  best  possible 
results  of  their  combined  wisdom.  When  once  they  enter 
our  legislative  halls  they  have  no  right  to  know  that  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  party  in  existence.  They  are  bound  to 
think  only  what  are  the  best  measures  for  the  people's 
interest,  and  to  give  us  those  measures.  That  is  not  what 
they  do.  Every  measure  is  made  a  "  party  question."  If 
the  administration  party,  as  it  is  called,  brings  forward  a 
wise  measure,  the  opposition  party,  if  it  dare,  opposes  it, 
for  fear  their  enemies  may  gain  votes  through  having  done 
the  people  good  service.  These  party  men  may  be  able 
men ;  they  may  be  men  of  honest  intentions.  They  are 
driven  by  the  pressure  of  this  vast  party  machinery  to 
serve  party  and  not  the  people,  whether  they  wish  it  or 
not ;  for  on  party  they  depend  for  their  future. 


134  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

So  much  as  to  Avhether  party  and  party  machinery 
helps  or  hinders  us  in  getting  from  the  people  and  their 
servants  wise  action.  But  when  measures  are  once  de- 
cided and  taken,  surely  no  one  can  claim  that  party  strife 
as  to  those  measures  should  go  on  unceasingly.  But  it 
never  ends.  No  question  is  ever  at  rest. 

In  private  affairs,  when  men  have  once  made  a  decision, 
they  act.  The  decision  may  or  may  not  be  wise.  Of  that 
they  cannot  be  certain.  But  when  the  decision  is  once 
made,  they  do  something — they  put  their  decision  to  a 
trial ;  and  if,  upon  trial,  they  find  they  have  made  a  mis- 
take, then  they  try  something  else.  In  public  affairs  we 
should  do  the  same.  When  a  course  of  action  is  once  de- 
termined on,  then  all  men  should  agree,  in  putting  it  to  the 
test  of  experience.  If  the  course  of  action  is  not  wise, 
time  will  so  prove ;  and  then  we  can  try  other  measures. 
And  so  we  should  do,  were  it  not  for  party. 

It  is  now  fourteen  years  since  we  ended  the  war  of  the 
rebellion.  When  that  war  ended  we  had  before  us,  no 
doubt,  a  great  work.  It  may  be  that  no  one  then  under- 
stood precisely  how  that  work  was  to  be  done.  Time 
would  certainly  have  shown  us  the  way,  if  party  strife  had 
not  always  kept  the  people  blind.  We  can  now,  at  least, 
easily  see  that  this  work,  though  great,  was  simple.  We 
had  only  to  keep  the  peace,  and  let  the  laws  of  nature 
work  out  their  own  results.  The  war  had  been  begun  and 
carried  on  by  the  people  of  the  North  with  one  purpose, 
to  enforce  obedience  to  United  States  laws.  That  was  all 
that  war  could  do  for  us,  if  our  success  was  most  complete. 
When  the  war  was  ended,  we  had  to  re-establish  the  ex- 
ecutive machinery  of  the  United  States  Government  and 
the  United  States  Courts  in  the  Southern  States.  And 
we  had  to  keep  an  army  there  to  enforce  United  States 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          135 

laws — an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men,  or  five  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  if  need  was.  That  army  should,  from 
the  beginning,  have  been  large  enough  not  merely  to  crush 
resistance,  but  to  make  the  thought  of  resistance  impossi- 
ble. That  would  have  been  economy  in  the  end.  It  was 
most  truly  for  the  interest  of  the  Southern  people.  Then, 
if  it  was  necessary  to  have  new  United  States  laws  to  se- 
cure to  any  one  class  or  all  classes  of  men  the  enjoyment 
of  their  rights,  Congress  could  pass  the  laws,  and  the  laws 
could  be  enforced.  There  were  some  things  that  could 
not  be  done  by  acts  of  Congress  or  by  army  orders. 
Time  was  needed  to  heal  the  wounds  of  a  great  revolution 
and  a  great  war.  The  Southern  people  had  been  ruined. 
Their  property  was  gone.  They  needed  to  work,  and  they 
wished  to  work.  And  the  one  great  service  we  could 
have  done  them  was  simply  to  keep  the  peace  between 
them  and  their  former  slaves  by  the  mere  presence  of  an 
overwhelming  armed  force,  so  that  affairs  could  in  the 
shortest  possible  time  settle  into  peaceful  channels.  The 
party  politicians,  who  have  talked  so  much  about  the 
rights  of  the  black  man,  have,  most  of  them,  cai'ed  noth' 
ing  for  those  rights.  What  they  wished  and  accomplish- 
ed has  been  to  keep  up  strife  between  two  races  and  to 
protect  neither.  The  interests  of  the  Southern  people 
and  of  the  Northern  people  were  precisely  the  same,  to 
have  peace  and  quiet.  There  are  lawless  men  everywhere. 
There  were  lawless  men  in  the  Southern  States.  But  the 
vast  majority  of  the  white  people  there  wished  to  keep 
the  peace.  The  party  men  on  both  sides  have,  conscious- 
ly or  unconsciously,  done  everything  in  their  power  to 
continue  the  strife  that  should  have  ended  when  the 
Southern  armies  surrendered.  If  at  the  end  of  the  war  a 
committee  could  have  been  appointed  of  fifty  intelligent 


136  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

men  from  the  South,  of  the  men  who  had  been  in  the  field 
while  the  war  lasted,  and  the  same  number  of  the  same 
class  of  men  from  the  North,  and  if  to  that  committee 
could  have  been  given  the  absolute  power  to  arrange  mat- 
ters as  they  thought  wise,  it  is  my  belief  that  all  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  situation  would  have  been  easily  surmount- 
ed. Our  whole  troubles  have  come  from  this  never-end- 
ing party  strife. 

And  not  only  do  party  men  foster  strife  when  we  need 
harmony,  but  in  this  strife  they  know  no  law  or  limit. 
They  push  it  as  far  as  their  wishes  and  courage  go — even 
to  the  length  of  armed  rebellion.  It  was  so  when  the  first 
opposition  party  was  formed  in  the  time  of  Washington. 
It  was  so  when  Mr.  Buchanan  and  his  friends  encouraged 
resistance  to  the  Government.  It  will  always  be  so  as  long 
as  parties  exist. 

But  it  is  in  time  of  war,  when  a  people  should  be  unit- 
ed, when  they  must  show  an  unbroken  front  to  their  ene- 
mies, that  the  greatest  evils  from  party  have  ever  come. 
In  every  time  of  danger  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  have  yet  had,  party  has  nearly  ruined  ns.  Party 
men,  whatever  may  have  been  their  intentions,  have  in 
practice  not  heeded  the  needs  of  the  people,  have  looked 
at  party  ends,  have  brought  war  on  us  when  it  suited  their 
purposes,  and,  when  war  has  come,  have  done  much  to 
bring  on  us  defeat  and  destruction. 

In  the  only  two  important  wars  that  we  have  had,  the 
war  of  1812  and  the  war  of  the  rebellion,  when  all  men 
should  have  united  against  the  common  enemy,  we  have 
been  nearly  ruined  by  party  strife. 

The  calm  opinion  of  to-day  is  that  the  war  of  1812 
was  entirely  needless,  that  it  was  begun  on  no  sufficient 
reason,  that  it  was  carried  on  with  disgraceful  inefficiency, 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          137 

and  that  it  brought  no  substantial  results.  That  the  war 
ever  came,  or  that  it  was  carried  on  as  it  was,  was  due  to 
the  violence  of  party  contest.  One  party  dragged  us  into 
the  war  for  party  reasons.  The  other  party,  after  war  had 
come,  did  its  utmost  to  cripple  the  administration  and 
make  the  war  a  ruinous  failure,  for  party  reasons. 

I  take  from  letters  of  Jeremiah  Mason,*  written  during 
the  war,  certain  extracts,  pictures  of  the  state  of  affairs  as 
he  then  saw  them.  He  says : 

"  Washington,  July  20th,  1813. 

"  To  me  most  things  here  are  new,  and  not  a  few  appear  strange. 
I  expected  to  find  some  dissatisfaction  among  the  old  friends  of  the 
administration.  But  I  was  not  prepared  to  expect  the  violent  jeal- 
ousies among  them  which  I  find.  They  have  no  confidence  in  each 
other.  *  *  *  The  Secretary  of  State  and  of  War  are  each  some 
distance  down  the  river,  at  the  head  of  separate  bodies  of  troops, 
preparing  to  oppose  the  enemy.  They  are  both  ambitious  of  military 
command,  and  envious  of  each  other.  The  influence  of  the  President 
is  much  less  than  I  supposed.  There  seems  to  be  little  plan  or  con- 
cert in  the  management  of  public  affairs." 

"Washington,  October  8th,  1S14. 

"  The  Government  is  in  utter  confusion  and  distress.  Without  a 
cabinet,  without  credit  or  money,  the  nation  is  in  a  most  deplorable 
condition." 

"Washington,  November  24th,  1S14. 

"  If  the  war  goes  on,  the  States  will  be  left  in  a  great  degree  to 
take  care  of  themselves.  What  this  will  end  in  it  is  impossible  to 
foresee.  This  is  the  cause  from  which,  in  my  opinion,  a  dissolution 
of  the  Union  is  to  be  apprehended.  *  *  *  If  the  people  discover 
the  general  government  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  defend  them,  they 
will  soon  withdraw  all  support  from  it,  and  look  for  relief  to  their 
State  governments.  If  compelled  to  tax  themselves  to  support  their 
militia  and  State  troops,  they  will  not  at  the  same  time  pay  heavy 
taxes  to  the  United  States." 

*  Hillard's  "  Life  of  Mason  "  (privately  printed). 


138  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

Mr.  Mason  bad  a  clear  idea  of  the  danger  of  the  nation 
and  its  cause.  He  writes  in  another  letter : 

"  Our  political  institutions  are  new,  and  not  very  well  understood 
by  the  people.  Our  government  is  weak,  and  has  been  for  the  last 
thirteen  years  carried  on  by  courting  their  prejudices  and  worst  pas- 
sions. I  am  not  certain  that  our  people  are  so  much  more  enlighten- 
ed and  virtuous  than  the  rest  of  mankind,  as  their  demagogues  are 
constantly  telling  them.  We  are  not  without  ambitious  spirits  ready 
to  take  advantage  of  occasions.  I  do  not,  however,  believe  there  is 
any  immediate  danger  of  the  establishment  of  an  arbitrary  govern- 
ment by  usurpation.  I  think  the  country  is  not  yet  prepared  for  it, 
but  I  fear  it  is  preparing.  I  do  not  see  much  chance  of  the  govern- 
ment's getting  into  better  hands.  Should  that  happen,  no  men  in 
the  nation  could  raise  it  from  its  present  degraded  condition  up  to 
the  tone  and  style  of  Washington. 

"  The  government  must  probably  for  many  years  remain  in  this 
degraded  state,  vibrating  between  life  and  death.  The  administra- 
tion may  often  pass  from  one  faction  to  another.  Each  faction,  with 
intent  of  securing  the  continuance  of  their  power,  will  gratify  the  worst 
prejudices  of  tlie  people,  and  pursue  measures  they  know  to  be  base  and 
unworthy.  Such  a  course  would  probably  soon  end  in  confusion,  out 
of  which  might  arise  a  new  order  of  things,  were  it  not  that  the 
State  governments  will  be  able,  as  is  hoped,  to  afford  a  tolerable  de- 
gree of  security  for  individual  rights." 

The  war  of  the  rebellion  came.  As  to  whether  it  would 
have  come  had  it  not  been  for  party  strife,  men  may  dif- 
fer. But  after  the  war  once  came,  as  to  the  disastrous  ef- 
fects of  party  strife  men  cannot  differ. 

Again,  as  in  the  war  of  1812,  when  the  nation  was  in 
the  greatest  danger,  when  we  needed,  of  all  things,  that  all 
loyal  men  should  sink  their  differences  of  opinion  on  other 
matters,  and  fight  together  for  mere  existence,  we  had  nearly 
half  the  men  at  the  North  arrayed  in  opposition  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, doing  all  they  could,  whatever  may  have  been  their 
purpose,  to  aid  the  public  enemy  and  destroy  the  nation. 

In  short,  at  all  times,  in  war  and  peace,  the  need  of  the 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          139 

people  is  agreement — on  something  to  be  done.  The  need 
of  parties  and  of  party  men  is  always  strife  over  what  they 
call  "principles." 

We  have  in  this  country  every  four  years  a  convulsion 
of  the  whole  nation.  The  entire  business  of  the  commu- 
nity stands  still  at  an  immense  money  loss.  If  the  men 
of  a  new  party  come  into  power,  they  may  adopt  a  totally 
new  system  of  levying  revenue ;  they  may  bring  in  a  new 
tariff ;  they  may  overthrow  the  existing  currency,  or  issue 
a  quantity  of  irredeemable  paper  money.  The  commer- 
cial and  banking  operations  of  the  whole  country  may  be 
thrown  into  utter  confusion.  Prosperity  may  be  changed 
to  ruin,  for  large  numbers  of  our  citizens,  according  to  the 
particular  measures  that  demagogues  think  will  carry  them 
into  office.  The  mere  machinery  and  labor  of  a  Presiden- 
tial election  cost  immense  sums  of  money.  This  money 
is  paid,  in  one  shape  or  another,  by  the  people,  and  out  of 
the  people's  purse.  Why  should  the  people  pay  this  im- 
mense tax  every  four  years,  have  their  public  servants  at 
all  times  doing  duty  to  the  party  instead  of  to  the  State, 
and  be  subjected  to  this  immense  business  loss  and  this 
enormous  upheaval  of  the  whole  social  fabric  ?  We  may, 
indeed,  live  through  it.  The  people's  liberties  may  not  be 
permanently  destroyed  by  it.  We  may  be  prosperous  in 
spite  of  it.  But  why  should  we  have  it  ? 

The  English  system  of  government  and  our  own  system 
are  both  bad.  We  have  a  revolution  once  in  four  years. 
They  have  one  whenever  the  ministry  are  beaten  in  the 
House  of  Commons.  I  do  not  yet  feel  certain  which  sys- 
tem is  the  worse. 

We  come,  then,  to  the  next  point.  Is  it  a  necessary 
thing  to  have  this  party  strife,  in  order  to  keep  alive  the 
interest  of  the  people  in  public  affairs  ? 


140  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

One  of  the  most  frequent  complaints  of  the  day  is  that 
our  people,  and  especially  the  educated  men,  do  not  take 
an  interest  in  public  affairs.  And  the  complaint  is  in  a 
measure  well-founded.  Men  do  not  take  a  healthy  inter- 
est in  the  affairs  of  our  government.  And  why  is  it  so  ? 
Simply  this :  the  ordinary  citizen  knows  that  he  has  no 
power,  that  the  party  men  can  and  will  manage  our  gov- 
ernment affairs  very  nearly  as  they  choose.  But  before 
party  machinery  and  party  power  became  so  fully  devel- 
oped, men  did  take  the  deepest  interest  in  all  the  affairs  of 
the  nation. 

All  men  in  the  country,  but  the  educated  men  more 
than  any  others,  think  and  read  and  talk  of  public  affairs 
more  now  than  ever  before.  As  a  class,  the  educated  men 
are  more  eager  than  any  others  to  go  into  public  life. 
Nothing  else  has  for  them  such  fascinations.  But  they 
cannot  get  there.  They  are  kept  out  by  the  party  leaders. 
They  try  again  and  again,  and  they  fail.  What  has  at 
times  seemed  the  indifference  of  elegant  leisure  is  in  fact 
the  despair  of  repeated  defeat. 

Is  it  a  possible  thing  that  men  of  any  class  should  lose 
their  interest  in  the  public  affairs  of  their  own  country,  of 
their  own  time  ?  This  government  and  these  laws,  we  live 
under  them.  They  make  or  mar  men's  fortunes  and  the 
fortunes  of  their  children.  Men  who  read  and  think  at 
all,  read  and  think  of  the  affairs  of  every  people  and  of 
every  age.  Wherever  we  go,  in  a  railway  train  or  in  the 
farm-houses,  we  hear  all  men  discussing  matters  of  Euro- 
pean politics.  Are  we  suddenly  to  lose  all  interest  in  the 
affairs  only  of  our  own  country,  and  in  the  making  of  our 
own  laws  ?  On  the  contrary,  remove  these  party  oligar- 
chies, and  the  best  men  in  the  country  would  again  come 
into  public  life.  Remove  these  party  contests,  and  we 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          141 

should  have,  instead  of  this  feverish  upheaval  once  in  four 
years  over  a  mere  struggle  for  office,  a  steady,  healthy  in- 
terest in  questions  of  public  policy.  When  men  found 
that  they  really  had  some  power  in  affairs  of  State,  they 
would  try  to  use  it.  Men  in  any  country  have  never,  un- 
der any  circumstances,  been  able  to  lose  their  interest  in 
the  affairs  of  their  own  Government.  We  are  not  now 
to  have  such  a  miracle  for  the  first  time  in  the  world's 
history. 

To  say  that  we  must  have  these  party  contests  in  order 
to  keep  up  the  interest  of  the  people  in  public  affairs,  is  to 
say  that  a  man  must  have  a  fever  once  in  four  years  to 
keep  warm. 

Are  these  party  combinations,  then,  necessary  to  preserve 
free  government  ? 

All  the  republics  in  history  have  been  destroyed  by 
party — by  these  organizations  of  men  who  have  made  a 
profession  of  carrying  elections.  The  tyranny  of  kings  has 
been  often  overthrown  by  one  people  or  another  in  the 
history  of  nations.  The  tyranny  of  party  is  the  most  dan- 
gerous enemy  freedom  can  have.  No  people  has  ever  yet 
conquered  it.  These  single  royal  tyrants,  with  only  one 
life,  are  puny  things ;  but  this  immense  monster  party, 
which  is  immortal,  has  the  people's  own  strength. 

But  if  these  were  the  only  evils  resulting  from  party 
combinations  we  might  be  comparatively  at  ease.  We  have 
not  yet  the  Avorst  point.  It  is  this  necessity  of  carrying 
elections,  under  which  we  put  all  our  public  servants,  which 
is  the  root  of  all  the  corruption  of  our  public  men.  We 
bind  them  hand  and  foot,  in  the  chains  of  party  slavery. 
And  we  do  more :  we  compel  them  to  serve  the  powerful 
interests  in  the  land  which  control  votes.  Our  public  ser- 
vants, on  questions  of  revenue,  on  all  matters  of  legislation, 


14S  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

where  we  have  a  right  to  their  honest  judgment  and  hon- 
est action,  do  not  give  us  their  honest  judgment  and  hon- 
est action.  They  are  driven  to  look  at  the  next  election. 
They  say  they  work  for  their  party.  They  give  it  too 
good  a  name.  They  shape  their  official  action  in  such  a 
way  as  to  gain  the  support  at  the  next  election  of  the  rich 
and  powerful  men  and  corporations.  Disguise  it  as  we 
may,  they  sell  their  official  action  for  votes ;  and  the  next 
step  downward,  the  selling  official  action  for  money,  is  one 
that  is  easily  and  often  taken.  But  that  is  not  often  the 
first  step. 

Some  men  have  been  in  the  habit  of  thinking  that  the 
corruption  which  AVC  have  had  among  members  of  Congress 
and  of  State  Legislatures  was  some  special  fruit  of  some 
special  feature  of  republican  institutions.  That  is  a  mis- 
take. Whenever,  under  any  system  of  government,  it  is 
necessary  for  public  officers  to  catch  votes  for  elections, 
they  will  catch  the  votes.  The  votes  will  be  bought  and 
paid  for,  with  money,  or  office,  or  official  action,  as  the  case 
may  be,  whether  it  be  under  a  monarchy  or  a  republic. 

It  will  be  well  to  examine  some  points  in  the  history  of 
corruption  in  England. 

Since  Parliamentary  government  came  into  existence,  it 
has  been  necessary  for  English  party  men  to  control  votes 
and  seats  in  the  House  of  Commons.  These  votes  and 
seats  which  were  needed  by  party  men,  were,  until  no  very 
long  time  since,  procured  in  the  simplest  possible  way — 
they  were  simply  bought  and  sold  for  money,  as  a  matter 
of  ordinary  every-day  business. 

Macaulay  says:  "From  the  day  on  which  Caermarthen 
was  called  a  second  time  to  the  chief  direction  of  affairs, 
Parliamentary  corruption  continued  to  be  practised  with 
scarcely  an  intermission  by  a  long  succession  of  statesmen 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          143 

till  the  close  of  tlie  American  war."  Mr.  Hallam  gives* 
£90,000  as  the  annual  amount  of  what  was  called  "  secret 
service  money,"  a  fund  always  believed  to  have  been  used 
for  the  purpose  of  buying  members  of  Parliament.  The 
Credit  Mobilier  and  Union  Pacific  scandals  in  this  country 
are  the  merest  repetitions,  with  changes  of  name,  of  the 
purchase  of  members  in  Parliament  by  the  City  of  London 
and  the  East  India  Company  in  the  reign  of  William  III. 
There  was  then,  as  in  later  years,  the  same  difficulty  in- 
finding  witnesses  and  in  opening  their  mouths;  the  same 
wonderful  losses  of  books,  papers,  and  memories  ;  the  same 
mysterious  disbursements  of  large  amounts  of  money  paid 
in  the  coin  of  the  realm.  The  East  India  Company  paid 
in  one  year,  as  was  alleged  by  its  officers,  to  members  of 
Parliament,  £80,000.  The  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons received  one  bribe  of  a  thousand  guineas  for  simply 
expediting  a  local  bill.  And  one  bribe  of  £50,000  was  of- 
fered to  the  Earl  of  Portland.  George  III.  wrote  to  Lord 
North :  "  Mr.  Robinson  sent  me  the  list  of  the  speakers  last 
night,  and  of  the  very  good  majority.  I  have  this  morn- 
ing sent  him  £6000,  to  be  placed  to  the  same  purpose  as 
the  sum  transmitted  on  the  21st  August." 

It  was  to  be  placed  where  it  would  do  the  most  good. 

Although  the  practice  of  buying  votes  in  Parliament 
and  paying  for  them  in  money  seems  to  have  ceased  about 
the  beginning  of  this  century,  yet  the  practice  of  buying 
and  selling  seats  in  Parliament  for  money  went  on  for 
years  longer.  It  was  the  ordinary  practice.  Before  the 
Reform  Bill,  men  bought  seats  from  the  proprietors  of 
the  nomination  boroughs;  after  the  Reform  Bill,  they 
bought  seats  from  the  electors.  The  bargain  was  made 

*  "  Const.  Hist.,"  vol.  iii.  p.  164. 


144  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

and  carried  out,  and  the  money  paid,  openly,  in  the  sight 
of  all  men. 

Public  opinion  in  England  has  greatly  diminished  the 
amount  of  corruption  in  English  Parliamentary  elections. 
But  down  to  this  day  it  is,  as  far  as  I  can  gather,  among 
gentlemen  of  position  and  education  in  England,  esteemed 
a  perfectly  right  and  proper  thing  to  buy  with  money  the 
votes  of  electors  to  a  seat  in  Parliament.  Undoubtedly 
public  opinion  is  better  than  it  was.  Corruption  in  Par- 
liamentary elections  is  not  what  it  was.  But  so  late  as 
the  year  1870,  in  a  report  of  a  Commission  on  the  elec- 
tions in  the  borough  of  Bridgewater,*  it  is  stated : 

P.  VI.  "  We  have  obtained  quite  enough  evidence  to  justify  us  in 
reporting  to  your  Majesty  that  there  is  much  reason  to  believe  that 
in  Bridgewater,  within  the  present  century  at  least,  no  election  has 
ever  taken  place  except  under  the  influence  of  practices  which,  not 
only  by  the  Lex  Parliament!,  but  by  the  common  and  statute  law  for 
the  time  being  in  force,  were  corrupt  and  criminal  practices,  and  law- 
fully punishable  as  such."  *  *  * 

P.  VII.  "  Whether  in  the  old  times,  when  the  areas  of  place  and 
population  were  narrow,  the  qualification  such  as  we  have  stated  it, 
and  the  constituency  small,  or  at  the  present  time,  when  all  those 
conditions  appear  to  have  extended  to  the  uttermost,  or  in  the  inter- 
vening period,  the  proportion  of  local  corruption  has  been  always  the 
same.  It  is  always  three-fourths,  at  least,  of  the  actual  constituency 
who  are  said  to  be  hopelessly  addicted  to  the  taking  or  seeking  of 
bribes,  and  who  show  by  their  conduct  that  the  imputation  is  well 
deserved ;  while  of  the  remainder  a  very  large  part,  perhaps  by  far 
the  largest,  are  addicted  to  the  giving  or  offering  or  negotiating  of 
bribes.  Rank  and  station  appear  to  make  no  difference.  Neither 
do  we  find  that  the  needy  are  more  corrupt  than  the  'well  to  do,' 
nor  the  latter  less  prone  to  corruption.  It  is  the  chronic  disease  of 
the  place,  and  not  one  political  party  is  more  or  less  than  any  other 

*  Bridgewater  Election  Inquiry  Commission :  Reports  from  Com- 
missioners, 1870.  Parliamentary  Records,  vol.  xix.  p.  30. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          145 

tainted  with  the  malady.  The  Tory  bribes  or  is  bribed  because  he 
believes  that  his  adversary  will  forestall  him  in  the  race  if  he  at- 
tempts to  run  it  on  '  purity '  principles.  The  Liberal  acts,  and  justi- 
fies his  action,  precisely  in  the  same  way." 

Speaking  of  the  electors,  the  report  says : 

"  They  claimed  their  bribes  as  of  right — a  common  right,  a  right 
founded  not  so  much  upon  contract  as  upon  ancient  precedent  and 
general  practice." 

The  report  further  stated  that  out  of  six  hundred  voters 
only  about  fifty  would  take  no  part  in  corrupt  practices 
before  1868;  and 

"  at  the  present  time  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  new  voters  were  of 
a  class  who  are  always  amenable  to  money  considerations,  and  the 
old  voters  remained  much  as  they  were  before.  Mr.  Barham,  indeed, 
stated  that  when  he  came  into  the  town  on  the  morning  of  the  elec- 
tion he  saw  hundreds  of  the  new  voters  standing  about  in  the  cattle 
market,  like  cattle  themselves,  waiting  for  the  highest  bidder." 

The  report  of  the  commission  shows  very  clearly,  as  do 
other  Parliamentary  records,  that  bribery  at  elections  to 
Parliament  was  reduced  to  a  regular  profession,  followed 
regularly  by  men  who  gave  their  services  for  pay  to  the 
men  in  either  party  who  might  chance  to  need  them.  And 
these  practices  were  not  apparently  disapproved  or  ques- 
tioned by  reputable  English  gentlemen.  In  the  same  re- 
port appears  the  statement  as  to  the  Bridgewater  election 
of  1866  (p.  37),  that "  Walter  Bagehot  and  George  Patton, 
Esquires,  two  of  the  candidates,  were  privy  and  assenting  to 
some  of  the  corrupt  practices  extensively  prevailing  there- 
at." And  in  a  schedule  of  bribers  annexed  to  the  same 
report  appears  the  name  of  Alexander  William  Kinglake. 

Some  men  have  an  idea  that  there  has  been  some  magic 
in  the  name  or  essence  of  an  English  country  gentleman 
that  made  what  is  called  corruption  impossible.  But, 

7 


146  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

when  corruption  in  the  House  of  Commons  was  at  its 
height,  the  House  was  filled  with  English  country  gentle- 
men. English  gentlemen  in  those  days  thought  it  no 
harm  to  buy  or  sell  votes  in  Parliament  as  well  as  seats. 
It  is  not  believed  that  members  of  Parliament  any  longer 
sell  their  own  votes  for  money.  But  Mr.  Bagehot  writes,* 
in  our  own  time:  "There  are  said  to  be  two  hundred 
'  members  for  the  railways '  in  the  present  Parliament.  If 
these  two  hundred  choose  to  combine  on  a  point  which 
the  public  does  not  care  for,  and  which  they  care  for  be- 
cause it  affects  their  purse,  they  are  absolute." 

From  all  which  facts  it  is  to  be  gathered  that  buying 
seats  in  Parliament  for  money,  and  selling  votes  in  Parlia- 
ment for  other  good  and  valuable  considerations,  are  prac- 
tices not  yet  entirely  dead,  even  under  a  "  constitutional 
monarchy." 

But  it  may  be  urged  that  free  government  has  never 
yet  in  the  world  existed  without  parties ;  that,  even  if  we 
could  abolish  parties,  the  experiment  would  be  one  full  of 
danger,  of  which  no  man  can  foresee  the  result. 

Here,  too,  we  need  not  rest  on  theory  or  conjecture. 
The  experiment  has  been  tried.  We  have  its  results. 

There  was  one  time  in  the  history  of  this  country  when 
we  had  no  political  parties.  Parties  did  not  come  into 
being  until  the  recurrence  of  two  or  three  Presidential  elec- 
tions had  shown  the  use  that  could  be  made  of  them. 
And  until  just  before  Mr.  Jefferson's  election  in  1 800  we 
had  nothing  that  deserved  the  name  of  party. 

And  how  did  the  people  prosper  without  those  blessed 
engines  of  liberty  ? 

We  went  through  the  war  of  the  Revolution  without 

*  "English  Constitution,"  p.  176. 


PARTY— ITS   CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          147 

parties.  Some  men  were  royalists,  others  were  rebels ; 
but  there  were  no  organizations  that  could  be  called  polit- 
ical parties.  Men  were  agreed  to  fight  the  common  ene- 
my, at  least  as  far  as  party  was  concerned. 

The  war  ended.  We  had -to  form  a  Constitution ;  again 
we  had  no  parties.  The  members  of  the  Constitutional 
Convention  came  together,  a  body  of  men  having  just  as 
strong  differences  of  opinion  as  any  body  of  men  at  any 
later  time.  Some  of  them  wished  a  monarchy,  some  of 
them  a  republic,  others  a  mere  league.  They  mety  agreed 
on  nothing,  either  of  principle  or  of  detail,  as  to  the  feat- 
ures of  the  government  they  were  to  have.  They  were 
not  even  agreed  to  have  a  government.  But  they  met  to 
agree  on  something.  And  they  did  agree.  They  made 
the  framework  of  a  government,  a  harmonious  system, 
not  indeed  a  perfect  one,  but,  according  to  Mr.  Gladstone, 
"  the  most  wonderful  work  ever  struck  off  at  a  given  time 
by  the  brain  and  purpose  of  man."* 

And  after  the  Constitution  was  formed  a  great  work 
was  still  to  be  done.  Here  was  a  nation  that  was  bank- 
rupt, weighed  down  with  public  and  private  debt,  ruined 
by  a  long  war  for  freedom.  A  new  government  was  to 
be  created  under  this  new  Constitution.  There  were  no 
courts.  There  was  no  army  or  navy.  There  was  no  treas- 
ury or  revenue.  To  organize  a  government,  build  up  its 
credit,  create  a  treasury  and  fill  it,  that  was  the  work 
which  our  public  men  had  to  do.  And  it  was  done.  The 
legislation  of  the  first  twelve  years  under  the  Constitution 
was  almost  as  remarkable  as  the  Constitution  itself.  That 
legislation  of  those  twelve  years  made  our  Government 

*  "  Kin  Beyond  Sea,"  North  American  Review,  Sept.-Oct.,  1878, 
p.  185. 


148  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

substantially  what  it  now  is.  The  whole  machinery  has 
since  been  operated  almost  precisely  as  those  men  of  the 
first  three  administrations  left  it.  The  work  of  succeeding 
Congresses,  compared  with  the  legislation  of  our  first  twelve 
years,  has  been  hardly  anything  more  than  the  passing  of 
revenue  and  appropriation  bills. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  events  that  finally  led  to  the 
War  of  the  Revolution,  it  had  been  necessary  for  all  men 
to  agree  on  some  one  line  of  action.  When  the  war  began, 
it  was  necessary  for  all  men  to  agree  on  some  one  form  of 
league.  When  the  war  was  ended,  it  was  necessary  for  all 
men  to  agree  on  some  one  form  of  government.  And  up 
to  that  time  the  people  had  gone  on  without  parties  or  par- 
ty contests.  It  was,  in  fact,  almost  entirely  due  to  the  ab- 
sence of  parties  and  party  contests  that  men,  in  the  thirty 
years  from  1770  to  1800,  were  able  to  carry  out  any  one 
of  the  points  of  policy,  every  one  of  which  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  freedom  of  the  colonies  and 
the  formation  of  a  new  national  government.  If  the  two 
great  political  parties  that  grew  up  within  the  first  twelve 
years  of  our  national  history  had  come  into  being  before 
the  Constitution  was  formed,  I  do  not  believe  the  Consti- 
tution would  ever  have  had  an  existence.  If  they  had 
come  into  being  immediately  after  the  Constitution  was 
formed,  I  do  not  believe  the  Government  would  ever  have 
had  an  organization. 

And  after  the  Constitution  was  formed  and  the  new 
Government  was  organized,  we  still  needed,  as  before, 
agreement.  Whether  men  had  before  wished  a  mere 
league  or  a  government  was  now  a  matter  of  no  moment. 
They  had  agreed,  to  have  a  government.  Whether  men 
had  before  wished  to  have  a  republic  or  some  other  form 
of  government  was  now  a  matter  of  no  moment.  They 


PARTY— ITS   CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          149 

had  agreed,  to  Lave  a  republic.  Their  differences  of  opin- 
ion on  these  points  were  dead  things  of  the  past ;  and  so 
they  should  have  been  left.  If  it  be  said  that  although  it 
had  already  been  decided  that  we  were  to  have  a  republic, 
yet  it  was  still  to  be  decided  what  kind  of  a  republic  we 
had  made  by  this  new  Constitution,  the  answer  is,  that  was 
a  question  to  be  decided,  not  at  the  polls,  but  in  the  courts. 
If,  after  the  experience  of  years,  it  should  be  found  that 
this  Government,  formed  under  this  Constitution,  was  not 
a  successful  working  machinery,  then,  indeed,  it  would  be 
time  to  have  another  Constitutional  Convention,  and  see 
if  this  machinery  could  not  be  in  some  way  modified,  so 
as  to  make  it  a  success.  But  until  that  was  done,  and 
so  long  as  this  Constitution  remained  unchanged,  the  thing 
for  all  men  to  do  was  to  agree,  in  giving  it  the  fairest  trial. 
It  may  be  said  that  men  had  to  discuss  the  qualifications 
of  candidates  and  the  advisability  of  measures.  No  doubt 
that  is  what  they  should  have  done.  That  is  precisely 
what  under  the  party  system  they  did  not  do.  But  after 
they  had  discussed  the  qualifications  of  men  and  the  ad- 
visability of  measures,  will  any  one  deny  that  they  were 
all  bound  to  obey  the  laws  ? 

But  it  may  be  urged,  How  has  it  happened  that  so 
many  men,  great  and  able  men,  have  been  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  parties?  Can  it  be  that  these  men  have  all 
been  mistaken,  and  that  party,  with  all  its  evils,  has  not 
had  its  mission  ? 

There  is  one  time  in  the  history  of  national  governments 
— rather,  there  is  the  time  before  they  begin  to  have  a  his- 
tory or  an  existence — when  something  like  party  has  a 
legitimate  place  in  national  mechanics.  There  is  one  thing 
which  so  dwarfs  all  others  in  importance  as  to  make  it 
wise  for  men  to  sink  all  other  differences,  and  combine  on 


150  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

that  one  question  alone.  And  that  is  the  struggle  for  free- 
dom and  free  government  against  tyranny  and  usurpation. 
Wherever  usurped  power  has  been  maintained,  by  its 
hereditary  transmission  to  the  descendants  of  usurpers, 
there  it  is  just  and  wise  for  all  men  to  combine,  in  one 
party,  if  we  choose  so  to  call  it,  to  conquer  their  freedom, 
peaceably  if  they  can,  by  war  if  they  must.  But  when 
that  has  been  done,  when  freedom  has  been  conquered, 
when  a  people  has  once  established  it  as  a  fact  that  usurp- 
ed power  is  not  to  be  inherited,  but  that  the  rulers  of  a 
people  are  its  servants,  to  be  chosen  by  the  people  them- 
selves, then  the  need  of  party,  or  anything  like  party,  is 
gone.  Party  then  becomes  nothing  but  faction. 

Now,  in  1787  we  had  our  freedom.  Our  right  to  choose 
our  own  rulers  had  been  conquered.  We  needed  no  par- 
ties. And  at  first  we  had  none.  Their  absence  was  our 
blessing. 

We  soon  had  parties — when  we  needed  them  not.  And 
we  have  ever  since  had  them.  Their  presence  has  been 
our  bane. 

Well  might  Washington  give,  as  his  last  advice  to  the 
American  people,  a  warning  on  the  dangers  of  faction.  It 
is  well  to  recall  his  words  of  wisdom : 

"I  have  already  intimated  to  you  the  danger  of  parties  in  the 
State,  with  particular  reference  to  the  founding  of  them  oir  geo- 
graphical discriminations.  Let  me  now  take  a  more  comprehensive 
view,  and  warn  you,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  against  the  baneful 
effects  of  the  spirit  of  party  generally. 

******* 

"  It  exists  under  different  shapes  in  all  governments,  more  or  less 
stifled,  controlled,  or  repressed ;  but  in  those  of  the  popular  form,  it 
is  seen  in  its  greatest  rankness,  and  is  truly  their  worst  enemy. 

"  The  alternate  domination  of  one  faction  over  another,  sharpened 
by  the  spirit  of  revenge,  natural  to  party  discussion,  which  in  differ- 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          151 

ent  ages  and  countries  has  perpetrated  the  most  horrid  enormities,  is 
itself  a  frightful  despotism.  But  this  leads  at  length  to  a  more  for- 
mal and  permanent  despotism." 

This  thing  that  we  call  party  is  the  poison  which  makes 
a  healthy  national  life  an  impossible  thing.  These  great 
party  combinations,  instead  of  being  combinations  of  citi- 
zens to  carry  wise  measures  in  the  interest  of  the  people, 
are  only  combinations  of  politicians  to  carry  elections  in 
their  own  interest.  Parties,  so  far  from  being  necessary 
to  carry  measures,  to  keep  alive  the  interest  of  the  people 
in  public  affairs,  and  thus  to  preserve  free  government,  are 
the  most  powerful  hindrances  to  efficient  action,  keep 
alive  endless  and  needless  strife,  are  hot-beds  of  corruption, 
and  are  the  most  dangerous  enemies  that  free  government 
can  have. 

This  party  oligarchy  under  which  we  now  suffer  is  not 
the  creation  of  any  one  set  of  men.  The  present  party 
leaders  are  not  responsible  for  its  existence ;  they  are  not 
to  be  blamed  for  it.  It  is  the  natural  legitimate  fruit  of 
our  government  system.  It  is  not  from  choice  that  our 
public  men  sacrifice  the  interests  of  the  people  for  those 
of  party.  They  form  these  immense  and  powerful  combi- 
nations only  because  our  system  of  government  drives 
them  to  it.  They  must  carry  these  elections,  or  they  will 
lose  their  places.  They  will  make  this  election  work  the 
profession  of  their  lives  so  long  as  we  compel  them  to  do 
so.  But  if  we  will  only  free  them  from  the  necessity  they 
are  now  under  of  doing  party  work,  we  can  have  from 
them  as  faithful  service  and  as  good  work  as  we  have 
from  the  men  we  employ  in  private  life. 

How  is  it  to  be  done  ? 

We  must  do  two  things. 

First,  we  must,  if  we  can,  keep  our  public  servants  out 


152  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

of  this  profession  of  carrying  elections.  Second,  we  must, 
if  we  can,  destroy  the  profession  altogether. 

In  order  to  accomplish  the  first  result,  to  keep  our  pub- 
lic servants  out  of  the  profession  of  carrying  elections,  we 
must  free  them  from  the  necessity  of  going  into  it.  In 
order  to  accomplish  that,  we  must,  unless  there  be  some 
good  reason  against  it,  have  every  public  servant  hold  his 
place  as  long  as  he  does  his  work  well.  We  must  reg- 
ulate his  tenure  of  office  by  the  way  in  which  he  does 
its  duties,  instead  of  by  the  movements  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  We  must  destroy  the  term  system. 

In  order  to  accomplish  the  second  result,  to  destroy  this 
profession  of  carrying  elections,  we  must,  if  we  can,  so  ar- 
range matters  that  the  profession  will  not  pay ;  then  men 
will  not  follow  it. 

Now,  if  we  elected  only  our  Chief  Executive  and  the 
members  of  our  Legislature,  there  would  be  very  few  offices 
which  election  work  could  capture.  And  if  we  abolish 
the  term  system,  no  one  could  tell  when  even  these  few 
offices  would  be  vacant.  The  professional  election  worker 
would  find  his  occupation  gone.  He  now  keeps  to  his 
profession,  even  if  he  is  for  a  time  out  of  office,  because 
he  knows  there  will  be,  at  the  end  of  one,  two,  or  four 
years,  a  large  number  of  vacancies,  some  one  of  which  he 
hopes  to  get.  Take  from  him  this  hope,  and  he  would 
betake  himself  to  some  other  employment. 

If  we  should,  then,  do  these  two  things,  reduce  the  num- 
ber of  elective  offices,  and  abolish  the  term  system,  we 
should  at  least  put  our  public  servants  under  pressure  to 
do  well  their  official  work,  and  put  an  end  to  this  trade  of 
carrying  elections.  Parties  for  any  proper  use,  combina- 
tions for  the  purpose  of  getting  wise  government  action, 
would  still  exist  whenever  there  was  any  need  for  them. 


PARTY— ITS  CAUSES,  NATURE,  AND  USES.          153 

But  would  there  be  other  bad  results? 

Our  purpose  in  having  the  people  elect  their  public 
officers  is  to  secure  in  the  public  service  our  best  men. 
Our  purpose  in  putting  our  public  officers  on  the  term 
system  is  to  secure  from  them  their  best  service.  If  we 
do  away  with  elections,  what  security  have  we  for  getting 
our  best  men  in  office  ?  And  if  we  do  away  with  the  term 
system,  what  security  have  we  that  we  shall  get  from  our 
public  servants  their  best  service  ? 

Those  are  the  questions  next  to  be  considered. 
7* 


154  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE    SECURITIES    FOR    GETTING    THE    BEST    SERVANTS. 

IT  was  assumed  at  the  beginning  of  this  argument  that 
the  general  framework  of  our  Government  was  good,  that 
its  division  of  the  work  and  the  duties  of  different  depart- 
ments and  officials  was  a  wise  one.  It  was  said  that  the 
main  inquiry  here  would  be,  How  we  are  to  secure  in  each 
department  of  our  public  service — 

1.  Our  best  men. 

2.  Their  best  work. 

A  short  examination  was  then  made  of  some  points  in 
the  three  distinctive  types  of  government — Hereditary 
Monarchy,  Constitutional  Royalty,  and  what  we  have  called 
a  Republic. 

As  to  Hereditary  Monarchy,  the  conclusion  reached  was 
that  the  hereditary  system,  as  a  machinery  for  selecting 
the  men  who  were  really  to  wield  power  in  the  State,  was 
a  failure,  and  that  the  good  result  which  was  sometimes 
gained  under  that  system,  that  is,  vigor  and  stability  of 
administration,  could  be  had  under  a  government  where 
the  officers  were  elected,  as  well  as  where  power  was  in- 
herited. It  was  simply  a  question  of  how  much  power  a 
people  should  give  their  chief  executive ;  and  the  power 
could  be  given  as  well  to  an  elected  executive  as  to  a  he- 
reditary executive. 

The  examination  of  Constitutional  Royalty  brought  us 
to  the  conclusion  that  executive  officials  should  not  do 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    155 

work  in  the  Legislature,  and  should  be  held  responsible 
only  for  their  executive  work;  and  further,  that  there 
should  be  at  the  head  of  the  whole  executive  administra- 
tion one  man,  with  power,  who  should  be  held  responsible 
for  the  working  of  that  whole  executive  administration. 

The  examination  of  the  working  of  our  own  system  of 
government  showed  that,  instead  of  our  having  a  govern- 
ment where  the  people  really  have  the  choice  and  control 
of  their  officers,  there  has  grown  up  a  party  oligarchy, 
which  has  taken  from  the  people  the  choice  of  their  pub- 
lic servants  and  the  control  of  their  public  work,  and  has 
established  an  oppressive  tyranny. 

The  argument  then  was,  that  party,  instead  of  being  a 
machinery  necessary  for  getting  wise  action  in  the  inter- 
est of  the  people,  was  only  a  combination  of  men  for  the 
carrying  of  elections,  was  the  strongest  hindrance  to  wise 
action  ;  that  it  was  the  cause  of  endless,  needless,  and  per- 
nicious strife ;  and  that,  instead  of  being  a  necessary  engine 
of  free  government,  it  is  really  the  most  dangerous  enemy 
free  government  can  have.  And  it  was  urged  that  we 
must  devise  some  means  of  ridding  ourselves  of  these 
combinations,  which  exist  only  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
from  us  the  choice  of  our  public  officers  and  the  control 
of  their  public  action. 

It  was  argued  that  the  only  means  of  destroying  these 
party  oligarchies,  and  freeing  both  citizens  and  our  public 
servants  from  their  tyranny,  was  to  abolish  the  term  sys- 
tem, and  reduce,  as  far  as  possible,  the  number  of  elective 
offices.  But  it  was  suggested  that  possibly  those  changes 
might  interfere  with  the  securities  which  the  people  now 
have  for  getting  the  best  men  in  the  public  service,  and 
for  getting  from  those  men  their  best  work. 

It  was  argued  that  the  only  officers  to  be  elected  by  the 


156  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

people  should  be  the  Chief  Executive  and  the  members  of 
the  Legislature.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  under  the  na- 
tional Government  those  are  the  only  officers  that  are  elect- 
ed. But  the  arguments  here  brought  forward  are  general 
in  their  bearing,  and  apply  with  the  same  force  to  State, 
county,  city,  and  town  governments  as  to  the  national 
Government. 

The  argument  from  this  point  forth  will  still  be  made 
general.  And  the  next  point  to  be  considered  is,  What 
are  the  real  securities  that  the  people  can  have  for  getting 
in  each  department  of  the  public  service  their  best  men  ? 

That  means,  of  course,  the  getting  in  each  department 
of  the  service  the  best  men  for  that  department.  One 
of  the  points  urged  against  what  is  called  Constitutional 
Royalty  was,  that  the  heads  of  the  executive  administra- 
tion are  selected  for  their  fitness,  not  for  the  duties  of 
their  executive  offices,  but  for  work  in  the  Legislature. 
And  one  of  the  worst  results  of  party,  whether  under  a 
system  of  constitutional  royalty  or  under  a  republic,  is 
that  public  officers  of  all  kinds  are  selected  for  their  fitness, 
not  for  the  duties  of  any  office,  but  only  for  election  work. 

To  secure  the  best  men  in  our  service,  we  must,  if  we 
can,  secure  two  things — 

1.  That  the  best  men   shall  offer  themselves  for  the 
service. 

2.  That  they  shall  be  taken  into  the  service. 

How,  then,  shall  we  secure  the  first  point  of  these  two, 
that  the  best  men  shall  offer  themselves  for  the  service  ? 

It  has  been  already  said  that  private  employers  have  no 
difficulty  in  finding  good  men  to  do  their  work.  Men 
usually  seek  employments  that  are  congenial,  and  sooner 
or  later  find  the  work  for  which  they  are  best  fitted.  The 
men  who  are  fit  for  the  people's  service  will  be  sure  to 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    157 

seek  that  service.  We  can  here  trust  to  the  operation  of 
natural  laws,  if  we  will  only  allow  them  to  operate.  To 
simply  allow  the  operation  of  natural  laws  must  be  our 
first  end. 

To  accomplish,  this  end,  the  main  thing  we  have  to  do  is 
simply  to  remove  the  barriers  we  have  raised  by  our  sys- 
tem of  false  republicanism,  to  destroy  this  party  oligarchy, 
which  drives  from  the  service  the  men  who  will  serve  only 
the  people,  and  keeps  in  the  service  only  those  men  who 
will  serve  party. 

But,  besides  that,  the  people  should  use  the  immense 
advantages  which  they  have  over  all  private  employers  in 
competing  for  labor.  As  things  now  are,  we  throw  them 
all  away. 

These  advantages  are — 

1.  The  people  have  a  service  that  is,  or  can  be,  more 
permanent  than  that  of  any  private  employer. 

2.  Their  affairs  are  more  vast,  more  important ;  and  the 
people  are  richer  than  any  private  employer.    They  should, 
therefore,  and  can,  pay  better,  in  money. 

3.  Above  all,  they  can  in  their  service  give  fame  and  rep- 
utation beyond  what  any  private  employer  can  dream  of 
giving. 

How  do  we  use  these  advantages  ? 

All  professions  and  occupations  have  their  chances. 
But,  aside  from  those  chances,  every  profession  or  business 
in  the  country,  other  than  our  public  service,  gives  to  the 
men  who  enter  it  a  certainty  of  employment  for  life,  if  they 
will  do  honest  work.  The  carpenter,  the  blacksmith,  the 
lawyer,  and  the  physician  all  know  that,  if  they  only  do 
honest  work,  they  are  certain  of  having  work  all  their 
lives.  So  we  deal  with  all  private  servants.  Is  it  so  with 
our  public  service  ? 


158  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

To  our  public  servants  alone  we  say,  Whether  you  do 
our  work  well  or  ill,  you  can  have  a  certainty  of  employ- 
ment only  for  four  years  or  two  years,  and  for  any  longer 
time  you  must  take  your  chance  of  carrying  an  election  at 
the  end  of  that  term.  You  may  grow  gray  in  our  service ; 
you  may  give  us  the  best  labors  of  a  long  life.  You  may 
have  spent  many  years  so  faithfully  in  learning  the  duties 
of  your  office  that  you  are  without  any  other  profession, 
and  have  no  other  means  of  earning  your  bread.  We  give 
you  no  certainty  of  employment  for  any  time.  We  warn 
you  in  the  outset  that,  whenever  the  party  leaders  need 
your  salary  to  reward  some  of  their  followers  for  work 
done  in  carrying  elections,  they  will  have  it,  and  your 
gray  hairs  and  your  years  of  faithful  service  will  count  for 
nothing. 

That  is  the  sober  truth,  without  exaggeration.  That  is 
precisely  what  we  say  to  the  men  who  wish  to  enter  our 
employ.  Can  we,  on  such  terms,  get  the  best  men  ? 

Take  the  next  point.  Our  public  affairs  are  vastly  more 
important  than  the  business  of  any  private  employer ;  they 
involve  larger  amounts  of  money  and  property — they  con- 
cern wider  and  more  varied  interests ;  and  the  people  of 
the  United  States  have  in  their  possession  and  under  their 
control  the  wealth  and  fortunes  of  all  the  individuals  in 
the  land.  We  ought  to  pay  our  public  servants  more  than 
any  private  employers  can  possibly  afford  to  pay.  We  thus 
have  it  in  our  power  to  draw  to  our  service  the  very  ablest 
men.  We  need  them.  We  ought  to  pay  for  their  work, 
as  we  can  well  afford  to  do. 

Moreover,  the  men  we  need  to  do  our  government  work 
are  not  the  men  who  live  the  lives  of  elegant  leisure,  on 
fortunes  that  other  men  have  made  for  them.  We  wish 
these  men  of  leisure  in  the  service,  if  they  can  stand  the 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    159 

tests,  if  they  can  and  will  do  the  hard  work.  But  in  the 
service  of  a  real  government  there  is  no  place  for  idlers. 
Here  is  the  finest  work  in  the  world,  to  be  done  by  the 
men  who  can  do  it  best.  Men's  minds  are  like  their  bod- 
ies ;  those  only  are  good  for  use  that  are  trained  in  hard 
work  of  some  kind.  In  the  large  number  of  instances  the 
men  in  the  world  who  can  do  good  work  are  not  the  men 
of  fortune,  but  they  are  men  who  need  to  be  paid  in  money 
for  the  work  they  do  ;  and  those  men  we  cannot  get  un- 
less we  pay  them  well  in  money.  There  are  places  enough 
in  the  world  where  they  will  be  well  paid.  To  those  places 
they  will  go. 

Now,  although  we  can  pay  and  ought  to  pay,  in  money, 
more  than  any  employer  in  the  country,  what  we  do  is 
this :  We  say  to  the  men  who  wish  to  enter  our  service, 
Although  we  give  you  no  certainty  of  permanent  employ- 
ment, we  do  give  you  a  certainty  of  poor  compensation. 
We  are  the  richest  employers  you  can  find ;  we  are  the 
meanest  paymasters.  In  any  other  service  than  ours  you 
have  the  possibility  of  a  reasonable  fortune.  We  give  you 
the  certainty,  if  you  are  honest,  and  give  your  whole  time 
honestly  to  our  service,  of  little  better  than  poverty. 

Is  that  a  wise  policy  ?  In  the  war  of  the  rebellion,  of 
what  consequence  would  ten  or  twenty  millions  of  dollars 
in  salaries  have  been  to  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
if,  by  paying  that  amount  of  money,  they  could  have  saved 
the  twenty-five  hundred  millions  and  the  lives  that  were 
thrown  away  ?  It  is  always  so.  There  is  never  any  econ- 
omy in  poorly  paid  labor. 

But  it  is  on  the  third  point  where  we  have  our  greatest 
advantage  that  we  make  our  greatest  sacrifice. 

We  have  it  in  our  power  to  give  to  our  public  servants 
fame  and  reputation  for  good  work  done  in  our  service. 


160  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

We  make  it  certain  that  they  shall  not  gain  fame  or  repu- 
tation in  that  service,  if  they  do  nothing  but  serve  us  well. 
Here,  too,  the  term  system  makes  our  chief  difficulty. 

Even  if  we  should  once  get  in  our  service  all  the  best 
men  in  the  country,  putting  wholly  out  of  consideration 
the  effects  of  party,  the  system  of  elections  for  short  terms 
of  years  would  certainly  result  in  driving  from  our  service 
the  best  men. 

The  expectation  was,  in  having  elections  at  intervals  of 
years,  that,  when  an  official  did  good  service,  he  would  be 
re-elected  at  the  end  of  his  term.  That  is  not,  however, 
the  way  in  which  the  system  operates.  Nearly  every  offi- 
cial act  of  every  public  officer,  according  as  it  is  done  in 
one  way  or  the  other,  works  a  direct  gain  or  loss  to  some 
one  man  or  set  of  men.  The  men  whose  interests  are  in- 
jured by  the  action  of  public  officers  know  their  injuries, 
and  can  easily  combine.  The  interests  that  our  officials 
protect  by  upright  action  are  commonly  the  general  inter- 
ests of  the  whole  people,  who  cannot,  or  do  not  so  easily, 
combine.  Moreover,  by  each  separate  act  a  public  officer 
may  make  a  new  set  of  enemies.  At  the  end  of  his  term 
many  men,  for  many  reasons,  wish  his  one  place.  The  nat- 
ural result  is,  that  when  a  public  officer  stands  for  a  re- 
election, all  his  enemies,  and  the  friends  of  all  other  men, 
combine  against  him  alone.  And  what  chance  of  re-elec- 
tion, under  such  circumstances,  has  a  man  who  lias  sim- 
ply discharged  his  duty,  without  conciliating  by  improper 
means  the  powerful  interests  in  the  land,  whatever  they 
may  be  ?  Suppose  the  case  of  a  man  of  great  and  varied 
knowledge,  a  master  of  the  principles  of  finance,  learned 
in  jurisprudence,  a  man  of  sound  sense  and  judgment :  put 
him  in  Congress  to-day,  let  him  simply  give  himself  to  the 
most  faithful  performance  of  his  duty,  never  speaking  but 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    161 

with  an  honest  purpose,  doing  his  work  in  the  most  skil- 
ful but  unobtrusive  manner ;  let  him  neither  have  nor  use 
the  arts  of  the  politician  ;  let  him  neither  flatter  nor  deceive 
the  people  who  put  him  in  his  place,  and  will  any  one 
claim  that  such  a  man  would  be  likely  to  secure  a  second 
term  in  Congress,  as  affairs  now  go,  or  as  they  have  gone 
at  any  time  in  the  last  thirty  years  ? 

When,  then,  we  add  the  certainty  that  this  plan  of  gen- 
eral elections  for  short  terms  of  years  certainly  brings  into 
existence  this  army  of  men  who  make  the  carrying  of  elec- 
tions their  profession,  who  need  all  the  places  under  gov- 
ernment for  their  own  purposes,  what  human  possibility  is 
there  that  the  good  men  who  do  now  and  then  get  into 
the  public  service  should  stay  there  ? 

We  see  every  session  in  Congress  a  few  eminent  men 
of  business — bankers,  mine-owners,  and  merchants.  They 
never  appear  for  more  than  one  or  two  terms.  What  does 
it  mean  ?  Simply  that  these  men,  who  have,  by  the  gain- 
ing of  their  own  fortunes,  proved  that  they  are  probably 
men  of  honesty  and  ability,  who  have  a  strong  wish  to  en- 
ter public  life,  and  give  to  the  service  of  the  people  the 
fruits  of  their  experience  and  the  use  of  their  powers, 
cannot  remain  in  the  people's  service,  because  they  are  in- 
dependent, because  they  make  enemies  and  do  not  serve 
party. 

The  best  men  cannot  long  stay  in  our  service.  But 
unless  a  service  is  permanent,  men  can  have  no  possibility 
of  gaining  in  it  fame  and  reputation.  In  all  the  ordinary 
professions  and  occupations  of  life,  reputation  comes  only 
from  long  and  faithful  service.  Can  it  be  otherwise  in  the 
public  service  ?  When  we  established  the  term  system,  we 
made  it  as  certain  as  we  could  that  when  the  system  had 
time  to  work  out  its  natural  results  it  would  be  impossi- 


162  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

ble  for  men  to  get  fame  from  simply  doing  well  the  peo- 
ple's work.  We  drive  them  into  the  profession  of  election- 
carrying. 

By  our  term  system,  then,  and  by  the  tyranny  of  party, 
which  is  its  chief  result,  and  by  our  practice  of  giving  to 
our  public  servants  poor  compensation,  we  not  only  refuse 
to  use  the  great  advantages  of  our  position  with  reference 
to  other  employers,  but  we  do  all  we  can  to  keep  the  best 
men  out  of  our  service. 

But  suppose  all  these  barriers  removed,  and  that  the 
best  men  for  our  service  offered  themselves  for  it,  as  they 
certainly  would.  How,  then,  are  we  to  make  sure  that  the 
best  men  shall  be  taken  into  the  service  ? 

To  secure  this  point  we  must  so  arrange  that — 

1.  The  choice  shall  be  made  by  those  who  are  best  able 
to  make  it. 

2.  The  men  who  are  to  make  the  choice  shall  have  all 
possible  means  of  testing  the  men  from  whom  they  are  to 
choose. 

3.  That  the  choice  shall  be  made  freely  and  honestly. 

The  first  of  these  points,  that  the  choice  of  public  ser- 
vants shall  be  made  by  those  who  are  best  able  to  make 
it,  shuts  off  at  once,  as  to  the  whole  body  of  executive 
officials,  except  the  chief,  the  method  of  popular  election. 

I  admit  and  claim  that,  for  the  selection  of  the  Chief  Ex- 
ecutive of  the  nation,  the  free  choice  of  the  whole  people, 
if  it  can  be  had  (not  the  choice  of  a  few  party  leaders),  is 
the  best  means  that  can  be  devised.  So,  too,  I  believe  that, 
when  party  tyranny  is  destroyed,  the  free  choice  of  the 
whole  people  is  the  best  machinery  for  choosing  the  mem- 
bers of  a  legislative  body.  But  as  to  the  qualifications  of 
the  vast  number  of  executive  officials  in  a  large  public  ser- 
vice, it  is  an  utterly  impossible  thing  that  the  people  at 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    1C3 

large  should  be  able  to  form  an  intelligent  judgment,  or 
any  judgment  at  all. 

The  point  I  make  is,  not  that  the  system  of  popular 
election  places  the  choice  of  our  public  officials  in  the 
hands  of  any  ignorant  class  of  the  people,  but  that  all  the 
people,  on  this  point,  without  reference  to  class,  are  igno- 
rant, are  equally  ignorant,  and  wholly  ignorant.  As  to 
these  qualifications  of  single  Government  officials,  no  one 
can  possibly  know  anything  at  all,  except  the  immediate 
superiors  in  office  of  the  men  in  question. 

To  secure,  then,  that  the  choice  of  our  public  servants 
should  be  made  by  the  men  who  are  best  able  to  form  a 
judgment,  or  by  men  who  are  able  to  form  any  judgment  at 
all,  it  is  necessary  that  all  subordinates  in  all  our  executive 
offices  should  be  appointed  by  the  head  of  the  office,  from 
the  men  whom  he  has  tried  in  the  office ;  in  other  words, 
that  as  to  the  great  body  of  executive  officials,  election  by 
the  people,  or  by  any  part  of  the  people,  should  be  alto- 
gether abandoned. 

And  as  far  as  this  point  alone  is  concerned,  if  we  con- 
cede it  as  to  any  of  the  subordinates,  we  must  concede  it 
as  to  all.  As  to  any  one  branch  in  any  of  the  great  exec- 
utive departments,  who  is  there  that  can  know  anything  of 
the  real  working  capacities  of  the  men  in  that  branch,  ex- 
cept the  man  who  is  its  head,  who  has  the  work  of  those 
men  every  day  under  his  own  eyes?  As  to  the  heads  of 
the  different  branches,  who  can  possibly  know  anything  of 
their  working  capacities,  except  the  man  who  sees  their 
work  every  day,  their  immediate  superior,  the  head  of  the 
department  ?  And  as  to  the  heads  of  departments,  who  can 
possibly  make  as  intelligent  a  choice  as  can  be  made  by  the 
Chief  Executive,  who  has  had  the  department  matters  and 
the  department  men  under  his  eyes,  it  may  be  for  years  ? 


164  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

As  far,  then,  as  this  point  is  concerned,  all  the  officials 
of  the  entire  service,  except  the  Chief  Executive,  should  be 
appointed,  and  not  elected.  And  the  appointments  should 
be  made,  of  the  officials  in  each  office  and  department,  by 
the  head  of  the  office  or  department. 

This  system,  it  is  very  easily  seen,  would  result  simply 
in  a  steady  stream,  by  promotion,  from  the  bottom  to  the 
top,  throughout  the  whole  executive  administration,  until 
we  came  to  the  very  head — to  the  Chief  Executive.  And 
that  is  precisely  what  we  have  in  every  well  -  organized 
service  in  the  world.  The  Chief  Executive  cannot,  of 
course,  appoint  himself.  And  he  should  be  elected,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  by  the  vote  of  the  whole  people — substan- 
tially as  he  is,  in  form,  now.  He  should  be  a  man  who 
has  already,  in  some  way,  made  a  national  reputation. 
And  if  party  and  party  influence  were  destroyed,  no  man 
would  be  elected  by  the  people  who  had  not  such  a  na- 
tional reputation. 

The  intention  in  giving  the  people  the  direct  choice  of 
their  officials  was  to  secure  a  wise  choice.  The  people,  as 
to  this  vast  number  of  executive  officials,  cannot,  from  mere 
lack  of  knowledge  as  to  the  men,  make  as  wise  a  choice 
for  themselves  as  some  one  else  can  make  for  them.  They 
should,  then,  trust  the  choice  to  those  men  who  can  best 
make  it. 

How,  then,  can  these  men  who  are  to  make  the  choice 
have  all  possible  means  of  testing  the  men  from  whom 
they  are  to  choose  ? 

Here  again  we  need,  of  all  things,  a  service  that  is  per- 
manent. The  men  in  the  service  must  have  time  to  show 
what  they  can  do.  There  must  be  time  for  the  processes 
of  natural  selection  to  operate.  Make  the  service  perma- 
nent, and  the  men  in  it  will  all  find  their  level.  As  cer- 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    165 

tainly  as  it  happens  in  other  professions,  the  able  men 
will  rise  to  the  top,  and  the  weak  ones  will  drop  to  the 
bottom. 

Much  is  now  written  and  said  in  favor  of  what  is  term- 
ed competitive  examination.  No  doubt  competitive  ex- 
amination is  a  thing  to  be  used.  But  examination  in 
what?  In  Greek  and  Latin  and  Mathematics?  They 
are  good  in  their  place.  Give  every  man,  in  every  profes- 
sion, as  much  of  them  as  he  can  have.  But  they  will  not, 
by  themselves,  give  us  good  public  servants.  What  we 
must  have  is  the  competitive  examination  of  actual  service. 
We  must  in  our  Government  service  put  men  to  the  same 
tests  that  we  do  in  other  services  and  professions — the  test 
of  actual  work.  Have  men  enter  the  public  service  always 
at  the  bottom  of  the  ladder,  and  have  them  compete  at  the 
special  work  they  are  to  do.  Let  them  prove  themselves. 
Find  the  best  men  by  the  natural  selection  that  actual  ser- 
vice will  make. 

But  to  have  the  possibility  of  any  such  competitive  ex- 
amination as  this  (and  it  is  the  only  one  that  can  have  any 
real  value),  we  must  have  no  term  of  service  of  four  years, 
or  two  years,  or  any  term  of  years  whatever.  The  public 
service  must  have  the  same  permanence  that  we  find  in 
the  service  of  our  great  mills  and  railroads,  if  we  hope  to 
be  able  to  find  men  out,  to  know  what  they  can  really  do. 
We  must  drop  the  men  at  the  end  of  one  day,  if  they  so 
soon  show  themselves  unfit.  If  they  show  themselves  fit, 
we  ought  to  keep  them  for  their  lives. 

Then,  as  to  the  third  point,  how  are  we  to  secure  that 
the  choice  of  officials  shall  be  made  freely  and  honestly  ? 

As  far  as  concerns  the  appointments  by  the  superior  ex- 
ecutive officers  of  their  subordinates,  we  must  secure  hon- 
esty of  official  action  in  that  respect  by  the  same  means 


166  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

through  which  we  secure  it  in  other  respects.  That  is  the 
point  to  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 

And  as  to  the  election  by  the  people  of  a  chief  execu- 
tive and  of  members  of  our  legislatures,  how  are  we  to 
secure  that  those  elections  by  the  people  shall  be  honestly 
and  freely  made? 

For  that  we  only  need  to  destroy  party.  The  American 
people  can  be  trusted.  This  fear  that  some  men  have  of 
the  people's  honest  vote  is  not  well-grounded.  Wise  and 
honest  opinions  have  their  due  weight  with  all  men.  Our 
difficulty  now  is,  that  party  demagogues  have  an  undue 
weight,  which  they  get  only  from  the  fact  that  they  con- 
trol all  this  immense  election  machinery.  Destroy  that, 
and  they  will  have  only  such  power  and  influence  among 
men  as  they  can  gain  in  an  honest  natural  way— in  honest 
natural  employments.  We  have  created  an  artificial  con- 
dition of  things. 

Were  the  people  left  to  make  their  own  choice  of  the 
men  who  are  to  make  their  laws  and  do  their  other  govern- 
ment work ;  were  they  unmolested  by  the  arts  and  mechan- 
isms of  party  men  who  have  selfish  purposes  of  their  own 
to  serve ;  were  all  the  citizens,  high  and  low,  rich  and  poor, 
learned  and  ignorant,  simply  left  to  their  own  counsels,  and 
allowed  to  honestly  choose  the  men  they  really  deem  the 
best  fitted  to  manage  their  public  affairs,  they  would,  to- 
day and  at  all  times,  place  the  Government  in  the  hands  of 
the  best  men.  The  mass  of  the  American  people,  and  of 
any  people  that  has  ever  conquered  the  right  to  choose 
their  own  rulers  and  take  any  real  part  in  the  working 
of  their  own  Government,  are  honest  men.  They  respect 
honest  men.  They  are  guided  by  honest  and  capable 
men  in  all  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life.  The  people  would 
choose  honest  men  to  Government  positions,  if  they  were 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    167 

left  to  themselves  and  to  the  advice  of  their  natural  ad- 
visers. Is  there,  even  now,  any  point  that  makes  a  man  so 
strong  a  candidate  as  the  having  a  reputation  for  honesty  ? 
Remove  party  machinery  and  the  influence  of  party  men, 
and  the  people's  choice  would  almost  invariably  be  a  wise 
one.  There  have  been  many  times  in  our  history  when 
elections  by  the  people  have  been  had  of  men  to  fill 
important  stations,  and  when,  from  special  circumstances, 
there  has  been  no  party  pressure,  or  party  pressure  has  had 
no  effect.  The  uniform  result  has  been  that  the  people 
have  made  a  good  choice.  Times  of  great  public  danger 
come,  when  the  people  are  thoroughly  alarmed,  when  ev- 
ery man  thinks  and  acts  to  the  best  of  his  ability.  The 
best  men  then  are  chosen  to  public  place.  So  it  was  when 
men  were  sent  to  the  Continental  Congress  and  the  Con- 
stitutional Convention.  So  it  was  throughout  the  early 
years  of  our  Government,  before  party  got  its  growth. 
Many  times  in  late  years  it  has  happened  that  the  peo- 
ple have  become  weary  and  disgusted  with  the  conduct  of 
the  professional  politicians  who  have  for  years  succeeded 
in  capturing  their  votes.  They  rebel,  and  elect  a  man 
of  character.  Ordinary  men,  of  less  than  the  ordinary 
amount  of  education,  are  amenable  to  ordinary  influences, 
to  reason  and  to  honest  argument.  They,  as  well  as  the 
richer  and  more  highly  educated  men,  appreciate  the  ne- 
cessity of  having  honest  men  in  the  Government.  They 
would  be  influenced  by  the  honest  men  in  their  voting  at 
all  times,  were  elections  free  from  party  pressure.  In  all 
private  affairs  of  life,  all  men,  rich  or  poor,  learned  or  ig- 
norant, choose  their  servants,  their  blacksmiths  and  their 
shoemakers,  their  lawyers  and  their  physicians,  looking  to 
the  one  point  of  whether  these  their  servants  have  proved 
themselves  to  be  honest  and  capable  men.  Is  it  conceiv- 


168  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

able  that  men  will  choose  their  public  servants  on  any 
other  grounds  ?  Will  they  in  all  the  ordinary  affairs  of 
life  act  like  men  of  sense,  but  in  their  public  affairs  alone 
act  like  men  without  sense?  That  is  not  human  nature. 
Whenever,  in  the  history  of  this  country,  bad  men  have 
been  elected  to  public  office,  it  has  been  the  work  of  party. 
Whenever  the  people  have,  for  any  reason,  risen  above  par- 
ty pressure,  they  have  elected  good  men. 

The  argument  of  this  chapter  thus  far  amounts  to  this — 

1.  To  secure  the  best  men  for  our  Government  service 
we  must  simply  not  stop  the  operation  of  natural  laws. 
We  must  put  our  service  on  the  same  footing  with  the 
service  of  other  employers. 

2.  We  must  use  the  advantages  that  we  have  over  other 
employers.     And  to  that  end — 

3.  We  must  abolish  the  term  system. 

4.  We  must  have  executive  officials  appointed  by  the 
heads  of  offices  and  departments,  and  not  elected  by  the 
people. 

5.  We  must  destroy  party.     And  to  that  end  we  must 
destroy  the  term  system. 

The  argument  in  this  chapter  has  been,  in  form,  an  in- 
quiry how,  in  the  future,  we  are  to  succeed  in  getting  the 
best  men  into  our  public  service.  The  inquiry  has  been, 
in  fact,  how  in  the  past  we  have  succeeded  in  keeping  the 
best  men  out  of  the  public  service. 

The  ablest  men  in  the  country,  the  men  who  could  best 
serve  the  people,  have  always  been,  and  now  are,  eager  to 
enter  the  people's  service.  They  cannot  get  there.  There 
is  nothing  that  spurs  men  like  the  desire  for  fame.  And 
that  desire  has  at  all  times,  and  everywhere,  brought  for- 
ward great  generals  and  great  statesmen,  whether  in  em- 
pires or  republics,  to  serve  the  people,  whenever  the  peo- 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVANTS.    169 

pie  has  been  allowed  to  take  their  service.  Public  life  has 
for  most  men  a  wonderful  fascination.  And  in  this  coun- 
try, before  party  machinery  and  party  management  became 
so  complicated  and  powerful  as  they  now  are,  before  the 
term  system  had  worked  out  its  legitimate  results,  Con- 
gress was  full  of  able  men.  The  ablest  men  and  the  best 
men  in  the  country  were  eager  to  go  there.  It  is  not 
kings  and  emperors  alone  who  can  get  great  men  in  the 
service  of  the  State.  The  Athenians  and  Romans  always 
were,  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  always  have 
been,  able  to  have  their  greatest  men  in  their  service  for 
the  mere  asking.  They  can  have  it  even  without  the  ask- 
ing. These  men  beg  to  be  taken  into  the  public  service. 
How  is  it  that  we  do  not  take  them  ?  How  are  we  able 
to  hinder  this  common  law  of  nature,  this  law  of  supply 
and  demand,  from  having  in  our  Government  affairs  its 
legitimate  operation  ?  Everywhere  else  it  is  in  full  force. 
Here  alone  it  fails. 

There  have,  in  the  history  of  the  human  race,  been  two 
great  forces  that  have,  at  one  time  and  another,  struggled 
to  prevent  the  people  from  selecting  for  themselves  their 
wisest  men  to  manage  their  Government  affairs.  Those 
two  forces  have  been  the  tyranny  of  kings  and  the  tyr- 
anny of  faction. 

The  tyranny  of  kings  we  need  not  fear.  Until  we  over- 
throw the  tyranny  of  faction,  it  will  be  an  impossible  thing 
for  the  people  to  get  the  services  of  their  best  men,  though 
those  men  are  at  all  times  eager  to  serve  them. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  if  we  give  up  the  term  system,  how 
shall  we  secure  any  "  responsibility "  on  the  part  of  our 
Government  officials — how  shall  we  secure  good  and  faith- 
ful service  at  their  hands  ? 

That  is  the  question  next  to  be  considered. 


170  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE    SECURITIES    FOR    GETTING    THE    BEST    SERVICE. 

THE  last  chapter  brought  us  again  to  the  conclusion, 
which  had  been  reached  at  earlier  stages  of  the  argument, 
that  it  Avas  especially  necessary,  in  order  to  do  away  with 
the  evils  under  our  present  system  of  government,  to  abol- 
ish the  term  system.  But  we  had  yet  to  consider  whether, 
by  abolishing  the  term  system,  we  should  not  lose  some 
security  which  we  now  have  for  getting  good  and  efficient 
service  from  our  public  officers. 

As  I  understand  it,  that  is  the  only  use  of  the  term  sys- 
tem— it  is  supposed  to  be  a  security  for  good  and  efficient 
service.  It  has,  as  I  understand  it,  always  been  adopted 
and  used,  only  as  an  indirect  method  of  removal,  for  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  a  public  officer  which  in  some  point 
failed  to  meet  the  approval  of  the  citizens  who  elected 
him. 

Let  us  consider,  then,  whether  we  can,  as  far  as  this 
point  is  concerned,  safely  abolish  the  term  system.  And 
let  us  make  the  inquiry  broader.  We  have  just  consid- 
ered the  question,  What  are  the  best  securities  that  a  peo- 
ple can  have  for  getting  the  best  servants  ?  Let  us  go  a 
step  farther.  Suppose  we  have  our  machinery  such  that 
we  shall  secure  the  best  men  in  our  public  service,  what, 
then,  are  the  best  securities  we  can  have  for  securing  from 
those  best  men  their  best  work  ? 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTIXG  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     171 

To  secure  from  our  public  servants  their  best  possible 
work  involves  two  points.  We  must  so  frame  our  system 
as  to  secure  that  our  servants  shall — 

1.  Do  the  best  work  within  their  knowledge. 

2.  Have  the  knowledge  how  to  do  the  best  work. 

In  other  words,  we  must  so  frame  our  system  as  to  se- 
cure, so  far  as  we  may — 

1.  Thorough  honesty  ;  and, 

2.  Thorough  training. 
How  is  that  to  be  done  ? 

Here,  again,  let  us  leave  theories  and  conjecture.  Let 
us  take  actual  experiments,  and  see  what  have  been  their 
results. 

Let  us  take  a  leaf  from  English  history. 

The  English  people  pride  themselves  on  the  purity  of 
their  courts.  However  it  may  be  in  all  other  places,  in  an 
English  court  of  justice,  it  is  always  said,  a  lord  is  no  bet- 
ter than  a  clown.  There,  at  least,  justice  can  be  had  by 
all  men.  But  has  it  always  been  so  ? 

So  long  as  judges  were  dependent  for  their  tenure  of  of- 
fice on  the  will  of  the  Crown,  there  were  to  be  found  in  all 
England  no  viler  tools  of  kingly  tyranny  than  the  judges 
on  the  bench. 

A  change  was  made.  English  judges  were  made  inde- 
pendent. They  were  made  to  hold  office  so  long  as  they 
did  their  work  honestly — during  good  behavior,  as  the 
phrase  goes ;  and  at  once  English  judges  became  honest 
and  upright  men.  And,  from  the  day  of  that  change,  the 
history  of  the  English  bench  has  been  (with  hardly  one 
exception,  if  even  one)  a  record  of  utter  official  purity. 
Everywhere  else  corruption ;  on  the  bench  alone  purity. 
On  the  bench  corruption  until  this  change  in  tenure,  and 
purity  ever  afterward. 


172  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

A  remarkable  result,  surely !  Can  it  be  matched  in  the 
records  of  any  other  people  ?  Let  us  take  a  companion 
picture  from  our  own  national  life. 

While  we  were  making  with  our  executive  and  legislat- 
ure the  experiment  of  short  terms,  we  were  making  an- 
other experiment  with  our  judiciary. 

For  many  years,  in  nearly  all  the  States,  the  judiciary  held 
office  during  good  behavior.  And  for  many  years  it  was 
a  point  recognized  by  both  parties,  or  by  all  parties,  that 
judges  should  be  independent  of  all  party  considerations, 
that  their  appointments  should  not  be  party  appointments, 
and  that  their  duty  was  solely  to  interpret  the  law,  and  to 
dispense  justice  impartially  between  man  and  man.  After 
party  lines  became  strongly  fixed,  it  was  seldom,  indeed, 
that  a  President  would  appoint  a  judge  from  the  ranks  of 
his  political  opponents.  But  it  was  by  all  men  agreed 
that  a  judge,  after  he  was  appointed,  was,  and  should  be, 
no  longer  a  party  man.  Both  parties  agreed,  that  the  judge 
should  know  neither  party  ;  and  in  some  way  it  happened 
that  the  judges  of  all  our  courts,  both  State  and  national, 
for  a  long  series  of  years,  were,  with  scarcely  an  exception, 
men  whose  perfect  official  purity  was  never  so  much  as 
questioned. 

So  matters  for  a  long  time  remained.  Party  politicians 
had  seats  in  Congress,  in  the  State  Legislatures,  but  not  on 
the  benches  of  the  courts. 

So  it  remained  in  the  State  of  New  York  until  the  year 
1846.  And  in  that  State  the  judges  were  wise  and  up- 
right, and  the  legislators  were  no  more  knavish  or  foolish 
than  legislators  of  other  States. 

In  an  evil  hour  certain  wiseacres,  most  of  them  lawyers, 
tried  to  make  a  new  State  Constitution.  Only  one  point 
of  it  needs  here  to  be  considered.  And  the  consideration 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     173 

of  this  point,  as  its  effects  developed  in  the  State  of  New 
York,  will  answer  for  all  like  experiments  in  other  States. 
At  the  time  of  this  formation  of  a  new  Constitution, 
as  tradition  tells  us,  there  were  in  the  upper  courts  of  the 
State  two  or  three  judges  who  were  guilty  of  the  crime  of 
growing  old.  They  were  known  to  be  upright.  But  ad- 
vancing years  had  stolen  from  them  somewhat  of  their 
youthful  impetuosity.  As  the  Constitution  then  stood  in 
New  York,  the  judges  of  the  upper  courts  went  out  of  of- 
fice on  reaching  the  age  of  sixty  years.  And,  with  that 
protection,  there  could  hardly  have  been  any  alarming 
amount  of  senile  incompetence  on  the  bench.  But  there 
were  two  or  three  single  individuals  whom  it  was  deemed 
necessary  to  get  rid  of.  If  they  had  been  well-pensioned, 
and  had  been  requested  to  resign,  they  would  undoubtedly 
gladly  have  done  so.  There  is  no  doubt  that  they  would 
have  been  removed  for  incompetence  by  the  Legislature, 
if  they  really  were  incompetent.  But  there  has  been  at  all 
times  in  our  national  history  a  chronic  tendency  to  sweep- 
ing remedies  and  constitutional  reforms,  as  they  have  been 
called.  Certain  men  argued  that  if  judges  should  be'elect- 
ed,  as  were  all  other  officers,  for  short  terms  of  years,  the 
people  would  be  able,  at  the  end  of  his  term,  to  drop  a 
judge  who  became  incompetent  or  was  guilty  of  miscon- 
duct. And,  moreover,  it  was  said  the  having  men  hold 
office  for  life  was  not  thoroughly  in  conformity  with  re- 
publican institutions.  Public  servants  should  be  responsi- 
ble, it  was  said,  to  the  people,  and  should  be  dependent,  on 
the  people.  So  it  was  decided  that  the  judges  who  had 
theretofore  been  appointed  by  the  executive,  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  Senate,  to  hold  office  during  good  behavior, 
should  thereafter  be  elected  by  the  people  for  a  short  term 
of  years. 


174  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

The  mere  traditions  of  olden  times  at  first  kept  the 
courts  pure.  Such  a  thing  as  electing  a  man  to  the  bench 
because  he  was  serviceable  in  carrying  elections  for  his 
party  had  never  been  heard  of.  It  was  not  at  once 
thought  of.  Very  soon,  however,  party  men,  who  were 
in  quest  generally  of  offices,  sought  judicial  offices.  All 
other  offices  were  given  to  party  men.  Why  should  not 
these  judicial  offices  be  so  given?  They  were  so  given. 
It  had  been  learned  that  legislative  and  executive  offices 
could  be  used  for  improper  purposes,  that  legislative  and 
executive  action  could  be  sold  for  favor,  for  influence,  and 
for  money.  It  was  soon  ascertained  that  judicial  office 
and  judicial  action  could  be  used  and  sold  in  the  same 
way.  And  so  judicial  offices  and  action  were  used  and 
sold.  And  in  due  course  of  time  the  bank  accounts  of 
certain  judges  of  the  highest  courts  in  the  State  of  New 
York  showed  that  a  seat  on  the  bench  could  be  made  an 
office,  if  not  of  honor,  at  least  of  profit,  and  that  ermine, 
though  a  costly  robe,  might  yet  yield  rich  revenues  to  the 
wearer. 

Some  astute  reasoners  endeavored  to  set  up  a  new  stand- 
ard for  official  action,  for  legislators,  executive  officers,  and 
judges  on  the  bench.  It  was  this :  It  was  seriously  ar- 
gued, and  became  a  well-settled  principle  of  practice,  that 
so  long  as  a  man  in  Congress  or  a  judge  on  the  bench 
was  not  paid  a  particular  sum  of  money  for  a  particular 
vote  or  order  or  decree,  the  vote  or  order  or  decree  was 
not  "  corrupt."  A  judge  might  ruin  the  business  of  a 
great  railroad  by  a  receivership,  might  imprison  an  hon- 
est citizen  without  bail,  might  take  a  banker's  bonds  from 
his  safe  by  an  illegal  order,  or  might  carry  on  the  business 
of  judicial  burglary  under  pretended  writs  of  court ;  and  so 
long  as  he  was  not  paid  in  money  for  each  one  particular 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     ItS 

act,  his  conduct  was  not  to  be  called  "  corrupt."  It  was 
admitted  that  perhaps  this  conduct  was  not  altogether 
praiseworthy,  was  not  in  all  respects  proper.  But,  accord- 
ing to  a  doctrine  thoroughly  in  vogue,  these  things  might 
all  be  done  for  a  politician  who  had  got  the  judge  his 
nomination  and  election,  or  they  might  be  done  for  a 
stock  speculator  who  furnished  his  house  for  him,  gave 
presents  to  his  children,  lent  him  large  sums  of  money, 
gave  him  sumptuous  dinners  with  companions  not  to  be 
named  in  decorous  society,  and  who  for  these  admirable 
qualifications  was  selected,  of  all  men,  as  the  fittest  to  be 
the  judicial  friend.  For  such  a  man  a  judge  might  break 
open  safes  and  steal  railroads,  imprison  honest  men  and 
release  thieves ;  and  so  long  as  there  was  no  bargain  for  a 
specific  money  payment,  there  was  nothing  "  corrupt"  in 
it.  It  would  be,  indeed,  hard  for  the  man  who  suffered 
by  any  of  these  proceedings  to  see  how  the  wrong  done  to 
him  was  any  the  less,  because  his  property  was  stolen  or 
he  himself  was  thrown  into  prison  merely  to  oblige  a 
friend.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  the  judicial  action  is  sub- 
stantially excused  by  any  such  consideration.  But  this 
was  often  argued.  Later  years  will  not,  it  is  apprehended, 
sustain  this  distinction. 

It  was  soon  seen  that  judicial  offices  were  more  impor- 
tant and  valuable  than  any  others.  They  had  more  power. 
These  judges  were  above  all  power.  These  decrees  of 
courts  could  be  used  to  punish  men  or  to  shield  them,  for 
carrying  through  stock  speculations  or  railroad  elections, 
or  elections  to  public  office.  And  it  came  to  be  the  fact 
that  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  knavery  of  the  party 
men  was  carried  on  under  the  protection  and  cover  of 
process  of  the  courts.  It  was  all  the  more  necessary  that 
these  places  on  the  bench  should  be  filled  by  men  who 


170  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

should  be  under  the  control  of  party.  The  result  was, 
that  whereas  judges  in  the  State  of  New  York  had  been 
uniformly  pure,  with  never  an  exception,  as  far  as  I  have 
ever  heard,  they  became  as  corrupt  as  any  other  class  of 
public  servants.  They  had  more  power ;  they  were  more 
lawless  and  tyrannical  in  the  use  of  it. 

It  was  a  point  questioned  by  no  one,  at  the  time  of  the 
formation  of  the  national  Constitution,  that  the  judges 
should  hold  office  during  good  behavior.  No  argument 
was  had  as  to  the  reasons  for  it.  But  there  is  no  doubt 
as  to  what  the  reasons  were.  In  England  the  tenure  dur- 
ing good  behavior  had  been  adopted,  simply  to  make  the 
judges  independent  of  the  king.  So  long  as  they  de- 
pended on  the  king  for  their  continuance  in  office,  it  was 
found  that  the  king  could  control  their  action.  And  it 
was  later  found  in  this  country  that  so  long  as  judges 
depended  on  party  men  for  their  continuance  in  office, 
party  men  could  control  their  action.  No  question  was 
made,  by  the  statesmen  who  drafted  the  United  States 
Constitution,  that  the  judges  on  the  bench  should  be  abso- 
lutely independent  of  all  men.  On  all  other  points  they 
differed.  On  this  point  they  all  agreed.  On  this  point 
all  statesmen,  everywhere,  have  agreed.  Even  in  New 
York,  such  has  been  the  general  disgust  with  the  results  of 
the  experiment  in  electing  judges  for  a  short  term,  that,  al- 
though the  power  of  the  party  men  hindered  a  return  to 
the  tenure  for  good  behavior,  yet  the  people  did,  by  a  con- 
stitutional amendment,  lengthen  the  terms  of  the  judges 
of  the  upper  courts  to  fourteen  years.  And  this  was  done 
for  the  one  avowed  purpose  of  making  them  more  inde- 
pendent ;  yet  the  people  shrank  from  making  the  judges, 
as.  they  should  be,  completely  independent,  as  far  as  their 
mere  tenure  of  office  can  accomplish  that  result. 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     m 

From  the  time  our  national  Constitution  was  adopted 
down  to  the  appointment  of  a  politician  to  the  Chief-jus- 
ticeship of  the  United  States,  there  was  not  one  single 
instance,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  where  the  purity  of  any 
United  States  judge  was  justly  questioned.  The  history 
of  the  United  States  courts,  till  within  a  very  recent  period, 
is  a  glorious  record  of  official  purity.  Marshall,  Curtis, 
Taney,  Story,  and  Nelson  are  names  that  will  live  forever 
in  national  history. 

On  the  bench  we  had  perfect  purity.  We  had  it  no- 
where else. 

But  in  the  general  Government  and  the  State  Govern- 
ments party  politicians  made  the  platforms,  and  substan- 
tially appointed  the  Representatives  and  Senators,  the  Pres- 
ident, and  all  the  officers  of  the  Government.  Although 
the  Presidents  in  the  early  times  appointed  only  jurists  to 
the  United  States  courts,  was  it  to  be  expected  that  they 
would  always  do  so  ?  Themselves  the  creatures  of  violent, 
and  sometimes  unprincipled,  party  men,  could  it  be  sup- 
posed that  they  would  appoint  better  men  to  the  bench 
than  they  did  to  the  executive  departments,  or  better  men 
than  themselves  to  either  ? 

Does  any  one  believe  that  Mr.  Lincoln  appointed  Mr. 
Chase  to  the  Chief-justiceship  of  the  United  States  because 
he  believed  Mr.  Chase  to  be  the  fittest  man  for  the  place  ? 
Mr.  Chase  may  have  been  a  great  lawyer.  It  will  hardly 
be  claimed  that  he  had,  when  made  Chief-justice,  proved 
himself  one,  or  that  he  was  appointed  for  the  reason  that 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  any  good  reason  to  believe  that  he  was 
one.  And  even  if  Mr.  Chase  had  then  been  a  man  of  high 
standing  at  the  bar,  the  simple  fact  that  he  was  the  most 
prominent  rival  of  Mr.  Lincoln  for  the  next  Presidential 
terra,  was  a  most  conclusive  reason  why  he  should  not  be 

8* 


178  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

appointed  to  the  highest  place  on  the  bench.  Whatever 
might  be  the  fact,  it  was  certain  that  the  belief  would  be, 
that  the  appointment  was  made  only  to  get  rid  of  a  rival. 
And  there  were  very  many  men  at  the  bar  and  on  the 
bench,  who  had  then  proved  themselves  to  be  storehouses 
of  legal  wisdom. 

It  has  always  been  believed  that  two  judges  in  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  were  appointed  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  reversing  a  previous  decision  of  that 
court  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  legal  tender  act ;  and 
the  decision  was  reversed,  as  the  expectation  was  that  it 
would  be. 

It  has  always  been  believed,  too,  by  a  large  portion  of 
the  American  people,  that  the  votes  of  several  judges  of 
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  on  the  points  of  the  last 
Presidential  election  were  controlled  by  the  party  sympa- 
thies of  the  members  of  the  court.  The  belief  may  be  not 
correct.  It  is  very  unfortunate  that  it  should  have  an  ex- 
istence. It  is  very  unfortunate,  too,  that  the  votes  of  all 
the  judges  of  the  court  should,  on  every  single  question, 
correspond  exactly  with  what  were  understood  to  be  the 
wishes  of  their  respective  parties,  and  that  the  votes  of 
some  members  of  the  court  on  different  questions  should 
not  be,  on  principle,  entirely  consistent.  Twenty-five  years 
ago  such  a  thing  never  would  have  been ;  and  in  earlier 
times  no  judge  of  any  United  States  Court  could  have 
been  found  to  lend  himself  to  such  a  scheme  of  executive 
and  military  usurpation  as  did  Judge  Durell  in  Louisiana. 
It  was  the  natural  and  certain  result  of  a  system  which 
made  parties  such  as  they  have  been,  that  judges  appoint- 
ed under  the  system  should  have  been  at  times  corrupt 
men.  The  wonder  is  that  we  have  not  had  many  more  of 
them,  even  with  the  tenure  during  good  behavior.  That 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     179 

the  standard  of  judicial  action  has  been  kept  as  high  as  it 
has  been  is  very  clearly  due  only  to  that  tenure. 

In  the  army  and  navy  we  had  precisely  the  same  expe- 
rience. We  cannot  forget,  of  course,  that  nearly  all  the 
Southern  men,  in  both  the  army  and  navy,  at  the  opening 
of  the  Rebellion,  left  the  service  of  the  Government.  North- 
ern men  would  have  done  the  same  thing  under  the  same 
circumstances.  The  men  in  the  Southern  army  believed 
themselves  to  be  doing  their  duty.  The  education  of  a 
life  could  not  fail  to  have  its  effect.  We  must  throw  this 
anomalous  case  out  of  our  consideration,  in  drawing  our 
general  conclusions  as  to  the  mere  working  of  government 
machinery.  And  aside  from  this,  down  to  the  opening  of 
the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  the  officers  of  the  army  and  navy 
were  men  whose  official  conduct  Avas  utterly  pure.  And 
so  it  happens,  too,  that  here  we  find  the  tenure  during 
good  behavior. 

And  at  last,  when  party  got  its  enormous  growth  and 
its  enormous  strength,  we  find  that  its  influence  corrupted 
even  officers  of  the  army  and  navy.  The  party  men  con- 
trolled and  influenced  the  executive  action  and  the  action 
of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments.  If  an  able  and  upright 
officer  balked  the  schemes  of  thieving  contractors,  he  was 
speedily  removed  to  some  very  harmless  sphere  of  duty. 
Cotton  expeditions  were  more  important  than  winning  cam- 
paigns. Army  officers  found  themselves  dependent  on  the 
powerful  party  men  for  their  professional  advancement.  Of 
course,  it  was  a  possible  thing  to  find  in  the  United  States 
army  men  who  could  be  corrupted  by  the  use  of  money 
and  influence.  Army  officers  as  well  as  judges  of  the 
courts,  in  later  days,  in  single  instances,  yielded  to  the  im- 
mense pressure  brought  on  them  by  party  men.  Such 
corruption  as  existed  in  the  army  and  navy  was  caused  by 


180  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

the  corrupt  use  of  party  power.  That  this 'corruption  was 
not  greater,  was  due  to  the  high  moral  tone  prevailing  in 
the  service,  and  this  moral  tone  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
officers  in  the  army  and  navy  held  their  commissions  dur- 
ing good  behavior. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  these  are  instances  only  of  execu- 
tive and  judicial  officers,  and  no  general  conclusions  can  be 
drawn  from  those  special  instances.  Especially,  it  may  be 
said  that  English  experience  and  our  own  experience  as  to 
the  judiciary  cannot  give  us  any  conclusions  on  which  we 
can  safely  rest  as  to  legislators.  It  may  be  argued  that 
there  is  a  great  difference  between  the  position  of  the 
judge  and  that  of  the  legislator. 

So  there  is.  But  where  is  the  difference,  in  this  point  ? 
The  judge  interprets  the  law;  the  legislator  makes  it. 
The  judge  says  what  the  law  is ;  the  legislator  says  what  it 
shall  be.  The  judge  hears  and  decides  between  two  parties 
or  a  limited  number  of  parties ;  the  legislator  hears  and 
decides  for  all  the  people.  The  judge  hears  counsel  in 
court;  the  legislator  hears  all  men  in  all  places.  Both 
judge  and  legislator  have  great  power,  the  use  of  which, 
in  one  way  rather  than  another,  will  work  great  pecuniary 
gain  or  loss  to  individuals.  The  honor  of  both  can  be 
sold ;  the  power  of  both  has  been  sold.  And  they  have 
both  been  sold  for  money.  And  of  the  two,  decrees  of 
courts  are  more  marketable  than  votes  in  a  legislature.  To 
buy  a  decree,  you  need  pay  only  one  man ;  to  make  votes 
of  any  value,  you  must  buy  many.  And  such  has  been 
our  experience.  The  courts  in  New  York,  in  1870,  were 
more  shamelessly  corrupt  than  our  legislatures  have  ever 
been.  The  ways  of  making  money  and  of  giving  bribes 
are  the  same  now  that  they  have  been  for  centuries.  In- 
junctions in  the  State  of  New  York  were  as  valuable  for  a 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     181 

stock  speculation  in  1845ras  in  18*7 0.  Eeceiverships  would 
have  been  jnst  as  useful  then  as  now  for  the  purpose  of 
ruining  a  rival  or  carrying  a  corporate  election.  It  was 
not  that  judges'  orders  had  no  money  value  prior  to  the 
year  1846  in  the  State  of  New  York.  But  they  were  nev- 
er sold.  As  soon,  however,  as  judges  had  to  sit  in  politi- 
cal conventions  when  they  should  have  been  on  the  bench ; 
as  soon  as  they  gave  their  time  to  manufacturing  voters 
instead  of  hearing  causes ;  as  soon  as  they  began  to  dis- 
charge thieves  from  prison  instead  of  sentencing  them ;  as 
soon  as  they  had  to  study  lists  of  repeaters  instead  of 
Blackstone  and  Kent ;  when,  instead  of  confining  their  at- 
tention to  the  faithful  discharge  of  their  duties,  they  had 
to  assist  in  working  the  ordinary  party  machinery  and  to 
help  pay  the  ordinary  party  expenses,  then  they  found  it 
necessary  to  sell  decrees  for  money,  and  they  sold  them. 

But  as  to  legislators,  too,  we  have  the  actual  experi- 
ments to  end  any  doubts  we  may  have. 

Corruption,  in  its  worst  form,  most  men  agree,  disap- 
peared from  the  English  Parliament  about  the  beginning 
of  this  century.  Its  disappearance  was  not  caused  by  the 
extension  of  the  suffrage,  for  no  such  extension  had  then 
been  had.  How  did  it  come  ? 

The  system  of  rotten  boroughs  is  gone.  It  deserved  to 
go.  It  was  full  of  the  greatest  abuses.  But  is  there  a 
possibility  that  it  had  precisely  one  good  point  ? 

In  the  bitter  party  struggles  that  continued  for  so  many 
years  in  the  House  of  Commons,  it  became  necessary  for 
both  parties  to  have  strong  men  to  fight  the  Parliamen- 
tary battles.  Able  men  could  do  good  service  and  gain 
renown  in  Parliament.  A  Parliamentary  career  began  to 
have  great  attractions  for  able  and  eloquent  men.  As 
these  men  made  themselves  useful  to  their  respective  par- 


182  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

tics,  and  as  they  gained  experience,  and  consequently  pow- 
er, it  became  more  and  more  important  to  their  parties  to 
keep  them  in  Parliament  year  after  year.  And  the  hold- 
ers of  large  landed  estates,  on  either  side,  at  all  times  had 
in  their  control  a  large  number  of  boroughs  from  which 
they  could  return  to  Parliament  any  one  whom  they  might 
wish.  So  it  came,  that  the  rotten  borough  system  was 
made  the  means  of  keeping  in  Parliament  many  able  men, 
and  some  very  great  men,  for  so  long  as  they  might  wish 
to  hold  their  seats.  Among  these  men  who  thus  held 
seats  in  Parliament  were  nearly  all  the  statesmen  who 
have  done  England  the  greatest  service.  Chatham,  Burke, 
Pitt,  and  Fox  all  came  into  Parliament  from  rotten  bor- 
oughs. So  it  was,  too,  with  nearly  all  of  the  men  whose 
names  are  brightest  in  later  English  Parliamentary  histo- 
ry. And  in  fact  there  was  in  the  English  Parliament  a 
larger  proportion  of  able  and  honest  men  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth,  when  England  was  full  of  rotten  boroughs, 
than  in  the  seventeenth  century  or  at  the  present  day,  at 
both  which  times  the  representation  in  Parliament  has 
been  comparatively  fair  and  equal. 

These  men  held  their  seats  nominally  for  seven  years, 
but  really  and  substantially  for  life,  or  as  long  as  they 
chose  to  keep  them.  They  had  everything  they  wished ; 
they  could  keep  everything  they  had.  They  had  no  need 
of  managing  party  election  machinery ;  they  had  not  to 
court  the  interests  of  rich  corporations.  They  had  the 
possibility,  by  wise  and  just  legislation,  of  gaining  fame, 
the  only  thing  they  had  to  gain.  By  unwise  or  unjust 
legislation  they  conld  lose  their  honorable  reputations,  the 
only  thing  they  had  to  lose.  The  result  was  that  these 
men,  though  often  full  of  class  prejudices,  were,  and  re- 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     183 

mained,  always  men  of  honor,  and,  in  matters  where  their 
class  prejudices  and  the  bitterness  of  party  contest  did 
not  blind  them,  they  were  wise  legislators. 

Corruption  disappeared  from  the  English  House  of 
Commons,  not  because  men  became  suddenly  more  virtu- 
ous, nor  because  there  was  less  money  in  the  world,  nor  be- 
cause votes  in  Parliament  became  less  valuable,  nor  through 
fear  of  punishment,  but,  in  the  main,  because  the  men  who 
led  the  House  of  Commons,  and  made  public  opinion  in 
and  out  of  it,  were  practically  independent  in  their  tenure 
of  their  seats. 

This  was  the  real  cause  that  enabled  the  greatest  Eng- 
lish statesmen  to  do  England  their  best  service.  Mark  the 
change  that  has  come.  Whereas,  fifty  years  ago,  there 
were  in  the  English  House  of  Commons  many  statesmen 
who  did  not  depend  for  holding  their  seats  on  carrying 
the  next  election,  who  did  what  they  believed  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  people  demanded,  without  fear  or  favor  of 
any  human  being,  now  the  members  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons are  fast  becoming  the  slaves  of  party,  as  thoroughly 
as  they  have  ever  been  in  this  country.  Statesmen  have 
given  way  to  party  mountebanks.  From  Burke  to  Bea- 
consfield — could  there  be  a  more  stupendous  fall  ? 

The  most  brilliant  eloquence  in  English  history,  their 
wisest  legislation  of  the  last  hundred  years — free-trade,  rev- 
enue reform,  the  extension  of  the  suffrage,  nearly  every 
government  measure  that  has  helped  make  England's  pres- 
ent greatness — has  come  from  the  statesmen  who  held  their 
seats  from  rotten  boroughs.  The  traditions  and  manners 
of  Pitt  and  Burke  and  Fox  still  hang  around  Westminster 
Hall.  Party  rule,  under  frequent  elections,  will  have  in 
England,  sooner  or  later,  its  legitimate  results.  It  has  not 
yet  brought  back  the  grossest  forms  of  moneyed  corrup- 


184  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

tion.  But  the  present  purity  of  English  legislative  halls, 
such  as  it  is,  is  a  legacy  from  the  Golden  Age  of  rotten 
boroughs. 

The  argument  thus  far  has  shown  incidentally  that  at 
least  there  are  some  evil  results  coming  from  the  term 
system,  as  we  have  had  it  established  under  our  general 
Government.  This  term  system  is  the  front  and  founda- 
tion and  superstructure  of  our  present  form  of  govern- 
ment. I  propose,  at  the  risk  of  some  repetition,  to  ex- 
amine more  specially  the  reason  for  its  adoption  and  its 
•working. 

The  one  purpose  that  is  supposed  to  be  accomplished 
by  this  system  of  short  terms  of  office  is,  that  the  people 
thereby  keep  the  complete  control  of  their  public  officials, 
and  that  any  abuse  or  misuse  by  these  officials  of  their 
power  is  thereby  made  impossible. 

There  ran  through  all  the  discussions  in  the  Conven- 
tions— both  the  Constitutional  Convention  which  framed 
the  Constitution,  and  the  State  Conventions  that  adopted 
it — a  thorough  distrust  of  the  honesty  of  the  men  who 
should  hold  public  office  under  the  new  national  Govern- 
ment. This  Constitutional  Convention  had  among  its  mem- 
bers Washington,  Hamilton,  Madison,  Franklin,  the  Mor- 
rises, and  Luther  Martin.  The  members  were  generally 
men  of  the  same  stamp  with  those  just  named.  Jefferson 
called  them  "  an  assembly  of  demigods."  "  These  men  were 
selected  by  an  honest  people,  for  a  great  work,  in  a  time 
of  great  danger,  when  the  best  men  are,  from  mere  popu- 
lar instinct,  placed  in  high  positions  of  trust.  It  was  just 
as  true  then  as  now,  that  knaves  are  always  suspicious,  and 
honest  men  are  seldom  so.  And  yet  somehow  it  came, 
that  the  members  of  these  Conventions,  State  and  national, 
really  believed  that  the  officials  and  legislators  under  this 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     185 

new  general  government  would  be  a  different  kind  of  men 
from  the  officials  and  legislators  under  the  State  govern- 
ments. It  was  feared  that  they  would  in  some  way  com- 
bine to  destroy  the  liberties  of  the  people.  Somehow  or 
other,  it  was  imagined  that  any  new  government,  outside 
of  and  above  the  State  governments,  was  to  be  a  monstrous 
thing,  and  its  officials  were  to  be  monstrous  beings,  not 
amenable  to  the  ordinary  laws  of  human  nature.  This  is 
no  exaggeration.  Mr.  Gerry,  in  the  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, made  a  motion  "  that  the  national  executive  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  State  executives."  And  he  argued  in  sup- 
port of  the  motion,  that  he  "  supposed  that  in  the  national 
Legislature  there  will  be  a  great  number  of  bad  men  of  vari- 
ous descriptions.  These  will  make  a  wrong  appointment ; 
besides,  an  executive  thus  appointed  will  have  his  partial- 
ity in  favor  of  those  who  appointed  him — that  this  will  not 
be  the  case  by  the  effect  of  my  motion,  and  the  executive 
will  by  this  means  be  independent  of  the  national  Legislat- 
ure." Mr.  Kandolph  opposed  the  motion,  and  argued,  "  An 
executive  thus  appointed  will  court  the  officers  of  his  ap- 
pointment, and  will  relax  him  in  the  duties  of  commander 
of  the  militia."*  Even  Hamilton  said,f  "  Take  mankind 
as  they  are,  and  what  are  they  governed  by  ?  Their  pas- 
sions. There  may  be  in  every  government  a  few  choice 
spirits  who  may  act  from  more  worthy  motives.  One 
great  error  is,  that  we  suppose  mankind  more  honest  than 
they  are.  Our  prevailing  passions  are  ambition  and  inter- 
est ;  and  it  will  ever  be  the  duty  of  a  wise  government  to 
avail  itself  of  those  passions,  in  order  to  make  them  sub- 
servient to  the  public  good ;  for  these  ever  induce  us  to 
action." 

*  Yates's  "  Minutes."  f  Elliot's  "  Debates,"  vol.  i.  p.  439. 


186  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

Now,  which  is  the  more  thorough  security  against  the 
dishonesty  of  a  servant,  public  or  private — to  discharge  him 
for  present  misconduct  at  the  end  of  four  years,  or  to-day  ? 
As  a  security  against  dishonesty,  or  inefficiency,  or  any 
misuse  of  trust,  the  terra  system  utterly  fails,  in  principle 
and  practice.  The  machinery  should  be  so  arranged,  as  it 
easily  can  be,  that  an  officer  shall  be  discharged  now,  not 
two  years  from  now,  for  misconduct  of  any  kind  which 
makes  him  an  unfit  public  servant.  And  can  anything 
other  than  this  be  an  approach  to  a  real  safeguard  ? 

The  purpose  of  having  officers  hold  for  a  term  of  years 
is  this,  to  make  those  terms  very  short,  and  thus  to  have 
the  officer  come  up  for  a  re-election  at  short  intervals — at 
intervals  so  short  as  to  give  the  people,  indirectly  and  in 
effect,  the  power  of  removing  him  at  any  time.  There  was 
also  the  idea,  that  in  a  short  term  a  public  officer  would 
not  have  the  time  to  accomplish  any  great  harm  by  any 
abuse  of  his  power.  And,  of  course,  the  only  honest  pur- 
pose which  this  term  system  could  serve  was  to  remove 
the  officer  at  the  end  of  the  short  term,  only  if  he  deserved 
removal,  and  to  continue  him  in  his  office  if  his  work  had 
been  well  done.  That  being  the  end,  then,  why  not  frame 
the  system  so  as  to  reach  the  end  directly  and  at  once, 
and  not  indirectly  in  the  remote  future  ?  Why  not  give  to 
some  one  man  or  body  of  men  the  power  of  removing  the 
officer  at  the  time  for  misconduct  or  unsatisfactory  work 
of  any  kind,  and  let  him  continue  in  office  so  long  as  his 
work  is  good  ?  That  is  the  way  we  do  with  private  ser- 
vants. Why  should  we  not  do  so  with  public  servants  ? 

Moreover,  the  whole  tendency  of  the  term  system  is  to 
make  it  as  certain  as  anything  can  be,  that  we  shall  never 
hold  any  one  official  responsible  for  any  one  act.  It  goes 
far  to  destroy  all  official  responsibility.  If  an  officer  mis- 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     187 

behaves,  men  do  nothing  at  the  time.  They  think  it  will 
be  so  much  easier  to  drop  the  officer  at  the  end  of  his 
term  than  to  punish  him  now.  They  therefore  wait  for 
the  end  of  his  term.  But  when  the  end  of  the  term  comes, 
they  forget  what  any  one  man  has  done  or  left  undone. 
Then  comes  the  contest  between  two  great  parties,  over 
great  moral  questions.  Then  it  is  a  matter  of  "  platforms  " 
and  party  "  records." 

The  expectation,  too,  was  that  under  the  term  system  the 
people  would  have  it  in  their  power,  if  they  should  wish, 
to  make  the  removal.  But  that  has  not  been  the  result. 
The  result  under  the  term  system  has  been  the  creation 
of  this  immense  party  machinery.  The  people  have  not, 
in  practice,  been  able  to  remove.  The  power  has  been 
taken  out  of  their  hands  by  party. 

It  might  be  said  that  we  should  avoid  some  of  the  evils 
of  the  system  if  we  made  the  terms  longer.  But  the  only 
purpose  of  having  the  term  at  all  is  to  have  it  short,  so 
that  the  people  can  in  effect  remove  the  officer  at  any 
time,  or  very  soon.  The  point  I  urge  against  the  short 
term  of  one  year  is  that  it  is  not  short  enough,  that  the 
whole  term  system  is  vicious,  that  no  official  should  have 
a  right  to  remain  in  his  office  for  a  day,  after  he  fails  to 
do  his  work  well.  The  term  of  ten  or  twenty  years  is 
simply  so  much  worse  than  the  term  of  one  year.  When 
men  say  the  term  should  be  lengthened,  as  many  men 
do,  it  shows  only  that  they  are  thoroughly  conscious 
that  there  is  something  rotten  in  the  system  as  we  now 
have  it. 

But  any  system  of  long  terms  would  have  its  peculiar 
disadvantage. 

Napoleon  commanded  the  armies  of  France  at  the  age 
of  twenty-seven.  Suppose  some  young  man  shows  the 


188  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

genius  for  affairs  of  State  that  Napoleon  showed  for  war, 
or  only  very  great  talent,  and  that  he  has  an  opportunity 
to  enter  the  national  Legislature  at  the  age  of  thirty  years. 
Suppose  the  term  for  which  he  was  to  hold  were  fifteen 
years,  the  longest  term  of  which  there  would  ever  be  any 
reasonable  probability.  At  the  age  of  forty-five  his  term 
would  end,  and  he  would  be  a  man,  certainly  (if  he  were 
honest),  without  a  fortune,  and  probably  without  even  a 
very  moderate  competence,  with  no  profession  or  occupa- 
tion, at  a  time  of  life  too  late  to  learn  one,  possibly  with 
a  family  dependent  on  his  salary  for  their  daily  support. 
The  best  men  will  not  take  such  risks.  And  it  is  this 
very  class  of  men,  the  men  who  might  display  so  great 
abilities  as  to  be  selected  for  public  station  at  an  early 
age,  who  are,  of  all  men,  the  ones  who  would  render  the 
State  the  greatest  service ;  for  they  would  not  only  have 
greater  abilities,  but  an  earlier  experience,  and  a  longer 
possible  time  of  service.  Such  were  Pitt  and  Hamilton — 
nearly  all  the  great  men  the  world  has  ever  known,  the 
men  who  make  or  save  a  nation. 

It  is  as  a  machinery  for  holding  officials  "  responsible," 
that  the  term  system  has  its  only  value.  But,  in  effect, 
the  term  system  is  a  system  under  which  officers  are  "  ir- 
responsible" almost  as  thoroughly  as  under  any  hereditary 
monarchy.  The  hereditary  king  holds  his  power  for  his 
life ;  and  meantime,  even  if  his  use  of  that  power  is  most 
unwise  and  disastrous,  it  cannot  be  taken  from  him.  The 
President  of  the  United  States  holds  his  power  for  four 
years;  and  meantime,  even  if  his  use  of  that  power  is  most 
unwise  and  disastrous  (so  long  as  it  be  honest),  it  cannot 
be  taken  from  him.  It  is  true,  if  the  President  is  guilty 
of  a  crime,  he  will  perhaps  be  removed  by  impeachment. 
So,  too,  if  the  king  commits  a  crime,  or  many  crimes,  he 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.     189 

will  perhaps  be  removed  by  a  revolution.  But  the  one 
is,  in  effect,  as  thoroughly  an  "  irresponsible  "  ruler  as  the 
other.  The  only  difference  is  this:  With  our  President 
the  time  during  which  he  is  an  "irresponsible"  ruler  is 
fixed,  and  certainly  short,  instead  of  being  unfixed,  and 
possibly  long.  But  why  should  a  man  be  "  irresponsible  " 
for  even  four  years  ? 

In  theory  the  term  system  is  unsound.  In  practice  it 
has  been  found  most  ruinous.  It  has  destroyed  the  re- 
sponsibility of  public  officials ;  it  has,  as  far  as  any  system 
could  so  do,  taken  from  the  people  the  control  of  their 
public  servants.  It  has  been  tried,  and  it  has  failed. 

Here  have  been,  then,  experiments  of  all  kinds,  with 
public  servants  of  all  kinds,  with  results  of  all  kinds. 
What  are  the  results  of  these  experiments? 

The  experiment  of  having  men  "  irresponsible  "  for  the 
use  of  their  power,  that  is,  giving  men  power  that  cannot 
be  taken  from  them,  has  been  tried,  thoroughly  tried,  and 
lias  always  failed.  Giving  them  irresponsible  power  for 
life  has  been  tried,  with  hereditary  kings,  under  different 
names  and  forms,  and  that  has  always  failed.  Giving  men 
irresponsible  power  for  a  term  of  years  has  been  tried 
many  times,  in  many  countries,  and  that  has  always  failed. 
The  experiment  of  making  men  "  responsible  "  for  the  use 
of  their  power — that  is,  of  having  them  hold  their  power 
only  so  long  as  they  use  it  well,  and  taking  it  from  them 
instantly  (not  at  the  end  of  one  or  two  years)  so  soon  as 
they  use  it  ill — has  been  often  tried,  and  it  has  never  failed. 
It  has  been  tried  with  judicial  officers,  with  executive  offi- 
cers, and  "with  •  legislative  officers  —  always  with  the  one 
unvarying  result. 

Now  what  is  the  reason  of  it?  For  a  reason  there 
must  be. 


190  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

Every  man  lives  for  the  future.  If  for  his  future  ad- 
vancement he  depends  on  a  king,  he  serves  the  king;  if 
for  his  future  advancement  he  depends  on  party,  he  serves 
party ;  if  for  his  future  advancement  he  depends  only  on 
doing  his  work  well,  he  will  do  his  work  well.  English 
judges  were  dependent  on  kings — they  sold  their  official 
action  for  kingly  favor,  and  for  money.  American  judges 
and  legislators  were  dependent  on  party — they  sold  their 
official  action  for  party  favor,  and  for  money.  When 
judges  and  legislators  have  been  free,  have  depended,  for 
their  fame  and  future,  only  on  being  honest,  they  have 
been  honest. 

How  wonderful  it  is !  "With  our  private  servants,  too, 
we  find,  if  we  keep  them  in  our  service  only  so  long  as 
they  serve  us  well  and  honestly,  they  serve  us  well  and 
honestly.  It  is  no  miracle,  nothing  but  a  law  of  human 
nature.  And  the  wonderful  thing  of  all  is,  that  this  law 
of  human  nature  governs  public  officials  as  well  as  human 
beings. 

How  was  it  that  for  sixty  years  we  had  in  the  courts 
of  New  York  utter  purity,  until  we  tried  the  term  system, 
and  that  then,  under  the  term  system,  we  had  as  scandalous 
corruption  as  had  ever  disgraced  the  history  of  any  civil- 
ized nation  ?  The  man  who  is  keen  enough  to  find  any 
other  reason  for  this  phenomenon  than  the  term  system 
itself  will  make  himself  famous  by  his  astuteness. 

One  other  question  he  will  then  do  well  to  answer.  It 
being  conceded,  as  it  will  be,  that  the  public  service  has 
wonderful  charms  for  all  men  who  have  any  gifts  fitting 
them  for  it,  and  it  being  certain  that  if  we  will  only  re- 
ward our  public  servants  as  we  do  men  in  the  other  em- 
ployments of  life,  we  can  have  the  best  men  in  the  coun- 
try to  do  our  work,  if  by  the  abolition  of  the  term  system 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.    191 

we  should  secure  in  our  public  servants  independence,  and, 
therefore,  honesty,  what  more  could  possibly  be  had,  or 
what  more  could  possibly  be  wished  ? 

This  is  no  mystery.  All  that  is  needed  is  that  we 
should  apply  to  matters  of  government  the  same  common- 
sense  rules  that  we  use  in  all  our  other  affairs. 

So  far  as  to  securing  honest  work  —  that  is,  the  best 
work  that  a  man  knows  how  to  give. 

How  is  it,  then,  as  to  securing  for  our  public  servants 
training,  knowledge,  experience  ?  How  are  w,e  to  secure 
that  they  shall  know  how  to  give  us  the  best  work  ? 

Here  is,  as  it  seems  to  me,  one  of  the  most  important 
points  of  this  whole  examination. 

And  here  is  the  great  fault  of  the  term  system.  It 
destroys,  to  a  certainty,  the  possibility  of  our  public  ser- 
vants gaining  any  thorough  training  for  their  official  work. 

It  will  be  wise  to  here  examine  shortly  the  ideas  of  the 
men  who  gave  us  the  system,  and  their  purposes. 

The  idea  of  the  colonists,  when  the  Constitution  was 
framed,  was  that  any  one  could  be  a  legislator.  Every 
man  voted  in  the  town -meeting,  and  was  a  legislator. 
Nearly  every  man,  too,  who  voted  in  the  town -meeting 
occasionally  went  to  the  State  Assembly  or  Senate  for  one 
or  two  years,  and  was  a  legislator  there.  And  the  colo- 
nists imagined  that  these  same  men  could,  well  enough,  go 
to  the  national  Congress,  and  be  legislators  there.  The 
only  danger,  then,  to  be  guarded  against  was  this,  that 
these  plain  farmers  and  honest  merchants,  who  were  up- 
right, simple  beings  at  home,  should  not  be  converted  into 
Julius  Ca3sars  when  they  reached  the  seat  of  the  nation- 
al Government.  And  to  the  majority  of  the  men  of  the 
time  it  seemed  the  sure  and  only  way  to  protect  them- 
selves against  that  danger,  to  give  to  all  officials  only  a 


192  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

short  term  of  office  in  which  they  could  have  any  oppor- 
tunity to  carry  out  their  designs  of  usurpation.  This  may 
seem  like  an  attempt  at  a  humorous  description  of  those 
men  in  a  past  age.  It  is  nothing  of  the  kind.  Any  one 
who  will  carefully  read  the  debates  in  the  various  State 
Conventions  which  met  to  consider  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution  will  find  those  debates  full  of  precisely  the 
fear  here  mentioned. 

It  was  assumed  that  usurpation  and  tyranny  were  the 
only  dangers,  and  that  the  system  of  short  terms  of  office 
was  the  only  safeguard. 

The  idea  our  ancestors  had  as  to  the  qualifications  re- 
quired in  Government  officials  was,  in  the  very  early  times, 
not  very  far  from  accurate.  In  the  colonial  days,  at  least 
in  New  England,  the  laws  of  property  were  taken  bodily 
from  the  English  common  law.  In  fact  there  was  very 
little  property  to  need  a  law  of  any  kind ;  and  the  legis- 
lation of  the  period  was  principally  confined  to  the  fixing 
of  the  number  of  lashes  which  should  be  the  penalty  for 
using  profane  language  on  the  Lord's-day,  or  like  matters, 
which  needed  no  very  deep  knowledge  of  the  great  prin- 
ciples of  jurisprudence.  The  people  were  poor ;  their  re- 
lations with  one  another  and  with  the  rest  of  the  world 
were  simple.  The  forests  were  to  be  cleared,  houses  were 
to  be  built,  the  Indians  were  to  be  fought,  after  the  ir- 
regular methods  of  frontiersmen.  The  times  before  the 
Revolutionary  period  had  never  called  for  statesmen.  Even 
when  the  Constitution  was  formed,  the  body  of  the  peo- 
ple did  not  thoroughly  understand  that  they  then  needed 
statesmen,  or  that  the  later  periods  of  the  national  life  and 
growth  would  need  statesmen.  There  was  less  knowledge 
then  than  now.  Professions  and  occupations  were  fewer, 
had  not  so  many  subdivisions.  In  the  rural  districts  ev- 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING   THE  BEST   SERVICE.    193 

ery  man  could  do  everything.  The  lawyer  tilled  his  farm 
in  the  hours  between  the  preparation  of  his  briefs,  or, 
more  truly,  tried  causes  in  the  intervals  of  his  agricultural 
pursuits.  That  there  was  such  a  thing  as  a  science  of 
government,  was  a  fact  that  those  men  forgot,  or,  rather, 
that  they  had  never  known  or  dreamed.  The  machinery 
for  the  composition  of  the  national  Legislature  was  pre- 
cisely what  had  always  been  used  for  the  composition  of 
the  State  Legislatures.  That  these  legislators  should  be 
chosen  by  the  people,  was  a  thing  assumed  by  all.  And 
that  they  should  be  kept  dependent  on  the  people,  by  be- 
ing elected  only  for  short  terms,  was  agreed  by  all. 

Even  then,  in  the  first  years  of  the  nation,  the  legislation 
in  Congress  needed  the  wisest  men  in  the  country.  There 
was  the  heavy  debt  to  be  funded  or  otherwise  arranged. 
Revenue  was  to  be  raised.  Courts  were  to  be  organized. 
The  whole  internal  machinery  of  a  new  government  was 
to  be  constructed.  The  whole  scheme  of  the  nation's  for- 
eign policy  was  to  be  decided.  Wise  men  were  needed  to 
deal  with  great  questions.  And  it  was  necessary,  too,  that 
the  men  who  carried  on  the  Government  should  give  time 
and  careful  thought  to  their  labors. 

But  if  the  best  men  in  the  country  were  then  needed, 
and  if  it  was  then  necessary  that  statesmen  should  give 
time  and  thought  to  the  nation's  affairs,  how  is  it  now  ? 
To  manage  well  a  railroad  of  a  hundred  miles  requires  the 
experience  of  years.  Theology,  medicine,  law,  need  the 
labors  of  a  lifetime  to  begin  to  learn  them.  Science  is  al- 
most newly  created  in  a  decade,  and  its  teachers  must  be 
its  most  zealous  students,  or  they  soon  become  only  its  land- 
marks. A  blacksmith  or  a  carpenter  takes  years  to  learn 
his  trade,  as  it  is  called,  before  he  is  trusted  to  do  the  com- 
monest bits  of  work.  And  he  is  ever  inventing  new  ma- 

9 


194  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

chinery,  new  ways  of  doing  new  things  ;  he  is  always  learn- 
ing. There  is  no  ordinary  profession  or  occupation,  that 
does  not  call  for  study  and  training  before  a  man  is  allow- 
ed to  practice  it,  and  in  which  a  man  does  not  need  the 
experience  of  a  whole  life.  But  our  men  of  public  affairs 
we  select,  in  the  large  majority  of  instances,  without  any 
reference  to  the  point  of  whether  they  have  or  have  not, 
for  the  work  they  are  to  do,  either  experience  or  knowl- 
edge. 

The  science  of  legislation,  or  rather  the  basis  upon  which 
a  science  of  legislation  is  yet  to  be  built,  is  wider  now 
than  ever.  What  is  there  that  a  law -maker  would  not 
need  at  times  to  know?  He  has  to  deal  with  matters  of 
finance,  commerce,  manufactures,  crime,  pauperism,  the  re- 
lations of  capital  and  labor,  the  control  of  great  corpora- 
tions, armies  and  navies,  harbors,  railroads,  and  canals.  On 
all  these  matters  he  will  need  knowledge.  That  knowl- 
edge he  can  perhaps  get  from  other  men  who  have  it. 
But  there  is  a  special  science  of  his  own  profession,  which 
he  has  yet  to  make  for  himself,  and  that  is  the  science  of 
the  actual  working  of  laws.  Some  men  have  an  idea  that 
you  can  make  a  nation  rich,  good,  or  wise,  by  a  statute. 
Perhaps  you  can.  It  is  certain  you  can  by  statutes  greatly 
help  or  hinder  a  nation  in  reaching  those  results.  But  by 
what  statutes  ?  Simple  resolutions  will  not  be  enough. 
One  of  the  great  books  of  the  world  is  written  on  the 
"Spirit  of  Laws."  But  there  is  yet  to  be  learned  the 
science  of  laws,  which  will  concern  itself,  not  with  vague 
theories,  but  with  the  actual  results  upon  the  life  and 
health  of  nations,  which  particular  measures  of  legislation 
are,  by  actual  experiment,  ascertained  to  have.  And  it  is 
this  science  which  we  must  give  our  public  servants  an 
opportunity  to  learn — rather  to  create.  The  days  of  im- 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING   THE   BEST  SERVICE.    195 

aginative  theorizing  are  over.  In  every  other  department 
of  human  thought  and  action  we  know  that  men  must  in- 
vestigate and  experiment.  The  chemist  no  longer  satisfies 
himself  with  mere  words  about  essences  and  relations. 
He  must  weigh  and  measure,  learn  what  these  substances 
in  nature  are,  and  how  they  work  on  one  another.  The 
student  in  medical  science  will  now  content  himself  with 
no  silly  saw,  such  as  "Like  cures  like,"  but  will  find  by 
actual  experiment  "  what  cures  what."  Can  it  be  other- 
wise with  the  men  who  are  to  gain  any  knowledge  of  the 
science  of  government  ?  To  expect  that  a  man  should  be 
able  to  do  good  work  in  -the  Government  service  without 
that  especial  training  which  can  only  be  had  by  the  study 
and  experience  of  a  life — that  he  can  be  a  legislator,  because 
he  is  a  banker  or  a  lawyer,  because  he  has  read  some  books 
on  finance,  or  constitutional  Jaw,  or  on  political  economy — 
is  as  absurd  as  to  suppose  that  a  man  could  build  and  nav- 
igate a  war -steamer  because  he  knows  something  about 
iron  and  coal  mines.  To  interpret  the  laws  as  they  are, 
after  they  are  made,  requires  a  life  training.  To  make  our 
laws  as  they  should  be,  we  take  men  without  any  training 
at  all,  and  we  dismiss  them  from  the  public  service  before 
they  can  gain  even  a  little  experience. 

Now,  how  are  we  to  secure  that  our  public  servants  shall 
gain  this  training  for  the  special  work  of  their  offices, 
which  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  them  to  have  ? 

In  the  first  place,  as  has  been  argued  before,  public  ser- 
vants must  have  duties  of  only  one  class.  Especially  the 
men  in  the  executive  administration  should  have  nothing 
to  do  with  general  legislation ;  and  the  men  who  have  to 
do  with  the  general  legislation — the  deliberating  and  de- 
ciding as  to  the  policy  of  all  departments  of  the  Govern- 
ment— should  not  meddle  with  the  details  of  administration 


196  A. TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

of  any  one  department.  This  is  a  principle  so  rudimen- 
tary, so  thoroughly  in  accord  with  the  experience  of  all 
men,  that  argument  would  seem  needless.  The  great  vice 
of  the  present  English  Government  system  is  the  neglect 
of  administration  by  the  heads  of  departments,  and  the 
incessant  meddling  with  details  of  administration  by  the 
Legislature. 

Assuming,  then,  that  each  public  servant  is  to  have  only 
duties  of  one  class,  clearly  the  system  should  be  so  framed 
as  to  give  the  official  every  possible  inducement  to  give 
his  whole  time  and  thought  to  the  work  of  his  office,  and 
to  nothing  else. 

This  term  system  gives  every  inducement  to  every  pub- 
lic official  to  give  his  time  and  his  best  efforts  to  the  car- 
rying of  elections.  We  have  tried  it  thoroughly.  That  is 
the  one  result  it  has  had.  It  has  converted  this  great 
army  of  public  officers  into  one  great  election  machinery. 
We  make  it  an  impossibility  for  them  to  get  training;  we 
make  it  a  certainty  that  they  will  never  get  it. 

Was  there  ever  any  system,  devised  for  any  purpose,  so 
ingeniously  designed  to  defeat  its  own  ends  ? 

Even  yet  we  have  not  reached  the  vital  defect. 

If  we  ever  wish  to  get  good  work  from  our  officials  or 
have  them  become  the  masters  of  their  professions,  we  must 
so  frame  our  system  that  every  man  in  the  Government 
service,  from  the  top  to  the  bottom,  will  have  everything 
to  gain  from  simply  doing  the  work  of  his  office  well — 
everything  to  lose  from  simply  doing  the  work  of  his  office 
ill.  Each  one  of  them  must  have  before  his  eyes  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  career  for  life  in  this  Government  service,  with 
the  possibility  of  gaining  the  greatest  prizes,  the  highest 
positions,  in  that  Government  service,  if  he  there  shows 
himself  the  best  man. 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING   THE  BEST  SERVICE.    197 

Lord  Bacon  says,  "To  take  a  soldier  without  ambition 
is  to  pull  off  his  spurs."  That  is  precisely  what  we  do 
with  all  our  public  servants.  We  say  to  them  :  "  If  you 
enter  our  service,  leave  hope  and  ambition  behind  you. 
Serve  some  other  master.  Give  your  time  and  thought  and 
labor  to  party,  and  not  to  us.  Whether  you  do  our  work 
well  or  ill,  it  will  give  you  no  claim  upon  us.  At  the  end 
of  four  years,  if  the  party  men  have  found  you  useful,  they 
may  give  you  another  four  years'  pay  from  our  Treasury. 
But  we  promise  you  nothing.  Win  your  spurs  elsewhere, 
not  here." 

Every  honest  trade,  or  business,  or  profession  gives  to 
honest  men  who  do  honest  work  the  possibility  of  a  career 
for  life.  We  must  put  our  public  servants  on  that  same 
footing,  if  we  ever  hope  to  have  from  them  good  work,  or 
have  the  Government  service  anything  other  than  it  now 
is — a  disgrace  to  the  nation. 

This  clearing  out  of  all  offices,  or  of  any  one  office,  at 
the  end  of  four  years,  or  of  one  year,  or  for  any  cause  oth- 
er than  for  inefficient  service,  is  most  disastrous.  The  ser- 
vice must  have  permanence.  Men  must  have  the  chance, 
which  they  have  in  other  professions,  of  rising  to  the  very 
highest  positions,  as  the  reward  of  great  work.  The  whole 
point  of  all  the  discussions  on  Civil  Service  Reform  is, 
that  you  must  have  this  permanence  in  the  service  for  the 
subordinates.  But  the  plan  is,  as  usually  stated,  that  this 
permanence  is  to  be  for  the  subordinates  only,  and  the 
heads  of  departments  must  still  come  in  and  go  out  on  the 
old  term  system.  That  is  most  unwise.  Do  we  say  to 
men  in  our  army, "  Promotion  you  may  have  up  to  a  cer- 
tain point,  but  our  general-in-chief  we  shall  always  select 
from  the  clergy  ?"  The  highest  places  of  all  in  the  service 
must  be  the  prizes  open  to  all  men  in  the  service.  In  that 


198  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

way  only  can  you  spur  men  to  the  highest  exertions.  In 
no  other  way  have  men  ever  been  able  to  get  any  other 
than  poor  work.  If  we  have  our  departments  full  of  clerks 
who  can  never  be  anything  but  clerks,  we  shall  never  have 
anything  but  the  work  of  clerks,  mere  routine  hack-work 
from  men  who  are  devoid  of  ambition.  And  should  the 
men  in  the  highest  places  in  Government  be  the  only  ones 
devoid  of  knowledge  and  training  ? 

If,  then,  the  argument  thus  far  be  sound,  if  we  assume 
that  officers  should  hold  their  offices  during  good  behavior, 
as  the  phrase  goes,  what  shall  we  call  good  behavior  ? 

The  Constitution  provided  in  terms  that  the  President 
should  be  removed  on  "  conviction  of  treason,  bribery,  or 
other  high  crimes  or  misdemeanors."  By  implication,  as 
lawyers  will  agree,  this  takes  away  the  power  of  removal 
for  mere  incompetency.  And  what  was  made  by  the  Con- 
stitution the  express  law  as  to  the  President,  has  been  uni- 
formly the  practice  as  to  other  officials.  The  idea  and  the 
practice  among  our  public  civil  officials  has  been,  that  any 
officer,  before  his  office  is  taken  from  him,  must  be  con- 
victed of  some  scandalous  crime,  on  a  trial,  such  as  crimi- 
nals have  in  a  criminal  court. 

This  idea  comes  from  the  old  principle  under  which  of- 
fices are  held  to  be  property.  In  England,  in  law,  offices 
were  property,  which  could  be  acquired  by  descent.  With 
us,  in  practice,  offices  have  been  property,  which  could  be 
acquired  by  purchase.  The  English  theory  and  the  Amer- 
ican practice  can  hardly  be  held  to  be  the  sound  principle 
for  an  efficient  government  service.  No  argument  will  be 
wasted  to  the  point  that  these  public  offices  belong  only  to 
the  people,  that  they  are  trusts  to  be  given  and  taken  away 
with  a  view  only  to  the  people's  interests,  and  that  they 
are  in  no  sense  property ;  that  the  officer  has  no  right 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE   BEST  SERVICE.    199 

whatever,  of  any  kind,  in  the  mere  holding  of  the  office. 
He  is  to  hold  it  so  long  only  as  the  people's  interests  are 
best  served  by  having  him  hold  it. 

Any  public  officer,  then,  should  be  removed  the  instant 
he  fails,  for  any  reason  whatever,  to  do  his  work  in  the 
most  perfect  manner.  Hold  him  "responsible,"  as  men 
are  elsewhere  held  responsible,  not  for  good  intentions  (let 
them  be  used  for  their  proper  paving  purposes),  but  for 
accomplishing  results.  Add  to  the  list  of  crimes,  for 
which  public  officials  may  be  removed,  the  crime  of  fail- 
ure. Can  we  have  any  efficient  work  under  any  other 
system  ? 

One  point  farther.  We  must  so  arrange  our  system  as 
to  have  thorough  supervision  of  every  official  by  some  one 
man  or  body  of  men,  whose  especial  duty  it  shall  be  to 
make  that  supervision,  and  who  shall  be  held  responsible 
for  making  it.  Nearly  every  breach  of  trust  in  private 
life  comes  from  the  lack  of  proper  supervision,  from  leav- 
ing large  amounts  of  money  or  property  in  men's  hands 
for  long  periods,  with  no  examination  by  other  men.  The 
temptation  is  too  strong.  If  men  were  sure  that  any  mis- 
use by  them  of  property  intrusted  to  their  care  would  be 
surely  and  quickly  found  out,  such  misuse  would  almost 
never  happen.  So  it  is  with  public  trusts.  And  how  is 
it  possible  to  have  thorough  supervision,  with  officials  who 
shift  from  one  day  to  another,  and  who  are  driven  to  give 
their  time  to  other  affairs  ? 

The  points  to  be  examined  in  this  chapter  were  stated 
to  be,  how  we  are  to  secure  that  our  public  servants  shall — 

1.  Do  the  best  work  within  their  knowledge. 

2.  Have  the  knowledge  how  to  do  the  best  work. 
And  these  points  are  the  utmost  that  we  need  to  secure, 

or  that  we  can  secure  under  any  plan  of  government. 


200  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

If  this  argument  has  any  soundness  at  all,  it  is  clear  that 
neither  of  these  points  can  be  secured  under  the  system  of 
terms  of  years. 

Let  us  go  a  step  farther. 

As  far  as  the  tenure  of  office  is  concerned,  there  are 
only  three  systems  to  be  considered : 

1.  The  holding  for  the  uncertain  term  of  life. 

2.  The  holding  for  the  certain  term  of  years. 

3.  The  holding  so  long  as  the  work  in  the  office  is  well 
done. 

Which  of  these,  as  a  system,  is  the  most  reasonable  ? 

Common  sense  and  experience  both  teach  us,  that  there 
should  be  in  every  government  machinery,  as  to  every  sin- 
gle office,  high  or  low,  executive  or  legislative,  some  pro- 
vision for  the  removal  of  the  officer  from  his  office.  Then 
the  only  remaining  practical  question  is,  whether  the  mere 
time  of  this  removal  shall  be  decided  by  death,  by  the 
movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  or  by  the  conduct  of 
the  officer. 

Experience  shows — 

1.  That  the  system  of  having  officers  hold  so  long  as 
they  do  good  service,  makes  it  as  nearly  certain,  as  any 
system  can,  that  we  shall  have  good  service. 

2.  That  the  system  of  having  officers  hold  until  death, 
makes  it  entirely  uncertain  whether  we  shall  have  good 
or  bad  service. 

3.  That  the  astronomical  system  makes  it  utterly  certain 
that  we  shall  have  a  bad  service. 

We  come  to  another  point. 

In  late  years  we  have  had  in  our  government  affairs  a 
vast  deal  of  corruption.  And  no  one  can  estimate  too 
highly  the  injuries  that  it  has  done  the  people. 

But  as  far  as  the  mere  moneyed  interests  of  the  peo- 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.    201 

pie  at  large  are  concerned,  what  we  have  suffered  from  in 
our  public  servants  has  been  not  so  much  their  corruption 
as  their  ignorance,  their  lack  of  training  for  their  special 
work.  The  corruption  we  have  among  our  Government 
officials  generally  concerns  the  moneyed  interests  of  pri- 
vate individuals  and  corporations.  Bad  enough  it  is.  But 
as  to  matters  that  concern  the  large  general  interests  of 
the  whole  people,  our  legislators  and  other  public  officials 
have  ordinarily  good  intentions.  But  they  do  not  know 
what  the  interests  of  the  people  really  demand.  If  they 
did,  they  would  gladly  do  what  is  right  and  wise.  Of 
course  they  must  work  for  their  party.  We  compel  them 
to  that.  But,  in  the  few  and  short  intervals  of  time  when 
they  are  not  manipulating  elections,  they  would  really  wish 
to  give  us  some  good  legislation  and  good  administration, 
if  they  only  knew  how  to  do  it.  They  are  often  really 
able  men.  They  may  be  good  lawyers,  or  may  know  well 
some  business  that  they  have  followed  before  they  entered 
the  Government  service ;  but  they  have  no  especial  train- 
ing or  knowledge  for  the  work  they  are  to  do  there,  and 
that  training  and  knowledge  we  make  it  impossible  for 
them  to  get. 

But  whatever  may  be  the  real  dangers  under  our  sys- 
tem of  government,  the  great  fear  of  the  body  of  our  peo- 
ple is  the  fear  of  combinations  among  public  officials,  for 
the  purposes  of  tyranny  or  corruption. 

Certainly  we  have  not  avoided  that  evil  under  our  pres- 
ent system.  No  more  corrupt  or  more  powerful  combina- 
tions could  be  found  than  our  present  party  combinations. 

But,  as  far  as  concerns  any  wilful  misuse  by  public  ser- 
vants, for  any  motive,  of  the  power  in  their  hands,  the 
main  safeguard  of  the  people  always  must  lie  in  the  charac- 
ter of  the  men  who  are  selected  to  be  our  public  servants. 

9* 


202  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

If  we  get  in  the  public  service  our  best  men,  men-  who 
have  been  tried  and  proved,  men  who  have  been  through 
life  faithful  to  all  the  trusts  they  have  ever  held,  and  if  we 
then  leave  them  free  to  learn  their  work  and  to  do  it  as 
well  as  they  know  how,  we  can  rest  content  that  no  great 
evil  will  befall  the  State.  We  have  tried  everything  as  a 
protection  against  misconduct  in  office.  And  what  is 
there  that  we  have  found  to  be  of  any  use  ?  We  have  had 
statutes  for  the  punishment  of  bribery  and  corruption,  and 
the  system  of  short  terms.  The  two  together  have'  been 
of  no  avail.  We  have  tried  the  system  of  parties.  That 
has  given  us  simply  a  powerful  tyranny. 

Yet  there  have  been  times  in  the  history  of  the  English 
House  of  Commons  when  its  members  were  above  any 
suspicion  of  dishonesty.  Would  any  one  have  ventured 
to  offer  Burke  or  Pitt  a  thousand  guineas  for  pressing  a 
local  bill  in  Parliament?  Imagine  a  man  proposing  to 
Hamilton,  or  John  Adams,  or  Mr.  Calhoun,  or  Mr.  Webster 
to  pay  stock  certificates  or  bank-notes  for  votes  in  Con- 
gress !  With  men  like  those  in  the  Legislature,  we  were 
as  safe  against  bribery  and  corruption  as  with  John  Mar- 
shall on  the  bench.  Does  any  one  believe  that  men  of 
that  stamp,  if  we  could  secure  them  in  the  public  service, 
would,  so  soon  as  ever  they  set  foot  in  legislative  halls, 
become  thieves,  and  belie  the  history  of  their  whole  lives  ? 

We  know  that  that  cannot  be.  Take  the  great  names 
that  we  have  had  in  our  judicial  history — Marshall,  Kent, 
Curtis,  Shaw,  and  Story — was  it  any  fear  of  punishment 
or  of  removal  from  office,  that  made  those  men  faithful  to 
their  public  trusts  ? 

Each  one  of  those  men  knew  that  he  needed  to  look  to 
no  party  caucus,  to  no  powerful  men,  for  his  continuance 
in  office.  He  could  hold  his  place  to  the  end  of  his  life, 


SECURITIES  FOR  GETTING  THE  BEST  SERVICE.    203 

so  he  was  only  honest.  He  knew  that  so  long  as  he  gave 
able  and  upright  decisions  he  would  keep  the  respect  and 
confidence  of  all  men.  He  knew  (if  he  ever  thought  of 
the  point)  that  if  he  gave  dishonest  decisions,  there  would 
be,  in  sober  fact,  the  least  chance  in  the  world  of  an  im- 
peachment or  punishment.  But  he  knew,  too,  that  sus- 
picion would  be  certain,  and  that  his  good  name  would  be 
as  certainly  ruined  by  suspicion  as  by  proof  and  conviction 
of  all  the  crimes  on  the  statute-book  in  all  the  courts  of 
the  land.  But  no  one  of  those  men  carefully  weighed  in 
his  mind  the  point  how  far  he  could  be  corrupt,  and  yet 
escape  an  impeachment,  or  how  much  favor  he  could  show 
to  this  or  that  suitor,  and  still  save  his  reputation. 

There  are  men  in  the  world  who  can  be  trusted. 

The  natural  inclination  of  any  upright  man,  who  has 
earned  the  confidence  of  his  fellow-men,  is  to  do  right  and 
justice.  And  to  secure  honesty  in  our  public  servants, 
that  is  the  main  point  which  we  must  look  to,  the  securing 
for  the  Government  service  our  best  men. 

To  secure  that,  as  has  been  seen,  we  must  destroy  party ; 
for  that  alone  it  is  that  keeps  the  best  men  out  of  our 
public  service. 

And  to  reach  that  end,  or  either  of  the  ends  here  urged 
as  desirable,  we  must  abolish  the  term  system. 

But  it  may  be  that,  as  to  particular  departments  of  the 
Government,  there  are  special  reasons  why  the  conclusions 
here  reached  are  unsound.  There  are,  too,  some  points, 
not  of  fundamental  importance,  relating  to  the  constitution 
and  operation  of  those  departments,  which  seem  to  me  to 
deserve  examination. 

These  matters  will  next  be  considered. 


204  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE    JUDICIARY. 

HAVING  considered  some  general  principles  as  to  the 
selection  and  the  tenure  of  all  officials  under  Government, 
we  have  then  to  consider  such  special  points  as  concern 
officers  in  the  different  branches  of  the  service. 

And  first,  what  are  the  points  that  particularly  concern 
the  judges,  the  officers  who  have  to  do  with  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  ? 

The  argument  thus  far  shows,  if  it  shows  anything,  that 
judges,  of  all  men,  should  hold  their  offices  during  good 
hehavior.  If  they  are  to  have  fear  or  favor  of  no  men, 
they  must  be  independent  of  all  men,  except  that  they 
must  be  punishable  for  misconduct. 

Many  men  agree  to  that.  But  the  men  who  would  con- 
cede that  point  generally  think  that  judges  should  not  be 
chosen  by  popular  election. 

If  parties  and  party  power  were  destroyed,  my  belief  is 
that  our  judges  would  be  best  elected  by  popular  vote,  un- 
der the  same  methods  used  for  the  election  of  a  chief  ex- 
ecutive and  members  of  the  Legislature,  instead  of  being 
appointed.  I  do  not  regard  the  point  as  a  very  material 
one — if  they  have  the  tenure  during  good  behavior.  We 
should  in  either  way  be  very  sure  of  good  men. 

But  with  party  removed,  I  should  feel  more  certain  of 
getting  the  best  men  on  a  popular  vote,  than  under  any 
system  of  appointment. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  ordinary  men  in  the  community 


THE  JUDICIARY.  205 

cannot  judge  of  the  qualifications  of  a  judge.  That  is 
true.  But  the  laymen  in  the  people  could  not  fail  to  be 
guided  by  the  opinions  of  members  of  .the  legal  profession 
as  to  the  qualifications  of  particular  men  in  that  profes- 
sion. Indeed,  it  is  the  members  of  the  bar  who  make  the 
reputation  in  the  community  of  all  the  men  of  their  own 
profession.  The  laymen  seldom  form  opinions  of  their  own 
on  those  matters.  They  get  their  opinions,  consciously  or 
unconsciously,  from  the  lawyers.  If  we  had,  in  form,  a 
popular  election  of  judges,  it  would  be,  in  substance,  an 
election  by  the  bar,  having,  however,  always,  in  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  people  at  large,  a  complete  security 
against  any  spirit  of  clique  which  might  grow  up  among 
the  lawyers  themselves. 

Moreover,  the  judges  on  the  bench  have  to  pass  on  the 
acts  of  the  Legislature  and  of  executive  officials.  It  seems 
wise,  under  these  circumstances,  that  they  should  not  have 
the  possibility  of  reward  or  advancement  at  the  hands  of 
either  the  Legislature  or  the  Chief  Executive.  Have  them 
subject  to  supervision  and  removal  at  the  hands  of  the 
Legislature,  as  they  have  always  been.  But,  aside  from 
that,  have  judges  so  placed  that  they  depend  for  further 
advancement  on  their  reputation  among  the  citizens  at 
large. 

There  are,  no  doubt,  faults  in  our  methods,  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  But  they  do  not  concern  the 
main  purpose  of  this  examination,  and  will,  therefore,  not 
be  here  considered. 


206  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

EXECUTIVE    ADMINISTRATION. 

WE  have  next  to  examine  the  points  which  especially 
concern  the  executive  administration  in  our  Government. 

It  is  the  experience  of  all  mankind  that,  in  order  to 
have  anything  like  vigor  or  system  in  executive  adminis- 
tration of  any  kind,  it  is  absolutely  essential  to  have  the 
responsibility  of  one  man.  That  is  the  special  lesson 
which  we  have  from  English  executive  administration.  If 
we  have  the  responsibility  of  many  men  of  a  party,  we 
have  no  responsibility  at  all.  We  must,  then,  if  we  wish 
our  executive  administration  to  be  harmonious,  systematic, 
or  efficient,  have  one  man  at  the  head  of  it  all,  and  hold 
that  one  man  responsible  for  it  all.  And  we  must  hold 
him  responsible,  not  for  good  intentions,  but  for  great  re- 
sults— for  the  perfect  working  of  the  entire  machinery. 

This  same  point,  too,  must  run  through  the  whole  ser- 
vice ;  each  man  at  the  head  of  a  department  or  of  a  minor 
office  must  be  held  responsible  for  the  perfect  working  of 
that  whole  department  or  office. 

The  responsibility,  too,  of  public  officers  must  be  a  re- 
sponsibility, so  far  as  may  be,  always  to  one  man.  Other- 
wise the  responsibility  will  not  be  steadily  and  evenly  en- 
forced. 

The  responsibility  must  be,  too,  so  far  as  may  be,  re- 
sponsibility for  only  one  class  of  work.  Otherwise  we  de- 
stroy the  possibility  of  thorough  training;  and  we  make 
it  certain  that  we  shall  have  great  confusion. 


EXECUTIVE  ADMINISTRATION.  207 

To  sum  up  this  branch  of  the  case,  then,  if  we  wish  vigor 
and  system  in  our  executive  service,  we  must  have  through- 
out, from  the  top  to  the  bottom : 

Responsibility — 

1.  Of  one  man; 

2.  To  one  man ; 

3.  For  one  work. 

But  then  comes  another  point. 

We  cannot  rightly  hold  one  man  responsible  for  having 
work  done  by  other  men,  unless  we  give  him  the  power, 
to  select  the  men  under  him  for  their  ability,  and  to  re- 
move them  for  their  failure,  to  do  good  work.  We  must 
give  every  official  the  appointment  and  removal  of  his 
own  subordinates. 

Make  that  the  law.  Give  our  Chief  Executive  any  name 
we  wish — call  him  a  president  or  a  king,  a  sultan  or  a 
head-centre — but  hold  him  responsible  for  the  thorough 
working  of  the  entire  executive  administration  under  him. 
Give  him,  then,  as  we  must  if  we  look  for  so  much  at  his 
hands,  the  appointment  and  removal  of  all  his  heads  of 
departments.  He  must  hold  each  one  of  those  heads  of 
departments  responsible  for  the  thorough  working  of  his 
whole  department.  Give  each  head  of  a  department,  then, 
the  absolute  appointment  and  removal  of  all  heads  of  sub- 
ordinate offices.  And  so  it  should  be  down  to  the  bottom. 

What  is  the  result  that  must  follow  from  such  a  sys- 
tem, and  which  it  has  always  brought  ? 

Every  official,  knowing  that  he  will  himself  be  removed 
if  the  work  to  be  done  by  the  men  under  him  is  not  done 
well,  will  see  to  it  that  the  work  of  those  men  is  done  well. 
He  will  be  driven  to  enforce  the  utmost  efficiency  and 
honesty  from  every  one  of  his  subordinates.  His  holding 
his  place  will  depend  on  what  they  do,  as  well  as  on  what 


208  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

he  does  himself.  So  it  will  be  with  every  official  from  the 
top  to  the  bottom  of  the  service.  We  shall  make  it  a 
matter  of  vital  necessity,  as  far  as  any  system  can  so  make 
it,  that  every  official  will  not  only  do  his  own  work  well, 
but  will  make  other  men  do  their  work  well.  Instead  of 
giving  them  all  one  common  interest  to  carry  elections,  we 
give  them  all  one  common  interest  to  carry  wise  govern- 
ment measures.  Instead  of  putting  them  under  pressure 
to  work  for  party,  we  put  them  under  pressure  to  work  for 
the  people. 

And,  of  course,  the  Chief  Executive  officer,  as  well  as  all 
his  subordinates,  must  be  "  responsible."  Of  all  men,  he 
cannot  be  exempted  from  the  rules  of  common  sense  and 
experience. 

To  whom,  then,  shall  the  Chief  Executive  be  "  responsi- 
ble," and  how  shall  his  responsibility  be  enforced  ? 

He  must  be  responsible  to  the  supreme  supervising  body 
— which  we  call  a  Legislature — and  his  responsibility  must 
be  enforced  by  giving  them  the  direct  power  of  removing 
him  summarily,  without  a  hearing,  if  they  think  the  pub- 
lic interests  demand  it,  for  any  reason  which  to  them  may 
seem  wise.  But  for  this  removal  there  should  be  required 
a  two-thirds  vote.* 

To  make  a  further  security,  which  I  do  not  believe 
would  ever  be  needed  or  used,  we  could  give  to  the  Legis- 
lature the  same  power  of  removal  as  to  all  executive  offi- 
cials. 

*  This  two-thirds  vote  should  be,  as  I  think,  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the 
members  of  both  Houses  of  the  Legislature,  sitting,  for  this  purpose, 
in  one  body. 

I  cannot  see  the  wisdom  of  using  in  a  government,  for  any  one 
purpose,  the  concurrent  action  of  more  than  one  body  of  men.  It 
makes  conflicting  wills  and  divided  responsibility. 


EXECUTIVE   ADMINISTRATION.  209 

What,  then,  would  be  the  results  of  such  a  change  from 
our  present  system  ?  It  would  be  feared  by  some  men 
that  it  would  bring  great  dangers. 

Let  us  see  what  would  be  the  precise  changes  from  our 
present  system.  They  would  be  these : 

1.  We  take  from  the  Chief  Executive  any  voice  in  the 
appointment  and  removal  of  the  great  number  of  subordi- 
nate officials,  which  the  President  now  has. 

2.  We  give  to  him  the  power  of  appointing  and  re- 
moving his  heads  of  departments,  where  he  now  must  have 
the  consent  of  two-thirds  of  the  Senate. 

3.  For  any  misconduct  or  for  any  failure  on  his  part  to 
give  good  and  satisfactory  results,  he  may  himself  be  at 
once  removed. 

4.  If  not  removed  for  misconduct  or  inefficiency,  he  may 
hold  office  for  his  life. 

Is  it  not  clear  that,  under  a  system  so  modified,  there 
is  no  danger  to  be  feared  from  the  executive  ?  He  would 
then  be  more  thoroughly  under  control  than  he  now  is. 
As  the  system  is  now,  there  is  no  power  in  the  Government 
that  can  remove  him  for  action  which  may  be«  most  dis- 
astrous for  the  people,  so  long  as  he  is  only  honest.  There 
may  be  thousands  of  contingencies,  which  no  human  being 
can  possibly  foresee,  which  will  make  it  absolutely  vital 
for  the  nation's  interests  that  the  Chief  Executive  should 
be  removed  from  his  office  without  a  day's  delay.  Can 
there  be  a  doubt,  that  the  power  should  be  lodged  some- 
where to  remove  the  man  who  commands  our  armies  and 
navies  if  at  any  particular  time  he  shows  himself  to  be  un- 
fit for  doing  the  duties  of  his  office?  Did  any  one  ever 
hear  of  such  a  thing  as  insuring  efficient  work  from  a  man 
who  could  not  be  removed  from  his  place  instantly,  so 
soon  as,  for  any  reason,  he  failed  to  do  his  work  well  ?  Do 


210  A. TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

we  give  a  private  servant  a  long  trial  in  court,  before  we 
dismiss  him  for  incompetency  or  misconduct  ? 

This  "  responsibility  "  of  the  heads  of  executive  offices 
is  the  one  good  point  in  the  whole  English  Government. 
It  is  a  point  which,  without  doubt,  we  need  in  our  own 
system.  But  it  is  the  one  man  at  the  head  whom  we 
must  hold  "  responsible ;"  and  it  is  the  doing  of  his  own 
work  for  which  we  must  hold  him  responsible,  and  not 
work  to  be  done  in  Congress. 

And  can  anything  be  more  childish,  as  a  device  for  in- 
suring efficiency  on  the  part  of  a  president  or  a  king,  than 
to  remove  his  servants  ?  Remove  him,  if  our  executive  ad- 
ministration is  to  be  anything  but  a  bedlam. 

If  we  put  our  executive  under  such  a  system  as  this,  we 
shall  have  the  best  security  we  can  for  good  administra- 
tion. Under  our  present  system  we  have  no  security  for 
anything  at  all. 

As  far  as  I  can  see,  the  danger  to  be  feared  from  the 
executive  would  be  none  whatever.  What  could  a  Presi- 
dent do  for  harm,  if  he  has  no  control  of  the  purse  ?  This 
control  of«  the  purse  has  always  been  enough  to  bring  to 
his  knees  the  proudest  hereditary  king.  We  do  not,  in 
this  age,  need  stronger  safeguards  with  an  elected  Presi- 
dent. 

The  only  danger  to  be  feared  would  be  at  the  hands  of 
the  Legislature.  There  is  where  the  power  lies.  There 
would  be  the  only  source  of  danger. 

Can  the  Legislature,  then,  be  trusted  with  the  power 
they  would  then  have  ?  That  is  the  real  question  ;  and 
that  question  is  next  to  be  considered.* 

*  Much  discussion  has  been  had  of  late  as  to  the  method  of  elect- 
ing the  President.  It  is  pretty  generally  agreed  that  the  present  pro- 


EXECUTIVE  ADMINISTRATION.  211 

cedure  is  faulty,  and  many  plans  have  been  suggested  by  way  of 
modification. 

As  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  now  stand,  there  is  always  a 
possibility  of  a  failure  to  elect  which  may  cause  serious  difficulties. 
This  possibility  of  a  failure  to  elect,  under  the  present  machinery, 
if  political  parties  were  destroyed,  would  be  almost  a  certainty.  The 
only  point  that  makes  it  possible  to  use  the  present  system  is  that  the 
Electoral  College  merely  chooses  between  the  two  party  candidates, 
merely  registers  the  decrees  of  the  party  leaders. 

No  body  of  men  in  government  machinery  can  be  of  any  real  ser- 
vice unless  they  meet  in  one  place,  where  they  can  have  an  inter- 
change of  minds,  where  they  can  act  together  and  understandingly. 
The  Electoral  College,  if  it  is  really  to  act  on  its  own  will  and  judg- 
ment, should  meet,  deliberate,  and  vote,  at  one  time  and  in  one  place. 
And  if  party  rule  were  destroyed,  then  the  Electoral  College  would 
become  a  real  working  assembly,  of  real  use  in  the  State.  Let  the 
College  be  the  judge  of  the  elections  and  qualifications  of  its  own 
members,  as  either  House  of  Congress  is.  We  can  trust  our  electors 
with  that  power  as  well  as  we  can  our  Senators  and  Representatives. 
If  parties  and  party  machinery  were  destroyed,  then  we  should  send 
to  this  Electoral  College  our  best  men.  They  would  have  a  real 
work  to  do,  and  they  would  do  it  well.  And  in  the  absence  of  par- 
ties and  party  machinery,  it  is  clear  that  an  Electoral  College  is  the 
only  way  in  which  we  could  have  anything  like  a  choice  of  a  chief 
magistrate,  or  of  any  official,  by  the  whole  people. 


212  A  TRUE   KEPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE     LEGISLATURE. 

To  the  minds  of  some  men,  a  legislature  is,  it  would  seem, 
nothing  but  a  bulwark  against  tyranny  and  usurpation. 

But  this  is  not  so  at  all  times.  When  any  people  be- 
gins the  struggle  for  the  right  to  spend  their  own  money 
and  choose  their  own  rulers,  they  are  driven  to  combi- 
nation ;  and  usually  they  find,  or  form,  an  assembly  of 
some  kind,  which  becomes  the  mainspring  of  revolution. 
This  assembly  in  most  instances  afterward  becomes  a  leg- 
islature. Naturally,  therefore,  men  come  to  think  that  the 
main  function  of  a  legislature  is  to  conquer  and  preserve 
freedom. 

But  when  a  people  has  once  gained  its  freedom,  when 
it  has  thoroughly  established  its  right  to  choose  for  itself 
the  men  who  are  to  manage  its  public  affairs,  then  this 
function  of  a  legislature  is  gone/  Then  a  legislature  be- 
comes properly  nothing  but  a  body  of  men  chosen  by  the 
people  to  exercise  the  supreme  control  over  all  its  govern- 
ment affairs. 

From  the  fact,  too,  that  there  has  been  in  English  his- 
tory a  continued  conflict  between  the  House  of  Commons 
and  the  Crown,  men  come  to  think  that  in  any  govern- 
ment such  a  conflict  is  unavoidable,  that  there  is  necessa- 
rily, at  times,  a  contest  for  supremacy  or  equality  between 
the  Legislature  and  the  Executive.  But  that  need  not  be 
so.  Where  you  have  a  hereditary  king,  there  you  cer- 
tainly do  have  always  an  element  of  discord.  A  heredi- 


THE  LEGISLATURE.  213 

tary  king  certainly  will  at  times  try  to  assert  his  own  will 
for  his  own  purposes.  The  Crown  encroaches.  A  House 
of  Commons,  then,  must  be  still  a  bulwark  of  liberty.  But 
when  hereditary  power  is  destroyed,  when  the  Chief  Exec- 
utive, as  well  as  the  members  of  the  Legislature,  is  chosen 
by  the  people  because  he  is  a  man  fit  for  his  place,  then 
this  need  of  never-ending  war  is  gone.  Then  we  can  have, 
and  we  should  have,  harmonious  co-operation  between  all 
officers,  executive  as  well  as  legislative,  for  the  highest  in- 
terests of  the  people.  Contest  can  then  cease. 

Something  analogous  to  a  conflict  between  a  king  and  a 
popular  assembly  is  always  possible,  too,  where  parties  still 
have  a  vigorous  existence,  when  there  chances  to  be  an  Ex- 
ecutive belonging  to  one  party,  and  a  majority  of  the  Leg- 
islature belonging  to  the  other.  In  that  abnormal  state 
of  things  we  often  have  contests  for  place,  more  bitter  than 
have  ever  been  the  honest  contests  for  liberty. 

But  when  this  monster,  party,  is  destroyed,  then  this 
never-ending  strife  for  power  between  men  in  high  places, 
for  their  own  purposes,  can  end.  Then  we  can  have  a  gov- 
ernment instead  of  a  bear-garden.  Public  officers  can  then 
become  public  servants.  Affairs  can  then  run  in  their  nat- 
ural channels. 

When  this  state  of  things  comes ;  when  we  once  begin 
to  operate  our  Government  merely  for  the  purpose  of  hav- 
ing certain  w<3rk  accomplished  in  the  best  and  cheapest 
way,  then  what  is  the  place  of  a  legislature,  and  how  is  it 
to  do  its  work  ? 

Here,  too,  some  men  have  an  idea  that  the  great  work 
of  a  legislature  is  to  make  laws,  as  it  is  called — that  is,  to 
lay  down  the  rules  that  govern  the  descent  and  purchase 
of  property,  the  rights  of  individuals,  and  their  remedies 
for  those  rights  in  the  courts.  And  some  of  us  even  go 


214  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

so  far  as  to  think  that  the  main  work  the  Legislature  has 
before  it  is  to  make  men  good,  to  supervise  their  morals 
and  their  religion. 

As  far  as  making  men  moral  or  religious  is  concerned, 
any  attempts  to  accomplish  these  very  desirable  ends  by 
statutes  or  resolutions  have  thus  far*not  been  crowned  with 
success.  There  is  a  mistake  in  the  method.  And  even 
as  to  the  rights  and  remedies  of  individuals,  every  lawyer 
knows  that  nearly  all  the  law  we  have  is  law  which  has 
been  made  by  judges,  and  not  legislatures.  And  strange 
as  it  may  sound  to  some  unprofessional  ears,  it  is  yet  true, 
that  the  time  of  our  courts  is  in  a  great  measure  spent 
really  in  undoing  legislation,  in  efforts  to  protect  individ- 
uals against  the  injustice  that  would  result  from  follow- 
ing the  letter  of  statutes,  and  the  arbitrary  rules  which 
have  in  old  times  been  laid  down  by  courts  themselves. 
As  far  as  concerns  the  regulation  of  the  ordinary  rights  of 
person  and  property,  it  would  be  much  better  if  the  Legis- 
lature would  let  those  matters  alone  altogether,  if  it  would 
leave  those  matters  to  the  judges,  if  it  were  understood  to 
be  the  law  of  the  land  that  the  judges  could  make  new 
law,  could  depart  from  the  old  precedents  when  those  prec- 
edents became  antiquated,  or  for  any  reason  worked  injus- 
tice. Law,  like  medicine,  should  be  administered  by  men 
who  make  it  a  study,  subject,  as  all  other  affairs  in  the  State 
should  be,  to  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  Legislature. 

The  real  work  for  a  legislature  in  a  real  government, 
which  is  constructed  and  managed  on  common-sense  prin- 
ciples, is  this  —  to  exercise  over  all  public  officials  a  su- 
preme supervision  and  control.  Supervision  and  control, 
and  not  the  originating  of  measures  of  administrative  re- 
form, is  their  proper  province.  In  a  rightly  arranged  sys- 
tem of  government,  where  all  the  officials  throughout  make 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  215 

their  official  work  the  profession  of  their  lives,  to  which 
they  give  their  whole  time  and  thought,  which  they  there- 
fore know  better  than  other  men,  the  schemes  for  admin- 
istrative reform,  and  for  practical  measures  in  the  govern- 
ment work,  would  naturally  and  almost  invariably  come 
from  the  men  in  the  different  special  departments.  Ev- 
erything that  these  specialists  in  the  different  departments 
should  devise  and  propose  would,  if  it  called  for  the  spend- 
ing of  more  money,  or  for  any  great  change  in  the  meth- 
ods of  working,  be  submitted  to  the  Legislature,  and  would 
be  by  the  Legislature  approved  and  authorized.  But  in 
the  vast  number  of  instances  that  would  be  all  that  the 
Legislature  would  do. 

The  English  House  of  Commons,  our  own  Congress, 
and  all  our  State  Legislatures  try  to  do  more  than  that : 
they  try  to  originate  elaborate  schemes  of  administration, 
and  to  arrange  the  details  of  government  work.  That  is 
a  mistake  that  comes  from  the  lack  of  system  which  runs 
through  these  two  forms  of  government,  from  the  fact  that 
neither  the  legislative  nor  the  executive  departments,  either 
in  Great  Britain  or  here,  are  in  the  hands  of  men  who  give 
their  entire  time  to  one  work — who  know  more  about  that 
one  work  than  other  men.  The  members  of  the  Legis- 
lature do,  in  the  vast  number  of  instances,  know  as  much 
about  matters  of  administration  as  the  executive  officers 
who  are  specially  charged  with  the  care  of  those  matters. 

As  soon,  however,  as  the  officers  in  different  depart- 
ments should  become  men  of  a  profession,  and  should  in 
that  profession  have  more  thorough  knowledge  than  other 
men,  then  the  body  of  the  Legislature  would  become  what 
it  should  be  —  a  supervising  committee  —  which  would 
represent  the  whole  people,  and  for  them  would  simply 
regulate  and  control  all  this  vast  government  work.  This 


216  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

supervising  committee  would  hear  the  reports  from  the 
Chief  Executive  of  work  already  done  in  the  different  de- 
partments of  the  Government,  and  of  money  expended ; 
it  would  then  listen  to  his  plans  for  new  work  to  be  done ; 
these  plans  would  be  submitted  in  the  form  of  careful 
statements,  giving  accurate  details  of  the  work  proposed  and 
the  money  it  is  to  cost.  When  a  private  individual  is  to 
build  a  mill  or  a  railroad,  he  gets  from  an  architect  or  an 
engineer  plans  and  specifications ;  and  if  the  architect  or 
engineer  knows  his  profession,  those  plans  and  specifica- 
tions are  correct,  down  to  the  minutest  detail  of  cost  and 
material.  Government  work  is  of  precisely  the  same  kind. 
It  consists  of  building  forts  and  ships,  making  vast  harbor 
improvements,  of  raising  and  spending  money.  It  is  work 
of  the  same  kind  that  is  done  for  individuals.  It  can  be 
done  in  precisely  the  same  way,  if  only  we  are  willing  to 
adopt  the  same  principles  of  common  sense  which  we  fol- 
low in  our  private  affairs.  And  if  we  construct  our  gov- 
ernment machinery  on  the  same  plan  on  which  the  great 
merchants  operate  their  business,  then  what  we  call  our 
Legislature  would  fill  the  function  here  pointed  out. 

Now,  to  secure  an  assembly  which  will  do  this  work  of 
supervision  and  control,  and  do  it  well,  two  points  are  to 
be  considered : 

1.  Its  constitution. 

2.  Its  powers. 

First,  what  shall  be  its  constitution — how  shall  it  be 
made  up  ? 

In  such  a  body  we  need — 

1.  Members  from  all  professions  and  callings — except 
party — for  we  wish  this  Legislature  to  have,  among  its 
own  members,  as  far  as  may  be,  knowledge  of  all  kinds. 

2.  Members,  in  number  large  enough,  to  insure  that  any 


THE  LEGISLATURE.  21 Y 

errors  of  one  man  or  clique  of  men  shall  have  as  slight  a 
chance  as  may  be  of  causing  unwise  decisions. 

3.  Members,  in  number  small  enough,  to  insure  efficient 
deliberation  and  action  by  this  assembly  as  one  body  meet- 
ing together. 

And,  to  secure  these  points,  experience  seems  to  show 
that  the  number  of  members  in  a  legislature  should  be 
about  five  hundred  men,  and  the  constituencies  should  be 
regulated  with  a  view  to  giving  that  number.  And  with 
a  legislature  of  that  size,  it  seems  quite  impossible  that 
any  one  interest  or  any  one  business  or  profession  could 
fail  to  have  its  full  representation,  or  could  have  too  large 
a  representation. 

That  point  of  number  being  disposed  of,  how  are  these 
members  to  be  chosen  ?  As  has  been  said,  if  parties  and 
party  schemers  can  be  destroyed,  there  is  no  way  so  safe, 
and  so  sure  of  giving  good  results,  as  to  have  these  legisla- 
tive members  chosen  by  a  popular  vote,  of  all  men.  The 
question  will  be  one  simply  of  choosing  the  best  men.  It 
is  a  certain  thing  that  the  men  who  would  be  chosen  would 
be  men  who  were  well  known  for  success  in  some  honest 
pursuit.  They  would  be  men  who  had  been  proved  and 
found  true,  and  proved  in  some  calling  other  than  that  of 
operating  election  machinery.  The  men  we  should  choose 
would  be  men  of  affairs.  Some  of  the  scholars  and  stu- 
dents would  be  chosen  if  they  had  shown  themselves  to  be 
men  of  wise  judgment  as  well  as  wide  knowledge.  But 
the  man  who  knows  books,  and  nothing  else,  has  no  place 
in  a  government  service. 

And  very  clearly,  if  anywhere  in  our  public  service  a 
body  of  servants  having  some  permanence  in  its  constitu- 
tion and  organization  is  needed,  it  is  in  the  Legislature. 
How  is  it  possible  that  a  body  of  men,  ever  changing  from 

10 


218  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

one  year  to  another,  should  be  able  to  have  any  real  knowl- 
edge, or  to  form  any  wise  judgment,  as  to  any  public  ques- 
tion ?  These  men  in  our  national  Legislature  are  to  have 
the  supreme  control  of  everything.  They  need  more  thor- 
ough knowledge,  if  possible,  than  any  other  men  in  the 
whole  service.  Is  it  not  clear  that  any  man — the  greatest 
genius  in  the  world — who  is  to  be  of  any  real  use  in  doing 
work  like  this,  must  have  the  peculiar  knowledge  that 
comes  only  from  giving  his  time  and  thoughts  to  this 
work,  and  to  nothing  else,  year  after  year?  Above  all 
things,  can  he  do  our  work  well  if  his  first  end  and  aim 
must  always  be  to  secure  the  next  election  for  his  party  ? 
Here  more  than  anywhere  else  in  our  government  must  we 
have  training  and  knowledge.  These  men  in  this  supreme 
assembly  must,  of  all  men,  be  free  to  give  their  time  and 
labor  and  their  best  judgment  to  the  people's  work.  For 
them,  above  all  men,  party  and  the  term  system  must  be 
destroyed.  If  we  destroy  party  and  party  rule  in  this  su- 
preme council,  we  might  almost  have  it  everywhere  else. 
If  we  leave  it  there,  we  might  as  well  leave  it  everywhere 
else. 

There  comes,  then,  the  question,  What  powers  should 
this  national  Legislature  have  ? 

As  it  would  seem,  this  supreme  Council  or  Legislature 
should  have — 

1.  The  absolute  control  of  the  money. 

2.  The   absolute  power,  in  its  supreme  discretion,  of 
making  all  necessary  laws,  and  of  regulating  the  duties  of 
all  public  officials. 

3.  The  absolute  power  of  removing,  by  a  two-thirds  vote, 
for  any  cause  in  its  judgment  sufficient,  any  government 
official. 

4.  No  power  whatever  over  appointments. 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  219 

(1.)  As  to  the  control  of  the  money,  that  is  a  power  that 
Congress  now  has,  that  the  House  of  Commons  has,  that 
the  legislative  assembly  has,  in  every  free  government. 

(2.)  As  to  the  power  of  making  all  necessary  laws  and 
of  regulating  the  duties  of  all  public  officials,  that  is  a  pow- 
er that  the  English  House  of  Commons  has ;  and  no  evil 
result  has  ever  come  from  their  having  it.  It  is  a  power 
that  every  State  Legislature  has ;  and  no  evil  result  has  ever 
come  from  their  having  it.  It  is  a  power  that  our  Con- 
gress now  has,  with  only  a  restriction  as  to  subjects.  On 
those  subjects,  however,  over  which  Congress  has  now  any 
power  at  all,  its  power  is  supreme,  except  for  the  Presi- 
dent's veto,  which  will  be  afterward  considered. 

Why  should  there  be  these  restrictions  as  to  subjects 
on  which  our  national  Legislature  may  use  its  supreme 
power  ? 

What  living  man  or  body  of  men  could  possibly  foresee, 
now  or  in  the  year  1787,  all  the  matters  on  which  this 
people  will  need  national  legislation?  Somewhere  under 
our  government  system,  either  in  our  Congress,  or  in  Con- 
stitutional Conventions  chosen  from  time  to  time,  the  pow- 
er must  be  of  deciding  what  measures  of  national  legisla- 
tion are  required  by  the  interests  of  the  whole  nation ; 
and  the  simple  question  is,  Who  can  most  wisely  decide  as 
to  what  those  measures  shall  be— the  members  of  the  Leg- 
islature, or  the  members  of  what  we  call  a  Constitutional 
Convention  ?  In  other  words,  shall  these  matters  be  de- 
cided by  the  men  of  experience  who  make  government  af- 
fairs their  one  profession,  or  by  new  men  taken  at  hap-haz- 
ard  from  other  professions  ? 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  even  now,  many  measures 
of  national  legislation  are  needed  which  are  not  within  the 
power  of  Congress.  Since  the  year  1787  we  have  grown ; 


220  A  TltUE  REPUBLIC. 

new  interests  have  come  into  existence;  the  people  have 
new  needs ;  new  kinds  of  work  are  to  be  done  by  our 
public  servants.  Many  matters  will  at  once  strike  any 
mind  on  which  national  legislation  is  necessary,  and  where 
legislation  by  the  separate  States  is  utterly  insufficient. 

Our  entire  manufacturing  interests  are  every  year  seri- 
ously interfered  with,  and  their  very  existence  is  endan- 
gered by  the  failure  of  the  water  in  the  rivers  and  streams 
which  furnish  power  for  many  of  our  mills.  These  riv- 
ers and  streams,  almost  everywhere,  have  failed  greatly  in 
late  years,  both  in  the  quantity  and  regularity  of  their 
water  supply.  It  is  on  all  hands  agreed  that  this  failure 
in  the  water  supply  is  caused  by  the  alarming  destruction 
of  our  forests.  This  same  cause  has  made  large  tracts  of 
our  territory  subject  to  long  and  severe  droughts,  such  as 
used  years  since  to  be  almost  unknown.  No  one  can  tell 
the  possible  danger  to  manufactures  and  agriculture,  if  the 
destruction  of  our  forests  goes  on  in  years  to  come  as  it 
has  gone  on  for  the  last  hundred  years.  Dr.  F.  M.  Oswald, 
in  the  Popular  Science  Monthly  for  August,  1877,  ascribes 
the  barrenness  and  desolation  of  countries  which  were 
once  the  most  rich  and  flourishing  gardens  on  the  earth  to 
nothing  but  the  destruction  of  the  forests.  And  he  quotes 
from  Champollion,  as  to  a  district  in  the  very  centre  of 
the  Sahara,  the  following  passage : 

"And  so  the  astounding  truth  dawns  upon  us  that  this  desert 
may  once  have  been  a  region  of  groves  and  fountains,  and  the  abode 
of  happy  millions.  Is  there  any  crime  against  Nature  which  draws 
down  a  more  tangible  curse  than  that  of  stripping  our  Mother  Earth 
of  her  sylvan  covering  ?  The  hand  of  man  has  produced  this  desert. 
And  I  verily  believe  every  other  desert  on  the  surface  of  the  earth 
was  Eden  once,  and  our  misery  is  the  punishment  of  our  sins  against 
the  world  of  plants.  The  burning  sun  of  the  desert  is  the  angel 
with  the  flaming  sword,  who  stands  between  us  and  paradise." 


THE  LEGISLATURE.  221 

It  is  very  clear  that  if  legislation  is  at  all  necessary  to 
protect  the  forests  of  the  country,  tlie  legislation  of  single 
States  could  accomplish  nothing.  It  must  be  national  leg- 
islation or  none.  Congress  has  now  no  power  to  legislate 
at  all  on  the  point ;  and  the  wealth  of  the  country  in  years 
to  come  may  depend  on  it. 

The  mere  existence  of  New  York  harbor  may  depend, 
in  the  same  way,  on  the  keeping  the  present  flow  of  water 
in  the  Hudson  River.  And  that  depends  on  keeping  the 
forests.  The  preservation  of  the  Mississippi  River,  our 
greatest  public  highway,  depends  on  keeping  our  forests, 
through  the  whole  region  from  the  Eocky  Mountains  to 
the  Alleghanies  —  or,  it  may  be,  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean 
to  the  Pacific.  Legislation  by  the  States  is  worth  no  more 
than  resolutions  in  a  town-meeting. 

Without  question,  we  need  a  national  Board  of  Health. 

It  has  been  very  generally  conceded  that  there  should 
be  a  "uniform  system  of  bankruptcy"  throughout  the 
States.  And  the  main  purpose  of  any  bankruptcy  system 
is,  to  have  only  one  administration  and  distribution  of  the 
estate  of  a' living  man  among  those  who  are  entitled  to  it, 
for  the  whole  country.  But  why  should  there  not  be  the 
same  unity  of  administration  of  the  estate  of  a  dead  man  ? 
In  these  days  of  railroads  and  telegraphs,  any  man  who  is 
engaged  widely  in  business  enterprises,  and  who  amasses  a 
large  fortune,  is  almost  certain  to  leave  property  in  differ- 
ent States.  In  every  State  there  must  be,  as  the  laws  now 
are,  a  separate  administration.  How  much  expense  and 
confusion  would  be  saved  if  there  could  be  only  one  ad- 
ministration for  the  whole  country,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
estate  of  a  bankrupt ! 

No  one  now  will  question  the  benefits  arising  from  the 
use,  under  proper  restrictions,  of  corporations.  They  make 


222  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

possible  large  enterprises  of  all  kinds  to  which  the  capital 
of  individuals  is  unequal.  They  make  possible,  too,  sta- 
bility of  management,  and  the  investment  of  capital  by 
one  person,  in  many  different  enterprises,  which  would  be 
beyond  the  power  of  any  one  man  or  set  of  men  to  over- 
see or  control.  And  these  corporations  often  must  nec- 
essarily have  property,  and  carry  on  their  operations,  in 
many  different  States.  Much  trouble  and  expense  would 
be  saved  if  there  could  be  one  national  law  for  the  forma- 
tion of  corporations,  which  should  have  an  existence  rec- 
ognized by  law,  through  all  the  States,  for  all  purposes. 
The  giving  of  such  a  power  to  Congi'ess  was  proposed  at 
the  time  the  Constitution  was  framed ;  and  the  necessity 
of  such  a  provision  has  become  more  and  more  apparent 
in  these  later  years. 

Can  any  one  doubt  that  it  would  be,  in  very  many  ways, 
a  great  advantage  if  the  laws  of  inheritance,  the  law  of 
marriage  and  divorce,  and  all  branches  of  mercantile  law, 
were  uniform  throughout  all  the  States?  But  they  can 
never  become  so  until  Congress  has  full  power  to  legislate 
on  all  subjects. 

It  may  even  be  considered  whether  there  would  not  be 
an  advantage  in  having  not  only  general  laws  applicable 
everywhere  through  all  the  States  on  very  many  matters 
that  cannot  now  be  thought  of,  but  also  whether  there 
would  not  be  great  economy  to  the  whole  country  in  hav- 
ing only  one  set  of  courts  of  justice.  Of  what  possible 
advantage  is  this  double  jurisdiction?  To  propose  the 
abolition  of  State  Courts  at  the  time  of  the  formation 
of  the  Constitution  would  have  been  folly.  Such  a  plan 
would  never  have  been  for  an  instant  considered.  It  would 
never  have  been  even  proposed.  But  why  should  we  have, 
in  numberless  matters  that  concern  rights  of  property,  one 


TPIE   LEGISLATURE.  223 

law  in  Massachusetts  and  another  law  in  New  York  ?  And 
why  should  we  have  the  law  administered,  for  one  class 
of  parties  and  matters,  by  a  court  that  we  call  a  United 
States  Court,  and  for  another  class  by  what  we  call  a  State 
Court  ? 

As  the  Constitution  now  is,  Congress  can  legislate  on 
no  new  subject  without  a  constitutional  amendment,  rati- 
fied by  the  conventions  of  a  certain  proportion  of  the 
States.  This  is  a  proceeding  difficult,  dilatory,  and  expen- 
sive. Certainly,  if  party  influence  were  removed,  and  Con- 
gress was  composed  of  the  men  who  were  really  the  choice 
of  the  people — men  who  should  make  the  science  of  gov- 
ernment and  the  interests  of  the  people  the  study  of  their 
lives,  and  who  were  independent  —  these  restrictions  as 
to  the  mere  subjects  of  Congressional  legislation  could  be 
safely  done  away  with.  The  general  restrictions  on  all 
legislation  should  be,  perhaps,  retained.  But  certainly  the 
Houses  of  Congress  could  be  as  thoroughly  trusted  with 
the  general  powers  of  legislation  as  the  State  Legislat- 
ures, or  any  other  legislative  body.  The  power  should  be 
somewhere  to  make  laws  without  restriction  as  to  subject- 
matter.  It  would  be  as  safely  placed  in  a  Congress  com- 
posed as  has  been  indicated,  as  in  any  body  of  men  that 
could  be  found.  If  we  are  to  have  such  an  intense  dread 
of  officers  appointed  by  the  people  themselves,  who  is  there 
that  we  shall  trust,  in  matters  of  legislation  or  anything 
else  ?  If  there  is  to  be  an  efficient  government,  there  must 
be  power.  The  only  question  is,  Where  shall  it  be  ?  There 
should  be  more  flexibility  in  our  government  machinery. 
We  cannot  at  this  time  make  provision  for  the  needs  of 
all  coming  ages ;  we  must  leave  it  for  the  men  who  are 
to  come  after  us  to  decide  what  legislation  they  need.  And 
who  can  possibly  decide  so  wisely  as  the  Legislature  itself  ? 


224  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

There  is  no  such  thing  as  the  people  themselves  deciding. 
That  we  do  not  wish  if  we  could  have  it.  We  wish  our 
men  of  the  greatest  wisdom  and  experience  to  decide  for 
us.  Should  we  think  of  calling  in  a  collection  of  horse- 
dealers  to  prescribe  to  the  medical  men  what  remedies  they 
are  to  give  their  patients  for  the  next  fifty  years?  If  we 
take  five  hundred  men  at  random  from  the  community,  it 
does  not  follow  that  they  know  everything  about  legisla- 
tion, and  that  they  are  fit  to  regulate  the  Government  ma- 
chinery for  all  coming  time,  even  if  we  do  give  them  the 
name  of  a  Constitutional  Convention. 

This  Legislature,  too,  must  be  supreme  over  all  depart- 
ments, not  co-equal  with  other  departments. 

Somewhere  in  the  State  there  must  be  one  power  that 
is  final  and  supreme,  or  we  have  only  turmoil.  Now,  where 
shall  this  supreme  power  be  ?  Can  it  possibly  be  in  safer 
hands  than  those  of  an  assembly  of  the  wisest  and  most 
experienced  men  in  the  country  ?  Shall  it  be  with  one  man, 
with  the  separate  wisdom  of  one  man,  or  with  the  many 
men,  with  the  combined  wisdom  of  all  ? 

That  being  assumed,  there  should  be  no  such  thing  as 
an  executive  veto.  No  one  man  in  the  State  can  be  safely 
given  the  power  of  overruling  the  decision  of  a  body  of 
men  such  as  our  Legislature  should  and  can  be.  We 
make  it  a  large  body  for  the  very  purpose  of  eliminating 
the  possibility  that  the  mistaken  views  of  one  man  or  a 
few  men  shall  be  able  to  do  any  real  harm.  It  might,  in- 
deed, sometimes  happen  that  this  one  man  whom  we  call 
a  President  would  be  right,  and  the  whole  large  assembly 
of  men  whom  we  call  a  Legislature  would  be  wrong.  Of 
that  we  must  take  our  chance.  The  chance  is  very  slight. 
But  when  the  will  and  judgment  of  the  Chief  Executive 
comes  in  conflict  with  that  of  the  Legislature,  there  should 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  225 

be  no  question  for  an  instant  which  is  to  yield.  We  can- 
not have  two  masters,  in  government  or  elsewhere. 

The  whole  point  of  the  necessity  of  a  veto  comes  from 
the  same  idea  before  mentioned,  that  government  is  a  per- 
petual conflict — a  system  of  "  checks  and  balances."  It 
should  be  nothing  of  the  kind.  There  must  be,  on  the 
contrary,  system,  unity ;  and  that  we  can  never  have  where 
there  is  a  contest  for  supremacy  or  equality. 

But  it  might  well  be  wise  to  require  for  all  legislation 
the  same  protection  which  we  now  require  for  measures 
that  have  been  vetoed  by  the  President  —  a  two -thirds 
vote.  Measures  of  general  policy,  which  are  really  called 
for  by  the  people's  interests,  would  seldom  fail  to  get  that 
two-thirds  vote.  But  this  point,  too,  would  probably  be 
most  wisely  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Legislature  itself, 
to  be  decided  by  the  experienced  men  from  the  results  of 
their  own  experience. 

(3.)  We  come,  then,  to  the  power  of  removing  the  Chief 
Executive. 

If  this  Legislature  or  supreme  council  is  to  have  any 
control  at  all  over  the  executive  administration,  it  must 
have  the  absolute  power  of  removing  the  Chief  Executive 
for  any  cause  which  is  in  the  opinion  of  the  Legislature 
sufficient.  And  here  is  the  wise  method,  and  the  only  ef- 
ficient method,  of  securing  between  the  executive  and  the 
Legislature  that  harmony  of  which  so  much  is  said.  This 
power  of  removal  should  be  guarded,  too,  as  it  would 
seem,  by  requiring  a  two-thirds  vote  for  its  use. 

Somewhere  this  power  of  removal  should  be  ;  and  it 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  men  who  would  have  the 
knowledge  how  to  use  it  wisely. 

No  man  or  body  of  men  could  have  the  knowledge,  as 
to  the  fitness  or  unfituess  of  the  Executive,  which  the  Leg- 
10* 


226  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

islatuve  would  have.  They  would  be  the  men  in  the  State 
who  would  have  had,  from  day  to  day,  all  his  official  con- 
duct under  their  eyes. 

Give  this  body  of  men  no  voice  in  the  appointment  of 
the  new  President,  and  I  can  see  no  possible  way  of  find- 
ing a  body  of  men  who  could  be  so  thoroughly  trusted  to 
use  honestly  the  power  of  removal,  as  this  same  Legislat- 
ure. If  the  policy  or  conduct  of  a  President  were  mis- 
chievous, as  it  might  be  or  become,  there  could  be  little 
doubt  that  a  two-thirds  vote  could  be  had  for  his  removal. 
If  a  two-thirds  vote  could  be  had  for  his  removal,  there 
is  little  doubt  that  he  should  be  removed. 

This  is  the  power  that  the  House  of  Commons  has,  as 
to  all  the  heads  of  departments,  on  a  mere  majority  vote 
— and  they  use  this  power  of  removal  whenever  the  min- 
istry err  on  some  one  single  question  of  public  policy. 
Men  generally  do  not  think  the  use  by  the  English  House 
of  Commons  of  that  power  on  such  a  reason  is  a  source 
of  danger.  But  remove  party  and  party  strife,  and  a 
President  would  never  be  removed  for  a  single  error.  On 
the  contrary,  the  knowledge  that  he  could  be  removed  for 
persisting  in  a  policy  at  variance  with  the  wishes  or  judg- 
ment of  the  Legislature  would  make  him  heed  their  wish 
and  judgment.  It  would,  too,  make  the  Legislature  toler- 
ant of  mere  single  errors  of  judgment  on  his  part.  And 
that  is  a  possibility  which  men  seem  to  have  lost  sight  of, 
that  either  the  Legislature  or  the  executive  could  possibly 
act  like  reasonable  individuals — that  either  one  could  pos- 
sibly yield  to  the  other.  Suppose  we  have  as  President  a 
man  of  wonderful  administrative  talent — that  talent  con- 
sisting, as  it  surely  would,  mainly  in  his  having  sound 
judgment  for  selecting  his  subordinates.  Suppose  that  he 
gave  us  successful  management  of  our  affairs  for  many 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  227 

years — that  he  managed  the  finances,  the  purchases  of  war 
material,  and  the  expenditure  of  money  for  our  rivers  and 
harbors,  with  wonderful  skill.  There  comes  up  some  one 
question  of  public  policy  on  which  he  and  the  Legislature 
differ.  Why  is  it  necessary  that  he  should  resign,  or  be 
removed,  because  he  does  not  think  the  policy  of  the 
Legislature  wise  ?  Why  can  he  not  give  up  his  own  will, 
take  the  policy  of  the  Legislature,  and  honestly  carry  it 
out,  with  all  the  skill  which  he  has  gained  and  shown  in 
his  years  of  service?  That  is  the  way  men  do  in  private 
affairs.  Suppose  this  line  of  policy  adopted  by  the  Leg- 
islature were  not  the  wisest,  would  the  nation  be  ruined  ? 
Would  not  time  show  its  lack  of  wisdom  ?  And  is  there  any 
reason  to  think  that  the  members  of  the  Legislature  would 
be  the  only  men  in  the  community  who  would  learn  noth- 
ing from  this  test  of  time?  Do  we  expect  that  our  public 
officials  will  never  make  blunders,  will  invariably  take  the 
wisest  course  of  action?  And  do  single  blunders  invaria- 
bly bring  utter  ruin  in  the  affairs  of  nations?  WTe  must 
assume  that,  under  the  best  system,  we  shall  sometimes 
have  a  mistaken  policy  on  the  part  of  our  rulers.  We  can 
only  choose  the  machinery  which  will,  on  the  whole,  give 
us  the  chance  of  the  fewest  mistakes.  But  no  mistakes 
can  possibly  burden  us  as  does  this  never-ending  strife  be- 
tween different  men  and  bodies  of  men  in  the  government. 
The  whole  matter  comes  to  this  one  point :  Can  we  find 
any  method  whereby  we  have  the  chance  of  fewer  blun- 
ders, than  the  method  of  giving  the  final  control  of  all  our 
affairs  to  an  assembly  of  the  wisest  men  that  the  people 
themselves  can  select  ? 

The  power  of  removing  judicial  officers  by  a  two-thirds 
vote  is  one  given  to  one  or  both  branches  of  the  Legislat- 
ure in  nearly  every  State  in  the  Union.  And  as  to  the 


228  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

propriety  of  their  having  that  power,  there  is  general  agree- 
ment. And  the  power  has  seldom,  if  ever,  been  misused. 

(4.)  We  come,  then,  to  the  next  point,  that  this  Legis- 
lature should  have  no  voice  whatever  in  the  appointment 
of  officials,  the  Chief  Executive  or  any  other. 

Invariably,  whenever  a  legislative  assembly  has  had  any- 
thing to  do  with  appointing  executive  officers,  that  assem- 
bly has  become  a  hot-bed  of  intrigue. 

I  assume  that  the  members  of  this  Legislature,  the  very 
large  majority  of  them,  would  be  men  of  pure  intentions. 
But  if  they  had  in  their  hands  the  appointment  as  well 
as  the  removal  of  the  President,  there  would  always  be  a 
temptation  to  scheming  men  to  combine  against  the  Pres- 
ident for  the  purpose  of  putting  some  other  man  in  his 
place.  If,  however,  the  choice  of  a  successor  depended  on 
the  action  of  a  body  of  men  which  had  then  no  existence, 
so  that  the  matter  of  who  should  be  the  successor  would 
be  one  that  could  not  possibly  be  made  certain  beforehand, 
could  not  be  made  the  matter  of  bargain  or  understanding, 
then  the  danger  from  this  source  is  reduced  to  the  least 
possible  degree.  For  that  reason  we  should  make  it  cer- 
tain that  this  Legislature,  though  it  might  remove  a  Presi- 
dent, could  have  no  voice  in  the  appointment  of  his  suc- 
cessor. Remove  from  them,  and  from  all  men  in  the  na- 
tion, this  great  temptation  to  combine  in  an  intrigue  against 
the  Chief  Executive. 

In  the  British  House  of  Commons  men  are  always 
scheming  to  get  office.  It  is  so  in  our  National  Legislat- 
ure, and  in  every  one  of  our  State  Legislatures.  It  was  so 
in  our  old  Continental  Congress,  which  had  only  one  pow- 
er of  any  kind  or  description,  that  of  appointing  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  army. 

Throughout  the  -war,  Washington,  nominally  in   com- 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  229 

niand  of  the  army,  never  could  be  certain  one  day  whether 
lie  would  be  in  command  the  next.  Every  member  of 
Congress  had  a  separate  plan  of  campaign.  No  two  men 
had  the  same  plan.  No  one  man  had  the  same  plan  two 
days.  There  was  nothing  but  intrigue.  The  men  in  that 
Congress  were  as  pure-minded  men  as  ever  met  in  one 
body  for  any  purpose.  They  had  magnificent  intentions. 
It  was  only  because  their  intentions  were  so  good  that 
they  intrigued.  They  saw  that  affairs  did  not  prosper. 
They  had  the  power  to  interfere,  and  they  used  the  power, 
with  the  best  motives  and  the  worst  results.  It  is  always 
so.  For  deciding  the  general  features  of  national  policy 
we  undoubtedly  need  the  wisdom  of  many  men.  For  ex- 
ecuting that  policy,  and,  above  all,  for  selecting  men,  we 
must  have  the  one-man  system. 

I  cannot  see  how  any  better  machinery  can  possibly  be 
devised  for  the  choice  of  a  President  than  our  present  Elec- 
toral College,  if  it  meets  in  one  body,  and  if  we  remove  the 
influences  of  party.  Put  it  in  the  people's  power  to  send 
members  of  Congress  to  this  Electoral  College,  if  they  wish 
to  do  so.  In  any  event,  we  should  be  certain  that  the  mem- 
bers of  this  College  would  have  advice,  and  all  the  real  as- 
sistance that  members  of  Congress  could  give  them.  In 
all  probability  the  choice  of  such  a  College  would  be  the 
choice  that  would  be  made  by  Congress  itself.  But  still 
Congress  should  not  be  the  body  which  would  have  the 
power  to  make  that  choice.  The  two  powers  should  not 
be  in  the  same  body. 

Here,  too,  it  is  proper  to  say  what  is  to  be  said  as  to  the 
provisions  for  temporarily  filling  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of 
President.  Let  us  do  away  with  that  fifth  wheel  to  a 
coach,  the  Vice-president.  Provide  simply  that,  in  case 
of  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  President,  from  any  cause,  the 


230  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

senior  cabinet  officer  shall  be  President  until  a  new  Presi- 
dent is  chosen  by  the  Electoral  College.  That  is  a  simple 
means  of  securing  that  there  shall  in  no  event  be  a  vacan- 
cy, for  so  much  as  one  day,  in  the  Chief  Executive  office. 
It  secures,  too,  that  the  temporary  control  of  executive  ad- 
ministration shall  be  in  the  hands  of  the  man  who,  proba- 
bly of  all  men  in  the  country  at  the  time,  has  the  most 
thorough  knowledge  of  it.  There  would  be  a  strong  prob- 
ability, too,  that  that  man,  who  would  certainly  be  a  man 
of  administrative  talent  and  of  great  experience,  would  be 
the  choice  of  the  Electoral  College. 

This  supreme  council  in  the  State  must  content  itself 
with  making  general  rules  and  laws,  and  must  then  hold 
the  Chief  Executive  "  responsible  "  for  results. 

But  it  has  been  here  argued  that  no  man,  under  this  or 
any  system  of  government,  should  hold  "  irresponsible  " 
power — power  which  cannot  be  taken  from  him.  Here  we 
have  thus  far  a  system  by  which  all  men  in  the  Govern- 
ment service,  up  to  a  certain  point,  are  made  "  responsible." 
The  lowest  man  in  the  executive  departments  is  responsi- 
ble to  his  immediate  superior,  and  this  superior  is  respon- 
sible to  the  man  above  him ;  and  so  it  is  till  we  reach  the 
head  of  the  department.  The  head  of  the  department, 
again,  is  responsible  to  the  Chief  Executive,  and  the  Chief 
Executive  is  responsible  to  the  Legislature.  But,  then,  to 
whom  is  the  Legislature  responsible?  Who  can  remove 
the  members  of  this  supreme  council  if  they  fail  to  do 
their  work  well  ?  They  are  to  purify  the  executive  ad- 
ministration and  the  judiciary.  Who  shall  purify  the 
purifiers  ? 

They  must  purify  themselves.  We  must  use  there  pre- 
cisely the  same  protection  we  have  had  ever  before.  As 
has  been  said,  one  corrupt  man,  or  a  few  corrupt  men,  can 


THE  LEGISLATURE.  231 

do  very  little  harm.  They  would  soon  be  found  out,  and 
their  power  for  evil  would  soon  be  gone.  We  assume 
that  some  of  these  men  may  be  dishonest ;  we  assume,  too, 
that  most  of  them  will  be  honest.  New  men  will  be  al- 
ways coming  in,  old  ones  will  be  always  going  out.  This 
supreme  assembly  will  be  like  the  sea ;  it  will  be  kept  pure 
by  the  streams  of  fresh  life  which  will  always  be  flowing 
into  it,  and  by  its  own  never-ceasing  motion  under  the  sun- 
light of  public  opinion. 

A  body  of  men,  chosen  as  these  men  would  be,  holding 
by  no  term  system,  on  a  tenure  which  will  be  somewhat 
permanent,  would  have  every  possible  advantage  for  giv- 
ing us  the  best  work. 

In  the  first  place,  the  men  in  the  Legislature  would 
soon  find  their  own  level — would  be  rated  at  their  own 
true  value,  for  doing  good  work  in  that  assembly,  and  not 
for  carrying  elections.  Then  at  last  we  should  have  it 
possible  that  the  regular  principles  of  natural  selection 
should  operate  and  have  their  legitimate  effect  in  the  se- 
lection of  our  legislators.  The  strong  men  would  rise  to 
the  top.  Men  who  were  only  clever  talkers  would  soon 
wear  out  the  patience  of  an  assembly  which  met  to  do  its 
own  work  quickly  and  well.  Men  who  came  to  such  an 
assembly,  too,  without  any  fitness  for  doing  its  work, 
would  be  treated  with  quiet  contempt  and  neglect ;  they 
would  find  the  air  uncongenial,  and  would  leave  it ;  they 
would  give  way  to  other  men.  This  having  permanence 
in  the  membership  of  our  Legislature,  as  well  as  for  other 
branches  of  the  Government,  would  operate  gradually  to 
give  us  there  the  services  of  the  men  who  were  best  fitted 
for  that  special  work ;  men  would  have  time  to  find  their 
true  places.  That  is  now  an  impossible  thing. 

Then,  too,  an  assembly  thus  constituted  would  have  the 


232  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

time  and  experience  needed  to  find  new  ways  of  doing 
new  work,  of  dealing  with  new  problems.  New  machinery 
for  doing  this  work  of  a  great  people  would  come  nat- 
urally into  existence — would  grow.  The  work  of  this  as- 
sembly would  gradually  drift  into  committee  work — the 
only  kind  of  work  which  can  be  well  done — except  in  the 
case  of  new  and  very  important  questions.  Everything 
done  by  the  committees  would  be,  of  course,  subject  to  the 
confirmation  and  approval  of  the  full  body.  As  has  been 
said,  with  a  permanent  executive  service,  nearly  all  meas- 
ures of  administrative  reform  would  be  suggested  by  the 
specialists — the  men  in  the  executive  service.  And  these 
measures,  when  they  came  before  the  Legislature,  would 
be  referred  to  committees  who  would  be  in  the  main  per- 
manent, and  would  be  made  up  of  men  who  would  give 
their  study  and  thought  to  matters  in  their  special  line  of 
duty. 

Then,  too,  the  new  blood  which  came  into  this  assem- 
bly would  come  steadily  and  unceasingly,  not  like  a  bien- 
nial avalanche.  Our  legislation,  our  government  work  of 
all  kinds,  would  have  stability ;  we  should  have  a  govern- 
ment policy.  Men  could  have  some  sense  of  security  as 
to  the  course  of  affairs.  A  measure  passed  at  one  session 
of  Congress  would  probably  not  be  repealed  at  the  next, 
nor  until  time  had  shown  it  to  be  unwise. 

But  the  great  gain  of  all  would  be  this,  that  measures 
of  government  policy  could  then  be  fairly  considered  be- 
fore they  were  taken,  and  fairly  tried  after  they  were 
taken.  As  matters  now  are,  that  is  impossible.  No  meas- 
ure is  considered  on  its  merits ;  every  measure  is  made  a 
"  party  measure."  We  must  have  no  "  party  measures." 
All  measures  should  be  measures  of  the  people.  It  is  our 
right  to  have,  from  every  single  man  in  our  legislative 


THE  LEGISLATURE.  233 

service,  his  best  judgment  on  every  single  measure  which 
comes  before  him  for  his  action.  On  no  measure  has  he 
the  right  to  consider  for  an  instant  what  the  interests  of 
his  party  call  for,  or  to  know  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
party  in  existence.  But,  as  matters  now  are,  even  after  a 
measure  is  once  passed,  we  still  have  "  party  "  interfering 
at  every  turn  with  its  having  a  fair  trial.  The  party  which 
opposed  the  measure  before  its  adoption  does  everything 
in  its  power  to  hinder  the  successful  working  of  the  meas- 
ure after  its  adoption.  When  a  measure  is  once  passed, 
the  interest  of  the  people  demands  that  all  men  should  co- 
operate in  putting  this  measure  to  a  fair  trial.  Until  that 
is  done,  no  man  can  tell,  certainly,  whether  it  is  good  or 
bad.  That  is  what  we  wish  to  find  out.  If,  on  trial,  tJae 
measure  is  found  to  give  good  results,  we  wish  to  keep  it, 
without  regard  to  party.  If  it  gives  bad  results,  we  wish 
to  undo  or  change  it,  without  regard  to  party. 

As  has  been  already  said,  what  we  need  in  our  govern- 
ment service  is  not  strife,  but  harmony — efficient  work. 
More  than  in  any  other  place,  we  need  that  harmony  in 
our  Legislature. 

We  can  never  have  it,  there  or  anywhere  else  in  the 
Government,  until  we  destroy  party.  Until  that  is  done, 
we  can  have  no  such  thing  as  government,  nothing  but 
repeated  political  earthquakes,  fostered  by  men  who  have 
not,  indeed,  bad  intentions,  but  who  are  driven  by  the 
overpowering  influences  of  their  surroundings  to  fight  over 
elections,  and  to  use  the  forms  of  free  government  to  per- 
petuate a  most  oppressive  tyranny. 

But  some  men,  even  if  the  arguments  here  made  should 
command  in  some  degree  their  assent,  would  yet  have  a 
lingering  fear  that  this  proposed  change  of  tenure  as  to  the 
Legislature  would  have  some  evil  features,  or  evil  results. 


234  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

They  would  fear  that  the  abolition  of  the  term  system, 
even  if  it  mio-ht  be  wise  as  to  executive  officials,  would  be 

O  ' 

unwise  or  dangerous  for  the  Legislature.  My  purpose  is 
to  meet  all  objections  to  what  is  here  proposed,  as  fairly 
and  fully  as  I  am  able.  These  objections  to  the  abolition 
of  the  term  system  with  our  legislators  would  be,  so  far  as 
I  can  anticipate  them,  these — 

1.  The  tenure  of  the  members,  as  here  proposed,  would 
be  substantially  a  tenure  for  life. 

2.  These  members,  thus  holding  for  life  in  a  permanent 
assembly,  would  get  out  of  sympathy  with  the  thoughts 
and  wishes  of  the  people. 

3.  There  would  be  danger  of  corrupt  combination  among 
the  members  of  a  permanent  body  such  as  would  be  then 
established. 

4.  The  people  would  lose  their  control  over  their  legis- 
lators. 

5.  This  would  not  be  a  "  representative  government." 

I  can  think  of  no  objection  that  would  not  be,  in  effect, 
a  mere  modification  of  one  of  these.  Some  of  them  have 
been  already  considered ;  but  they  will  be  again  noticed. 

(1.)  Let  us  take  the  first  one-'— that  we  should  have  sub- 
stantially a  life  tenure  for  our  legislators. 

That  is  undoubtedly  true.  We  should  have  substantially 
a  life  tenure ;  but  it  would  not  necessarily  be  a  long  term. 

Remove  party  influences,  and  the  men  who  would  be 
sent  to  our  Legislature  would  be,  in  the  large  number  of 
instances,  men  of  somewhat  advanced  years,  men  who  had 
already  made  a  reputation  in  some  walk  of  life.  I  have 
made  a  rough  calculation  of  the  terms  of  actual  service  of 
the  judges  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  the  Mas- 
sachusetts Supreme  Court,  and  the  New  York  Supreme 
Court  (taking  the  New  York  judges  down  to  the  year  1846, 


THE  LEGISLATURE.  235 

when  the  term  of  years  was  introduced).  The  average 
period  that  these  computations  have  given  is  a  term  of 
about  twelve  years.  And  this  computation,  though  not 
made  with  nice  accuracy,  cannot  be  much  in  error.  There 
is  every  reason  to  think  that  that  would  be  about  the 
average  length  of  the  term  of  service  of  legislators,  if  they 
should  hold  office  during  good  behavior.  Sometimes  the 
term  of  service  would  be  longer,  sometimes  shorter.  Now 
no  one  seems  to  have  the  least  fear  of  giving  our  judges  a 
term  of  fourteen  years.  In  Pennsylvania  some  judges  have 
a  term  of  twenty-one  years.  And  where  is  the  difference  ? 
As  far  as  concerns  the  mere  length  of  the  term  of  service, 
no  point  can  be  made  against  the  tenure  during  good  be- 
havior. 

(2.)  Take  the  next  point — that  there  would  be  danger 
that  the  members  thus  holding  for  life  in  a  permanent  as- 
sembly would  get  out  of  sympathy  with  the  thoughts  and 
wishes  of  the  people. 

This  is  a  fear  which  comes  in  the  main  from  the  idea 
that  government  is  a  moral  agency,  instead  of  a  machinery 
for  collecting  revenue  and  doing  work.  But  let  it  be  fair- 
ly met. 

In  the  first  place,  once  in  twelve  years  we  should  have 
substantially  the  entire  membership  changed.  This  of  it- 
self would  seem  to  be  a  sufficient  safeguard  against  any 
danger  of  this  kind. 

But  these  men  who  would  go  to  our  national  Legislature 
would  not  necessarily  cease  to  be  human  beings.  They 
would  still  live  with  other  men.  They  would  still  have  all 
their  old  interests.  Is  there  any  man  in  the  community 
whose  ideas  do  not  change  and  grow  ?  Can  such  a  thing 
be  ?  Can  any  man  live  from  one  day  to  another,  read 
new  books,  see  new  men,  learn  from  the  press  what  is  be- 


236  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

ing  done  and  said  throughout  the  world,  and  himself,  alone 
of  all  men,  stand  still  ?  If  that  can  happen,  we  are  surely 
coming  upon  an  age  of  miracles.  Can  these  men  be  dead 
statues,  when  all  the  rest  of  the  world  is  living  and  mov- 
ing? Can  they  think  in  an  utterly  different  way  from 
that  in  which  other  men  thinlc,  in  which  they  have  them- 
selves thought  all  their  lives — or,  rather,  will  they  at  once 
stop  thinking  ? 

Suppose,  on  the  other  hand,  that  these  men  who  would 
be  chosen  by  the  voice  of  their  fellow-men  to  care  for  the 
fortunes  of  the  State,  for  the  reason  that  they  had  proved 
themselves  to  be  men  of  power — suppose  it  should  happen 
that  these  men  should  lead  the  thought  of  the  nation,  in- 
stead of  being  an  age  behind  it.  And  which  is  the  more 
likely  supposition  of  the  two  ?  These  men,  who  would 
make  laws  and  administration  the  one  study  of  their  lives, 
would  be  the  teachers  and  not  the  pupils  of  the  people. 
And  when  the  people  once  learned  that  to  be  the  fact  (as 
they  soon  would  do  if  it  were  the  fact),  then  what  our  leg- 
islators did  and  said  would  command  with  the  people  the 
same  confidence  and  respect  that  other  men  command  in 
their  professions.  But,  as  things  now  are,  most  of  us  know 
as  much  as  our  legislators. 

(3.)  Next,  what  would  be  the  real  danger  of  corrupt 
combination  ? 

Kemove  party  influence,  and  the  men  who  would  be 
chosen  to  our  national  Legislature  would,  above  all,  be 
men  who  had,  all  their  lives,  proved  themselves  to  be  hon- 
est. As  Mr.  Lincoln  put  it  in  a  sentence  before  quoted : 
"  All  that  I  am  in  the  world,  the  Presidency  and  all  else, 
I  owe  to  that  opinion  of  me  which  the  people  express 
when  they  call  mo  '  Honest  old  Abe.' "  If  we  send  to 
our  Legislature  men  who  have  been  all  their  lives  honest — > 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  23T 

if  we  put  them  in  high  public  place,  with  the  eyes  of  all 
the  world  on  them,  where  from  honest  action  they  have 
everything  to  gain,  and  from  dishonest  action  they  have 
everything  to  lose,  will  such  men  suddenly  throw  aside  all 
their  old  habits  of  thought  and  action,  and  try  to  betray 
and  enslave  the  people  with  whom  they  have  always  lived, 
and  with  whom  they  have  still  to  live  all  the  rest  of  their 
lives  ?  That  is  an  imagination  simply  monstrous.  Such  a 
thing  cannot  be.  We  have  never  known  anything  like  that. 

No  doubt  it  might  happen  that,  even  with  party  com- 
binations destroyed,  we  should  at  times  get  bad  men  in 
high  place.  But  unless  there  were  many  of  them,  no  great 
harm  could  come  of  it.  That  is  the  very  reason  why  we 
give  the  supreme  power  to  a  body  of  many  men,  and  not 
to  any  one  man.  In  a  legislative  body  of  an  ordinarily 
large  number  of  members,  one  member  alone  can  do  little 
or  nothing  in  the  furtherance  of  a  corrupt  purpose.  He 
must  have  many  associates.  One  man,  then,  has  nothing 
to  gain  by  being  corrupt,  unless  he  can  influence  many 
other  men  to  be  corrupt  with  him.  And  how  much  dan- 
ger would  there  be  of  that? 

But  when  the  point  is  urged  that  under  a  tenure  during 
good  behavior  there  would  be  danger  of  corrupt  combina- 
tion, the  argument  is,  by  implication,  that  the  term  system 
gives  us  purity.  But  so  far  from  the  term  system  giving 
us  purity,  it  has  given  us  nothing  but  corruption,  whenever 
and  wherever  it  has  been  tried — in  the  Legislature,  on  the 
bench,  and  in  the  executive  department.  More  than  that, 
having  the  term  system  in  the  Legislature  and  executive 
alone,  where  the  real  power  in  any  government  is,  and 
must  be,  has  done  much  to  corrupt  the  other  departments 
of  the  service.  And  it  is  only  the  tenure  during  good  be- 
havior that  has  been  the  protection  of  those  other  depart- 


238  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

mcnts.  The  term  system  has  given  us  corruption,  because 
it  has  made  officials  dependent  on  party  men.  The  tenure 
during  good  behavior,  wherever  it  has  been  tried,  has  given 
us  purity,  because  it  has  made  officials  independent  of  all 
men.  So  they  must  be,  if  we  wish  to  protect  them  from 
the  powerful  influences  to  which  they  may  at  any  time  be 
exposed. 

But  this  fear  of  corrupt  combination  among  the  mem- 
bers of  a  legislature  throws  entirely  out  of  consideration 
the  immense  strength  of  public  opinion.  Can  we  not  be- 
gin to  weigh  this  one  all -controlling  power  at  its  true 
value?  It  is  what  has  brought  every  true  reform  in  our 
whole  history.  There  is  no  absolute  monarch  among  civ- 
ilized nations  who  does  not  fear  it.  Can  it  be  that  these 
public  officials  of  a  free  people,  chosen  from  the  people, 
by  the  people  themselves,  will  be  the  only  men  in  the 
world  who  will  pay  no  heed  to  it  ? 

But  consider  the  position  of  affairs  now.  We  do  have, 
as  things  now  are,  the  most  powerful  combination  ever 
seen,  of  all  our  officials,  under  the  party  system ;  and  tak- 
ing that  system  at  its  worst,  we  have  been  able  to  endure 
it,  and  the  liberties  of  the  people  (as  the  term  is  common- 
ly used)  have  been  tolerably  secure.  With  party  destroy- 
ed, where  can  there  be  any  real  danger  from  combinations 
in  the  Legislature  alone  ? 

(4.)  We  come,  then,  to  the  objection  that  the  people 
would,  under  this  tenure  for  during  good  behavior,  lose  the 
control  of  their  legislators. 

This  point  in  a  measure  implies  that  the  people,  under 
the  term  system,  keep  that  control.  But  we  know,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  that  they  do  not.  The  actual  result  of  the 
term  system  has  been  to  take  all  control  from  the  people 
and  give  it  to  the  party  organizations. 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  239 

But  under  the  system  here  proposed  the  people  would 
retain  every  real  control  over  their  legislators  that  they 
now  have,  and  would  free  these  legislators  from  the  tyran- 
ny of  party  under  which  they  now  labor.  The  only  direct 
machinery  we  now  have  for  punishing  a  corrupt  legislator 
is  the  power  of  removal  which  rests  with  the  Legislature  it- 
self. That  we  should  still  keep.  And  there  would  be  no 
such  powerful  influences  to  hinder  its  use,  on  fitting  occa- 
sions, as  the  influences  of  party  now  are.  But,  as  has  been 
argued,  so  far  as  concerns  mere  honesty  of  action,  the  only 
real  protection  we  ever  can  have  is  in  the  character  of  the 
men  we  put  in  public  place.  What  we  wish  to  secure  is, 
in  the  main,  the  choosing  our  best  men  to  our  Legislature ; 
and  if  we  do  that,  we  can  trust  them  to  be  honest  after 
we  choose  them. 

(5.)  But  it  may  be  said,  this  would  not  be  "  representa- 
tive government."  This  would  be  setting  up  an  inde- 
pendent power  in  the  State,  a  new  will — not  the  will  of  the 
people,  but  a  will  over  and  above  the  will  of  the  people. 

What  do  we  mean  by  "representative  government?"  and 
in  what  correct  sense  can  any  real  government  be  "  repre- 
sentative ?"  Throwing  names  and  words  aside,  what  kind 
of  "  representative  "  government,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
can  any  people  possibly  have  ? 

Some  men  have  an  idea  that  our  legislators  are  to  "  rep- 
resent" the  wishes  and  opinions  of  what  they  term  the 
"people,"  on  every  question  that  comes  up  for  action. 
But  what  is  the  "people?"  Where  are  we  to  find  the 
record  of  its  wishes  or  its  opinions  ?  There  can,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  be  only  the  wishes  and  opinions  of  the 
individual  men  who  make  up  the  people.  And  when  men 
say  that  legislators  are  to  follow  the  wishes  and  opinions 
of  the  "  people,"  they  mean,  at  most,  the  wishes  and  opin- 


240  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

ions  of  a  majority  of  these  individual  men.  But  if  legis- 
lators are  to  follow  the  wishes  of  a  majority  of  the  peo- 
ple, is  it  to  be  a  majority  of  the  whole  people,  or  is  each 
legislator  to  follow  the  wishes  of  a  majority  of  his  own 
constituents?  Putting  it  either  way,  how  is  a  legislator 
to  get  at  those  wishes  ?  Is  he,  when  measures  come  up 
for  action,  to  send  to  his  constituents,  or  to  some  imagi- 
nary collection  of  men,  for  a  letter  of  instructions  ? 

Anything  in  the  most  remote  degree  like  that  is  simply 
impossible. 

But  do  we  wish  that?  Suppose  we  send  to  the  Legis- 
lature men  much  wiser  than  ourselves,  for  the  very  reason 
that  we  know  them  to  be  wiser  than  ourselves — do  we  not 
wish  those  men  to  use  their  wisdom,  and  act  on  the  best 
judgment  which  that  wisdom  can  compass?  Put  that 
question  to  a  vote,  if  everything  in  the  world  is  to  be  de- 
cided by  a  majority  vote,  and  there  is  no  doubt  how  the 
majority  will  be.  Rich  and  poor  —  men  whom  we  call 
educated  and  whom  we  call  ignorant — will  agree  there. 

Do  we  really  wish  that  our  legislators  should  give  us  only 
such  legislation  as  we  ourselves  think  best  ?  Do  men  wish 
their  shoemaker  to  make  such  shoes  as  they  themselves 
would  make,  or  their  lawyer  to  try  their  causes  as  they 
themselves  Avould  try  them,  or  their  physician  to  give  them 
such  drugs  as  they  themselves  may  fancy  ?  What  we  wish 
from  our  public  servants  is,  not  such  work  as  we  should 
ourselves  do,  or  as  we  may  think  the  best,  but  better  work 
than  we  know  anything  about.  On  any  proper  theory  of 
government  we  select  our  very  best  men,  to  use  their  own 
brains,  and  not  ours,  in  our  service.  We  choose  them,  or 
should  choose  them,  because  they  will  be  leagues  in  ad- 
vance of  anything  we  dream  of. 

Our  legislators  are  not  to  "  represent "  our  wishes  and 


THE   LEGISLATURE.  241 

ideas.  They  are  to  represent  us.  They  are  to  act,  for  us, 
but  on  their  own  best  judgment.  They  are  to  act,  not  on 
the  wish  of  any  one  man  or  body  of  men,  nor  for  the  in- 
terest of  any  one  man  or  body  of  men,  but  for  the  highest 
interests  of  the  whole  people. 

They  are,  for  us,  to  supervise  and  control  all  our  public 
work.  They  are,  for  us,  to  decide  what  that  work  shall  be, 
and  how  it  shall  be  done.  This  they  are  to  do  for  us,  be- 
cause, in  the  nature  of  things,  we  cannot  do  it  for  ourselves. 
And  in  that  sense  only  are  they  to  "  represent "  us. 

And  in  this  sense  only  is  "representative  government" 
a  possible  thing — that  the  people  are  themselves  to  choose 
their  servants,  instead  of  having  men  usurp  or  inherit 
power. 

And  therein  consists  free  government. 
11 


242  A  TKUE  REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  XL 

A    TRUE     REPUBLIC. 

LET  us  now  see  what  are  the  conclusions  to  which  we 
have  been  led. 

The  chief  points  which  have  been  here  maintained  are 
these — 

1.  Public  officers  must  have  only  one  kind  of  work. 
There  must  be  no  confusion  of  legislation  and  executive 

administration. 

2.  Each  officer  must  be  held  "  responsible  " — for  doing 
well  the  work  of  his  own  office. 

No  man,  then,  must  hold  office,  for  life,  or  for  any  term 
of  years  or  days,  but  only  for  so  long  as  he  does  well  the 
work  of  his  office. 

3.  Each  executive  officer  must  be  made  responsible  to 
his  immediate  superior  in  office. 

Every  head  of  an  executive  office  or  department  must, 
then,  have  the  power  of  appointing  and  removing  all  his 
subordinates  in  that  office  or  department. 

4.  There  must  be  one  Chief  Executive  at  the  head  of  the 
executive  administration,  who  must  be  held  responsible  for 
all  that  executive  administration. 

5.  That  chief  executive  must  be  responsible  directly  to 
the  supreme  assembly. 

6.  That  chief  executive  must  be  chosen  by  the  votes  of 
the  whole  people  through  the  machinery  of  an  Electoral 
College. 


A  TRUE  REPUBLIC.  243 

7.  There  must  be  some  one  power  in  the  State  which  is 
supreme  over  all  citizens  and  officers. 

8.  This  supreme  power  must  be  an  assembly,  of  a  rea- 
sonable number  of  men,  chosen  by  the  people. 

9.  This  assembly  shall  have  the  power — 

a.  To  make  all  necessary  laws. 

b.  To  raise  and  disburse  the  people's  revenues. 

c.  To  create  and  abolish  all  offices  (except  that  of  Chief 
Executive)  and  regulate  their  duties. 

d.  To  remove  all  officers. 

e.  To  appoint  no  officers. 

10.  Aside  from  this  framework  of  executive  officers,  and 
from  this  supervising  council,  is  the  judiciary — the  body  of 
men  who  dispense  justice. 

As  they  have  to  pass  on  the  acts  of  both  executive  offi- 
cers and  of  this  supervising  body,  let  them,  too,  be  elected 
by  the  people. 

Let  them,  too,  be  removable  by  the  Legislature,  as  there 
is  no  permanent  body  of  men  with  whom  that  power  of 
removal  can  be  so  well  left.  That  is  substantially  as  it 
is  now  arranged. 

This  is  the  statement  of  all  the  positions,  which  it  has 
been  attempted  to  establish  in  this  argument  by  an  exam- 
ination of  the  results  of  actual  experiments  in  government 
mechanics. 

Let  us,  then,  compare  our  system  of  government  as  it 
would  be,  when  modified  as  is  here  proposed,  with  the  pres- 
ent English  system  of  government,  and  see  what  points 
the  two  would  have  in  common,  and  what  would  be  the 
points  of  difference. 

The  points  the  two  systems  would  have  in  common 
are — 

1.  The  omnipotence  of  the  Legislative  Assembly. 


244  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

2.  The  power  in  the  Legislative  Assembly  to  summarily 
remove  the  executive. 

The  points  of  difference  are — 

1.  We  should  have  one  man  as  Chief  Executive  instead 
of  a  committee. 

2.  This  Chief  Executive  would  be  responsible,  instead  of 
his  servants. 

3.  The  Chief  Executive  would  be  chosen  by  the  people, 
instead  of  depending  on  the  contingencies  of  party  ma- 
nojuvres  in  the  Legislative  Assembly. 

4.  The  power  of  removal  would  be  restricted  by  the 
two-thirds  vote  required. 

5.  Executive  officers  would  be  chosen  for  fitness  for  ex- 
ecutive work,  and  not  for  party  considerations. 

6.  Executive  officers  would  depend  for  their  tenure  of 
office  on  doing  well  their  executive  work,  instead  of  on  the 
contingencies  of  party  in  the  Legislature. 

7.  The  Legislative  Assembly  having  nothing  to  do  with 
appointments,  the  inducements  to  intrigue  for  office  would 
be,  as  far  as  may  be,  removed,  and  the  time  and  labor  of 
its  members  would  be  given  to  their  proper  work,  the  su- 
pervision and  control  of  all  government  affairs. 

It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  the  points  the  two  systems 
would  have  in  common  are  the  ones  which  have  been  very 
generally  conceded  to  be  the  wise  points  in  the  English 
Constitution. 

The  points  of  difference  are  the  points  wherein  the  Eng- 
lish executive  administration  is,  as  has  been  argued,  essen- 
tially faulty. 

Let  us  see,  then,  what  changes  in  our  present  national 
system  of  government  will  be  made,  if  we  adopt  all  these 
proposed  modifications. 

The  changes  would  be  few  and  simple. 


A  TRUE   REPUBLIC.  245 

1.  We  abolish  the  term  system.     We  should  have  no 
man  holding  his  office  for  a  day  longer  than  he  does  his 
work  well. 

2.  We  give  to  Congress — 

a.  All  the  legislative  power. 

b.  None  of  the  appointing  power. 

c.  The  removing  power,  by  a  two-thirds  vote,  for  any 
cause  in  their  discretion. 

3.  We  give  to  the  Chief  Executive  and  his  heads  of  de- 
partments— 

a.  None  of  the  legislative  power. 

b.  Full  appointing  and  removing  power  as  to  executive 
officers. 

4.  We  have  the  Electoral  College  meet  in  one  place,  and 
make  it  the  judge  of  the  qualifications  and  elections  of  its 
own  members,  as  the  Houses  of  Congress  now  are. 

5.  In  case  of  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  President  from 
any  cause,  we  have  the  senior  head  of  department  act  as 
President  until  a  successor  is  chosen. 

That  is  the  enumeration  of  all  the  changes.  And  in 
what  do  they  consist  ?  In  only  two  points. 

1.  They  give  unity  and  simplicity  to  our  present  system. 

2.  They  provide  the  means  for  enforcing  the  responsi- 
bility of  public  officials  where  now  none  exists. 

As  to  the  first  point. 

The  Legislature  is  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  ap- 
pointment of  officials  or  with  the  details  of  administra- 
tion. That  is  to  be  left  to  the  men  in  the  executive  ad- 
ministration, the  only  ones  who  can  have  any  knowledge 
of  what  is  to  be  done.  The  Legislature  will  only  super- 
vise and  control. 

The  executive  is  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  legislation. 

Every  official  will  have  work  of  one  kind. 


246  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

As  to  the  second  point. 

Under  the  system  proposed,  there  will  be  a  means  provided 
for  enforcing  the  responsibility  of  our  public  servants. 

The  old  maxim — what  is  every  one's  business  is  no  one's 
business — furnishes  the  key  to  our  difficulty.  Under  our 
present  system,  or  lack  of  system,  we  depend  on  "  the  peo- 
ple," as  we  say,  to  enforce  the  responsibility  of  officers. 
The  result  is  that  no  one  enforces  that  responsibility.  We 
say,  we  will  all  make  it  our  business  to  follow  carefully 
what  each  one  of  our  public  servants  does.  We  cannot 
do  that.  Each  one  of  us  is  occupied  with  his  own  private 
affairs.  We  cannot  be  always  watching  our  public  ser- 
vants or  hearing  complaints  against  them.  What  we  must 
do,  then,  is  to  so  arrange  our  service  as  to  have  it  perma- 
nent, and  have  some  one  man  over  each  one  servant,  whose 
especial  duty  it  shall  be  to  enforce  the  responsibility  of 
that  servant.  Whenever  one  of  these  servants  does  a 
wrong  act  there  will  always  be  some  person  in  the  com- 
munity whom  that  wrong  act  will  hurt.  We  can  depend 
on  that  man  to  complain,  and  set  in  motion  the  machinery 
to  punish  that  wrong,  if  we  only  furnish  the  machinery, 
and  make  it  simple,  speedy,  and  vigorous.  The  man,  then, 
who  is  hurt  must  not  be  compelled  to  make  a  general  lam- 
entation to  "  the  people,"  and  ask  them  to  remember  this 
wrong  act  until  the  end  of  two  years  or  four  years,  and 
then  put  the  officer  out  of  his  office.  There  must  be  some 
one  man,  the  superior  in  office  of  the  official  who  has  done 
the  wrong,  to  whom  he  can  go  then,  to  whom  he  can  make 
his  complaint  then,  and  from  whom  he  can  get  his  redress 
then.  Appealing  to  the  people  does  no  good.  To  hear 
these  complaints,  the  people  would  have  to  organize  them- 
selves in  one  grand  court,  with  one  unending  sitting,  with 
millions  of  ears  and  brains.  Imagine  it ! 


A  TRUE   REPUBLIC.  247 

It  may  be  said  that,  under  the  present  system,  the  Pres- 
ident and  the  heads  of  departments  have  the  power  and  the 
duty  of  enforcing  this  responsibility  of  subordinates.  They 
have,  indeed,  the  duty,  but  we  destroy  their  power.  How 
can  a  President  enforce  responsibility,  when  he  must  have 
the  consent  of  some  large  body  of  men  to  a  removal  or  an 
appointment  ?  If  he  should  attempt  to  discipline  a  sub- 
ordinate, the  subordinate  knows  there  is  another  power,  a 
body  of  men,  among  whom  he  can  intrigue,  and  through 
whom  he  can  possibly  conquer  his  superior.  And  how 
can  any  officer  enforce  responsibility  who  has  only  a  short 
time  within  which  to  inform  himself  as  to  the  affairs  of 
this  great  service,  and  who  is  driven  to  combine  with  the 
very  subordinates  whom  he  should  discipline,  in  order  to 
carry  these  continual  elections  ? 

It  is  an  impossible  thing.  There  can  be  no  enforcing 
of  responsibility  under  any  such  arrangement  as  that. 

Under  the  modifications  that  I  propose,  however,  the 
plan,  and  the  whole  of  the  plan,  is  this : 

Every  official  has  work  of  only  one  kind.  For  that 
work  of  one  kind  he  will  be  held  "  responsible "  to  one 
man,  who  is,  in  his  turn,  responsible  for  enforcing  this  re- 
sponsibility to  the  one  man  above  him.  And  when  we 
reach  the  head,  he,  and  he  alone,  is  responsible  for  all  the 
men  under  him  to  the  one  supreme  body.  And  every  one 
of  these  officers  is  to  stay  in  the  service,  and  rise  in  the 
service,  so  long  as  he  does  his  work  well. 

Thereby  we  make  it  certain,  as  far  as  any  system  can 
make  it  certain,  that  each  one  of  these  officers  will  make 
the  work  of  his  office  the  one  profession  of  his  life,  that 
he  will  learn  his  work,  and  do  it,  as  men  do  in  private  af- 
fairs ;  whereas  now  we  make  it  certain  that  our  public 
servants  will  neither  know  their  work  nor  do  it.  We 


248  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

make  it  impossible  for  them  to  learn  it ;  we  make  it  cer- 
tain that  they  will  do  something  else.  At  the  end  of  a 
time  when  an  officer  might  possibly,  if  we  allowed  him  to 
do  so,  learn  something  of  the  duties  of  his  office,  we  re- 
move him,  and  put  a  new  man  in  his  place  who  is  as  de- 
void of  knowledge  as  the  one  removed  was  in  the  begin- 
ning. Is  it  strange  that  our  public  service  is  inefficient  ? 
Why  should  we  not  have  the  laws  of  human  nature  work- 
ing with  us,  to  secure  good  government,  instead  of  having 
them  all  working  against  us,  to  secure  anarchy  ?  Why 
should  we  not  have  our  public  servants  working  together 
in  harmony  to  serve  our  interests,  instead  of  prolonging 
strife  to  serve  the  interests  of  their  party  ? 

One  point  further. 

If  this  system  is  sound  and  wise  for  the  national  Gov- 
ernment, it  is  sound  and  wise  for  State  governments,  for 
our  county  and  city  and  town  governments.  They  are  all 
alike — machineries  for  doing  work. 

And  it  is  this  immense  election  machinery  which  we 
must  destroy.  And  we  must  destroy  it  everywhere. 

An  attempt  has  been  made  during  the  progress  of  this 
argument  to  anticipate  and  fairly  meet  the  objections 
which  may  be  made  to  the  plan  here  proposed.  But  there 
may  be  some  points  which  still  need  to  be  examined,  and 
as  far  as  I  can  anticipate  them,  they  will  now  be  considered. 

It  will  seem  to  some  men  that  the  plan  here  proposed 
involves  a  great  change  in  our  government  machinery. 
So  it  does.  But  we  need  a  great  change.  We  must  have 
one  of  some  kind.  The  only  question  is  what  the  change 
shall  be. 

It  may  be  said  that  this  plan  would  be  wholly  an  experi- 
ment. So  it  would  be.  So  was  the  Constitution  itself 
only  an  experiment.  So  is  every  single  new  statute. 


A  TRUE   REPUBLIC.  249 

Keeping  the  Constitution  as  it  now  is,  is  nothing  but  an 
experiment — a  new  one — for  we  shall  continue  it  under 
new  conditions.  And  the  question  is,  whether  we  will 
continue  an  experiment  which  we  know  has  failed,  or  will 
try  a  new  experiment  which  we  think  may  succeed. 

But,  above  all  things,  some  will  fear  that  the  system  here 
proposed  would  create  an  "  aristocracy,"  something  at  war 
with  the  spirit  of  republican  institutions,  and  therefore 
dangerous.  And  this  word  "  aristocracy "  will  have,  to 
some  men,  a  portentous  sound. 

Guizot  says*  the  word  "  aristocracy  "  means  "  a  govern- 
ment where  the  sovereign  power  is  centred  in  a  particu- 
lar class  of  citizens,  who  are  invested  with  that  power  as 
an  inheritance,  by  right  only  of  their  birth,  in  a  manner 
more  or  less  exclusive,  sometimes  almost  entirely  exclu- 
sive." 

It  is  not  intended  to  depend  on  this  mere  definition,  or 
on  any  mere  matter  of  words  and  terms,  to  meet  the  point 
now  under  consideration.  But,  as  it  seems  to  me,  the  dis- 
tinction made  in  the  extract  just  given  goes  to  the  root 
of  the  matter.  It  is  the  hereditary  element,  that  makes 
the  only  danger  in  any  "  aristocracy."  If  we  have  in  the 
State  a  body  of  men,  who  have  from  their  birth  been 
brought  up  in  the  idea,  not  that  they  are  public  servants 
who  owe  a  duty  to  the  people,  but  that  power  over  the 
lives  and  fortunes  of  other  men  is  theirs  of  right,  inherit- 
ed by  them  with  their  lands,  to  be  used  for  their  own  ends 
and  purposes,  there  is,  no  doubt,  always  danger,  from  such 
men,  of  tyranny  and  corruption.  But  take  an  assembly 
of  men  who  have,  for  their  honorable  lives,  been  chosen  by 
the  people  from  their  own  number  to  be  the  people's  ser- 

*  "  Origines  du  Gouvernement  Representatif,"  vol.  i.  p.  101. 
11* 


250  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

vants — with  such  an  assembly  of  such  men,  we  have  never 
seen  the  slightest  tendency  toward  anything  of  the  kind. 

We  should  have  a  chief  magistrate,  chosen  by  the  peo- 
ple. We  should  have,  over  and  above  him,  a  supreme  as- 
sembly, chosen  by  the  people.  New  men  would  be  con- 
tinually coming  into  this  assembly.  Once  in  twelve  years 
it  would  be  substantially  a  new  body.  This  supreme  as- 
sembly controls  the  revenues.  No  scheme  of  usurpation 
or  wrong  could  succeed  without  its  aid  and  assent.  And 
if  five  hundred  men,  chosen  as  these  men  would  be,  can  be 
induced  to  corruptly  aid  any  scheme  of  usurpation,  then 
we  must  use  the  remedies  against  usurpation  that  are  al- 
ways left  outside  of  the  law. 

But  that  means,  it  may  be  said,  revolution.  So  it  does. 
Revolution  is  the  only  remedy,  under  any  government, 
against  usurpation  on  the  part  of  the  rulers  of  the  State. 
But  at  this  day,  in  a  free  country,  revolution  accomplishes 
its  end  before  it  has  an  existence.  The  fear  of  it  is  all 
the  protection  needed.  Revolution  always  has  been  the 
voice  of  the  people,  of  public  opinion.  Before  the  age  of 
printing,  steam,  and  the  telegraph,  armed  insurrection  was 
the  only  way  the  people  could  make  its  voice  heard.  It 
has  now  other  methods,  less  costly  and  more  powerful. 
Revolution  by  force  of  arms  may  still  be  the  remedy  used 
by  ignorant  and  oppressed  peoples.  But  it  is  a  remedy 
that  belongs  to  the  age  when  a  people  has  not  yet  gained 
freedom  and  knowledge. 

Popular  assemblies  have  often  been  conquered,  with  the 
people,  by  usurpers.  They  have  at  times,  in  the  heat  of 
revolution,  committed  great  excesses.  They  have  not,  as 
far  as  I  am  aware,  ever  lent  themselves  knowingly  to  any 
scheme  for  destroying  the  people's  liberties. 

If  ever  there  could  have  been  danger  of  corrupt  com- 


A  TRUE   REPUBLIC.  251 

bination  on  the  part  of  a  legislative  body  of  reasonable 
numbers,  it  was  after  the  Restoration  in  the  reign  of 
Charles  II.  The  reaction  from  the  doctrines  of  the  Rev- 
olution had  brought  in  a  spirit  of  most  unreasoning  and 
subservient  loyalty  to  the  King.  Corruption  had  no 
bounds ;  and  the  House  of  Commons  was  not  an  assembly 
chosen  by  the  whole  people,  but  its  members  were  mem- 
bers of  the  landed  aristocracy,  who  had  no  sympathy  with 
anything  like  popular  government.  Yet  in  this  Parliament, 
the  longer  it  existed,  the  more  determined  was  the  opposi- 
tion to  royal  usurpation.  Mr.  Hallam  has  a  most  signifi- 
cant passage  on  this  point,  which  is  worthy  of  the  most 
careful  consideration.  He  says  :* 

"  Long  sessions,  and  a  long  continuance  of  the  same  Parliament, 
have  an  inevitable  tendency  to  generate  a  systematic  opposition  to 
the  measures  of  the  Crown,  which  it  requires  all  vigilance  and  man- 
agement to  hinder  from  becoming  too  powerful.  The  sense  of  per- 
sonal importance,  the  desire  of  occupation  in  business  (a  very  char- 
acteristic propensity  of  the  English  gentry),  the  various  inducements 
of  private  passion  and  interest,  bring  forward  so  many  active  spirits, 
that  it  was,  even  in  that  age,  as  reasonable  to  expect  that  the  ocean 
should  always  be  tranquil,  as  that  a  House  of  Commons  should  con- 
tinue long  to  do  the  King's  bidding  with  any  kind  of  unanimity  or 
submission.  Nothing  can  more  demonstrate  the  incompatibility  of 
the  Tory  system,  which  would  place  the  virtual  and  effective,  as  well 
as  nominal,  administration  of  the  executive  government  in  the  sole 
hands  of  the  Crown,  with  the  existence  of  a  representative  assembly, 
than  the  history  of  this  long  Parliament  of  Charles  II.  None  has 
ever  been  elected  hi  circumstances  so  favorable  for  the  Crown ;  none 
ever  brought  with  it  such  high  notions  of  prerogative ;  yet  in  this 
assembly  a  party  soon  grew  up  and  gained  strength  in  every  succes- 
sive year,  which  the  King  could  neither  direct  nor  subdue.  The 
methods  of  bribery  to  which  the  court  largely  had  recourse,  though 
they  certainly  diverted  some  of  the  measures  and  destroyed  the  char- 

*  Hallam's  "Const.  Hist."  vol.  ii.  p.  355. 


252  A  TKUE   REPUBLIC. 

acter  of  this  opposition,  proved  in  the  end  like  those  dangerous  med- 
icines which  palliate  the  instant  symptoms  of  a  disease  that  they 
aggravate.  The  leaders  of  this  Parliament  were,  in  general,  very, 
corrupt  men ;  but  they  knew  better  than  to  quit  the  power  which 
made  them  worth  purchase.  Thus  the  House  of  Commons  matured 
and  extended  those  rights  of  inquiring  into  and  controlling  the  man- 
agement of  public  officers,,  which  had  caused  so  much  dispute  in  for- 
mer times ;  and,  as  the  exercise  of  these  functions  became  more 
habitual,  and  passed,  with  little  or  no  open  resistance,  from  the 
Crown,  the  people  learned  to  reckon  them  unquestionable  or  even 
fundamental,  and  were  prepared  for  that  more  perfect  settlement  of 
the  Constitution  on  a  more  republican  basis,  which  took  place  after 
the  revolution." 

And  in  a  note  to  this  same  passage  is  given  the  follow- 
ing: 

"Aubrey  relates  a  saying  of  Hamilton,  just  before  the  Restoration, 
which  shows  his  sagacity :  '  Well,  the  King  will  come  in.  Let  him 
come  in,  and  call  a  parliament  of  the  greatest  cavaliers  in  England, 
so  they  be  men  of  estate,  and  let  them  sit  but  seven  years,  and  they 
mil  all  turn  CommonwealtKs  men.'1 " 

An  English  king,  with  a  parliament  made  up  of  men 
whose  thoughts  and  training  were  all  in  favor  of  kingly 
power,  and  against  what  we  call  popular  government,  was 
unable  to  crush  free  government.  That  was  two  hundred 
years  ago,  in  royal  England.  To-day,  in  republican  Amer- 
ica, we  can  safely  assume  that  a  President  of  the  United 
States  will  never  be  able  to  induce  the  representatives  of 
the  people  to  betray  their  trusts  for  the  purpose  of  aiding 
plans  of  usurpation.  That  these  men  would  set  up  a 
monarchy,  or  a  hereditary  aristocracy,  is  not  to  be  be- 
lieved. England  and  every  other  nation  in  Europe  began 
with  a  monarchy,  and  they  are  all  working  toward  repub- 
licanism. Are  we  alone  to  reverse  the  order  of  nature? 
And  what  has  made  in  Europe  the  revolution  from  mon- 


A  TRUE  REPUBLIC.  253 

archy  to  republicanism?  Nothing  but  the  advancing 
growth  of  public  opinion.  And  is  public  opinion  to  be 
powerless  with  us  alone  ?  Jefferson  said,*  "  The  spirit  of 
our  people  *  *  *  that  would  oblige  even  a  despot  to  gov- 
ern us  republicanly." 

We  may  assume,  then,  that  our  legislators  and  other 
officials  would  never  combine  to  set  up  a  king  or  any  one- 
man  power.  Their  own  interests  would  prevent  that. 
Royalty  has  always  had  to  conquer  its  power,  and  will  not 
at  this  late  day  get  it  by  popular  election. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  even  if  there  be  no  great  dan- 
ger that  the  legislators  should  give  hereditary  power  or 
excessive  power  to  a  President,  or  to  any  one  man,  they 
might  attempt  to  commit  legislative  usurpation,  to  make 
a  tyranny  by  the  Legislature  itself. 

But  what  could  they  do  ? 

Has  combination  for  the  purposes  of  usurpation  ever 
been  possible  among  more  than  two  ov  three  men  ?  And 
would  not  combination  of  any  two  or  three  men,  for  any 
purpose  of  this  kind,  be  certain  to  bring  revolution  in 
Congress  as  well  as  out  of  it  ?  Undoubtedly,  against  the 
dangers  of  possible  combination  and  usurpation  it  is  wise 
to  have  the  supreme  power,  the  control  of  the  purse,  rest 
in  the  hands  of  an  assembly  of  reasonable  numbers.  But 
so  long  as  the  control  of  the  purse  is  in  the  hands  of  a 
legislature,  combination  for  usurpation  by  any  set  of  men 
out  of  the  Legislature  is  impossible.  And  so  long  as  the 
Legislature  has  as  many  as  three  hundred  members,  com- 
bination for  usurpation  by  any  set  of  men  within  the  Leg- 
islature is  impossible. 

Let  us  not,  however,  be  afraid  of  a  mere  word.     There 

*  Jefferson's  "Writings,"  voL  vii.  p.  11. 


254  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 

undoubtedly  would  be  an  "  aristocracy,"  in  the  true  mean- 
ing of  the  word — a  "  government  by  the  best  men,"  an  ar- 
istocracy in  which  birth  without  worth  would  give  no  title, 
which  would  be  open  to  the  son  of  the  poor  man  and  the 
rich  man  alike,  to  any  man  who  proved  himself  honest  and 
able,  and  to  no  one  else.  Such  an  aristocracy  would  be 
filled  with  men  like  Washington,  Webster,  Hamilton — with 
men  who  themselves  did  the  great  deeds,  not  with  feeble 
descendants  of  great  men.  And  if  the  poorest  man  in 
America  could  command  the  services  of  the  ablest  and 
most  honest  men  in  the  country,  to  do  for  him  his  govern- 
ment work,  if,  too,  he  had  himself  the  possibility  open  to 
him  of  the  highest  career  in  the  State  for  which  he  should 
show  himself  fit,  what  more  could  he  or  would  he  ask  ? 
And  would  he  be  frightened  from  having  this  condition  of 
things  by  the  word  "aristocracy,"  or  by  any  other  word 
or  set  of  words.  From  an  "  aristocracy  "  of  that  kind  we 
should  have  little  to  fear.  It  is  the  one  thing  of  all  things 
needed  in  this  country,  and  in  every  free  country,  to  pre- 
serve free  government. 

One  further  point  is  made  very  clear  by  all  past  expe- 
rience. When  judges  in  England  were  corrupt,  it  was  the 
men  who  were  already  rich  and  powerful  who  could  buy 
decrees.  In  this  country,  when  legislators  have  been  cor- 
rupt, it  has  been  always  the  great  railroad  corporations, 
the  large  moneyed  interests,  the  men  who  were  already  rich 
and  powerful,  who  could  buy  statutes.  Such  members  of 
Congress  as  were  corrupt  gave  their  fine  words  to  the  poor, 
and  sold  their  votes  to  the  rich.  So  it  was,  too,  with  cor- 
rupt judges  in  our  courts.  The  only  protection  that  the 
poor  and  the  weak  can  ever  have  against  the  rich  and  pow- 
erful, lies,  above  all  things,  in  having  all  public  officials — 
judges,  legislators,  and  executive  —  independent,  therefore 


A  TRUE   REPUBLIC.  255 

honest  and  fearless.  Could  a  rich  man  or  a  powerful  man 
obtain  favor,  or  anything  more  than  justice,  from  Marshall, 
or  Kent,  or  Story  ?  And  as  our  judiciary  once  was,  so  ev- 
ery branch  of  our  Government  should  be,  pure.  And  so 
it  can  be.  Did  the  benches  of  our  courts  fifty  years  ago 
hold  all  the  honest  men  in  the  world  ?  But  we  know  that 
our  judges  then  were  honest. 

All  governments,  which  deserve  the  name,  have  certain 
features  in  common,  and  certain  main  points  of  difference. 

They  all  have,  under  some  name  or  form — 

1.  Judicial  officers — for  administering  justice. 

2.  Executive  officers — for  doing  government  work. 

3.  A  supreme  authority — one  man,  or  one  body  of  men 
— which  controls  and  regulates  all  officials  and  their  duties. 

We  do  not,  indeed,  in  all  governments,  find  every  official 
confined  to  one  class  of  duties,  as  he  should  be,  if  the  work 
is  to  be  well  done.  But  we  find,  in  all  governments,  these 
different  kinds  of  work. 

The  differences  between  different  forms  of  government, 
in  the  main,  concern  one  point — the  point  whether  power 
in  the  State  shall  be, 

1.  Property,  held  by  individuals,  descending  with  their 
other  property  to  their  children ;  or, 

2.  A  trust,  reposed  by  the  people  in  their  fittest  men. 
The  idea  that  power  in  the  State  is  property  is  at  the 

bottom  of  the  hereditary  system.  That  system  does  not 
rest  on  a  sound  idea,  and  whenever  any  people  has  real  life 
and  strength,  it  will  sooner  or  later  destroy  the  system  of 
inherited  power. 

If,  then,  we  hold  that  power  in  the  State  is  a  trust  to 
be  reposed  by  the  people  in  its  fittest  men,  we  must  make 
our  system  such  as  to  secure  in  the  public  service,  as  was 
stated  in  the  outset, 


256  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

1.  The  best  men. 

2.  Their  best  work. 

And  we  must  secure  the  true  substance,  not  the  false 
form  of  good  government.  If  men  try  to  persuade  us  to 
give  our  public  servants  power  only  for  two  or  four  years, 
on  the  fear  that  otherwise  we  shall  lose  our  control  over 
those  servants,  we  must  carefully  examine  whether  by  that 
system  of  terms  for  years  we  shall  not  really  lose  all  con- 
trol over  our  servants,  and  be  setting  over  ourselves  and  our 
servants  a  new  tyrant,  stronger  than  any  hereditary  tyrant 
ever  was. 

We  have  been  trying  to  do  more  than  lies  in  our  pow- 
er. We,  the  people,  if  we  assume  or  pretend  to  make  our 
own  laws,  or  to  make  for  ourselves  the  selection  of  every 
one  of  our  public  servants,  undertake  a  task  beyond  our 
strength.  We  are  then  driven  to  elections  for  one,  two, 
and  four  years.  We  make  it  certain  that  there  will  grow 
up  a  body  of  professional  traders  in  elections,  and  that 
these  traders  will,  through  their  greater  skill,  gained  by 
constant  practice,  take  this  matter  of  the  choice  of  our 
public  servants  from  us.  We  must  be  content  to  do  less 
with  our  own  hands.  We  must,  as  we  do  in  our  private 
affairs,  use  the  hands  and  brains  of  other  men,  who  can  do 
our  work  for  us  better  than  we  can  do  it  ourselves.  We 
must  choose  one  man  to  manage  all  this  vast  government 
work  for  us.  We  must  trust  him,  as  we  trust  other  men, 
as  other  men  trust  us.  We  must  give  him  the  power  to 
choose  his  subordinates  to  do  that  work,  because  we  know 
he  can  make  that  choice  better  than  we  can.  We  will 
hold  him  "  responsible  "  for  the  work  of  all  those  subordi- 
nates. Even  that  mere  holding  him  to  that  responsibility 
we  cannot  ourselves  do.  We  must  have  that  done  for  us, 
by  a  body  of  men  who  can  meet,  deliberate,  give  careful 


A  TRUE   REPUBLIC.  257 

thought  to  our  affairs,  and  have  thorough  knowledge  of 
them.  These  men  we  will  ourselves  choose  from  our- 
selves. They  shall  be  our  wisest  men,  who  have  lived 
among  us  all  their  lives — who  have  always  been  faithful 
wherever  they  have  been  tried  —  whom  we  know  to  be 
men  of  honor,  who  will  not  betray  us.  There  are  such 
men — thousands  of  them.  Those  men  we  know  we  can 
trust,  and  we  will  trust  them.  We  will  get  them  in  our 
service,  and  keep  them  there.  We  will  give  them  the 
power  that  we  cannot  use  ourselves,  for  we  know  it  will 
with  them  be  in  wiser  hands  than  our  own.  We  will 
learn  the  measure  of  our  own  strength.  We  will  not  try 
to  make  our  own  shoes,  or  our  own  laws.  We  will  have 
both  made  for  us,  by  the  best  men  we  can  find  for  either 
service. 

Then  we  shall  have  a  Government,  of  the  people  —  for 
the  people  —  by  its  wisest  men.  That  will  be  a  TRUE 
REPUBLIC. 


258  A  TRUE  REPUBLIC. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

CONCLUSION. 

THE  great  mistake  made  by  our  ancestors,  if  any  was 
made,  was  in  supposing  that  the  men  in  our  government 
service  could  not  be  trusted.  They  thought  that,  to  se- 
cure liberty,  it  was  necessary  that  no  one  man  or  body  of 
men  should  have,  either  full  power  over  one  thing,  or  any 
power  for  a  long  time.  For  that  reason  they  gave  the 
executive  a  voice  in  legislation,  and  they  gave  one  branch 
of  the  Legislature  a  voice  in  appointments  of  executive 
officers.  For  that  reason  they  made  both  executive  and 
legislative  officers  hold  only  for  short  terms  of  years. 

We  have  tried  very  thoroughly  this  plan  of  tying  the 
hands  of  our  public  servants.  It  does  not  answer  our 
needs.  If  we  expect  good  work  from  our  public  officials, 
we  must  trust  them  with  power — the  power  to  do  bad 
work  as  well  as  good.  If  our  servants  wish  to  be  corrupt, 
they  will  devise  ways  of  corruption,  no  matter  how  we  limit 
their  powers.  The  restrictions  of  Constitutions  and  statutes 
have  never  been  enough  to  keep  men  honest. 

What  we  must  depend  on  for  securing  good  and  honest 
work  is,  in  the  main,  the  character  of  the  men  we  place  in 
public  office.  We  must  also  have,  as  to  every  official,  the 
power  of  removal,  vested  in  the  hands  of  some  one  man 
or  body  of  men,  where  we  think  it  will  be  most  wisely 
used.  But  that  is  not  our  chief  dependence.  The  power 
of  removal  must  exist.  But  we  do  not  count  on  its  being 
often  used. 


CONCLUSION.  259 

In  all  our  private  affairs  we  trust  men.  Every  day  and 
every  hour  we  put  in  the  hands  of  other  men  our  lives 
and  fortunes.  We  know  we  can  do  so  safely.  We  can, 
too,  trust  our  public  servants,  if  we  only  let  our  best  men 
serve  us.  No  doubt  we  cannot  trust  our  public  affairs  in 
the  hands  of  men  who  are  selected  by  the  chance  of  birth, 
but  we  can  trust  men  who  are  chosen  for  their  honest  lives. 

In  order  to  get  those  best  men  in  our  service,  all  we 
need  is  to  have  things  free.  We  must  throw  off  the 
chains.  The  best  men  must  be  free,  to  enter  the  people's 
service.  The  people  must  be  free,  to  take  those  men  into 
their  service.  Those  men  must  be  free,  after  they  are  in 
the  service,  to  give  the  people  their  best  work.  We  must 
have  no  fetters,  of  party,  or  hereditary  power. 

This  is  no  visionary  Utopian  scheme.  The  aim  is  sim- 
ply to  have  our  government  affairs  managed  as  well  as  are 
our  private  affairs.  Why  should  they  not  be?  It  is  not 
proposed  to  try  any  new  experiments.  There  is  nothing 
new  here.  Everything  has  been  proved,  by  the  experience 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race. 

And  if  these  modifications  proposed  are  wise,  it  is  a 
perfectly  possible  thing  to  have  them  made.  The  work  of 
changing  this  Constitution  would  be  a  mere  trifle  compared 
with  the  work  of  making  it.  We  forget  how  hard  a  task 
it  was  to  form  this  Government.  All  the  prejudices,  of  all 
classes  of  men,  in  all  the  colonies,  were  in  the  beginning 
opposed  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  Madison 
wrote  to  Washington,  on  the  3d  February,  1788  :* 

"New  York,  February  3d,  1T88. 
"  To  GENERAL  WASHINGTON  : 

"  DEAR  SIR, — Another  mail  has  arrived  from  Boston  without  ter- 
minating the  conflict  between  our  hopes  and  fears.  I  have  a  letter 

*  "  Madison's  Papers,"  p.  572. 


260  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

from  Mr.  King,  of  the  27th,  which,  after  dilating  somewhat  on  the 
ideas  in  his  former  letters,  concludes  with  the  following  paragraph : 
'  We  have  avoided  every  question  which  would  have  shown  the  divis- 
ion of  the  House.  Of  consequence,  we  are  not  positive  of  the  num- 
bers on  each  side.  By  the  last  calculation  we  made  on  our  side,  we 
were  doubtful  whether  we  exceeded  them,  or  they  us,  in  numbers. 
They,  however,  say  that  they  have  a  majority  of  eight  or  twelve 
against  us.  We  by  no  means  despair.'  Another  letter  of  the  same 
date,  from  another  member,  gives  the  following  picture :  '  Never  was 
there  an  assembly  in  this  State  in  possession  of  greater  ability  and 
information  than  the  present  Convention ;  yet  I  am  in  doubt  whether 
they  will  approve  the  Constitution.  There  are,  unhappily,  three  par- 
ties opposed  to  it — first,  all  men  who  are  in  favor  of  paper  money 
and  tender  laws — these  are,  more  or  less,  in  every  part  of  the  State ; 
secondly,  all  the  late  insurgents  and  their  abettors  —  in  the  three 
great  western  counties  they  are  very  numerous ;  we  have  in  the  con- 
vention eighteen  or  twenty  who  were  actually  in  Shay's  army ;  third- 
ly, a  great  majority  of  the  members  from  the  province  of  Maine. 
Many  of  them  and  their  constituents  are  only  squatters  on  other  peo- 
ple's land,  and  they  are  afraid  of  being  brought  to  account ;  they  also 
think,  though  erroneously,  that  their  favorite  plan  of  being  a  separate 
State  will  be  defeated.  Add  to  these  the  honest  doubting  people, 
and  they  make  a  powerful  host.  *  *  *  With  all  this  ability  in  sup- 
port of  the  cause,  I  am  pretty  well  satisfied  we  shall  lose  the  question, 
unless  we  can  take  off  some  of  the  opposition  by  amendments.  I  do 
not  mean  such  as  are  to  be  made  conditions  of  the  ratification,  but 
recommendations  only.  Upon  this  plan  I  flatter  myself  we  may  pos- 
sibly get  a  majority  of  twelve  or  fifteen,  if  not  more.'  " 

All  possible  objections  were  made  against  it.  Luther 
Martin  wrote  :* 

"  Let  me  call  the  attention  of  this  House  to  the  conduct  of  Vir- 
ginia when  our  Confederation  was  entered  into.  That  State  then 
proposed  and  obstinately  contended,  contrary  to  the  sense  of  and  un- 
supported by  the  other  States,  for  an  inequality  of  suffrage  founded 
on  numbers,  or  some  such  scale,  which  should  give  her  and  certain 
other  States  influence  in  the  Union  over  the  rest.  Pursuant  to  that 

*  Elliot's  "  Debates,"  vol.  i.  p.  346. 


CONCLUSION.  261 

spirit  which  then  characterized  her,  apd  uniform  in  her  conduct,  the 
very  second  resolve  is  calculated  expressly  for  that  purpose — to  give 
her  a  representation  proportioned  to  her  numbers — as  if  the  want  of 
that  was  the  principal  defect  in  our  original  system,  and  this  altera- 
tion the  great  means  of  remedying  the  evils  we  had  experienced  un- 
der our  present  government. 

"  The  object  of  Virginia  and  other  large  States  to  increase  their  pow- 
er and  influence  over  the  others  did  not  escape  observation." 

George  Mason  wrote  :* 

"In  the  House  of  Representatives  there  is  not  the  substance,  but 
the  shadow  only,  of  representation,  which  can  never  produce  proper 
information  in  the  Legislature  or  inspire  confidence  in  the  people. 
The  laws  will,  therefore,  be  generally  made  by  men  little  concerned 
in  and  unacquainted  with  their  effects  and  consequences. 

"  The  Senate  have  the  power  of  altering  all  money  bills,  and  of 
originating  appropriations  of  money,  and  the  salaries  of  the  officers 
of  their  own  appointment,  in  conjunction  with  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  although  they  are  not  the  representatives  of  the  peo- 
ple, or  amenable  to  them.  These,  with  their  other  great  powers  (viz., 
their  powers  in  the  appointment  of  ambassadors  and  all  public  offi- 
cers, in  making  treaties,  and  in  trying  all  impeachments),  their  influ- 
ence upon  and  connection  with  the  supreme  executive  from  these 
causes,  their  duration  of  office,  and  their  being  a  constant  existing 
body,  almost  continually  sitting,  joined  with  their  being  one  complete 
branch  of  the  Legislature,  will  destroy  any  balance  in  the  Govern- 
ment, and  enable  them  to  accomplish  what  usurpations  they  please 
upon  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people. 

"  The  judiciary  of  the  United  States  is  so  constructed  and  extended 
as  to  absorb  and  destroy  the  judiciaries  of  the  several  States,  there- 
by rendering  laws  as  tedious,  intricate,  and  expensive,  and  justice  as 
unattainable,  by  a  great  part  of  the  community,  as  in  England,  and 
enabling  the  rich  to  oppress  and  ruin  the  poor.  *  *  * 

"  *  *  *  The  President  of  the  United  States  has  the  unrestrained 
power  of  granting  pardon  for  treason,  which  may  be  sometimes  ex- 
ercised to  screen  from  punishment  those  whom  he  had  secretly  insti- 
gated to  commit  the  crime,  and  thereby  prevent  a  discovery  of  his 

*  Elliot's  "  Debates,"  vol.  i.  p.  494. 


262  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

own  guilt.  By  declaring  all  treaties  supreme  laws  of  the  land,  the 
executive  and  the  Senate  have  in  many  cases  an  exclusive  power 
of  legislation,  which  might  have  been  avoided  by  proper  distinctions 
with  respect  to  treaties,  and  requiring  the  assent  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  where  it  could  be  done  with  safety.  *  *  * 

"  This  government  will  commence  in  a  moderate  aristocracy ;  it  is 
at  present  impossible  to  foresee  whether  it  will,  in  its  operation,  pro- 
duce a  monarchy  or  a  corrupt  oppressive  aristocracy;  it  will  most 
probably  vibrate  some  years  between  the  two,  and  then  terminate  in 
the  one  or  the  other." 

Gouverneur  Morris  wrote  to  Washington  :* 

"  With  respect  to  this  State,  I  am  far  from  being  decided  in  my 
opinion  that  they  will  consent.  True  it  is  that  the  city  and  its  neigh- 
borhood are  enthusiastic  in  the  cause ;  but  I  dread  the  cold  and  sour 
temper  of  the  back  counties,  and  still  more  the  wicked  industry  of 
those  who  have  long  habituated  themselves  to  live  on  the  public,  and 
cannot  bear  the  idea  of  being  removed  from  the  power  and  profit  of 
State  government,  which  has  been,  and  still  is,  the  means  of  support- 
ing themselves,  their  families,  and  dependents,  and  (which  is  per- 
haps equally  grateful)  of  depressing  and  humbling  their  political  ad- 
versaries. What  opinions  prevail  more  southward  I  cannot  guess. 
You  are  in  a  better  condition  than  any  other  person  to  judge  of  a 
great  and  important  part  of  that  country. 

"I  have  observed  that  your  name  to  the  new  Constitution  has 
been  of  infinite  service.  Indeed,  I  am  convinced  that,  if  you  had  not 
attended  that  convention,  and  the  same  paper  had  been  handed  out 
to  the  world,  it  would  have  met  with  a  colder  reception,  with  fewer 
and  weaker  advocates,  and  with  more  and  more  strenuous  opponents. 
As  it  is,  should  the  idea  prevail  that  you  will  not  accept  the  Presi- 
dency, it  would  prove  fatal  in  many  parts." 

The  Constitution  was  finally  adopted  because  the  sober 
sense  of  the  American  people  told  them  they  needed  a 
government.  It  will  be  of  service  to  see  precisely  how 
the  "  people  "  then  thought  and  felt.  I  quote  the  words 

*  Elliot's  "  Debates,"  voL  i.  p.  506. 


CONCLUSION.  263 

of  a  plain  New  England  farmer,  in  the  Massachusetts  Con- 
vention which  met  to  act  on  the  proposed  Constitution : 

"  Mr.  President,  I  am  a  plain  man,  and  get  my  living  by  the  plough. 
1  am  not  used  to  speak  in  public,  but  I  beg  your  leave  to  say  a  few 
words  to  my  brother  plough- joggers  in  this  House.  I  have  lived  in  a 
part  of  the  country  where  I  have  known  the  worth  of  good  govern- 
ment by  the  want  of 'it.  There  was  a  black  cloud  that  rose  in  the 
east  last  winter,  and  spread  over  the  west.  [Here  Mr.  Widgery  in- 
terrupted :  Mr.  President,  I  wish  to  know  what  the  gentleman  means 
by  the  east.]  I  mean,  sir,  the  county  of  Bristol ;  the  cloud  rose  there, 
and  burst  upon  us,  and 'produced  a  dreadful  effect.  It  brought  on  a 
state  of  anarchy,  and  that  led  to  tyranny.  I  say,  it  brought  anarchy. 
People  that  used  to  live  peaceably,  and  were  before  good  neighbors, 
got* distracted,  and  took  up  arms  against  government.  [Here  Mr. 
Kingsley  called  to  order,  and  asked  what  had  the  history  of  last  win- 
ter to  do  with  the  Constitution.  Several  gentlemen,  and  among  the 
rest  the  Hon.  Mr.  Adams,  said  the  gentleman  was  in  order — let  him 
go  on  in  his  own  way.]  I  am  going,  Mr.  President,  to  show  you,  my 
brother  farmers,  what  were  the  effects  of  anarchy,  that  you  may  see 
the  reasons  why  I  wish  for  good  government.  People,  I  say,  took 
up  arms ;  and  then,  if  you  went  to  speak  to  them,  you  had  the  mus- 
ket of  death  presented  to  your  breast.  They  would  rob  you  of  your 
property ;  threaten  to  burn  your  houses ;  oblige  you  to  be  on  your 
guard  night  and  day ,  alarms  spread  from  town  to  town ;  families 
were  broken  up ;  the  tender  mother  would  cry, '  Oh,  my  son  is  among 
them !  What  shall  I  do  for  my  child  ?'  Some  were  taken  captive, 
children  taken  out  of  their  schools,  and  carried  away.  Then  we 
should  hear  of  an  action,  and  the  poor  prisoners  were  set  in  the 
front,  to  be  killed  by  their  own  friends.  How  dreadful,  how  distress- 
ing, was  this !  Our  distress  was  so  great  that  we  should  have  been 
glad  to  snatch  at  anything  that  looked  like  a  government.  Had 
any  person  that  was  able  to  protect  us  come  and  set  up  his  stand- 
ard, we  should  all  have  flocked  to  it,  even  if  it  had  been  a  monarch ; 
and  that  monarch  might  have  proved  a  tyrant ;  so  that  you  see  that 
anarchy  leads  to  tyranny,  and  better  have  one  tyrant  than  so  many 
at  once. 

"Now,  Mr.  President,  when  I  saw  this  Constitution  I  found  that  it 
was  a  cure  for  these  disorders.  It  was  just  such  a  thing  as  we  want- 


264  A  TRUE   REPUBLIC. 

ed.  I  got  a  copy  of  it,  and  read  it  over  and  over.  I  had  been  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Convention  to  form  our  own  State  Constitution,  and  had 
leafned  something  of  the  checks  and  balances  of  power,  and  I  found 
them  all  here.  I  did  not  go  to  any  lawyer  to  ask  his  opinion;  we 
have  no  lawyer  in  our  town,  and  we  do  well  enough  without.  I 
formed  my  own  opinion,  and  was  pleased  with  this  Constitution.  My 
honorable  old  daddy  there  [pointing  to  Mr.  Singletary]  won't  think 
that  I  expect  to  be  a  Congressman,  and  swallow  up  the  liberties  of  the 
people.  I  never  had  any  post,  nor  do  I  want  one.  But  I  don't  think 
the  worse  of  the  Constitution  because  lawyers,  and  men  of  learning, 
and  moneyed  men  are  fond  of  it.  I  don't  suspect  that  they  want  to 
get  into  Congress  and  abuse  their  power.  I  am  not  of  such  a  jealous 
make.  They  that  are  honest  men  themselves  are  not  apt  to  suspect 
other  people.  I  don't  know  why  our  constituents  have  not  a  good 
right  to  be  as  jealous  of  us  as  we  seem  to  be  of  the  Congress ;  and  I 
think  those  gentlemen,  who  are  so  very  suspicious  that  as  soon  as  a 
man  gets  into  power  he  turns  rogue,  had  better  look  at  home. 

"We  are,  by  this  Constitution,  allowed  to  send  ten  members  to 
Congress.  Have  we  not  more  than  that  number  fit  to  go  ?  I  dare 
say  if  we  pick  out  ten  we  shall  have  another  ten  left,  and  I  hope  ten 
times  ten ;  and  will  not  these  be  a  check  upon  those  that  go  ?  Will 
they  go  to  Congress,  and  abuse  their  power  and  do  mischief,  when 
they  know  they  must  return  and  look  the  other  ten  in  the  face  and 
be  called  to  account  for  their  conduct  ?  Some  gentlemen  think  that 
our  liberty  and  property  are  not  safe  in  the  hands  of  moneyed  men 
and  men  of  learning.  I  am  not  of  that  mind. 

"Brother  farmers,  let  us  suppose  a  case  now:  Suppose  you  had  a 
farm  of  fifty  acres,  and  your  title  was  disputed,  and  there  was  a  farm 
of  five  thousand  acres  joined  to  you  that  belonged  to  a  man  of  learn- 
ing, and  his  title  was  involved  in  the  same  difficulty,  would  you  not 
be  glad  to  have  him  for  your  friend,  rather  than  to  stand  alone  in 
the  dispute  ?  Well,  the  case  is  the  same.  These  lawyers,  these 
moneyed  men,  these  men  of  learning,  are  all  embarked  in  the  same 
cause  with  us,  and  we  must  all  swim  or  sink  together ;  and  shall  we 
throw  the  Constitution  overboard  because  it  does  not  please  us  alike  ? 
Suppose  two  or  three  of  you  had  been  at  the  pains  to  break  up  a 
piece  of  rough  land  and  sow  it  with  wheat ;  would  you  let  it  lie  waste 
because  you  could  not  agree  what  sort  of  a  fence  to  make  ?  Would 
it  not  be  better  to  put  up  a  fence  that  did  not  please  every  one's  fan- 


CONCLUSION.  265 

cy,  rather  than  not  fence  it  at  all,  or  keep  disputing  about  it  until  the 
wild  beasts  came  in  and  devoured  it  ?  Some  gentlemen  say,  Don't 
be  in  a  hurry ;  take  time  to  consider,  and  don't  take  a  leap  in  the 
dark.  I  say,  Take  things  in  time ;  gather  fruit  when  it  is  ripe.  There 
is  a  time  to  sow  and  a  time  to  reap.  We  sowed  our  seed  when  we 
sent  men  to  the  Federal  Convention ;  now  is  the  harvest,  now  is  the 
time  to  reap  the  fruit  of  our  labor ;  and  if  we  won't  do  it  now,  I  am 
afraid  we  never  shall  have  another  opportunity." 

There  are  men  now  in  the  United  States,  very  many  of 
them,  like  the  farmer  in  the  Massachusetts  Convention 
— men  whom  we  do  not  call  "  educated,"  but  who  under- 
stand the  problems  of  political  science  as  well  as  many  of 
those  who  have  more  to  do  with  books.  These  matters 
here  discussed  are  matters  of  importance,  but  they  are  easi- 
ly within  the  understanding  of  ordinary  men.  Whether  we 
will  have  our  executive  affairs  managed  by  one  man,  who 
is  held  responsible  for  doing  his  work,  or  by  a  commit- 
tee of  party  men  who  are  held  responsible  for  controlling 
votes  in  a  legislature,  is  a  very  simple  matter.  Whether 
it  is  wiser  to  have  the  man  who  commands  our  armies 
removed  at  once  if  he  fails  to  give  us  good  work,  or  to 
have  him  keep  his  office  for  two  or  three  years  longer — 
any  one  can  understand  such  a  question  as  that. 

If  these  views  are  sound,  men  will  be  convinced  by  them. 
If  they  are  not  sound,  no  one  will  heed  them. 

That  is  the  only  question  we  have  to  examine — whether 
these  views  here  urged  are  sound.  If  they  are,  the  people 
will  put  them  into  practice. 

12 


APPENDIX. 


WHILE  this  book  is  going  through  the  press,  I  find  the  lat- 
est evidence  as  to  the  condition  of  English  army  administra- 
tion. 

The  following  extract  is  from  a  letter  printed  in  the  London 
Times  of  30th  June,  1879.  Apparently  the  writer  of  the  letter 
is  possessed  of  accurate  information  on  the  matters  of  which 
he  speaks.  And  it  is  well  understood  that  the  Times,  like  oth- 
er reputable  journals,  does  not  print  statements  of  this  kind 
•without  first  being  satisfied  as  to  the  character  of  the  writer 
and  the  correctness  of  what  he  writes. 

"THE  STATE  OF  THE  ARMY. 
(From  a  Military  Correspondent.) 

"Exception  may  be  taken  to  the  assertion  that  the  army 
is  in  a  state  of  collapse,  but  the  following  facts  clearly  prove 
that  the  term  is  no  exaggeration.  On  the  1st  of  this  month 
the  total  number  of  soldiers  above  three  months'  service  in 
the  fifty-five  battalions  of  the  Line  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  Ireland  amounted  to  21,9f>0.  The  eighteen  battalions  of 
the  Line  which  stand  first  on  the  roster  for  foreign  service,  and 
which  would  naturally  form  the  First  Army  Corps  in  the  event 
of  war,  number  but  10,421  men,  and  of  these  6082  are  under 
two  years'  service.  These  battalions  are  2413  beneath  their 
peace  complement,  one,  the  Ninety-fifth  Foot,  being  367  below 
its  proper  strength.  Thus,  to  bring  the  First  Army  Corps  up 
to  a  war  footing,  it  would  require  9579  transfers.  Even  the 
five  battalions  at  the  head  of  the  roll  for  active  service  are 
889  under  their  peace  establishment ;  but  to  bring  them  to  the 
usual  war  strength  of  1000  bayonets,  3000  volunteers  would 
have  to  be  called  for.  The  five  battalions  which  recently  em- 


268  APPENDIX. 

barked  for  South  Africa  were  not  selected  on  account  of  their 
nufituess  for  active  service;  on  the  contrary,  they  were  high 
on  the  roster  for  foreign  duty,  arid  presumably  were  in  a  fit 
condition  to  embark  ;  yet,  owing  to  one  cause  or  another,  vp- 
icards  of  1000  men  from  these  five  battalions  were  rejected  on  the  reg- 
iments being  detailed  for  embarkation.  We  may  assume  that  the  rest 
of  the  army  is  in  a  like  condition.  Consequently,  deducting  200 
men  from  each  corps  as  unfit,  we  find  that  there  are  but  11,000 
efficient  soldiers  of  over  three  mouths'  service  in  the  infantry 
of  the  Line.  It  will  be  said  that  we  have  our  Keserves, 
and  that,  according  to  the  opinion  of  the  Lord  Chancellor, 
these  men  are  permitted  to  volunteer.  True,  but  the  Army 
Reserve  numbers  but  16,949  men ;  and  the  Militia  Reserve,  the 
members  of  which  are  scarcely  in  a  condition  to  take  their 
place  in  the  ranks,  amount  to  22,214.  Deducting  three  per 
cent,  for  absentees,  this  gives  us  something  short  of  50,000  men 
as  the  total  available  strength  of  the  infantry  of  the  Line  in 
the  United  Kingdom.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  there  is 
not  a  single  battalion  now  at  home,  if  we  except  the  Twenty-eighth, 
which  has  just  returned  from  the  Straits  Settlements,  which  is  in  a  fit 
state  to  take  the  field.  Of  the  battalions  first  on  the  roster  for 
foreign  service,  which  would  in  any  emergency  naturally  form 
the  First  Army  Corps,  and  which  would  prior  to  embarkation 
require  to  be  completed  to  a  strength  of  1000  non-commission- 
ed officers  and  men,  six  do  not  muster  400  each.  I  take  them 
as  they  stand  on  the  roster — the  Ninety-fifth  is  now  363  strong ; 
the  Seventy-fifth,  369 ;  the  Forty-ninth,  322 ;  the  Thirty-eighth, 
303;  and  the  Thirty-first,  376.  Among  the  twenty-one  battal- 
ions composing  the  Second  Army  Corps — that  is,  taking  them 
on  the  roster  for  foreign  service — fifteen  are  under  400  strong, 
while  there  are  five  corps — the  First  Battalion  Ninth,  the  For- 
ty-fifth, the  Seventy -sixth,  the  Seventy -seventh,  and  the 
Eighty-seventh — which  do  not  number  300  men.  These  fig- 
ures represent  all  men  over  three  months'  service,  and  include 
many  who  are  medically  unfit  or  who  are  but  partially  train- 
ed, so  that  they  would  be  considerably  reduced  before  the  reg- 
iments could  be  termed  efficient.  The  Fifty-second  Light  lu- 
fantry,  one  of  the  strongest  regiments  in  England,  musters  but 
568  men,  whereas  its  authorized  strength  is  laid  down  at  720. 
If  these  numbers  represented  efficients,  or  men  who  were  likely 
to  remain  with  the  colors,  the  matter  would  be  different;  but 
periodical  calls  are  made  on  regiments  for  volunteers,  and  the 
best  and  smartest  men  leave  in  the  hope  of  seeing  some  active 
service.  Colonels  and  captains  complain,  and  with  sonic  show 
of  reason,  that  they  caiiuot  take  any  interest  in  their  men, 


APPENDIX.  269 

when  they  know  that  in  all  probability  they  -will  only  be  as- 
sociated with  them  for  a  few  mouths.  To  show  how  injurious 
this  system  of  volunteering  is,  and  how  regiments  are  reduced 
to  mere  skeletons,  I  may  take  the  Second  Battalion  of  the 
Twentieth  Foot  as  a  case  in  point.  During  the  last  twelve 
months  the  "Mindens"  have  given  253  volunteers,  and  have 
received  322  recruits.  At  the  present  moment  the  corps,  after 
deducting  one  company  under  musketry  instruction,  and  the 
usual  officers'  servants  and  baud,  can  muster  only  sixty  men 
for  parade  and  guard  duties.  The  other  regiments  at  Dev- 
ouport  are  equally  weak.  The  Thirty  -  seventh  Foot  in  the 
past  year  has  given  270  men  as  volunteers,  and  now  barely 
musters  100  men  fit  for  duty.  The  Second  Battalion  Fifth 
Fusiliers,  the  first  corps  for  foreign  service,  has  186  recruits  in 
its  ranks,  and  during  the  last  six  months  has  given  352  volun- 
teers. The  Sixty-ninth  is  in  a  similar  condition.  In  point  of 
fact,  a  very  large  proportion  of  regiments  now  at  home  cannot 
parade  300  strong. 

"It  is  not  only  in  point  of  numbers  that  regiments  are  practically 
inefficient,  but  also  in  discipline.  It  is  well  known  that  non-com- 
missioned officers  are  the  backbone  of  an  army ;  they  give  the 
tone  to  the  rank  and  file,  and  in  quarters  and  on  service  they 
impart  steadiness  to  the  corps.  With  good  non-commissioned 
officers  a  colonel  may  take  his  battalion  anywhere,  may  do 
anything;  with  bad  non-commissioned  officers  the  battalion 
is  like  machinery  without  steam — it  has  no  motive  power. 
The  one  great  cry  throughout  the  service  is  the  want  of  non- 
commissioned officers.  Owing  to  the  short -service  system, 
smart  young  fellows  are  passed  rapidly  through  the  ranks  and 
promoted,  in  the  hope  that  they  will  turn  out  well.  Often, 
too  often,  they  are  quite  untried  men — men  with  little  self- 
restraint,  and  with  but  a  slight  knowledge  of  the  real  mean- 
ing of  the  word  discipline.  Instead  of  bearing  with  the  hasty 
recruit,  and  by  their  example  teaching  him  true  soldierly  in- 
stincts, they  needlessly  harass  the  men,  and  petty  acts  of  in- 
subordination are  the  result.  His  Royal  Highness  the  Field- 
Marshal  Commauding-in-Chief  has  on  more  than  one  recent 
occasion  alluded  to  the  great  difficulty  of  obtaining  good  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  to  the  pernicious  effect  bad  men 
have  on  the  discipline  of  a  regiment.  Insubordination  in- 
creases, courts-martial  are  of  common  occurrence,  and  a  gen- 
eral tone  of  uuhappiness  pervades  a  corps  thus  cursed.  In  one 
regiment  that  embarked  for  South  Africa  there  were  no  fewer 
than  thirty-two  men  in  prison,  in  two  others  fifteen  ;  another 
corps,  now  at  home,  which  a  few  years  ago  stood  almost  un- 


270  APPENDIX. 

equalled  for  the  absence  of  crime,  has  Lad  during  the  last 
twelve  months  twenty-seven  courts-martial,  and  five  sergeants 
in  a  few  weeks  have  been  reduced  for  drunkenness  on  duty — 
in  olden  days  an  almost  unheard-of  offence. 

"  It  is  clear,  from  a  perusal  of  these  facts,  that  the  present 
short-service  system  needs  some  modification;  it  is  equally 
clear  that  there  is  something  radically  faulty  in  the  admin- 
istration of  it.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  we  should  have 
a  large  and  ever-increasing  reserve,  wherewith  to  increase  our 
battalions  in  time  of  danger  to  a  -war  footing  ;  but  it  is  none 
the  less  necessary  that  we  should  retain  in  the  ranks  a  goodly 
quota  of  old  soldiers,  to  give  steadiness  to  the  now  largely  in- 
creased proportion  of  young  men.  It  is  evident,  too,  that  in- 
ducements must  be  held  out  for  well-educated  men  of  sterling 
character  to  accept  and  retain  non-commissioned  rank.  Vol- 
unteering from  one  regiment  to  another  should  be  most  spar- 
ingly permitted ;  it  is  subversive  of  discipline,  and  opposed  not 
only  to  the  traditions  of  the  British  Army  but  to  the  dicta  of 
all  our  best  generals.  Lord  Clyde  expressed  himself  in  his 
usual  forcible  way  on  the  subject,  and  a  very  able  memoran- 
dum of  his  is  still  extant  in  which  he  unhesitatingly  condemns 
it.  When  a  regiment  uears  the  top  of  the  roster  for  foreign 
service  it  should  be  recruited  to  its  full  strength;  and  should 
it  suddenly  be  required  to  embark  on  war  service,  its  own  re- 
serve men  should  be  drafted  into  it.  By  this  means  esprit  de 
cwps  would  be  retained  and  regimental  traditions  remain  un- 
shaken. It  is  impossible  that  the  men  of  the  Ninety -first 
Highlanders  can  retain  much  of  their  old  spirit  when  we  rec- 
ollect that  374  volunteers  from  all  parts  of  the  kingdom  were 
poured  into  the  corps  within  a  day  or  two  of  its  embarkation 
for  South  Africa.  It  is  scarcely  to  be  wondered  at  that  com- 
plaints should  reach  home  of  the  slackness  of  discipline  of  regi- 
ments or  of  the  frequency  of  severe  punishments.  Officers 
cannot  know  their  men ;  men  can  have  no  confidence  in  offi- 
cers who  are  unknown  to  them.  Even  comradeships  among 
each  other  have  to  be  formed.  Until  officers,  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  and  men  form  one  homogeneous  mass,  a  regi- 
ment can  never  be  called  a  fighting  unit. 

"  It  is  as  easy  to  point  out  the  failures  in  administering  the 
system  as  it  is  the  blots  in  the  system  itself.  It  appears  by 
the  Parliamentary  return  showing  the  condition  of  the  regi- 
ments embarking  for  South  Africa,  issued  last  March,  that  in 
five  battalions  there  were  no  less  than  211  men  medically  un- 
fit. It  would  be  interesting  to  learn  whether  these  were  prin- 
cipally old  soldiers  or  recruits.  If  the  latter,  there  must  be 


APPENDIX.  271 

something  radically  defective  in  our  system  of  medical  iuspec- 
tioii  and  in  our  system  of  reports;  if  old  soldiers,  the  question 
arises, Why  were  they  not  got  rid  of  before?  Then,  again, 
there  ivere  623  men  nnexercised  in  musketry — that  is  to  my,  men  tvho 
had  never  fired  a  ball-cartridge  even  at  a  target ;  and  that  this  is  no 
exceptional  circumstance  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  your 
correspondent  with  Brigadier-General  Wood's  column,  in  a  re- 
cent letter,  reported  that  a  draft  reached  the  Ninetieth  Light 
Infantry  just  prior  to  the  battle  of  Kambula,  and  that  upwards 
of  100  men  composing  it  were  nnexercised  in  musketry.  Can 
•we  expect  steadiness  under  fire  from  raw  recruits  like  these  ?" 

The  difficulty  is  in  the  system.  The  War-office  has  no  one 
responsible  head  who  gives  his  whole  time  to  its  affairs.  It  is 
managed  by  a  party  man,  who  does  his  main  work  in  Parlia- 
ment, who  has  no  training  for  his  place. 

What  can  be  expected  from  an  Administration  where  the 
Commissariat  is  attached  to  the  Treasury  ?  It  was  so  during 
the  Crimean.  War ;  I  do  not  know  if  it  is  still  so. 


THE    END. 


EDITED  BY  JOHN  MORLEY. 


These  short  Books  are  addressed  to  the  general  public,  with  a  view  both 
to  stirring  and  satisfying  an  interest  in  literature  and  its  great  topics  in  the 
minds  of  those  who  have  to  run  as  they  read.  An  immense  class  is  growing 
np,  and  must  every  year  increase,  whose  education  will  have  made  them 
alive  to  the  importance  of  the  masters  of  our  literature,  and  capable  of  in- 
telligent curiosity  as  to  their  performances.  The  series  is  intended  to  give 
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HUME Professor  HUXLEY. 

GOLDSMITH WILLIAM  BLACK. 

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Bv  JOHN  RICHARD  GREEN,  M.A., 

AUTHOR  OF  "A  SIIOKT  HISTORY  or  THE  ENGLISH  PEOPLE,"  "STBAY  STUDIES 
FROM  ENGLAND  AND  ITALY." 


Iii  Five  Volumes.     8vo,  Cloth,  $2  50  per  volume. 

Volumes  I.,  II.,  and  III,  now  ready. 


Mr.  Green  has  done  a  work  which  probably  no  one  bnt  himself  could 
have  done.  He  has  read  and  assimilated  the  results  of  all  the  labors  of 
students  during  the  last  half  century  in  the  field  of  English  history,  and  has 
given  them  a  fresh  meaning  by  his  own  independent  study.  He  has  fused 
together  by  the  force  of  sympathetic  imagination  all  that  he  has  so  collected, 
and  has  given  us  a  vivid  and  forcible  sketch  of  the  march  of  English  history- 
His  book,  both  in  its  aims  and  in  its  accomplishment,  rises  far  beyond  any 
of  a  similar  kind,  and  it  will  give  the  coloring  to  the  popular  view  of  English 
history  for  some  time  to  come. — Examiner,  London. 

Mr.  Green  nowhere  writes  anything  to  fill  space ;  he  never  multiplies 
words ;  he  uses  every  line  of  the  added  spaee  for  the  presentation  of  matters 
that  greatly  need  to  be  inciuded ;  he  has  packed  every  inch  full,  and  the 
larger  work  impresses  the  reader  as  still  singularly  compact  and  free  from 
prolixity.  It  is  still,  in  its  expanded  form,  a  model  of  conciseness,  direct- 
ness, and  simplicity.— If.  Y.  Evening  Post. 

To  speak  of  Mr.  Green's  merits  as  a  historian  is  by  this  time  a  work  of 
supererogation.  They  have  already  been  amply  recognized  in  all  quarters. 
— Saturday  Review,  London. 

Although  we  have  a  multitude  of  English  histories,  we  have  hitherto  had 
no  adequate  history  of  England.  Of  course,  there  have  been  summaries 
and  compends;  but  none  that  wns  at  once  broad,  comprehensive,  phil- 
osophical, and  complete.  *  *  *  Mr.  Green's  descriptions  of  battles  are  very 
brief;  his  accounts  of  the  great  movements  which  have  left  their  impress  on 
all  subsequent  time  are  full.  He  is  more  concerned  to  trace  the  progress 
of  the  nation  than  to  give  an  account  of  the  prowess  of  single  individuals. 
He  is  a  man  of  liberal  ideas  and  of  a  progressive  spirit,  but  writes  with 
singular  impartiality — Chrittian  Union,  N.  Y. 


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